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Abstract 
Major defence projects have a reputation of cost increases, time delays and in some cases 
not meeting user requirements. The aim of this study was to discover the factors which 
create the difficulties in UK defence acquisition projects. The dataset used in this research 
are seventeen, National Audit Office: Value for Money reports of major defence projects. 
Qualitative Software NVivo 8 was used to organise passages from the reports into 
categories of factors representing the defence acquisition process. A content analysis 
method was applied to the categories in order to highlight their quantitative and 
qualitative significance. A Transaction Cost Economics approach was taken to formulate 
the research propositions, which were tested using the qualitative content analysis. 
 
The fundamental transformation in defence procurement leads to post-contract asset 
specificity. There is a lack of substitute suppliers in defence procurement due to the high 
switching costs. There are three reasons given for this development in defence: (1) a 
legacy of the privatisation policy in the defence industry; (2) ownership transfers of 
specialised assets under the prime contracting approach and; (3) the transaction-specific 
investments by the MoD. The prime is able to take advantage of transaction-specific and 
relation-specific investments in the transaction for future contract tenders, due to the 
pre-contract asset specificity which results. This sequence of events is identified as the 
cause of the bilateral dependency condition in defence acquisition. 
 
Uncertainty and asset specificity, to a lesser extent, were identified as the major causes of 
transaction-costs in defence acquisition. These transaction-costs were given as the causes 
of failures in meeting the value for money criteria of defence projects. The MoD has 
responded, in recent time, to project failure through a governance trade-off from a 
traditional market-based transaction towards a bilateral governance approach. A focus of 
this bilateral governance approach is the application of Smart Acquisition principles and 
the IPT mechanism (joint MoD-Industry teams). In order to strengthen and support the IPT 
mechanism it is argued that a relational contracting approach should be taken. Traditional 
contracting approaches weaken the joint team working, whereas relational contracting 
applies partnership principles of better communication, cooperation and collaboration. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will introduce two of the most important areas of this research, the research 
outline and research focus. The research outline will discuss the background to the 
research, the purpose of the research and the objectives to be met. The research focus 
will highlight two critical parts of the research. The first being the research questions and 
propositions, which will drive the analysis of the research findings, and the second is the 
contribution being made to practice and knowledge.  
 
The research background will address the original purpose of this study, which later had 
to be changed due to organisational changes. The research was to be focused on primary 
investigation; this however had to be changed when access to primary data became 
limited. Therefore a change in the agenda of the research developed, which will be 
presented in the following sections.  
 
In the research purpose I will discuss the need to understand UK defence acquisition as 
one of the most important areas of the State. In the last decade UK defence acquisition 
has gone through a number of transformations and with the election of a new coalition 
government it is one of the priority departments set for changes. These transformations 
and changes have put a spotlight on the UK defence acquisition process, which has been 
intensified by the economic difficulties the UK has recently entered.  
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The objective of this research is to highlight the challenges the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
is faced with when undertaking defence projects. To meet this objective the research will 
review three areas: UK Defence Acquisition, Defence Economics and National Audit Office 
(NAO) publications. I will explain further how these three areas allow me to meet the 
research objective. 
 
Research questions and propositions will be outlined in this chapter. The research 
questions look at the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) perspective of defence 
acquisition; they attempt to understand defence by applying a TCE lens. The propositions 
follow-on from the research questions, they are the proposed outcomes in defence when 
assessing the effects of transaction costs in defence. The research questions and 
propositions are to be addressed in greater detail in the analysis of the data. However, 
they are presented and explained in this chapter to provide the focus for the thesis. 
  
The contribution to knowledge in this research is two fold. Firstly, this research provides a 
structured systematic analysis of NAO reports. Secondly, the research provides new 
insight by applying a TCE lens to defence acquisition using the dataset. These two 
contributions provide a practical and theoretical application to knowledge in the field of 
defence economics.  
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1.2 Research Outline 
1.2.1 Background 
This doctoral research finds its origins within a major collaborative programme involving 
ten leading universities in the UK funded through a joint venture by EPSRC and BAE 
Systems. The programme was entitled Network Enabled Capabilities through Innovative 
Systems Engineering (NECTISE). This doctoral research was initiated in the second year of 
the NECTISE programme.  
 
The purpose of NECTISE was to research the implementation of a new defence capability 
Network Enabled Capability (NEC), to be briefly explained in section 2.4.1. The 
introduction of NEC by MoD created a number of research questions in through-life 
management, decision support, architecture for networks and, control and monitoring for 
systems of systems. 
  
It was a joint academic-industry research programme in which regular meetings took 
place to discuss ideas. Academics at all levels were involved, from Academic Leads at the 
professorial level, Research Assistants and a handful of doctoral student, and were joined 
by engineers and management from industrial collaborators. 
 
The original research programme of this thesis was based in the through-life management 
strand. The focus was on the acquisition challenges faced by industry in the NEC 
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environment. The objective of the research was to develop new modes of collaborative 
working between the MoD as client and BAE Systems as a prime contractor, which 
support the evolutionary nature of NEC.  
 
The research method was based on investigating a conceptual framework for long-term 
collaborative working by applying TCE theory. This would be achieved by conducting 
interviews with key members of an Integrated Project Team (IPT), a concept to be 
discussed in section 2.3. These interviews were to be supported by the inspection of 
documentary data. Further to this an organisational scenario model was to be developed 
of the acquisition environment for NEC with IPT team members from MoD and BAE 
Systems.  
 
This ambitious research programme was supported by the NECTISE organisation. Access 
was to be readily available due to the sponsorship of BAE Systems. The early stages 
provided promising access to engineers and management of BAE Systems in workshops, 
seminars and conferences. The research plan was first to familiarise with the concepts of 
TCE, Defence Acquisition and NEC. The latter proved to be the most challenging since it 
seemed there were confusions within the academic, industry and MoD communities as to 
what NEC actually stood for.  
 
The difficulties in the research programme arrived in the second year of the doctoral 
research and the third year of the NECTISE programme. The third year of NECTISE 
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heralded the mid-term review, in January 2009, which took place at the lead university 
campus, Loughborough University. The NECTISE researchers, specifically the research 
assistants and doctoral students, were tasked with providing posters of their research. I 
presented a poster of the early stages of my doctoral research (Appendix 2).  
 
A panel made up of the sponsors toured the large hall quizzing researchers on the value of 
their research in order to decide whether to continue the programme into the major 
demonstration phase. The decision was announced by the Technical Director of the 
NECTISE programme, Prof. Michael Henshaw in April 2009. The decision was taken to stop 
the NECTISE programme. While a reason was not given for this decision, it is thought that 
this was due to a lack of value added to BAE Systems from the system engineers in 
academia.  
 
The doctoral research suffered significantly from this development in NECTISE due to the 
issue of access becoming less forthcoming. The impetus given to collaborate with 
academia from NECTISE had suddenly broken down and the question of access became a 
major difficulty to the doctoral research. The ambitious doctoral programme became less 
realistic without the backing of BAE Systems.  
 
Attempts were made to open up new avenues for the doctoral research. My supervisor 
attempted to gain access to a subsidiary of BAE System, Insyte, in which a meeting was set 
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up in order to discuss a possible area of research. This meeting while at first proving to be 
promising, faltered for reasons unknown when contact became difficult.   
 
It was clear that the original research was going to be difficult to reinitiate without 
support. Therefore a revised doctoral research which required less access and relied on 
secondary data was designed. The idea for the new doctoral research was based on work 
done by Dalton (2007). The revised doctoral research is discussed further below.  
 
However, the original research was not completely lost. The NECTISE research team at 
Manchester Business School, Academic Lead Prof. Graham Winch, Research Assistant Dr. 
Eunice Maytorena, my co-supervisor Dr. David Lowe and I, collaborated in a paper, which I 
presented at the Sixth Annual Research Symposium at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The paper discusses the defence acquisition process for NEC using a 
transaction cost approach. The paper provides a conceptual framework which develops 
the structures and actions of an Advanced Military Vehicle IPT.  
 
1.2.2 Purpose 
The revised doctoral research aims to provide an analysis of the defence acquisition 
process using secondary sources in the form of Value for Money (VfM) reports on defence 
projects. The idea for this methodology comes from Dalton (2007) doctoral thesis, in 
which she applies a textual analysis of VfM reports in transport infrastructure, public 
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service buildings and government accommodation projects. While the same methodology 
is applied to Dalton (2007), the analysis in this doctoral research looks to apply a TCE lens 
to the textual and content analysis of defence VfM reports.  
 
The purpose of this research is to understand the defence acquisition process within the 
UK context. The focus is on the transactions involved in the acquisition of the defence 
equipment or service, which is undertaken on a project basis. A defence project can vary 
in physical, monetary and temporal size. The interest is in looking at the transaction 
involved in major projects which are in excess of tens of millions of pounds and can take 
several decades reach their in-service phase. 
 
In understanding the acquisition of these major defence projects the focus shall be on the 
transactions involved between the MoD and the prime contractor. The difficulties in 
defence transactions have been generally documented. However, the more intrinsic 
nature of the problems in defence acquisition has not been discussed at length.  
 
This may be due to the fact that the focus has not been on the transaction costs involved 
in defence acquisition. This research is to highlight the major factors contributing to the 
high cost, lengthy and poor performance projects which have come to characterise 
defence projects and apply a transaction cost approach to the findings.  
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The reason for using TCE as the theoretical basis for defence acquisition is based on the 
focus of the theory on the exchange relationship between the buyer and the seller. This 
focus is congruent to the research purpose and provides the best basis for the research, as 
will be explained further in Chapter 3.   
 
The MoD has attempted to make a number of changes to the way it acquires its defence 
projects over the years. It has changed the institutional, governance and process of 
defence acquisition in order to mitigate the problems mentioned. It has had mixed results 
in its endeavours. It is hoped that in highlighting these problems a new perspective on 
how to combat the difficulties in UK defence acquisition can be presented. 
 
1.2.3 Objectives 
The main research objective is to understand the nature of the transactions occurring in 
UK defence acquisition. The nature of the transaction is dependent on the way the MoD 
engages its prime contractors, the environment in which the transaction takes place and 
the resulting governance mode.  
 
There are three areas of interest in this research, which provide the background to the 
research objectives. The first area will be a review of UK Defence Acquisition (Chapter 2).  
This chapter will look at the historical developments in the institutional and policy context 
of successive governments and the impact on the MoD and Industry. 
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The second area will be an economic discussion of defence acquisition. Chapter 3 will 
present the various economic disciplines used to provide insight into defence 
procurement policy. This chapter will assess the merit of these economic disciplines in 
delivering the desired research outcomes, specifically to understand the difficulties of the 
defence procurement and the solutions to mitigate them. The aim of this chapter will be 
to outline the reason for choosing TCE as the theoretical basis of this research. 
 
Chapter 4 will follow-on from the economic review by exploring TCE in greater depth, and 
analysing the theoretical purpose of TCE. This chapter will provide a discussion of the 
origins, development and critique of TCE. The application of TCE theory will be assessed, 
with a view to develop the way in which this research will apply TCE to defence 
acquisition. 
 
The third area will be an analysis of NAO publications of defence project management. 
The NAO are tasked by Parliament, as an independent quasi-governmental body, to 
scrutinise and audit the spending of government departments, including the MoD. They 
supply parliamentary committees with reports describing the performance of the 
departments on public spending projects. The focus of this research is in two types of 
reports by the NAO: Major Project Report (MPR) and Value for Money (VfM) Reports. 
 
While MPR is based on the highest expenditure projects per year (as per the criteria) the 
VfM reports look at individual projects at the evaluation phase. The purpose of the MPR is 
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to look at the overall annual performance of the department and recommend any 
changes to MoD project management practice.  
 
MPRs are used to provide evidence of the problems involved in defence acquisition, which 
are cost increases, time delays and failure to meet key user requirements. These reports 
will be discussed in length, in Chapter 5, and provide the basis of a preliminary study of 
defence acquisition practice. The analysis in this chapter will be a general discussion on 
how the MoD performed in developing major defence projects in the reporting period 
1993 to 2010. The systematic structured analysis of the MPR is the preliminary study to be 
applied to the analysis of the dataset.  
 
The VfM reports provide a more in-depth insight into individual projects. The reports look 
specifically at the acquisition process – the reasons for the acquisition, the bidders for the 
project, the negotiations, the contracting process, and the risks involved, and so on. The 
VfM reports are the dataset for this research and are analysed using qualitative software 
NVivo. The consequence of choosing to use the VfM reports are that this will make the 
focus of the transaction-cost analysis from the buyer’s perspective.  
 
A major part of the textual analysis is the dissemination, collation and categorisation of 
the text. The principal category, defence acquisition process, is separated into three 
subcategories: Selection Process, Contracting Process and Risk, Uncertainty and 
Complexity. The causal links of these factors are then investigated.  
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A content analysis of the categories provides the quantitative (frequency count) and 
qualitative significance of the factors and the factorial relationships. Greater emphasis is 
put on the qualitative findings as this research is anchored on a qualitative approach using 
content analysis. The finding of this analysis is applied to the research questions and 
proposition outlined in this chapter.  
 
The objectives of the research are:  
 To understand the common factors of why defence projects fail to satisfy value for 
money criteria such as time, cost and user requirements;  
 To highlight common characteristics of defence projects in order to understand 
how defence acquisition can be improved; 
 To apply a transaction cost economics lens to the content analysis findings in order 
to gain insight into defence acquisition.  
 
1.3 Research Focus 
1.3.1 Research Questions and Propositions 
The research questions will set the agenda for the research into UK defence acquisition. 
The research questions follow-on from the research purpose and objectives, and will 
inform the research propositions in conjunction with the literature review. The three 
research questions will be furthered by undertaking a literature review into Transaction 
Cost Economics and the Major Projects Reports, Chapter 4 and 5 respectively. The 
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research questions will be tested against the dataset (Value for Money reports) using the 
propositions formulated. 
 
The research questions focus on three key areas of the defence acquisition: First on the 
MoD-Industry relationship; second the Value for Money criteria for defence projects; and 
third on organisational changes in defence procurement.  
 
Thus, the research questions are as follows:   
1 How is the relationship between the MoD, as buyer, and Industry, as supplier, 
affected by the fundamental transformation in the acquisition process? 
2 Is the presence of the environmental dimensions (uncertainty, asset specificity, 
and frequency) in the contract responsible for the cost and time variations and 
poor performance in customer requirements? 
3 What is the response, by the buyer (MoD), where project failures exist, in terms of 
the transaction governance? 
 
The first research question looks to investigate the transformation of a competitive 
tendering process in the contract award of the acquisition process to a bilateral 
dependent relationship, due to the fundamental transformation, thereafter. This has 
many consequences for the way the relationship will continue for the transacting parties 
and how the project will be managed and delivered.  
 
The research findings will be analysed to see whether elements of the fundamental 
transformation are present in the acquisition process. This is a search for descriptions of 
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transaction-specific investment made in the acquisition process, which results in a 
bilateral dependent relationship between the MoD and the Prime in the project, within 
the VfM reports. Hence, the proposition is as follows: 
 
Proposition 1: If the Prime makes transaction-specific investments then the 
fundamental transformation results in a bilateral dependency, between the MoD 
and the Prime, in defence acquisition. 
 
In the second research question, the analysis looks at the difficulties occurring in a 
defence acquisition project and attempts to see if the difficulties are due to inappropriate 
considerations in the contract design to environmental factors (outlined by Williamson 
(1975)) resulting in transaction costs. In this aim the focus will be on the presence of the 
environmental dimensions in defence procurement. In order to identify the presence of 
these environmental factors there is a reliance on interpreting Williamson’s definitions 
through inferences from the dataset.  
 
The effect of the presence of environmental factors in the contract is to create a situation 
where the project will be hindered due to the resulting transaction costs. It is proposed 
that it is due to the manifestation of the transaction costs in the project that failure to 
meet the value for money criteria of the MoD results. The following proposition thus 
provides a link between the TCE consideration and project management by stating the 
result of transaction costs is to make project failure more likely: 
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Proposition 2: The presence of transaction costs in the contract contributes to the 
failure to meet value for money criteria. 
 
The final research question looks at how the MoD attempts to deal with failures of 
organisation. Specifically, if there are any changes implemented to the transaction 
governance in order to remedy the difficulties within the project. This research question 
relies upon evidence of a change in the selection process used by the MoD to change the 
way it procures its defence equipment or/and services from Industry. This evidence looks 
at the way the MoD has changed its defence acquisition practice at the institutional, 
governance and process level. 
 
The evidence which is being sought in the data is the transitions in procurement route and 
how the procurement routes differ in terms of transaction governance; references to 
failures in transactions in terms of organisation and whether any remediable action was 
taken or not; and the relationship between project failure and transaction governance (in 
the form of the selection process). TCE theory suggests that where there is a failure in the 
organisational mode then a transaction governance trade-off is expected, and as such a 
new governance mode is expected.  
 
Proposition 3: If defence projects fail due to transaction-cost considerations in 
organisation then a governance trade-off is expected in defence acquisition. 
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The purpose of the research questions and propositions is to apply a transaction-cost 
perspective to defence in order to provide greater understanding and analysis of the 
reason for project failure, as stated as the first objective of this study. The categorisation 
and manipulation of the VfM reports will provide the basis for presenting the data for a 
content analysis process. This will be aided by providing a TCE lens to the data in order to 
focus on the transactional issues of the acquisition process. 
 
1.3.2 Contributions 
The first contribution to knowledge in this research is a unique contribution to practice; 
the systematic structured analysis of NAO defence reports. In a meeting with the Head of 
Defence in the NAO, Tim Banfield, commented that a cross-analysis of defence reports 
had never been performed. It is due to this uniqueness in the research that the NAO were 
interested in the research and provided a great deal of support and time in providing 
documentation and discussions on the focus of the research. 
 
The analysis of MPR provided a common thread in what was occurring in the cost, time 
and user requirements performance since the first publication of the reports in 1993. The 
contribution made in analysing the MPR is further enhanced by focusing the analysis from 
the general to the specific level when looking at VfM reports.  
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Whereas the MPR is an audit of the annual performance of major projects; VfM reports 
are a documentary of the progression of individual defence project from concept to the 
point of its development at the time of the report. The analysis of the VfM report is based 
on finding the common factors and structuring their role on the defence acquisition 
process.  
 
In combining the systematic structured analysis of the MPR and VfM reports the 
contribution in practical knowledge is the wealth of knowledge provided on the 
constituents of defence projects. The evidence gathered on the transactions in defence 
project is of great volume with the quality coming from an independent and powerful 
source in the form of the NAO.  
 
The contribution made to theoretical knowledge is provided in the application of TCE to 
defence acquisition. In using a TCE lens to defence acquisition the findings of the 
systematic structured analysis of VfM reports can be magnified. This study of defence 
economics looks at the way in which the transaction costs involved in defence acquisition 
can be explained.  
 
There has been great difficulty in explaining the problems involved in the acquisition 
process. TCE provides the analytical tools in which the main factors can be explained by 
applying it to observable actions. The structure of the transaction is broken down in 
detailed to explain the defence acquisition decision facing the MoD. In applying TCE in this 
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way to the defence case there is scope in replicating this method to other industries or 
national defence systems. 
 
A key research contribution to TCE theory and defence economics is provided in the 
analysis of Proposition 1, in which the effects of the fundamental transformation is 
explored. In the analysis of the data set, the findings show that the fundamental 
transformation in defence leads to post-contract asset specificities (as outlined in TCE), 
but also creates pre-contract asset specificities for future transactions.  
 
This case is observed due to the unique role the MoD plays as a monopsony buyer and an 
investor in defence acquisition projects, and it is also a consequence of the high capital 
needed upfront to initiate defence projects. This contribution provides new insight into 
the connection between post-contract and pre-contract asset specificity, and on the 
unique nature of the buyer-supplier relationship in defence acquisition. 
 
1.4 Summary 
The UK defence acquisition process is in a stage of flux, the 2010 Strategic Defence Review 
will signal the changes desired in defence acquisition. This is an exciting time to be 
studying defence economics. There are signs that serious changes are needed in the way 
the UK manages its defence acquisition. This research provides the reasons for change 
and how this may be achieved.  
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This research highlights the challenges facing the MoD in delivering defence projects. The 
aim is to provide the major factors affecting the timely, affordable and required 
performance in the acquisition of defence projects. The focus will be on the point of 
transaction between the MoD and its prime contractor in the project.  
 
To deliver the research purpose three objectives have been set for this research. These 
objectives are to understand why projects fail to meet their VfM requirements, on the 
whole. To identify the common factors in defence acquisition to see what affects it has on 
the overall process. To apply TCE to the acquisition process of defence projects, in order 
to signify the findings of the research.  
 
Three areas of focus will be applied to this research to provide the background and 
preliminary study of defence acquisition. This will be a historical perspective of the 
defence acquisition in the UK, an economic analysis of defence acquisition, and studies of 
NAO reports documenting the management of defence projects. 
 
In order to deliver on the research objective, research questions and proposition have 
been outlined in this introductory chapter. These research questions will apply TCE theory 
to the VfM reports data set and the level of support for the propositions will be assessed. 
The findings of the analysis will then be used to provide solutions to the transactional 
difficulties in defence acquisition. 
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The contribution of this research is in practical terms to provide a systematic structured 
analysis of NAO reports on defence projects. The theoretical contribution to knowledge is 
the application of a transaction cost perspective to defence acquisition. The application of 
TCE theory in defence acquisition has provided greater insight into the nature of 
transaction-cost investments in defence acquisition, and their effects on the buyer-
supplier relationship. The combination of these contributions is to provide greater 
understanding in the area of defence economics policy and to place a focus on UK defence 
acquisition. 
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2 UK Defence Acquisition 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) is responsible for the acquisition of equipment and 
services for defence, on behalf of the Armed Forces. The MoD engages with suppliers in 
the defence industry to deliver the operational requirements of the Armed Forces. The 
defence industry has evolved over time, beginning as a cluster of entrepreneurial 
businesses providing military equipment, to the MoD, to becoming nationalised as part of 
the War effort in the First World War, in 1914.  
 
The defence industry, in the last fifty years, has gone through a number of changes in its 
structure: from nationalisation to privatisation; introduction of competition, consolidation 
of the national and regional defence industry and the liberalisation of the national 
defence sector.  
 
These changes in the defence industrial structure have had a major effect on the defence 
acquisition practice of the MoD. It is true that the MoD has had to respond to the 
evolution of the defence industry in its acquisition practice; however this is not its sole 
reason for changing its way of doing business. The MoD has been driven by the purpose of 
becoming an ‘intelligent customer’ and engaging with the defence industry in improving 
the acquisition process.  
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This chapter will chart the evolution of the defence industry, discussing the processes of 
privatisation, national consolidation, competition, European consolidation and 
internationalisation. The question being posed in this chapter is: How has UK defence 
acquisition policy developed over time to impact the relationship between the MoD and 
Industry? 
  
2.2 Privatisation of the Defence Industry 
2.2.1 Monopsony and Monopoly 
The movement towards privatisation in the defence industry is more of a full circle rather 
than a new way for defence. The war fighting effort in the history of the British military 
has been mainly supported by private enterprise. Edmonds (1999, p.115) points out ‘the 
idea of looking to the private sector to provide for the defence and protection of the state 
is far from being a new phenomenon. Indeed, it might be argued that the assumption that 
armed forces and the provision of national defence is primarily, a state/public sector 
responsibility has been more the exception than the rule’.  
 
In medieval times monarchs looked to their more privileged subjects to support military 
campaigns with practical and financial aid. It was also common to procure professional 
armies from abroad to support the conscripted forces, especially from the Swiss. It was 
King Henry VIII whom first created a nationalised Navy, expanded further by Queen 
Elizabeth I. This was all to protect merchant vessels from hostile nations and piracy. Once 
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the public exchequer could afford the cost of shipbuilding, maintenance and naval 
operations a fully state-owned Navy was in existence in the 16th century (Edmonds, 1999, 
p.116). 
 
It was in the 20
th
 Century when the UK Armed Forces took on the form it now resembles. 
With the race to build an Empire and the advances in military technology, the Armed 
Forces were expanding their role and purpose. The scale of the World Wars in 1914 and 
1939 and the proximity to the home state created a need for a national defence force. 
Edmonds (1999, p.117) states ‘the consequence was that throughout the remainder of the 
century, the armed forces not only continued to widen their sphere of interest and 
requirements, but also became increasingly a state-owned and state-run institution’. 
 
Hartley (1997, p.40) explains ‘the MoD has the task of obtaining a budget which enables it 
to achieve its objectives (missions). This requires difficult choices in a world of uncertainty 
and the results are reflected in the size of the UK defence budget and its allocation 
between capital (equipment) and labour (personnel)’. Until the privatisation of the 
defence industry at the beginning of the 1980s, the MoD had full control of production. 
Production was delivered through the MoD’s in-house procurement; procurement from 
the market was limited to specialised goods and competition was limited at the time.  
 
The Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher initiated a policy of privatising the 
state-owned defence companies, in order to create a free market philosophy within the 
 - 32 -  
defence sector (Bishop, 1995a). In 1979, the five largest defence companies were British 
Aerospace (BAe), British Shipbuilders (BS), Royal Ordnance Factories (ROF), Rolls-Royce, 
and General Electric Company (GEC); of which only GEC was privately-owned (Smith 1989, 
p.193).  
 
The aim of the Government was to have an arms length relationship with industry, and to 
allow industry to define the way it undertakes its own day-to-day business. The 
Government sold its shares in BAe to the private sector in the period of 1981-85, and sold 
the ROF business to BAe for £190m in 1987. This was followed by the return of Rolls-
Royce to the private sector, after 16 years of state-ownership.  
 
The shipbuilding industry was also privatised in a sequence of sales ending in 1989 
(Bishop, 1995a). These sales created the dominance of the defence market by: GEC, in 
electronics; Rolls-Royce in aero-engines; and BAe in airframes and missiles (Smith, 1990). 
The defence industry had to quickly adapt to a new kind of customer relationship.  
  
While these new privately-owned companies had the technical know-how to undertake 
the business, they had to adapt to the new world of market transactions. The defence 
companies enjoyed a domestic monopoly in the areas which they specialised in. The MoD 
being a monopsonist (a single buyer), and the defence companies having a monopoly in 
their specialisations, created a long-term buyer-supplier relationship. Industry was also 
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able to negotiate cost-plus contracts which in effect put the risk of defence projects on 
the MoD’s balance sheet. 
   
Smith (1990, p.189) explains ‘as one might expect, the combination of domestic 
preference and economies of scale makes monopoly common in defence markets, 
though, in some cases the monopolists are relatively small firms’. Such as Vickers, whose 
turnover was relatively small compared to BAe, GEC and other larger defence firms, had a 
monopoly in tank production in the 1980s.  
 
The result of privatisation was that the MoD entered into a market where it dealt with 
monopolists who controlled the production of specialised defence materiel. As part of the 
arms race, due to the Cold War, demand was high for defence equipment. This shifted the 
buyer-supplier power towards industry, due to a lack of competition on the supply side. 
 
With control of production being transferred to the privatised companies, the MoD, with a 
lack of commercial knowledge, found itself in a weak bargaining position. Thus, in the 
early days of privatisation, with a lack of competition, each side possessed considerable 
power in the buyer-supplier dichotomy.  
 
The MoD’s negotiating power was due to its consumer power. Hartley (1991, p.79), points 
out ‘as a monopsonist or a single buyer, MoD’s procurement choices can have a major 
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impact on UK Industry… Its purchasing decisions can also determine the size of an 
industry, its structure, conduct and performance of defence industries’. 
 
The defence industry, however, were able to balance the consumer powers as they 
possessed greater control of the national defence market. Fraja and Hartley (1996, p.72) 
explain ‘on the supply side, the UK defence industry is characterised by domestic 
monopolies, especially for high technology equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, aero-
engines, and missiles, together with submarines, tanks, and torpedoes. The result is an 
industry dominated by a small number of large defence contractors (e.g. British 
Aerospace, GEC, Rolls-Royce, and VSEL)’.  
 
Due to a lack of trust (Humphries and Wilding, 2004a) and cooperation, an adversarial 
relationship was pervasive at the outset of the newly privatised defence industry and its 
customer. Adding to this difficult relationship between the MoD and the defence industry 
was the fact that contracts were predominantly written on a cost-plus basis (Cullen and 
Hickman, 2001), which put a lot of the risk on the MoD.  
 
Defence project expenditures were insufficiently controlled. The risks in defence projects 
were, and still are, extremely high due to the extent of uncertainty and complexity in 
defence acquisition. Peck and Scherer (1962, p.44) explain ‘it is also that these 
uncertainties are greater than those existing elsewhere in the economy’.  
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With the MoD already taking on the expenditure of R&D, the extra added cost of a cost-
plus project created a strain on the UK’s defence budget. The other issue with cost-plus 
contracting is that it is difficult to assess the efficiency of defence projects due to 
underlying complexity and uncertainty. This can be advantageous for the defence 
companies as cost-reimbursable (Williamson, 1967) features of cost-plus contracts make 
costly investments attractive to companies. 
 
2.2.2 Levene Reforms 
Bishop (1995a, p.175) points out ‘by the early 1980s there was considerable 
dissatisfaction with such traditional procurement policies. Lack of competition had, it was 
argued, created inefficiency in the defence sector, while cost-plus contracts created little 
incentive to keep cost down’. Within the Government free market perspective, was the 
underlying push for competition in the defence sector. The end of the Cold War allowed 
the Government to refocus its expenditure on less costly, low intensity operations and 
reap the “peace dividends” (Humphries and Wilding, 2001).  
 
This led to the implementation of the Levene Reforms (Levene, 1987), which focused on a 
policy of ‘price competition’ and ‘greater collaboration’ with Industry. Peter Levene, (MoD 
Chief of Defence Procurement (1984 – 1991)) was responsible for the transformation from 
the MoD’s traditional role of monitoring and auditing to a more stringent administrator 
role, transferring the risk in defence equipment procurement to industry (Smith, 1990). 
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However, as Mathews and Parker (1999, p.28) explain ‘whilst the Cold War was the 
principal reason for rising defense expenditure, the maladies of cost-plus pricing and “gold 
plating’ were also held to be attributable for the MOD’s lack of cost control’. Thus, the 
MoD transferred the risk in procurement to industry by replacing cost-plus contractual 
arrangements, with firm or fixed price contracts offered as competitive tenders. 
 
Defence spending peaked in 1985, but gradually fell by 18% in real terms between 1986-
87 and 1990-91 (McIntosh, 1993). Bishop (1995, p.176) comments ‘the attempt by the 
government to introduce greater competition into the defence industry has been 
heralded as a great success by the MoD. A government study in 1998 claimed a saving of 
40 per cent on a sample of thirteen contracts’.  
 
Competition policy meant the government was willing to allow market forces to mould 
the defence industrial base (Hartley, 1991). This in effect resulted in the consolidation of 
the national markets, with the dominant defence companies buying out smaller defence 
companies (e.g. the acquisition of Plessey by GEC-Siemens in 1989). 
 
While competition in defence has been supported, as a policy, by the MoD; collaboration 
with Industry has been less successfully implemented. The MoD competitive pricing 
policies had a major impact on the survivability of a number of defence companies which 
relied on defence, thus resulting in many of them deciding to diversify or exit their 
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defence business (GEC, Ferranti etc.). This rather than creating collaboration resulted in a 
more adversarial industrial relationship.  
 
2.3 Competition and Liberalisation 
2.3.1 Competition 
Fraja and Hartley (1996, p.76) state ‘since 1983, competition has been central to MoD’s 
procurement policy and its pursuit of best value for money which now embraces life-cycle 
costs and not solely acquisition costs’. The MoD was willing to look further than home in 
its aim to create competition and deliver value for money.  
 
The free market policy of the Thatcher government signified liberalisation towards foreign 
interest in the national defence sector, as evident by the UK becoming a member of the 
Independent European Programme Group (IEGP). The IEGP was geared towards the 
opening of the European defence equipment market in Europe to greater international 
competition (Bishop 1990). While, on the surface the MoD was open to bids from 
international defence companies, the reality was a much more protective Ministry.  
 
Fraja and Hartley (1996, p.76-77) point out ‘during the 1980s, MOD developed its 
competitive procurement policy by reducing the entry barriers, so that UK and foreign 
firms were able to bid for major contracts and by increasing competition at the sub-
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contract level together with allowing the possibility of competition for production work 
separately from development work’. 
 
Competition was a means of keeping Britain’s defence giants on their toes, but placing 
major contracts with foreign firms was not common during the early stage of 
liberalisation. Smith (1990, p.191) states ‘in 1987-88 15 companies received over £100m 
from MoD. This 15 included one foreign company (Boeing, supplier of AWACS)… ’. 
However, it was a signal that the MoD was ready to do business with foreign companies, 
especially (or exclusively) with US and European companies. 
  
In defence statistics reports by the Defence Analytical Services Agency (DASA), providing 
data from 1980 to 2010, it is clear the impact the Levene reforms had on contract type in 
the last three decades. The data clearly shows that ‘contracts priced by competition’ 
increases in share, over all contract types, in value and volume over the last three 
decades.  
 
Table 2.1 is a breakdown of the information provided in the reports from DASA (1992,…, 
2010), the data prior to 1992 is historic data shown in DASA (1992). The data in Table 2.1 
shows the range (from the minimum to the maximum share within the decade) of 
contract share by value (percentage value of contract with respect to total contract 
expenditure for the year) and by number of contracts over the year. The data presents an 
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illustration of the trends; some data has been omitted in the ranges as they act as 
anomalies. 
 
 
Table 2.1 shows that the lion share of the most valuable (monetarily) contracts in the 
1980s were priced by competition. However, more than half of defence contracts in the 
1980s were priced with reference to market forces. This trend continues in the 1990s, 
although during this period the share by value of competitive pricing contracts had 
doubled. The number of contract priced using market forces had reduced to between a 
third and two thirds; this is mainly due to an increase in competitive pricing contracts. In 
the 2000s, competitive pricing became the dominant contract type by value and share. 
 
Other interesting trends in the figures for contract type in the last three decades is the 
demise of cost-plus contracting and the re-emergence of incentive-based contracting. 
Contracts priced using ‘cost-plus a percentage fee’ basis have gradually reduced from 22% 
 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Contract Type (Contract 
priced by) 
Value (% 
share) 
Number (% 
share) 
Value (% 
share) 
Number (% 
share) 
Value (% 
share) 
Number (% 
share) 
Competition 22 – 44   12 – 14  41 – 71  16 – 54  51 – 70  34 – 42  
Market Force 14 – 26  59 – 72  4 – 23  33 – 67  8 – 12  25 – 41  
Estimates 20 – 35  8 – 16  16 – 30  12 – 17  18 – 30  17 – 28  
Incentives to minimise 
costs 
3 – 20  1 1 – 5  0 – 1  2 – 17  0 – 3  
Cost-Plus a % Fee 4 – 22  2 – 11   1 – 4  0 – 2  0 0 
Table 2.1: MoD Contract Types 1980-2010 (DASA (1992,…,2010))   
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share in value and 11% share in volume in 1980-81 to 1% share in value and volume at the 
end of the decade(DASA 1992, p.19). 
 
This trend continued through-out the 1990s and by the 2000s cost-plus contracting was 
negligible. There are two curious anomalies, however, in 1997-98 and 2009-10 cost-plus 
contracting registered a 3% and 4% share by value, respectively. The only connection in 
these two years is that they occurred during changes of government. I speculate that this 
may be due to contract awards made in the dying days of the old administrations. 
 
In terms of incentive-based contracts, the trend shows that in terms of numbers it has 
been sparingly used never going above a 5% share of contracts (bar the anomaly of 16% in 
1992-93). However, the value of these contracts has represented on average a tenth of 
the contract prices and the share has increased in the last three years to 24%, 14% and 
17% in value, respectively.  
 
 The defence industry is facing a bidding process where competitive pricing has squeezed 
their profit margins. Hartley (1991, pp.75-76) states ‘since 1983, MoD has become more 
conscious of the need to obtain better value for money in equipment procurement. As a 
result, it has become a more demanding customer, with competition as the central 
element in its more commercial approach’.  
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NAO (1994a, p.9) explains the aim: ‘during the 1980s the department adopted a number 
of initiatives with the objective of setting their relationship with their suppliers on a more 
commercial footing. The main feature of this was a drive to increase the proportion of 
contracts let competitively, not just among United Kingdom contractors but also by 
inviting overseas bids, whilst seeking to bring market pressures to bear on the remaining 
unavoidable non-competitive procurements. The Department also sought to place greater 
responsibility for the delivery of goods with industry to provide a better incentive to them 
to manage cost and programme risk’.  
 
The change in procurement policy, namely through competitive pricing, was not seen as a 
positive change in all quarters. The Society of British Aerospace Companies claimed it was 
the MoD using its position as a monopsonist to drive down profit rates and create 
excessive costs (Bishop, 1995) in the procurement tendering stage. The competition policy 
was creating frictions in the MoD’s industrial relations within the defence market, which 
would have repercussions for future acquisition policy. 
  
The late 1980’s and early 1990’s were a difficult period for the defence industry, the 
creation of competition and the reduction of military spending resulted in a downturn for 
the sector. Humphries and Wilding (2001, p.84) describe this period with some stark 
statistics for the defence sector. ‘Thus, between 1985 and 1997 spending on equipment 
reduced by 40%, by 45% on R&D and industry employees fell by 50%’. 
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The deceleration in defence spending is shown in the trend line for defence equipment 
expenditure from 1980-2010, in Figure 2.1. Unfortunately, the results for 2001-02 and 
2002-03 were difficult to ascertain in the DASA reports due to changes in accounting 
presentation in the latter reports. The figures are collated from DASA (1992, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2010) reports. 
 
 
The graph shows defence expenditure dramatically rising from 1975-76 to 1980-81; 
gradually increasing until 1992-93; expenditure then falls until the mid-1990s; and a 
steady increase in the 2000s. This trend line thus indicates a slump in defence spending in 
the post-cold war era. This is due to the reforms in procurement and a reduction in 
defence spending in that period. However, as the UK engaged in a variety of military 
Figure 2.1: Defence Spending 1975 to 2010 (DASA 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2010) 
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operations, namely Iraq and Afghanistan, annual defence expenditure increased in the 
2000s.  
 
Competition had the effect of creating industry champions (Smith, 1990). The larger 
defence companies were moving to consolidate their positions in the sector by acquiring 
the smaller firms. This also coincided with the MoD allowing a few foreign-owned firms to 
enter the UK defence market, such as Siemens and Boeing.  
 
The defence market was undergoing some radical structural changes, and the MoD 
wanted to stamp its authority on the sector by initiating a change in procurement policy. 
The changes which the MoD was demanding of industry were conveyed by the then Chief 
of Defence Procurement Executive, Dr Malcom McIntosh: 
“Having achieved three-quarters by value of our equipment competitively, there is more to do. 
We are looking very hard at the factors which inhibit competition on the remaining quarter of 
our business, with a view to seeing how we can best introduce market forces into areas which 
have hitherto been the preserve of a few companies. The next few years will see us pushing 
very hard for more competition in the support areas, spares, repairs, overhauls, etc. I am less 
than satisfied with the service that industry has provided on support activities in the past and 
believe that competition will serve to sharpen things up.” 
(McIntosh 1993, p.27) 
 
The Chief of Defence Procurement was portraying a bullish attitude towards the defence 
industry. However, in the early 1990s he could afford to be highly critical, since defence 
spending had dramatically been reduced during the post-Cold War period. As the UK 
entered multilateral operations in the Gulf and the Balkans in the late 1990s, the MoD 
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became more reliant on the defence Industry. The adversarial nature in defence, which 
resulted from the competitive pricing policy, clearly impacted the strains in defence 
procurement during the UK’s proactive international military interventions in places such 
as Sierra Leone and the Balkans. 
    
2.3.2 Liberalisation 
Hartley (1991, p.75) explains that due to political pressure, liberalisation of the UK 
defence sector was a slow and gradual process. ‘There are pressures to buy British rather 
than foreign equipment (e.g. Nimrod AEW v. Boeing AWACS; UK v. Foreign tanks) and to 
support jobs buying from firms in areas of high unemployment (e.g. shipbuilding)’. The 
European and American defence companies thus entered the UK defence market using 
the strategy of acquiring smaller, more specialised, national defence companies or 
through joint ventures with larger defence companies.  
 
Consolidation began in earnest, not only nationally but also regionally, as the European 
defence companies began their mergers and acquisition activity of British-owned firms. At 
this time, a lot of the national defence companies decided to exit the defence sector and 
diversify their businesses, due to the drop in demand for defence equipment.  
 
Defence companies started either expanding their export business, entering joint ventures 
or exiting the defence sector to diversify into the civilian market (Bishop, 1995b) as a way 
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of coping with the downturn in the defence sector. GEC was one of those who decided to 
exit the defence industry and concentrate on the telecommunication sector.  
 
By the end of 1999, BAE Systems (BAES) was formed, as BAe acquired GEC’s defence 
business (Marconi Electronics Systems). In the same year, Thomson-CSF (a French defence 
company) acquired the UK defence companies, Shorts Missile System and Racal (the new 
company was later renamed Thales). Following this, the Italian defence company 
Finmeccanica merged their helicopter business with GKN (UK) in a 50/50 share, to create 
AgustaWestland (later wholly-owned by Finmeccanica). The list goes on (Anon, 2003); 
mergers and acquisitions were agreed at a great pace with some being reviewed by the 
Parliamentary Defence Select Committee.  
 
The MoD was keen on these mergers and acquisitions occurring, as it would create the 
competitive industry that the MoD desired. Cook (2000, p.39) explains ‘...the UK MoD has 
encouraged Thomson CSF to emerge as an alternate prime contractor to BAE to sustain 
competition at the upper level of the chain’. With that purpose, Thales spent 1999-2001 
buying up a number of British companies (Moores, 2001) to position itself as a competitor 
to the dominant prime contractor BAES. 
 
Smith (1990, p.190) suggests ‘at an international level competition is much stronger, and 
any reduction in the political preference for domestic production will make the U.K. 
market potentially contestable’. It would seem that the MoD was motivated, in the late 
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1990s, to make the U.K. defence sector more competitive by allowing entrants from 
abroad. The entry barriers to the defence industry were being lowered through a policy of 
competition and liberalisation. The MoD was well placed to decide how it wanted to 
structure the defence market by using its regulatory powers and its position as the major 
buyer, to regulate industry profits (Braddon and Hartley, 2007). 
 
Although the MoD possesses strong buyer powers it hasn’t always deployed them 
effectively, with cost and time exceeding budgeted and estimated contractual 
agreements. The MoD has within the last decade understood that it had to create a 
partnership with industry, by moving away from the pervasive adversarial nature that was 
common in the 80s and 90s. In order to create an effective and efficient supply 
relationship the MoD introduced a number of supply chain management initiatives in an 
effort to engage with industry.  
 
It is also a response, in the effort to keep the national defence companies from relocating 
their operations in what is now a globalised defence market. An example of British 
companies looking beyond the national market is the global diversification of BAE 
Systems. BAE Systems (2010, p.5) identifies its home markets as ‘where it has established, 
or seeks to establish a good position in the defence industrial base’, thus United States, 
United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Australia and India.    
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Cook (2000, p.37) comments ‘other UK Suppliers have shown themselves to be equally 
adept at winning more than their fair share of contracts on world markets’. The defence 
market, it can be argued, with the free market policies of western nations and customers 
in emerging nations (such as South Africa and Saudi Arabia) has become global.  
 
NAO (1994a, p.33) explains ‘the decline in the size of production orders means that 
overhead rates charged to the Department are increasing. Against this the Director 
General of Defence Contracts has estimated that, in 1992, the Department saved £340 
million because exports of defence equipment lowered unit costs as a result of overheads 
being spread over a wider base’.   
 
The national defence market is essentially still the number one focus for national defence 
companies, and governments are still selective in what contracts are awarded to foreign 
defence companies and which exports are allowed to foreign nations. However, there is 
an evident effect on the defence industrial base of the globalised defence industry.  
 
Humphries and Wilding (2004b, p.261) explain ‘UK defence procurement supply chain 
relationships are similarly long termed, inextricably linked and characterised by complex 
problems and, moreover, being also driven by global market conditions (concentration) 
and increased customer (MoD) sophistication to change’. They explain their concept of 
‘sophistication to change’ in greater detail in Humphries and Wilding (2001). It is in the 
way the MoD has transformed its relationship with Industry to one of partnership as a 
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response to the globalised defence markets and the traditional adversarial stance towards 
Industry.  
 
Whether partnership has become the modus operandi in defence acquisition is a central 
theme of the research questions in this thesis. It is difficult to see how such a radical 
change from the adversarial nature in defence acquisition to one with partnership has 
been achieved. The answer to this transformation lies in the policies followed by the MoD 
in the 2000s. The change in government in the 1997 elections, to the Labour party 
(commonly known as New Labour) may have created a stimulus for a revision of the 
defence industrial strategy. 
 
The New Labour government undertook a number of studies, such as options for change 
and the strategic defence review, which reassessed defence procurement. A number of 
mechanisms were introduced to improve defence acquisition at the process level such as 
the Smart Procurement Initiative, later renamed Smart Acquisition. It is fair to say that the 
2000s heralded a new way of engaging Industry in defence acquisition. 
 
2.4 Defence Acquisition 
2.4.1 Acquisition Process 
Fraja and Hartley (1996, p.76) explain ‘while there undoubtedly exist situations where 
only one potential contractor can be found by the agency (e.g. UK warship building), in the 
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vast majority of cases more than one firm has the ability of supplying the required system, 
especially if the domestic market is opened up to foreign suppliers’. Thus, the MoD can 
follow competitive pricing in a majority of cases, and as such has increased the use of 
competition in defence procurement. 
  
Smith (1990, p.195) points out ‘in recent years MOD has attempted to become more 
commercial in its purchase. This involved increased use of competitive tendering; the 
avoidance of cost-plus contracts, and tying payment to performance, the structure of the 
MOD Procurement Executive was also changed to make it a ‘more demanding, better 
informed customer’’.  The effects of these changes are evident in the figures presented in 
Table 2.1, however organisational changes only started in the 1990s.  
 
The ‘Options for Change’ defence review, in 1991, outlined the expectation that the 
armed services maintains the same level of performance and meet its policy objectives, 
while working at a reduced budget with 20% reduction in manpower (Smith, 1990, p.123). 
  
One of the major changes implemented in the review was the opening up of the defence 
market to a diverse nature of defence requirements. Smith (1990, p.123) explains ‘basic 
services, such as catering, cleaning, transport, and maintenance and repair, were among 
the first to be ‘contracted out’ as representing better value than when provided within 
the services themselves’. The level of contract tendering by the MoD was increasing in 
sum, value and diversity. 
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When placing a competitive contract for tender MoD had a list of companies they 
considered eligible. Where the procurement was of a high value, technically complex and 
high risk contract the eligible companies would be sifted to shortlist tenders. A bulletin 
was also created to ensure that interested parties, especially those abroad, could be 
aware of available opportunities. This was important to ensuring the competitive 
contracting route remained effective (NAO 1994a, p.17).  
 
Fraja and Hartley (1996) point out ‘interestingly, since the introduction of competition 
policy, imports into the UK have increased from 5 per cent of MoD equipment purchases 
in the mid-1980s to 9 per cent in the mid-1990s, although the share for UK industry 
remained remarkably constant at some 80 per cent over the period’. Competitive 
tendering was giving foreign firms a chance to enter the UK market; however it was still at 
a low market share. 
 
NAO (1994a, p.18) explain ‘one of the benefits of competition is that it can encourage 
tenderers to produce innovative and cost effective solutions to the Department’s 
requirement’. Competition was effectively forcing industry to seek new ways of winning 
the contract by delivering well-balanced and costed bids. 
 
There are costs attached to competitive tendering and bidding for the MoD and industry 
respectively. Costs for the MoD can arise from compiling tender documents, provision of 
advice, evaluations of tenders and negotiating contracts including iterative tendering. The 
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cost for industry is estimated at an average of 3 per cent of the contract value, which 
ultimately is passed on to the MoD. Therefore, the MoD recognising this problem in the 
1990s moved towards creating a longer term relationship with suppliers governed by taut 
contractual conditions (NAO 1994a, pp. 18-19). 
 
The MoD continues to look at ways of improving its tendering process. MoD (2005, p.48) 
states ‘we are tackling industry’s concerns about the expense and uncertainty that can 
arise from protracted and inefficient tendering. We are taking steps to speed up decision 
making and to minimise costs’.   
 
In terms of awarding production contracts the MoD used separate contracts for 
production phases. NAO (1994a, p.20) explains ‘previously, the Department have 
sometimes split production quantities into several tranches and competed them 
separately. However, with reduced quantities likely to be purchased in the future, splitting 
production into tranches is less likely to be cost effective’.  
 
Competition was not suitable for all procurement projects; some could only be sourced by 
specialist defence companies. Competition was not effective where contractors had a 
unique capability. For such instances, the MoD introduced a policy of ‘No Acceptable 
Price, No Contract’ (NAPNOC). NAO (1994a, p.21) explains ‘NAPNOC is predicated on the 
fact that the department’s negotiating position is strongest before a contract is let’.  
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Where competition was suitable, the MoD recognised that its competitive tendering 
policy required adapting if it was to deal with the cost of tendering and unifying 
production contracts.  The introduction of prime contracting provided the long-term 
relationship with suppliers the MoD desired. Prime contracting is the method of selecting 
a contractor to manage the project, empowering them to deal with the supply chain and 
making them responsible for the delivery of the project.  
 
NAO (1994a, p.24) explain ‘since the mid-1980s the Department’s policy has been, where 
possible, to appoint a single company or consortium, referred to as the prime contractor, 
which has responsibility for co-ordinating the actions of sub-contractors and integrating 
the individual components of complex projects’. The prime contractor would also have 
some responsibilities for in-service phase.  
 
This new procurement process was a good fit with the way the defence sector developed 
as a result of competition and liberalisation; a number of large companies were present in 
the defence sector which had the capability of managing large defence projects. It also 
removed issues with integration and compatibility of sub-systems, as this became the 
prime responsibility of the prime contractors (also known as primes). It allowed the MoD 
to tender the contract to a smaller group of companies which had the capability to 
provide such a large and complex project. The MoD also transferred management 
responsibilities for selecting and organising the supply chain. 
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Mathews and Parker (1999, p.30) explain ‘MOD PE appoints a prime contractor 
responsible for providing the required equipment, making use of subcontractors where 
necessary and, indeed, for managing the project in its entirety’. Prime contractors are able 
to negotiate lucrative contracts, due to the risk involved in managing such large projects. 
However, it does make competition more difficult when the contracts can only be 
undertaken by a small group of companies who have the resources to manage such large 
projects and large supply chains.  
 
The award of prime contractorship transfers a lot of the management and organisation 
risk to the contractor. This in turn means the contractor will expect a premium for taking 
on the risk. NAO (1994a, p.24) points out ‘contractors understandably seek to charge 
extra when asked to bear the risks involved with prime contractorship. However, the 
Department do not routinely assess these costs when deciding upon their procurement 
strategy for individual programmes’. 
 
Mathews and Parker (1999, p.38) state ‘on balance, prime contracting is of value to both 
MOD and industry because of the improved risk management that it fosters: minimizing 
cost and schedule over-runs as well as through-life costs; rationalization of R&D 
expenditure and facilitates an enhancement of systems integration’.   
 
The focus, thus, turns towards the way in which the MoD structures its contracts in order 
to gain the most from the prime contractor, whilst allowing enough flexibility to deal with 
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uncertainty. The MoD implemented the Downey Cycle, shown in Figure 2.2, to manage 
the procurement of defence equipment and to provide a mechanism to control defence 
projects.  
 
 
NAO (2006a, p.5) states ‘the timely agreement of a contract is akin to managing a mini-
project in its own right. As such, the contracting process should be well planned, agreed 
and understood. It should be resourced with suitably experienced and trained commercial 
staff and involve all stakeholders in the contracting process, not just the commercial 
officers and project leaders’.  
 
Prime contracting has allowed greater amount of flexibility for the government in terms of 
the responsibilities it can transfer to its supplier. However, the challenge of writing and 
agreeing a contract, which has enough checks and balance, whilst ensuring the wording is 
not too restrictive, is still a major challenge for the MoD. The difficulty is that the contract 
is dealing with complexity and uncertainty at a larger scale, under prime contracting 
rather than under the multiple sub-systems contracts. 
 
Figure 2.2: The Downey Cycle (NAO 1999, f.5, p.8). Each approval can take up to two years to decide to 
whether or not to proceed to the next stage.  
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How much technical risk the MoD places on prime contractors plays an important role in 
the success of the project. MoD (2002, p.13) explains ‘we also need to manage 
technological risk effectively. Burdening prime contractors with unmanageable levels of 
risk will not lead to efficient project performance. Neither of course does close 
government control or the protection of industry from the costs associated with normal 
commercial risk’.  
  
NAO (2006a, p.11) points out ‘contracts are most likely to support successful project 
delivery if they are negotiated against a common information base and with an 
understanding of stakeholders’ aspirations. In applying the contract it will be important 
that all parties understand the way in which achievement of the desired outcomes is 
incentivised and the position of each stakeholder is protected’. It is not always clear what 
the desires of the MoD are nor do they always align with those of industry.  
 
The transfer of risk from the MoD to the prime contractors became more evident with the 
introduction of Private Finance Initiatives (PFI). PFI is a type of Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) which aims to provide the commercial sector with opportunities to undertake public 
projects, in order to gain from improved business practice and save money. Parker and 
Hartley (2003, p.97) explain ‘PPPs including in the UK ‘private finance partnerships (PFIs) 
are part of a wider policy of ‘privatisation’ based on the expectation that the private 
sector provides services more efficiently and more effectively than the public sector’.  
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Gray (2009, p.198) explains ‘…in the UK most PPPs are funded via [PFI], in which the 
private sector provides the initial capital investment in return for future ‘rental’ payments 
from public sector. This model is also frequently implemented in situations where it is 
believed that the private sector can bring superior management and/or operational skills 
to public services, and ultimately benefit to taxpayers’. 
 
PFI became a popular part of public project finance under the Labour Government; they 
used PFI to build hospitals, schools and other infrastructure projects. The Government 
would argue that this form of finance takes the cost off the taxpayer and allows the 
Government to pursue a greater number of public projects. NAO (2008a, p.13) points out 
‘the first PFI contract signed by the Department covered the provision of non-combatant 
vehicles (known as the “white fleet”) in 1996. The Department has since signed a steady 
stream of deals’. 
 
This research will include PFI procurement projects in the dataset. In fact, the PFI contract 
being described by NAO (2008) is one of the reports (The Procurement of Non-combat 
Vehicles for the Royal Air Force (HC 738, 1999)) which will be analysed. 
 
In the MoD, PFI is an important part of the procurement method. NAO (2008a, p.12) 
states ‘in relation to the total defence budget, PFI represents a small, but important, part 
of the Department’s annual spending. In 2007-08 the Department paid £1.3 billion in PFI 
service charges, approximately four per cent of its total outturn of around £36 billion’. 
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PFI has its critics, and towards the end of the New Labour government many 
commentators criticised the poor cost controls in PFI projects especially in the NHS. 
Parker and Hartley (2003, p.97) comment ‘at the same time, however, concerns have 
been raised about their true long-term costs and therefore on their ability to provide 
public investments more cheaply on a life-time cost basis’. One of their arguments is that 
the government can borrow money at a cheaper rate, thus public expenditure savings are 
not really achieved when the private sector absorb higher interest rate costs. The private 
sector will pass on the interest payments of the loans on the project to the MoD.  
 
PFI is only one of many procurement routes which the MoD uses in its projects. When 
deciding the need for PFI there is a proper appraisal of other possible routes. NAO (2008a, 
p.21) explain ‘before a large PFI project can be procured, it must in line with other 
Ministry of Defence projects satisfy the department’s Investments Approval Board that 
there is value for money case for proceeding with the procurement. The Investment 
Approval Board also establishes whether the project is consistent with the Department’s 
strategic investment plans, well-founded in relation to delivery of the customer’s 
requirements, takes account of all key cost-drivers and is deliverable’. 
 
MoD PFI projects are often managed by IPTs and are supported and scrutinised by the 
Private Finance Unit. Established in late 1990s, the Private Finance Unit was centralised in 
London in 2005 and given greater influence. The unit provides ‘specialist commercial 
expertise’, guidance and assistance. A study by the unit found that PFI procurements are 
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substantially delivered on-time, to-budget and deliver the services required (NAO 2008a, 
p.21). 
 
Parker and Hartley (2003, p.102) explain the structure of PFI contracts. ‘They differ from 
complete privatisation in that the MoD retains the responsibility for ensuring service 
delivery, with the private sector investing  in, managing and operating any capital assets 
needed for delivering the service. As the customer, the MoD pays directly for services or 
output, usually through long-term contracts, typically in excess of 10 years, with MoD 
payments covering the whole or the majority of the project cost’. 
 
One of the major reasons for PFI is the ability to transfer the risks of the projects to the 
contractors. Parker and Hartley (2003, p.102) state ‘MoD believes that it benefits from 
PPPs/PFIs by obtaining value for money from existing budgets; from improved quality of 
services through opportunities for innovation and the application of the latest commercial 
techniques; from reduced risk to MoD by transferring risk to private sector and through 
the use of appropriate incentive contracts; and by exposing its staff to private sector 
management, commercial and financial skills’. 
 
When assessing the risk in PFI projects the NAO (2008a, p.22) identified nine out of ten of 
the risk categories to be low or moderate. The one high risk category is ‘specification of 
the asset or service’. NAO (2008a, p.25) recommends ‘in order to allocate risk effectively, 
both parties need to understand the size and nature of that risk. For specifications to be 
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effective departments need to be clear on what they require, which in turn depends on 
accurate data relating to any existing service provision, the condition of assets being 
transferred to contractors and the future needs of the service users’.  
 
Other procurement processes include Military Off-The-Shelf (MOTS), Commercial Off-The-
Shelf (COTS), International collaboration and PPP’s based on PFI and Government owned – 
Contractor operated (Go-Co) arrangements. These are all ways that the MoD approaches 
its procurement in order to match the most effective way of working with industry and 
dealing with budget constraints.  Table 2.2 provides a description of all these procurement 
processes.  
 
The procurement process relies heavily upon a clear line of communication and data 
transfer from the MoD to industry. In order to ensure that the interests of the MoD and 
its suppliers are aligned there needs to be a strong and constructive relationship. NAO 
(2006a, p.17) states ‘the contract should provide suitable incentives to underpin such 
constructive working relationships and reward achievement of project outcomes, whilst 
adequately protecting parties in case of problems’.  
 
Hartley (2007, p.1162) explains ‘procurement agencies have to select a contract type 
ranging between extremes of firm/fixed prices and cost-plus contracts and the 
‘intermediate’ case of target cost incentive contracts. Each has different risk sharing 
arrangements between the buyer and seller; each has different efficiency incentives, rent 
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and equity properties; and each has different opportunities for strategic behaviour in 
contract negotiations’. 
 
With Fixed Price contracts the prime usually agrees a premium for taking on the risk and 
the payment is agreed based on the contracted requirements being met. Contracting for 
Availability takes on a pay-as-you-go format, where the contractor charges the MoD each 
time it wishes to use the service. Incentive-based contracts take on a mix of performance-
based and milestone payments with risk being a part of a pain/gain share arrangement. 
Cost-plus is where the contractor is reimbursed for any cost incurred in the project and 
the risk is taken on by the MoD. 
 
 
Procurement Process Description Contract Types 
Non-Competitive A monopoly occurs on the expertise to undertake the 
project. A single contractor available. 
Cost-Plus, NAPNOC, non-
competitive Fixed-Price 
Prime Contractor Companies able to taking on the role of systems 
integration and managing the supply chain. This contract is 
tendered, usually 2 or 3 large defence companies bid. In 
some cases there maybe a long-term partnership in place. 
Fixed- or Firm- Price, Incentive-
based  
PPP (PFI, Go-Co) The Private sector works with the government on 
delivering projects using various separations of 
responsibilities on asset management, capital investment, 
project management and operation.  
Contract for Availability, 
Incentive-based.  
MOTS The government buys ready made equipment from an ally 
nation, who was the projects original sponsor. 
Memoranda of Understanding  
COTS The government buys ready made equipment from the 
commercial sector, mainly used in I.C.T or mass product 
non-complex procurement.  
Fixed- or Firm- Price 
International Collaboration The UK jointly procures specifically large and complex 
equipment with allies such as the U.S, within NATO or 
European partners. 
Memoranda of Understanding, 
Workshare Agreements 
 
Table 2.2: Procurement Process  
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2.4.2 Smart Procurement Initiative 
The reduction in government spending and the loss of the cosy relationship due to 
downsizing, competition and opening up the market to foreign firms created adversarial 
feelings between the MoD and Industry. The once, long-term cosy contractual relationship 
enjoyed in the defence sector became a thing of the past. The MoD was under pressure to 
restructure itself, and to change its acquisition practice by introducing more competitive 
contracts, focus on lifecycle costs and reduce specification rigidity (Humphries and 
Wilding 2001, p.84-5). The MoD had to change its way of doing business. 
  
Edmonds (1999, p.125) explains ‘the Strategic Defence Review 1997/8 recognised a 
problem that was costing the exchequer dearly, not to mention the frustration for the 
armed services when their equipment arrived late, expensive and not to specification. 
Convinced that there were efficiencies to be found the Review introduced a new process, 
that of ‘smart procurement’’. This initiative had the motto ‘cheaper, faster, better’ as its 
driving force.  
 
The Strategic Defence Review in 1998 (SDR1998) looked at tackling the challenges facing 
defence procurement (MoD, 1998). It highlighted three areas where defence procurement 
was failing to achieve efficiency: poor value for money; poor project management; and 
poor industrial relations. The introduction of the Smart Procurement Initiative was to deal 
with these shortcomings. The initiative focused on changing the culture of MoD and the 
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defence industry, as a whole, moving the relationship towards a partnership, rather than 
the usual competitive adversarial one (Edmonds, 1999, p.125).   
 
The initiative was a joint exercise with industry to identify a new set of procurement 
processes which will improve the way the MoD procures defence equipment. It also 
provided greater opportunities to industry by opening up more requirements to be met 
by the commercial sector.  
 
The changes were brought about in consultation with the Defence Industries Council and 
the Trade Associations. The Defence Industries Council, is chaired by the Defence 
Secretary, and constitutes representatives from the defence industries and the four major 
trade associations (the Society of British Aerospace Companies, Defence Manufacturers 
Association, Federation of the Electronics Industry and British Naval Equipment 
Association). The purpose of the council is for the MoD to consult the defence industries 
on matters of common interest (MoD, 1998).  
 
In line with the changes to the procurement process, the MoD made a few of its own 
organisational changes, recommended in SDR1998. In 1999, the three single service 
logistic organisations for the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and Army, were unified to create 
the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO). In the same year, the Procurement Executive 
was given agency status, and became the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA). The 
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responsibilities of the DLO and DPA are shown in the lifecycle process CADMID (Concept, 
Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service and Disposal) in Figure 2.3.   
 
 
CADMID is a lifecycle process introduced to defence acquisition to provide a more 
efficient and effective through life capability management of defence equipment. MoD 
(2006, p.13) explains ‘the CADMID cycle has been used since 1999, when it was devised as 
part of the ‘Smart Procurement’ initiative to deliver equipment capability within agreed 
performance, cost and time parameters’. Each phase within the lifecycle has its own 
objectives and delivery methods.  
 
The Concept Phase is a statement of the military customer’s requirement. It consists of a 
definition, risk identification and cost, time and specification outline. After this point the 
project needs to gain ‘initial gate’ approval. Approval for defence projects go through the 
Figure 2.3: The CADMID Cycle (NAO 2004a, p.29) 
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Investment Appraisal Board (IAB), as part of the Defence Management Board. The IAB will 
decide whether the project delivers current defence requirements and whether it is value 
for money. 
 
After achieving initial gate approval the project needs to go through an Assessment Phase. 
The time, cost and performance requirement are balanced and the risks of the project are 
defined, quantified and controlled at this stage. Using these findings the project team will 
require a ‘main gate’ approval. This is the final approval required to bring the project 
forward. Again, the IAB will be responsible for assessing the merits of the project and 
deciding whether to invest in the project, ask for changes or to halt the project altogether.   
 
The project, after gaining main gate approval, moves through the Demonstration Phase. 
During this phase continuous progress is to be made on risk reduction and performance 
targets being fixed for manufacturing. The project team will be expected to deliver the 
military requirements in the Manufacture Phase.  
 
The equipment is provided to the front line with any provisions for support and upgrading 
of equipment being a part of the In-Service stage. The end of the equipment lifecycle is at 
the Disposal phase, which requires the project team to safely dispose of the equipment, a 
particularly important phase for equipment handling toxic and radioactive material, such 
as nuclear submarines (MoD 2006, p.13).  
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In line with the CADMID process, a project team is set up with responsibilities for 
delivering the procurement phase (CADM) by working with the Prime Contractor and the 
DPA. When the procurement has been completed the project is transferred to the DLO at 
the user phase (ID). This project team is known as the Integrated Project Team (IPT). 
 
The IPTs are responsible for delivering defence capability to the customer (Armed Forces). 
NAO (2002a, p.7) states ‘the introduction of IPTs has involved the reallocation of around 
10,000 personnel into some 130 teams within 18 months’. IPTs consist of MoD personnel 
from key specialisations (such as finance and defence requirements office) working 
alongside business unit representatives from the prime contractor.  
 
OGC (2007, p.10) explains the IPT concept in public procurement. ‘The aim is to identify 
the most appropriate specialists and involve them at key points throughout the project 
where their expertise can contribute to the design process as well as the construction 
process’. 
 
Cullen and Hickman (2001, p.527) explain ‘the overriding objective of the IPTs is to reduce 
the costs of procurement by developing a more open relationship with their contractors 
promoting innovation and monitoring all operations within a ‘shared data environment’. 
At the heart of the IPT concept is collaboration with industry, working in partnership to 
ensure value for money.  
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The introduction of the CADMID process and IPTs in the acquisition policy review of 
SDR1998 changed the focus towards a through-life approach.  
 
The McKinsey review concluded that there should be a through-life approach to the 
acquisition of defence equipment, with each project being managed throughout its life-cycle 
by a dedicated IPT… For smaller projects where it was not practical to establish a dedicated 
through-life IPT the Department evolved the model to create ‘cluster’ IPTs which manage 
groups of capability related projects. There is a larger number of smaller projects and the 
results of our census highlighted the widespread use of cluster IPT concept, as only 20 per cent 
of IPTs were single project IPTs’.  
 
(NAO 2002a, p.7) 
 
The reforms made in the Smart Procurement initiative were aimed, not only at 
restructuring the MoD, but also at looking to create a partnership with the defence 
industry. A partnership, in which, competition would create better value for money and 
improve customer service in defence procurement. However, an important question 
posed in this research is whether competition and partnership can coincide harmoniously.  
 
Where there is competitive pricing hard bargaining must exist, this will impact the buyer-
seller relationship. There is a lack of focus on this point in the MoD’s procurement policies 
in the early part of the 2000s, and thus a lack of improvement in the adversarial 
relationship. IPTs were introduced as a way of creating a post-procurement means of 
interaction between the MoD project team and that of the prime contractor.    
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Cullen and Hickman (2001, p.525) explain ‘this introduces a ‘whole-life approach’ to 
acquisition, and has as one of the main tenets, the use of MoD Integrated Projects Teams 
to work closely with all contractors and their suppliers in order to identify ‘Gainshare’ 
opportunities’. Gainshare is the cooperation between MoD and its prime contractor to 
identify possible savings which can then be inserted into the contract agreement.  
 
The MoD has fast-tracked the implementation of the IPT policy. The Smart Procurement 
Implementation Team (SPRINT) was tasked with creating the IPT structure by April 2000. 
NAO (2002a, p.11) comments ‘the Department acknowledges that its approach to the 
creation of IPT structure was pragmatic and therefore likely to require modification. Since 
inception, the Department has made modification on a case-by-case basis through the 
creation of new IPTs, termination of existing IPTs and transfer of projects between IPTs as 
it has learnt from experience and its capability requirements have changed’.   
 
Humphries and Wilding (2001, p.85) highlight ‘the government made a clear statement of 
policy that its smart procurement initiative depended heavily on the concept of 
partnership in order to reap the benefits of competition and collaboration’. Cullen and 
Hickman (2001) argue that the initiative, however, tries to match opposing cultures. They 
suggest ‘English commercial contract law’ which has at its heart arms length contractual 
relations, prohibits the collaborative working relationship demanded of the IPTs ethos.  
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The NAO (2006a, p.18) report on successful projects through maximising contracts 
contradicts Cullen and Hickman’s (2001) view on the effects of contracts on IPTs. ‘Nearly 
80 per cent of project teams surveyed considered they had a good relationship with their 
contractor… On the same basis, a similar proportion of industry contractors thought they 
had a good relationship with the Department… ’.  
 
The test of the success of this relationship ultimately lies in the ability of the IPTs to 
deliver value for money. The atmosphere under which the contract was agreed will also 
have an impact on the way the IPT mechanism will work. If the prime feels that it needs to 
regain some lose from its negotiated pricing; the IPT will most likely feel the strains of 
these price-focussed engagements. The point is that the success of the IPT is determined 
by the procurement process. 
    
2.4.3 Acquisition Reform  
The MoD recognised that in order to reform its industrial strategy it needed to look 
beyond procurement and focus on the entire acquisition process. The Smart Procurement 
Initiative was renamed Smart Acquisition, in 2000. MoD (2001, p.4) states ‘the aim of 
Smart Acquisition is “to enhance defence capability by acquiring and supporting 
equipment more effectively in terms of time, cost and performance.” Understanding this 
aim means understanding that the effective acquisition and support of defence capability. 
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This aim gives equal emphasis to initial procurement and support, as integral parts of the 
overall acquisition process’.  
 
Smart Acquisition aims to improve the relationship between the MoD and the defence 
industry, like its predecessor. There are seven principles to Smart Acquisition:    
• A whole life approach, typified by applying through life costing techniques 
• Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) with clearly identified customers 
• A better, more open relationship with industry 
• More investment in the early project phases 
• Effective trade-offs between system performance, through-life costs and time  
• New procurement approaches, including incremental acquisition  
• A streamlined process for project approval  
    
 (www.mod.uk, accessed 15 November 2008) 
 
With these principles, the MoD is making an explicit change in the way it wants to do 
business with its industrial base. The MoD wants to move away from the adversarial 
relationship which has typified defence equipment acquisition and create a partnership 
approach.  
 
MoD (2002a, p.14) explains ‘Smart Acquisition has engendered a profound change in the 
relationship with industry throughout the supply chain. With industry increasingly 
involved in providing long-term service to the MoD, we have recognised that a 
partnership approach, building reliable links with suppliers, is often the best means of 
realising our goals’.  
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This partnership is built on a number of acquisition models, which are chosen on the basis 
of project best-fit rather than “one-size-fits –all”. The DPA was responsible for using a 
variety of contractual models to support the partnership with industry, and to seek 
mutual benefit through appropriate acquisition models (MoD 2005, p.31). 
 
NAO (2005a, p.7) explains that successful delivery of major projects requires certain 
characteristics in a partnership. ‘Successful working relationships are characterised by soft 
factors such as team working, trust and honesty, when the Department and industry 
partners on a project display these behaviours they are more likely to develop a common 
understanding of the tack, the progress being made and give early warning of problems’. 
 
Tangible factors such as dealing with risk can play an important role too. MoD (2005, p.31) 
explains ‘partnering relationships, designed for mutual benefit, that recognise that risk is 
shared and reward performance, are more attractive to industry. The UK has a history of 
leading the way in deploying innovative acquisition and financing models in defence, for 
example PFI and PPP, and continuing to develop experience in these areas will allow us 
and our key suppliers to provide us with better value capability, more consistency and 
clarity and hence less risk, and better profit returns to industry’.  
Effective ongoing management of a project and the interface with the prime contractor on the 
basis of a sound understanding of the remaining risk and the effectiveness of outstanding 
mitigation actions is fundamental to successful procurement performance. Where there is 
poor understanding and mitigation of risks, cost and time contingencies can quickly be eroded 
by cost escalation and delays, adding to the pressures on the procurement budget. Conversely, 
where there is good understanding and mitigation of risks, it may be possible to release some 
cost contingency, relieving pressure elsewhere on the procurement budget’. 
 
(NAO 2004b, p.15) 
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Dealing with risk is an important part of Smart Acquisition. MoD (2002) states ‘Smart 
Acquisition calls for a greater proportion of defence equipment budget to be spent during 
the earliest phases of projects, in order to reduce technical risk before them main 
investment decision is made’.   
 
Participants from industry in Gray’s acquisition review felt that the MoD moves to 
contract for procurement before properly assessing the technical risks of a project (Gray 
2009, p.140). This is not in keeping with Smart Acquisition principles, nor does it follow 
the CADMID process where risk identification should occur in the concept phase.  
 
MoD (2005) has in the Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper realised that 
there are challenges to acquisition reform. The way acquisition is being undertaken has 
significantly changed and Smart Acquisition is a part of this change. MoD (2005, p.131) 
states ‘the nature of acquisition is evolving and we face an increasingly demanding and 
complex environment. Closer collaborative engagement between us and our industrial 
suppliers will be vital if we are to continue to deliver the improvements that the Armed 
Forces and UK taxpayers demand’. 
  
Success in acquisition is judged, NAO (2005a, p.13) states, by ‘the boundaries of a project 
[which] are the objectives, the time, cost and performance targets that the project has to 
deliver against and the plan for achieving them. The boundaries must be realistic and 
accepted by all stakeholders at the start of the project but, as with the project’s 
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structures, must be flexible enough to evolve given that the circumstances to which the 
project is responding will inevitably change during its life’. 
  
However, ultimately the success depends on how the project delivers the customer’s 
needs. MoD (2010, p.8) explains ‘success in acquisition ultimately rests on whether we 
deliver the equipment our Armed Forces need, when they need it, and to cost. This is not 
always a simple assessment to make; for example we might be compelled by 
circumstances to exceed a project’s budget in order to deliver required performance. We 
will, however, seek to develop better ways of measuring improvements in acquisition as 
part of implementing this strategy’. 
 
Gray’s review to a certain extent places some of the faults of unmatched requirements 
with the customer itself. Customer 1 (to be explained further) is responsible for the 
formulation of the future military needs of the Armed Forces. Gray (2009, p.27) claims 
‘unfortunately, this organisation (now the MoD Capability Sponsor) was denied the ability 
and authority to exercise proper control over its own budgets at that time, and this 
created a significant weakness in its structure. It was given power to choose what military 
capabilities it wanted to order, without being charged with the responsibility for balancing 
the books’. 
 
This lack of cost control mechanism created the incentive for the Director of Equipment 
Capability (DEC) to order capabilities, which were not properly assessed for their cost 
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effectiveness. The representation in the Capability Sponsor also creates an unhealthy 
atmosphere according to Gray. The Capability Sponsor is comprised of single-services 
officers, which rotate into it and back to their own services. Their career progression is 
managed by their services rather than the joint organisation. This incentivises them to 
fight the corner of their own services, rather than look at the bigger picture (Gray 2009, 
p.30). 
 
Staff rotation in MoD, specifically military personnel and civil servants, as a whole, is a 
major difficulty in the management of acquisition. IPT leader tenure (Gray 2009, f.8.2, 
p.184) compared between 2003 and 2009 levels of sample IPTs shows worrying signs of 
low levels of long-term tenure. The overall picture shows that IPT leader tenure is falling 
in 2009 in comparison to 2003. Thirty-seven per cent of IPT leaders stay with their IPTs for 
less than a year compared to twenty-three per cent staying for 3-5 years.  
 
The MoD does believe, however, that it has achieved a great deal with Smart Acquisition. 
MoD (2005, p.131) states ‘our Smart Acquisition initiative has delivered significant 
benefits for Defence in the form of improved performance and delivery of affordable, 
battle winning capability to the Front Line. The basic principles of Smart Acquisition still 
hold true and existing change programmes throughout the department provide a solid 
foundation on which to build’.   
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There has also been a positive view of the achievement of the implementation of the 
Defence Industrial Strategy. Gray (2009) states ‘since the publication of the DIS in 
December 2005 there has been significant progress in five of the key sector strategies 
(maritime, rotary wing, complex weapons, fixed wing and land). These are beginning to 
result in noticeable benefits to the defence programme as a whole’. In fact Gray states 
that DIS reviews should be a regular part of acquisition review, possibly in conjunction 
with SDRs. 
  
The implementation of its acquisition reform, in Smart Acquisition, and the Defence 
Industrial Strategy which laid out the way the MoD wanted to create collaboration with 
industry, was the beginning of the changes to the MoD. The latest of the reforms is the 
restructuring of its acquisition organisation with the merger of the DLO, DPA and the 
DCSA (Defence Communication Service Agency) to create Defence Equipment and Support 
(DE&S) in April 2007. DE&S has taken over all responsibilities of the previous departments; 
the main aim of the integration is to create a coherent organisation and remove dual 
accountability problems inherent in the past (MoD, 2007).  
 
The merger of the DPA and DLO came about as a recommendation of the Enabling 
Acquisition Change report by McKane (2006). The difficulties of the acquisition process 
have been described as being due to the dual accountability of IPT Leaders to DPA and 
DLO creating conflicting priorities.  
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The changes implemented to resolve these problems have tackled the ‘symptoms rather 
than the root cause’ (McKane 2006, p.29). Thus, McKane (2006, p.30) recommended 
‘…the establishment of an integrated procurement and support organisation by merging 
the DPA and DLO, led at 4-star level (or equivalent)’.  
 
The merger has allowed the dual accountability problem to be removed, and in place is a 
single organisation responsible to overseeing the whole life cycle. The IPTs are 
encompassed within the DE&S structure and have a clear and single point of contact, in 
terms of accountability. The Gray (2009) report commended the speed and effectiveness 
in which the DE&S was established. However, there are some issues which it recognises as 
creating difficulties in acquisition with regards to the way DE&S works.  
 
To deliver capability, the Capability Sponsor organisation and DE&S need to work closely 
together to ensure that Users needs and perspectives are considered alongside the industrial, 
technical and financial constraints that arise in meeting these needs. However, in practice, 
close working has translated into lack of clear project ownership and has diluted accountability 
for poor performance. Within the wider Defence community DE&S is often seen as “most 
responsible” for project difficulties, however the seeds of the problem were often sown in the 
planning systems, providing DE&S with an impossible task to deliver to time and budget from 
the outset’.  
 
(Gray 2009, p.137) 
 
 - 76 -  
Further changes occurred in the privatisation of some of the MoD research capability. The 
Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) were created when the Defence 
Research Agency and twelve science and technology offices were amalgamated in 1995.  
 
The MoD wanted to explore ways of creating a PPP for DERA in 1997. NAO (2007a) 
explains ‘the department divided DERA by reviewing each division and keeping the most 
sensitive areas of the business within a new trading fund, named the Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratory (DSTL). All other functions were transferred to a new corporate 
entity, 100 per cent owned by the Department, which became QinetiQ’.  
 
QinetiQ became a private entity in 2007, when the MoD sold its shares (retaining special 
shares for national interests) to The Carlyle Group. The privatisation process was highly 
controversial (Mollas-Gallart and Tang, 2006) due to issues surrounding intellectual 
proprietary rights (IPR) in the commercialisation of QinetiQ. In the close partnership 
between industry and the MoD, the data sharing environment meant a great deal of IPR 
transfer was occurring.  
 
NAO (2007a, p.15) explains ‘one of the key areas of concern for the defence industry was 
the ability of QinetiQ to exploit commercially the wealth of intellectual property it had 
been given by the defence industry. Because DERA was seen as an extension of the 
Department, contractors had in the past exchanged intellectual property with DERA 
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without regard to whether this was required under their contract and sometimes without 
maintaining thorough records’. 
 
The MoD undertook a Records Audit and Separation Project to classify and transfer 
intellectual property to the appropriate organisation. Where intellectual property was 
generated by DERA and where current work was being undertaken by QinetiQ using 
industry IPR, QinetiQ were able to retain these IPRs. However, QinetiQ was ordered to 
transfer previously attained IPR, from industry, back to the MoD. Not everyone was happy 
with this process and there is a feeling in industry that QinetiQ were able to gain an unfair 
advantage (Mollas-Gallart and Tang, 2006). 
 
Financially the separation of DERA and the sale of QinetiQ proved successful. However, 
the MoD’s desire to become an ‘Intelligent Customer’ (MoD 2005) may have suffered. 
Mollas-Gallart and Tang (2006, p.205) suggest that ‘to remain an intelligent customer and 
decision maker the MoD needs to ensure that it has access to a foundation of knowledge 
covering a broad spectrum of technologies… This risk [to impartiality and independence] 
will be compounded if that knowledge and expertise is being re-interpreted for the 
Department by a commercially motivated DERA with its own shareholder-driven agenda’. 
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2.4.4 Organisation of Acquisition 
This section will discuss the organisation of the defence acquisition process. This will focus 
on the customers of the acquisition, the role the DE&S plays on managing the defence 
acquisition process and the role of the IPTs as the mechanism for the process. 
 
In the acquisition process the MoD delivers to two customers, these are known as 
Customer 1 and Customer 2. The nature and responsibilities of the two customers are 
outlined in the Enabling Acquisition Change report (McKane 2006, p.12): 
• Customer 1 identifies the equipment capability required to meet Defence Strategic 
Guidance and translates this requirements into a balanced and affordable equipment 
programme. Customer 1 is organised by capability area, each managed by a Director 
of Equipment Capability (DEC). Each DEC acts as a Single Point of Accountability 
responsible for coordinating the delivery of new and enhanced military capability 
across all Defence Lines of Development. In addition, each DEC has delegated 
authority from the Chief Scientific Adviser to define the need for research to capture 
capability requirements and to explore and de-risk possible technology solutions. 
 
• Customer 2 is responsible for the delivery of operational military capability through 
properly trained and equipped force elements, managing equipment once it is in-
service, and providing advice and expertise to Customer 1. There are two dimensions 
to the Customer 2 role, Core Leadership, providing the user perspective and managing 
allocated resources to achieve the required output (undertaken by Front Line 
Commands). 
 
However, the merger of the DPA, DLO and DCSA to create the DE&S has created a change 
in the way the defence acquisition process is managed. The MoD has used the merger and 
the Defence Industrial Strategy as a tool for changing the way it organises the acquisition 
process.  
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This has created an emphasis on creating a ‘unified customer’ represented by the 
Equipment Capability Customer (ECC). MoD (2007, p.7) explains ‘ the ECC, acting as 
Sponsor for new and enhanced military capability, will host and lead the Capability 
Planning activity, working with the Users (Single Services and Joint), DE&S, the central 
planning staffs, and the Science, Innovation and Technology (SIT) community to develop 
options to change military capability in response to changing policy priorities, threats, 
capability excess or shortfall, resource constraints, out of service or obsolescence, or 
industrial constraint and opportunities’.  
 
In its blueprint for the DE&S, MoD (2008a, p.5) explains ‘DE&S is part of the MOD ‘Unified 
Customer’, working with others to translate industrial capacity into effective military 
capability to conduct and support operation, merging equipment and support provision 
with other Defence Lines of Development. Fundamental to the success of the MoD Unified 
Customer is that participants exercise shared ownership for Through Life Capability 
Management decisions, whilst retaining clear responsibility for delivery of business 
activities within the defence acquisition process’.  
 
In its business strategy the MoD (2008b, p.7) sees ‘DE&S works as part of “Team  
Defence” including Head Office, User, Sponsor, technology community and Industry’ as 
shown in Table 2.3. 
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The MoD (2008b, p.8) comments on its future, ‘by 2012, through PACE, we expect to have 
evolved into an effective and agile organisation where people are motivated by delivery 
and actively seek out opportunities to work here. Shorter acquisition timescales will help 
Group Activity  
Sponsors – Deputy Chief Defence Staff (Equipment Capability) Leads TLCM, including commissioning DE&S to deliver an 
Equipment & Support Plan over the long term (10 years). The 
Sponsor programmes the costs of new equipment and associated 
support in years 1-10 and support for in-service equipment in 
years 5-10. The main effort of DECs moves, therefore from 
supervision of DE&S projects to planning and managing through 
life capability. 
User – the single Service Chiefs of Staff and Front Line 
Commands. 
Responsible for programming the support of in-service 
equipment and delivery of commodities (e.g. fuel) and services 
(e.g. strategic communications) supplied by DE&S over the short 
term (4 years). The User is also responsible for merging Defence 
Lines of Development into effective military capability within a 
specific Service domain, and bringing a greater awareness of the 
opportunities and limitations of in-service equipment and 
support. The User also has an independent assurance role at 
Main Gate, assessing whether the proposed solution can be 
delivered as an effective and integrated military capability at an 
In Service Date.  
MoD Centre – the central finance staff. Generates Resource Control Totals for the Sponsor and the User, 
and programming Operating Costs for DE&S. The RP divisions 
also input central planning guidance and resource constraints to 
Through life Capability Management decision-making and take 
impacts and opportunities for non-equipment Defence Lines of 
Development to the relevant owner for consideration or action, 
where these are beyond the User’s authority.  
Science, Innovation & Technology community Supports decision making, investigates and tests proposals, 
advises on the technical “art of the possible” and encourages 
innovation. DE&S interface with SIT is key to making sure that 
capability solutions fully exploit and pull-through technology 
opportunities.  
Industry – DE&S Clusters are the primary MOD point of 
engagement for Industry. 
Working under the strategic direction of the Defence Commercial 
Director to establish effective business arrangements with 
industry. DE&S will be commercially robust but flexible and fair. 
Through greater transparency and closer working with industrial 
capacity to meet the demands of TLCM. And, through netter 
understanding of the industrial supply chain, DE&S will explore a 
broader range of commercial approaches that deliver continued 
value for money. 
Table 2.3: DE&S Interface (MoD 2008b, p.7) 
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people see results of their efforts. Specialist staff will be deployed where they are needed, 
using their expertise to better effect. Our simplified processes will allow us to work more 
effectively with Industry, and our innovative approaches will allow us to speed up 
acquisition and actively prioritise work to meet the needs of Sponsor and User’.  
 
In the desire to ensure a unified organisation during the merger, it was decided that DE&S 
would become an integral part of the MoD rather than given agency status. This, however, 
has resulted in a lack of independence for the DE&S. This goes against the Smart 
Procurement Initiative which aimed at creating a clear distinction in the role of the 
requirements and the acquisition community (Gray, 2009, p.8).  
 
Gray (2009, p.181) suggests ‘since cost estimates and technical specification are subject to 
influence from both Head of Capability and the military, DE&S is not sufficiently ‘arm’s 
length’ to be held accountable for problems in project delivery’. The recommendation by 
Gray was to give DE&S a Go-Co or Trading Fund status, in order to create a more arms 
length approach (Gray 2009, p.210). 
 
This recommendation was rejected by the MoD. The MoD (2010, p.13) states ‘we decided 
not to follow the Gray recommendation that Defence procurement be undertaken at 
arm’s length from MOD, possibly by a [Go-Co] entity. In our view, acquisition is core 
business for defence and there is strong benefit from involving the military in the process, 
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and from developing a more integrated approach to managing military capability. Both 
would be much harder under an arm’s-length relationship’.   
 
The Gray report also suggests that the command structure in DE&S needs to change. It 
points out that there is only one three-star official, the Chief Operating Officer, 
responsible for the acquisition programme, it suggests this task is too large and needs 
support. The report also suggests that while the Chiefs of Materiel were of use in 
establishing the DE&S, the role held by three 3-star chiefs is no longer required. 
Continuing on the command structure, there is also a suggestion of rationalising the roles 
of Finance, Chief of Staff and Corporate Services (Gray 2009, p.43).   
 
In a speech at the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, the current Defence Secretary – 
Dr Liam Fox stated his desire to ‘decentralise the MoD’. The Defence Secretary outlines his 
plans to split the MoD into three areas ‘policy and strategy, the armed forces and 
procurement and estates’. He also stated his view that the MoD “can’t keep on making 
long specification and then re-specifications”.  
 
Dr. Fox hinted at the restructuring of the top ranks, as well as the reduction of civilian 
workforce at the MoD. A Defence Reform Unit has been set up as a steering group for the 
reforms by the coalition Government (Conservative Party and Liberal Democratic Party) to 
be led by Lord Levene (ex-Chief of Defence Procurement) (BBC NEWS, 2010).  
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The DE&S will manage the IPT mechanism throughout the CADMID lifecycle, taking on the 
role once held by DPA and DLO. The unification of the role is to create better 
management of the process by removing dual accountability and allowing the DE&S to 
support the acquisition process from ‘cradle to grave’. 
 
MoD (2007, p.15) states ‘…the primary “building block” of DE&S will continue to be the 
Integrated Project Teams (IPTs). Many of these are already genuinely through-life and for 
these the most significant change may be to the clusters in which they sit. All IPTs will 
continue to develop and maintain their relationships with the ECC, as Sponsor, and the 
Front Line Commands/PJHQ, as User, governed by CSAs with their customers’.  
 
Kebede et al. (2009, p.323) describe the mechanisms used to create an IPT for an 
Advanced Military Vehicle (AMV) acquisition. ‘One important idea behind the IPT was to 
have a co-located project team that could take advantage of team working, good 
communication and cooperation. This notion was realized through continuous interaction 
enabled by prescribed tasks, teams and routines. The management of the relationships 
(customer, user, suppliers) was therefore a key tactic in this programme’.  
 
The case study, however, identified a number of challenges for encompassing the 
collaborative nature of the IPTs. The bidding process of the AMV was through a 
competitive bid process which required a great deal of negotiation on the pricing. This 
created the difficulties in investing funds into the collaborative process, such as the 
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‘shared date environment’. The difficulties of bringing forward the customers 
requirements negotiated in the bid created tensions between industry and the MoD, 
which made it challenging to incorporate collaboration in the IPT (Kebede et al., 2009, 
p.323). 
 
The primary purpose of the IPT is to be a mechanism for delivering and managing defence 
projects by engaging with the prime contractor. Kebede et al. (2009) provide the 
structural organisation of the AMV IPT, which is based on sub-system teams, providing a 
clear identification of the roles, responsibilities and routines of the IPT team members.  
 
However, Kebede et al. (2009, p.325) find that ‘the dynamics of task and team are 
structured around the best practice routines at both the corporate and IPT levels, yet 
these are perceived to be inadequate. Those at the IPT level are mandated by the MoD; 
while those at the company level are mandated by the corporate level’. 
 
The IPT mechanism provides a process in which DE&S can manage and support the 
acquisition process. The structural organisation of IPTs creates clear identification of 
responsibilities for the acquisition process, which DE&S and industry can identify when 
engaging with the project. The case study of the AMV IPT by Kebede et al. (2009) 
identifies the challenges facing IPTs in order to encompass the desired collaborative 
relationship with Industry. This will be further challenged by changes in defence 
capability, which complicates the number of stakeholders engaging with IPTs. 
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2.5 Changes in Defence Capability   
2.5.1 Network Enabled Capability 
The organisational changes in the MoD of the last decade have been matched by the 
developments in technology and capability of the UK Armed Forces. There is a transition 
from platform-centric to network-centric equipment in defence capability. This is a 
consequence of the MoD realising that it needs to take advantage of the advances in 
information communication technology to meet its operational requirements.  
 
In this vain the MoD has introduced a programme known as Network Enabled Capability 
(NEC) as part of its modernisation of defence capability. James (2004, p.15) describes 
‘Network Enabled Capability comprises three core elements: sensors (to gather 
information); a network (to fuse, communicate and exploit the information); and strike 
assets (to deliver military effects)’.  
 
Platform-centric equipment differs from network-centric equipment in that they are 
based on a separate and individual configuration. Platforms are purposely built as self-
sustaining components, which may provide a number of capabilities. Within network-
centric equipment the component is network-ready, as in it is ready to be virtually 
connected to other equipment which has a network infrastructure.  
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It is enabled by information communication capabilities to work as a system of systems. A 
platform may have its own information systems, but it is not designed to connect with 
other systems other than through communication systems. Networking systems have the 
ability to exchange data and even commands in certain circumstances. 
 
The challenges which would face the MoD as part of the introduction of a move towards 
network-centric equipment were identified early on. The MoD (2002, p.22) states ‘the 
strategic environment will continue to change, and our military priorities will develop 
likewise. Exploitation of the potential of networked capability, using information 
superiority linked to precision attack systems to achieve a rapid response to often fleeting 
opportunities, poses new challenges both to Smart Acquisition and to our industrial 
policy. It presumes a further shift of emphasis away from platform-based acquisition, and 
towards the development of sub-systems independently from their host platforms’.   
 
A graphic representation of NEC is shown in Figure 2.4; in the graphics MoD represent 
their expectation of NEC. Platforms will be connected using ICT systems creating a 
network which will take advantage of C4ISTAR (Command, Control, Communication and 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capability 
to create a coherent operation involving a range of personnel in the Armed Forces (Figure 
2.5) abroad and at home.  
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The MoD is engaged in a significant modernisation of its communication capabilities 
(James, 2004) in order to meet the challenges and requirements for NEC. The MoD views 
the introduction of NEC into the armed Forces as a long term process. The plan is to 
achieve interconnection by 2009 in the initial state; a transitional state characterised by 
integration in the middle of the next decade; and mature state characterised by 
synchronisation in the second decade (MoD 2005, p.106). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2.4: An Example of NEC (MoD 2005, p.21)  
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The figures emphasise the interconnectedness of the sub-systems to create a network in 
the operational arena. This is emphasised by the description provided by the MoD (2005): 
  
The growing importance of networks and their interactions may make a platform-centric 
perspective less useful in future when considering how to meet operational capability 
requirements, and where the critical interfaces between systems may reside. Some systems, 
particularly those which seek to integrate a number of different sensors and weapons systems 
across platforms, are likely to require deeper and more complex integration into their 
platforms and into networks. This may sometimes require deep knowledge of the sub-systems 
involved and their potential contribution to military capability separate from their physical 
integration into a platform system’.  
 
(MoD 2005, p.61) 
 
Figure 2.5: High-Level Network Map of NEC (MoD 2005, p106) 
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The challenges to the acquisition of NEC equipment is the speed at which procurement is 
undertaken, the inherent risk involved in such a process and the regular disposal of legacy 
C4ISTAR systems. Quintana (2007, pp.5-6) explains ‘but speeding up acquisition will also 
require the MoD to accept greater risk… In addition, industry stressed the need for rapid 
prototyping… Finally, industry believes that the MoD also needs to be serious about early 
disposal of equipment. The C4ISTAR sector moves too fast to think in terms of 25-30 
years. There is a real incentive to buy rapidly if equipment is only going to last five years!’.  
  
2.5.2 Capability Management 
The MoD emphasises that in order for NEC to become a part of the MoD’s defence 
capability, changes in the management of defence capability are just as important. MoD 
(2005, p.59) points out ‘in a period where platforms are likely to remain in-service for 
many years, unless systems engineering capability and vital long-term knowledge are 
maintained, it is little use investing in cutting-edge science. New technologies will have 
less benefit without knowledge of how they might be exploited into existing equipment’. 
  
The NEC programme will rely on embedding new networking technology into existing 
platforms and systems, as well as newly procured equipment. How the technology will be 
procured is also an important question for the MoD and its partners in Industry, whether 
it should be done through COTS procurement or through customised designs from existing 
systems providers. As explained earlier, NEC has put the spot light back on the defence 
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acquisition process; the main issue being whether current acquisition practices are 
adequate to deal with the complexity behind NEC.  
 
James (2004) states ‘NEC poses a challenge for Smart Acquisition because the delivery of 
NEC requires very different acquisition practices to those used for platform-centric 
equipment’. Through-life costing techniques and investment during early phase of 
development are particular points of Smart acquisition which do not fit the lifecycle of 
NEC technology.  
 
Whereas platform lifetimes can reach 30 to 40 years NEC technology, specifically 
computer software and hardware for networking have much shorter lifetime of 2 to 5 
years. This creates a challenge for the MoD’s acquisition policy and structure, especially 
for the CADMID lifecycle.  
 
With the changes in defence capability MoD has been looking at how it manages its 
capabilities:  
There is a general shift in defence acquisition away from the traditional pattern of designing 
and manufacturing successive generations of platforms – leaps of capability with major new 
procurement or very significant upgrade packages – towards a new paradigm centred on 
support, sustainability and the incremental enhancement of existing capabilities from 
technology insertions. The emphasis will increasingly be on through-life capability 
management, developing open architectures that facilitate this and maintaining – and possibly 
enhancing – the systems engineering competencies that underpin it’.   
 
(MoD 2005, p.17) 
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A result of this and in consultation with the Acquisition Policy Board (APB) an examination 
of the through-life capability management (TLCM) approach was reviewed by McKane 
(2006). The APB is responsible for acquisition policy, consulting with a number of 
stakeholders in industry and government to implement changes in the MoD’s acquisition 
process. It reports to the Defence Procurement Minister.  
 
McKane (2006, p.10) provides the APB definition of TLCM as ‘…an approach to the 
acquisition and in-service management of military capability in which every aspect of new 
existing military capability is planned and managed coherently across all Defence Lines of 
Development (DLOD) from cradle to grave’. 
  
McKane (2006, p.22) comments ‘TLCM implies an approach to the planning and 
management of military capability which takes a holistic view of current and future 
capability, including all its components. This implies arrangements which enable those 
responsible for planning individual capabilities to trade between the present and the 
future. In the context of incremental acquisition, this applies in particular to the mix of 
expenditure on new equipment and on maintaining in-service equipment, though it could 
also apply to the other components of capability’. 
 
MoD (2007, p.7) explains ‘TLCM will consider a much wider range of options for meeting 
capability needs, examining both new and in-service equipment solutions, exploring 
opportunities and implications for trading across all DLODs – Equipment (including 
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Support), Personnel, Training, Logistics, Infrastructure, Concepts – while considering 
capability delivery on a much longer term, programme basis’. 
  
Gray’s acquisition review was highly critical of the implementation and implications of 
TLCM. Gray (2009, pp.40-41) explains ‘as a general proposition, it is hard to argue with the 
assertion that managing these related activities in a co-ordinated way is anything other 
than a good thing. It is in the execution of this assertion that potential problems lie. In the 
first instance, the objective that TLCM is trying to achieve is fearsomely complex and 
inherently based in financial data’. 
 
Gray believes that the Programme Boards, under the control of Capability Planning and 
Capability Management Groups, created to co-ordinate the financial and programme 
data, do not have sufficient data or adequate financial modelling provisions. He argues 
that the ‘Lines of Development’ represented on the Programme Board create an extra 
layer of difficulty in decision-making, compounded by the regular staff rotation system. 
The board lacks a leader in the form of an accountable decision maker (Gray, 2009, p.41).  
 
Gray (2009, pp.41-42) comments ‘furthermore, a key consequence of effective TLCM may 
be to increase short-term spending to gain economies in the longer term (i.e., “spend to 
save”). The current structures and financial environment within the MoD do not provide 
fertile ground for this type of trade-off to take root. The TLCM structure is, therefore, 
unobjectionable in principle, but fraught with potential pitfalls in practice’.  
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The response in MoD (2010, pp.15-16) is ‘the through-life approach to managing 
capability was established in 2006, and is continuing to evolve. It has already delivered 
benefits, but will take some time to achieve its full potential. In line with Government best 
practice, our approach has widened its focus from individual projects, to embrace 
‘programme management’ – the co-ordinated management of groups of related projects 
and activities’. 
 
While it is understandable that the MoD argues TLCM is still maturing and expanding its 
focus to the programme level, it fails to address the crucial issue of funding. TLCM relies, 
as Gray points out, heavily on a ‘spend to save’ philosophy. This philosophy has become 
even more difficult to implement in the last few years due to the effect of the financial 
crisis on government spending. The current Coalition government are looking to make 
savings now; this creates a challenge for TLCM.  
 
With the introduction of complex networking technology to the more platform centric 
technology, how the system is managed and maintained will differ from usual practice. 
With networking technology maintenance needs to occur more frequently then the 
normal ICT components in platforms. Networks require updates in software more 
regularly, and to a lesser extent to hardware.  
 
Networks will also be open to a more unconventional attack than the Armed Forces are 
used to, through technological warfare. Attacks on computer systems are more easily 
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deployed in a network environment. It is also important to recognise that by deploying 
networking capability, the effective use of such means of warfare becomes an important 
part of the operation.  
 
Thus, the MoD (2004, p.7) highlights ‘the key to NEC is effective information management. 
The availability and use of information has always been essential, but we have not always 
been as effective as we should be in making it available. As newer information systems are 
introduced, the function of Information Management (IM) will grow in importance and 
effective IM tools will become a key enabler’. 
 
It is difficult to see how the MoD can continue to fund its modernisation programme in 
telecommunication, which is key to NEC success, under current financial constraints. The 
operations which the UK is currently engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya are unlikely to 
hinge on superior telecommunication, but rather on ground and air force capability.  
 
NEC is a modern military capability, one which may be crucial in the future if the UK is 
threatened by more sophisticated enemies. However, at the moment the threat emanates 
from the challenges of asymmetric warfare, and thus information superiority is secondary 
to the need for ground and air superiority. 
 
The MoD’s recent Strategic and Security Defence Review 2010 (SDSR2010) has signalled 
that there will be minimal support for expensive modernisation programmes. HM 
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Government (2010, p.9) outlines ‘one clear lesson since the last Strategic Defence Review 
in 1998 is the need more frequently to reassess capabilities against a changing strategic 
environment. We must avoid the twin mistakes of retaining too much legacy equipment 
for which there is no requirement, or tying ourselves into unnecessarily ambitious future 
capability’. This does not bode well for the NEC programme. 
 
The impact of SDSR2010 on defence acquisition policy is, in my view, minimal in terms of 
process. Unlike SDR1998, the Coalition government refrained from introducing new 
procurement, or acquisition, methods in the review. While they outlined a number of 
defence equipment programmes which will be cut as part of the review, there was a lack 
of vision in acquisition strategy. However, they have set-up a parallel review to look into 
the running of the MoD and reform of the Armed Forces, to be led by Lord Levene.  
 
What is clear is that the MoD will be engaged in frequent, and rather uncomfortable, 
renegotiation of contracts with Industry as part of its obligation to reduce the defence 
budget deficit which the Coalition government puts at a figure of around £38 billion (HM 
Government, 2010, p.31).  
 
These renegotiations will certainly create a strain on defence industrial relations and will 
have an impact on the ‘partnership’ ethos. It is going to be a hard sell for the MoD to be 
urging for greater partnership from Industry, while at the same time having to renege on 
its commitments on previous and current defence contracts.  
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These developments in defence will have a major impact on defence industrial relations 
for the next few decades. It is too early to say how this will impact the move to 
partnership. Partnership may be the tool to ease the transition towards leaner defence 
acquisition or it may break under the strains of the conflicting interests in profit verse 
value for money. 
 
2.6 Summary 
The privatisation of the defence industry by the Thatcher government in the 1980s has 
been a catalyst for change in the defence sector. Privatisation returned the way defence 
equipment is developed and acquired, by government, back to its original space in the 
private sector. This industrial change forced the restructuring of the defence sector, 
beginning with the consolidation of the national defence industry. 
  
In a market-based industry, the MoD was forced to review its role as a customer and its 
position as a monopsonist. With the power of being a single buyer, and at a time when 
defence spending was at a low, due to the post-Cold War era, the MoD used its regulatory 
powers to create competition within the defence sector. It changed the type of contracts 
it used for defence acquisition from the ‘gold-plated’ cost-plus approach to competitive 
pricing. Commentators of this change believed that this signalled the end of the ‘cosy 
relationship’ between the MoD and industry. 
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Due to the monopolistic nature of the national defence industry, MoD followed a policy of 
economic liberalisation. It sought and encouraged bids from foreign companies interested 
in entering the UK defence industry. These competitive pressures and the reduction of 
defence spending had a profound effect on the national defence industry. Some defence 
companies decided to divest their defence business, enter strategic alliances with other 
national or foreign-owned companies, or commit investment to the global defence 
industry. 
 
The larger UK defence companies became competitive in the global defence sector and 
gained considerable power in the national defence industry. This balanced the MoD-
Industry relationship, to one where a monopsonist was dealing with mainly monopolist 
sectors. The relationship turned adversarial. The MoD tried to use its powers to exert time 
and cost pressures on industry and in turn, industry used their expertise to extract greater 
amount of investment and transfer more risk.  
 
The MoD recognised in the late 1990s and early 2000s that this had to change. This 
created the introduction of the Smart Procurement Initiative and later the Smart 
Acquisition Principles. The introduction of IPTs and the CADMID lifecycle resulted from 
these policy initiatives.  
 
The Defence Industrial Strategy in 2005 and Enabling Acquisition Change in 2006 reviewed 
how the MoD delivers its acquisition projects and recommended certain organisational 
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restructuring. This resulted in the MoD describing its desire to work collaboratively with 
industry using a Prime Contractor arrangement and IPT mechanism. The creation of DE&S 
is supposed to facilitate a more coherent organisation working with IPTs to facilitate 
collaboration with industry.  
 
DE&S was successfully established and is continuing its operations as the organisation 
responsible for managing the acquisition process, as a whole. It uses the IPT mechanisms 
to manage individual defence projects, and clusters them into TLCM groupings. While the 
IPTs provide a structural advantage to managing the acquisition process, the case study by 
Kebede et al. (2009) provides evidence for some concerns in terms of the way it 
engenders its aim of collaboration with industry. 
 
The Gray (2009) report criticised some of the changes made in the conception of the 
DE&S, specifically the role it plays in the MoD, its leadership structure and some issues of 
accountability. The MoD (2010) while accepting that more work needs to be undertaken 
to create the desired performance of the DE&S, on the whole rejected a number of the 
recommendations made by the Gray report.  
 
However, it is clear that the MoD will be facing some major changes to its structure under 
the current coalition government of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, who are 
looking to make savings for their programme of reducing the national budget deficits. It is 
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clear in speeches by the Defence Secretary, Dr. Liam Fox, that the restructuring of the 
MoD is one area of change.  
 
Some of the comments made by the Defence Secretary had similarities to the 
recommendations made in the Gray Report. The decentralisation of the MoD and the 
restructuring of the top rank in the organisation seemed to be in synch with the Gray 
Report recommendations. While it is most likely the DE&S will continue to exist as it is 
(especially due to the time and money put into its establishment) its relationship with the 
MoD is likely to change.  
  
The introduction of NEC has created a number of challenges for defence acquisition. The 
MoD is assessing how NEC can be fully implemented as part of the UK’s defence 
capability. The change from a platform-centric to network-centric equipment programme 
has created a number of technical and acquisition challenges for the MoD. 
  
In terms of the acquisition challenges, the major challenge is how the flexible and rapid 
pace of NEC technological change can work with Smart Acquisition principles. The 
CADMID process is known for its long-term, through-life focus; it is not clear how this 
process would work with NEC acquisition. There are also issues as to how IPT clusters 
would share information for NEC systems, where intellectual proprietary may belong to 
more than one company.   
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The MoD is facing dynamic and immediate operational requirements; change is an 
important part of being able to deal with emerging threats. What the MoD requires from 
procurement projects can change from its inception to when it is scheduled for service. It 
is important that flexibility in the contract allows for negotiation with suppliers on 
adjustments.  
 
These changes, however, need to be appropriately costed and provide value for money. 
The MoD feels that it needs to create a collaborative relationship with prime contractors, 
specifically using an IPT mechanism, in the defence acquisition process in order to fully 
utilise this new method of contracting. 
 
The challenge is how the MoD facilitates a truly collaborative relationship with its primes 
after decades of adversarial contractual relations. It also becomes a greater challenge 
under the financial pressures the Coalition government finds itself in. SDSR2010 has 
outlined the cuts in the defence budget, facing the MoD, which will result from cutting, 
scaling back or renegotiating defence programmes.  
 
Therefore, the answer offered to the research question posed in the introduction section 
of this chapter is: the transaction between the MoD and Industry is dependent on the 
acquisition policies followed by the MoD and the processes implemented. The changes in 
defence policy over time have transformed defence acquisition from one where there was 
a ‘cosy relationship’ with industry to an ‘adversarial relationship’. Recently, the MoD has 
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made certain efforts to move to a more ‘collaborative relationship’ with industry. This 
research will ascertain the success of such a policy.     
  
An investigation of the economic arguments for collaboration can aid understanding on 
why it may be an important change in acquisition policy. The contribution of this paper to 
knowledge and research will be in an analysis of these economic arguments. The research 
will look at the defence acquisition process using the economic factors that represent it.  
 
This thesis will also present some ideas as to how the collaborative agenda for defence 
can be attained. The contribution of changes in defence policy – such as IPTs, the CADMID 
process and TLCM – to creating collaboration will be investigated looking at historical 
documentation. This will allow us to understand what changes are needed, if any, how 
these changes may be implemented and what difficulties may arise. 
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3 The Economics of Defence Procurement Policy 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
Having described a brief history of UK defence acquisition; the focus of the thesis turns to 
a discussion of alternative economic theories applied to defence procurement policy. 
Defence procurement has been a focus for several economic theories. Economic theory 
desires to explain the structural and philosophical aspects of human engagement with 
respect to monetary exchanges. The question in this chapter is, thus: Which economic 
theory can be best applied to understanding defence procurement? 
 
The focus of the economics of defence procurement policy is to understand the structural 
and philosophical aspects of the organisational engagement of the MoD (in the UK 
perspective) and Industry. This research favours the application of Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) principles to defence procurement. Through providing alternative 
approaches to TCE, it will be argued that the strengths of applying TCE to defence 
procurement out-weights alternative economic theory.    
 
The discussion will begin by reviewing the general economic arguments in defence 
procurement policy. The focus will then move to recent examples of discussions on the 
economics of defence procurement policy. The economic principles of competition 
theory, principal-agent theory, and game theory have been chosen as alternatives to TCE, 
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as they are the most frequently applied theories to defence procurement. The use of 
these economic theories in defence procurement policy will be addressed. 
  
TCE plays an important role in defence procurement policy. The theoretical basis of TCE 
will be presented, in greater detail, in the following chapter. In this chapter the focus will 
be to critique studies which have used TCE for defence procurement in order to see what 
lessons can be learnt from the authors approaches. The purpose of structuring the thesis 
in this way is to provide first a comparative discussion of the economics of defence 
procurement and then to look at greater detail (in Chapter 4) the TCE approach used in 
this research.  
  
3.2 Economic Description of Defence 
3.2.1 Uncertainty in Defence Markets 
There are three seminal works on the economics of defence procurement policy. These 
are Hitch and McKean (1960), Peck and Scherer (1962) and Williamson (1967). The 
authors lay out the economic nature of defence. While they speak mainly of the US case, 
it can be equally applied to the similar transactional context of the UK. The discussions 
vary from the value of using economic analysis for defence procurement, uncertainties 
which exist in defence production, the market-based transactions, to the contract design 
of the exchange of products and services.  
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Hitch and McKean (1960, p.4) provide the foundations for an economic analysis of 
defence. They state ‘national security, from the point of view of an economist, may be 
said to depend on three things: (1) the quantity of national resources available; (2) the 
proportion of these resources allocated to national security purposes; and (3) the 
efficiency with which the resources so allocated are used’. The aim of this research is 
based mainly on the third point of efficient use of resources in defence procurement. 
 
The authors support the basis of applying economic analysis to defence strongly. They 
argue that it is not merely an administrative question to be solved using management 
theory, but that there are alternatives to the approach of managing the resources of the 
State in the pursuit of national security, which needs to be analysed using an economic 
perspective. It seems their analysis is based on the view that management theory is 
limited to the appropriate use of available resources, whereas economic theory describes 
choices to be made in deploying the resources to alternative outcomes. 
 
As such, Hitch and McKean (1960, p.118) explain ‘the essence of economic choice in 
military planning is not quantitative analysis: calculation may or may not be necessary or 
useful, depending upon the problem and what is known about it. The essential thing is the 
comparison of all relevant alternatives from the point of view of the objectives each can 
accomplish and the cost which it involves; and the selection of the best (or a “good”) 
alternative through the use of appropriate economic criteria’. 
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It is, therefore, as applied to this research, a question of what is the best possible way for 
the MoD to procure goods and services from the supplier. This leads to several alternative 
routes of procurement, supply agreements, requirements and so on. The economic 
analysis is thus in the choice of these alternative routes, which can deliver ‘value for 
money’ for the MoD. In this, lies the justification for using an economic approach for 
defence procurement – specifically, alternative choices in resource allocation in defence 
procurement.     
 
This choice of alternative use of resources is not as straight forward as it may seem. The 
choice is impacted by uncertainties in defence markets. These uncertainties make it 
difficult to make informed decisions of the alternative routes available in defence 
procurement policy. It is impossible for humans to calculate all contingencies in the 
uncertain defence market. There is then a risk in any decisions taken that unforeseen 
events may take place, which adversely affect the decision taken.  
 
Peck and Scherer (1962, p.17) define uncertainty as ‘the relative unpredictability of the 
outcome of a contemplated action’. What makes the economics of defence different to 
any other economic process? Peck and Scherer (1962, p.17) believe ‘…uncertainty is a 
pervasive feature of all economic activity, and most of the uncertainties in weapons 
acquisition have their commercial counterparts. But there is uniqueness in both the 
magnitude and the diverse sources of uncertainty in weapons acquisition’. Uncertainty is 
seen to be at the centre of the economics of defence.  
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The magnitude of the uncertainty is characterised by the lengthy process of defence 
contracting. This uncertainty pervades the product lifecycle of the defence equipment. 
Defence products such as fighter aircraft, nuclear submarines, and helicopters and so on, 
can take up to 20 years to enter service and can be expected to stay in service up to 50 
years. 
  
The lengthy production and service time’s puts a great amount of uncertainty on the 
efficacy of the product in a changing operational environment. The strategic uncertainties 
may mean that a certain weapon may no longer be appropriate in a new terrain or 
operation.  
 
The diversity of the uncertainty in defence acquisition can be seen in all aspects of the 
process. Starting with the threat, in a complex international political framework it is 
difficult to predict where the threat may come from. We may identify certain nations 
which pose a threat to our security, but it is difficult to say what may take that threat 
towards a direct attack on the nation, allies or interests. It is also uncertain for those in 
charge of procuring weaponry at which point the civilian government will decide action is 
required to confront the threats.  
 
Those who are charged with deciding the requirements of the Armed Forces face political 
uncertainty. Political uncertainty is only one facet of the uncertainties facing defence 
acquisition; there are uncertainties in contracting process, the supplier, the technology, 
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the cost, time and performance etc. The magnitude of the uncertainty intensifies and 
creates greater risk. 
 
Peck and Scherer (1962, p.24) make these points by explaining the uncertainty in two 
dimensions: internal and external uncertainty. ‘Internal (or technological) uncertainties 
relate to the possible incidence of unforeseen technical difficulties in the development of 
a specific weapon systems. External uncertainties relate to factors external to an 
individual project and yet affecting the course and outcome of the project, they originate 
in the pace of technological change in weaponry, changes in strategic requirements, and 
shifts in government policy’. 
 
Williamson (1967) concentrates his efforts on the contractual uncertainties of defence 
acquisition. Williamson (1967, p.222) explains ‘what I want to call attention to is that it is 
not merely cost uncertainty, but uncertainty together with large size, that is responsible 
for the large financial risk associated with defence contracts’. Williamson, like Peck and 
Scherer, points to the size of the uncertainty.  
 
Peck and Scherer (1962, p.44) go one step further by suggesting it is not only that the 
uncertainty increases with the number of contracts in defence, but it is also unique in 
nature to defence. It does not exist elsewhere in the economy. We therefore have the 
magnitude, diversity of cause and uniqueness of the uncertainty, which makes the 
economics of defence separate to any other. 
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3.2.2 Contract Mechanisms  
As with any economic activity there must be a buyer and seller. In the case of defence this 
is rather straightforward in that the buyer is usually a single source. This is the case in the 
UK, and also in the US. Peck and Scherer (1962, p.49) explain ‘there is in this country but 
one ultimate consumer of advanced weapons, the United States Government’. 
 
This point has been discussed in length in Chapter 2 with regards to the UK case. The 
monpsonistic and monopolist nature of the defence economy plays a great role in the 
varying economic theories of defence, as will be discussed in the next section. Exports 
may provide an alternative source for the seller; however this is regulated by government 
and is mainly for the purpose of off-loading surplus production in order to reduce 
production costs. The government is able to withhold any defence products it deems of 
strategic importance, from the international market.   
 
The private enterprise of defence production has been a more regular form of defence 
economy in the US, rather than the UK, in the last century. Peck and Scherer (1962, 57) 
describe the transaction involved in the US defence acquisition. ‘… The price of a weapon 
system is not determined by market competition. Instead, the price is largely determined 
by reimbursement of costs actually experienced plus a fee bargained for in advance’. 
Deciphering the price, after the production, creates a great amount of difficulty for the 
buyer.  
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The fact that private enterprise is unable to raise the large capital required (specifically 
during the 20th Century) to fund the production of defence equipment is an important 
factor in defence economics. It leads to Peck and Scherer (1962) arguing ‘it is not only that 
a market system does not now exist in the weapons acquisition process. We can state the 
proposition more strongly. A market system in its entirety can never exist for the 
acquisition of weapons’.  
 
This is due to the fact that the pure market system provides a clear division between the 
seller and buyer, the producer and consumer. I specify the 20
th
 Century because there 
have been instances before that period where the state leased or bought weaponry 
(much less complex and costly than now) directly from private enterprise or individuals. In 
the 21
st
 Century we have also seen the introduction of PFI as a clear indication of targeted 
private funding of defence equipment production.  
 
However, the level of investment required to build technically complex equipment is 
unmanageable for the private sector to undertake independently. Thus, the norm is that 
defence departments invest a majority of the funds for defence projects, especially the 
procurement costs such as feasibility studies, production and manufacturing costs. 
Suppliers may invest their own funds in the project in order to gain ownership of certain 
assets. Since, the investment requirements of major defence projects in the 21
st
 century 
are of the level unaffordable to the private sector, this supports Peck and Scherer (1962) 
proposition of a pseudo-market system in defence.    
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Nevertheless, there is still the issue of how the buyer ascertains the true price of the 
product. This is done through a contracting process, where the transacting parties agree 
to the conditions of the exchange. Williamson (1967) addresses the economics of defence 
contracting by discussing two specific contracting processes popular in the US and UK, at 
the time of his writing, cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts and incentive contracts. These 
days in the UK cost-plus contracts are rarely used, instead it is more common to see 
incentive-based and firm- or fixed- price contracts. It is, however, important to highlight 
how Williamson (1967) provides the economic argument for contracting. 
 
Williamson (1967, p.222) explains ‘the overriding justification of CPFF contracts is that of 
cost uncertainty. A degree of uncertainty pervades all R-and-D work, and early production 
runs frequently involve product modifications and technique developments that render 
cost estimation on these items difficult’. The major reason for CPFF is to protect the 
supplier from ruin. The alternative would be to give the supplier a portfolio of defence 
contracts or large profits in order to protect themselves from bankruptcy. The alternatives 
are not politically favoured in the US and thus CPFF provides for a risk-aversion 
mechanism (Williamson 1967, pp.222-223).  
 
Peck and Scherer (1962, p.206) point to the disadvantage of CPFF. ‘Throughout the 
weapons industry the use of cost reimbursement contracts makes economies of scale less 
decisive than in commercial operations. Under such contracts the firm with higher costs 
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because of its size can pass such costs on to government, if the buyer either does not 
recognize these costs or is willing to bear them’. 
 
The issue with cost-plus contracting is that it is perceived as encouraging ‘gold plating’. 
The contractor will do all that they can to increase the costs to ensure a greater return. 
There are no incentives to reducing the expenditure of the project. Williamson (1967, 
p.228) explains ‘… it has long been recognized that overruns have been excessive and that 
incentives for cost control have been weak under the CPFF form of contracting, as a 
remedy for this condition, incentive-fee contracts have been employed’.  
 
Incentive fee contracting places some of the risk towards the contractor. The contractor 
gains the savings when the project is within or below cost and is responsible for the costs 
if it overruns. It is in the interest of the contractor to be economical when planning their 
expenditure. The efficacy of the incentive-fee contract, for the buyer, thus no longer lies 
on the production side, but on the negotiating power.  
 
The risk of cost escalation may be averted by incentivising the seller; however, the issue 
turns to the effectiveness of target cost estimations. Williamson (1967, p.230) explains 
‘although an underestimation bias exists when CPPF contracts are in force, an 
overestimation bias may operate when incentive-fee contracts are used; for the greater 
the differential between negotiated target costs and true expected costs, the larger the 
potential profit return to the contractor’.  
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The incentive-fee contract sets up the bargaining situation between the buyer and seller. 
The buyer has a great deal of negotiating power due to its position as a monopsonist. The 
seller, however, can rely upon the scarcity of competition to drive a hard bargain. 
Williamson (1962, p.232) points out that the US Services (procurement agencies for the 
Armed Forces) are at a disadvantage due to ‘… inferior status is generally imputed to the 
civil servant relative to his counterpart in private industry’. This makes bargaining, even in 
a position of superiority through monopsony, a difficulty.  
 
3.3 Applying Economic Theory to Defence 
3.3.1 Economic and Formal Contractual Relationships 
Cullen and Hickman’s (2001) conceptual paper discusses contractual arrangements and 
their effects on collaboration between buyer and supplier. They use a case study of the 
Aerospace sector, mainly in the defence industry. The use of IPTs as a mechanism for 
contractual relations is a central part of their study. They use TCE as one of their economic 
theories to describe contractual relations, as well as using the principal-agent theory, and 
extensions to both these theories. The basis of their paper is to argue that the English 
commercial contract law with its characteristics based on an arms length relation is 
incompatible to the collaborative nature of IPTs.  
 
TCE is a theory developed by Oliver Williamson, as an extension of Ronald Coase study of 
The Nature of the Firm, looking at the way transactions occur within the firm and across 
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markets. The aim is to understand the elements involved in the exchange of goods or 
services between a buyer and supplier. Williamson outlines a number of factors affecting 
the transactions, within the firm and across the market, and develops this over time to 
include environmental conditions and human behaviour assumptions.  
 
In terms of the environmental conditions affecting a transaction are uncertainties, asset 
specificity and frequency and the behavioural assumptions are that of bounded rationality 
and opportunism. These environmental conditions and behavioural assumptions interact 
in the transaction and can lead to an ‘organisational failure’ problem.  
 
The transacting bodies can follow a variety of transaction governance frameworks from 
market, hybrid to hierarchical governance in order to install contractual safeguards in the 
transaction to counter-act the hazards created by the environmental conditions and 
human behavioural assumptions. As such this all takes place under the institutional 
context (or as Williamson called it ‘atmosphere) in which the transaction is placed 
(Williamson 1975, 1981, 1985). This theory will be explored in greater detail in the 
following chapter, as it is the basis on which this research relies upon. 
 
 The Principal-Agent theory, on the other hand, is an expression of the relationship 
between a principal who seeks an agent, with specialist knowledge or due to the reason 
that the task requires coordinated action. The theory is then based on the alignment of 
interests between the principal and the agent. Since, the principal may have conflicting 
 - 114 -  
interests with the agent, whom may have his/her own interests at heart, or that such 
interests may not be efficiently delivered by the agent.  
 
Therefore, the principal will seek to create incentives for the agent to align its interests 
with that of the principals. The challenge then becomes how the principal can effectively 
design such incentives and the adverse selection and moral hazards which need to be 
mitigate in these incentive mechanisms. The principal-agent exchange (e.g. shareholder 
and manager or manager and worker) is based on hierarchical control under conditions of 
information asymmetry and the conflict of each party seeking to maximise their own self-
interest (Moe, 1984, pp.755-757).     
 
Cullen and Hickman (2001) use TCE as a way of explaining how a bilateral relation prevails 
and how in such situations defence transactions can be understood in terms of 
uncertainty/complexity etc. The principal-agent theory, however, is used to discuss the 
effectiveness of the contract in creating (or inducing) a collaborative relationship. Their 
main argument is that the situation, which the IPTs are placed in, creates a conflicting 
atmosphere between collaboration and contracting, which assumes failure to deliver. This 
results in a less open relationship between the MoD and the prime in the IPT.  
 
The threat of claims being made against the prime due to observable delays and other 
performance criteria, whilst in a transparent IPT environment, is of great concern to the 
authors. Cullen and Hickman (p.531, 2001) explain ‘however, if they [the prime 
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contractor] do not reveal their fears and they manage to put their programme back on 
track, unless the product that they ultimately deliver is defective, they will not have 
exposed themselves to a risk of a contract claim as they have withheld information from 
the other party’.  
 
This suggests the MoD would use the IPT mechanism as a monitoring mechanism. The 
prime would in this environment be risking a claim for not meeting contractual 
obligations. It would therefore be in the interest of the prime to limit or withhold 
information, in certain areas, to the MoD. This would damage the collaborative nature of 
the IPT and would limit its effectiveness. Thus, the authors point to the conflict between 
collaboration and contractual controls. 
 
It is an assumption by Cullen and Hickman (2001) that the purpose of the IPTs is to 
monitor the primes. No evidence of that has been presented by the authors, nor has this 
been an espoused aim by the MoD. Secondly, if the programme is completed in the long 
run, and the recovery is successful, the MoD will have no basis on which to make a legal 
claim. As delivery of the project would already have been discussed beforehand at 
conception, or would be under continuous assessment between the MoD and its primes. 
As such, the MoD would already be privy to the information which the authors claim they 
seek.  
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A second example given by Cullen and Hickman (2001), for the problems of contracting 
and collaboration, is one of new product development. Proprietary rights of innovative 
products during the production phase, which the prime discovers and wants to keep 
secret. They argue that as the new ‘innovative’ idea is not part of the contractual 
obligations of the prime, they may seek to keep this hidden from the MoD, which would 
be difficult in an IPT situation.  
 
This situation may be due to the fact that the MoD provides the investment in the 
production phase. They therefore may have an IPR claim for any new product 
development, which results from this investment. The primes would want to exploit the 
new product development, which they may argue was not in the contractual terms. This 
creates a conflict, which exists only in the case of the IPT mechanism where the staff from 
the MoD would be able to identify such opportunities.  
 
Cullen and Hickman (2001) thus highlight the difficulty of sharing data and space between 
buyer and supplier. There are conflicting desires, and while sharing information may 
reduce transaction costs it may also create opportunistic behaviour, they argue. It would 
seem asymmetry of information provides some protection for the prime.  
 
One can argue that if the primes were worried about such issues they would not enter 
into the collaborative working arrangements of an IPT in the first place. Since the primes 
under prime contracting possess greater control and influence on investments and 
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proprietary rights, in return for greater risk-sharing in the contract. Therefore, the fact 
that the MoD is aware of the product does not necessarily disadvantage the prime, as is 
assumed by the authors. 
 
I suggest that Cullen and Hickman (2001) concentrate their efforts too much on how the 
contractual arrangements of ‘English commercial contract law’ will negatively impact on 
collaboration, rather than discussing how commercial contracts can be written to further 
collaboration and reduce organisational failure. They do suggest, however, a ‘code of 
conduct’ which would preside over the rules of engagement in IPTs, in order to create a 
tradition of trust.   
 
3.3.2 Porter’s Five Competitive Forces 
Braddon and Hartley (2007) approach the aerospace industry (military and civilian) with a 
different economic perspective. They look at the competitive forces driving the UK 
aerospace industry. Braddon and Hartley (2007, p.716) explain ‘the UK aerospace industry 
is highly imperfect comprising domestic monopolies in military and civil aircraft (BAE 
Systems), helicopters (AgustaWestland) and engines (Rolls-Royce), a duopoly in missiles 
(MBDA; Thales: Racal and Short Missiles Systems) and oligopoly in the equipment sector 
(BAE Avionics; Thales; Smiths; Cobham)’.  
 
 - 118 -  
The study by Braddon and Hartley (2007) assesses ‘Porters five competitive forces model’ 
for the aerospace industry. Braddon and Hartley (2007, p.718) suggest ‘the UK aerospace 
industry has at least three intense competitive forces, namely, powerful buyers in both 
military (government) and civil markets (prime contractors), fierce competitive rivalry and 
substitute products: hence the prediction that UK aerospace will have few firms which are 
very profitable for long periods’.  
 
Porter’s (1980, p.4, f.1.1) five competitive forces model has industry competitors at the 
centre of the model, with potential entrants, suppliers, buyers and substitutes impacting 
competition. He explains ‘the goal of competitive strategy for a business unit in an 
industry is to find a position in the industry where the company can best defend itself 
against these competitive forces or can influence them in its favor’.    
 
Braddon and Hartley (2007) assess these competitive forces using statistical indicators for 
the period 1980 to 2000. The indicators they look at are: labour productivity, output, size 
of firms, development time-scales, labour hoarding, exports and profitability. These 
indicators are used to identify the UK aerospace industry strength as compared to the 
USA, within the EU and other rivals. It is clear that the military market plays a major role in 
the competitiveness of the industry as a whole.  
 
Braddon and Hartley (2007) conclude ‘the UK aerospace industry is the largest in the EU. 
The USA is the UK industry’s major rival and provides the ‘benchmark’ for assessing its 
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performance. On this basis and using the indicators reviewed in this article, the UK 
industry improved its competitiveness over the period 1980 to 2000’. It is important, 
especially in the military market, that the UK aerospace industry can be competitive in the 
global market.  
 
Export is an important part of the defence industry; it allows UK market leaders to take 
advantage of surplus production and allows the government to offset production costs. 
Hartley (1997, p.45) explains ‘the UK defence equipment industry is a major exporter, 
achieving a substantial surplus on its balance of trade. Aerospace dominated defence 
exports, averaging 85% of total defence export sales over the period 1990-95 with the 
Middle East as a major export market (e.g. Al Yamamah contract with Saudi Arabia)’. 
 
The competitiveness of the UK defence industry in the global market plays an important 
role on the national buyer-supplier dimensions. This has become especially true in recent 
years, where the dominance of large UK defence suppliers, such as BAE Systems, has been 
pronounced. However, the MoD is able to influence BAE Systems activities in export using 
its regulatory powers. BAE Systems, for its part, has become a multinational organisation 
and is able to use that as leverage in its home markets (UK, US, Saudi Arabia, Australia and 
India).   
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3.3.3 A Game Theory Approach 
Gardener and Moffat (2008) from Defence Science & Technology Laboratory explore how 
game theory can be used to understand the prevailing ‘conspiracy of optimism’ in defence 
acquisition.  
 
The ‘conspiracy of optimism’ Gardener and Moffat (2008, p.226) explain is ‘… a potential 
source of poor behaviours in some acquisition programmes, whereby the uncertainty of 
the acquisition environment can be exploited by both sides for short-term gain. This has 
effects similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which the rational strategy for any player is to 
defect from the common good; here the rational view must be short term focussed 
although this is very much at the expense of behaviour which would benefit the whole 
community’.  
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a non-zero sum game which results in a greater or less 
than zero outcomes. Thus, two actors may not cooperate in the game even where it is in 
their interest to do so. In game theory non-zero sum games represent social-economic 
questions (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953, p.504), such as the one Gardner and 
Moffat (2008) represent in the conspiracy of optimism.  
 
Gardner and Moffat (2008) suggest optimism-bias creates the cost and time overruns 
which plagues the defence acquisition programmes. It is also what creates the adversarial 
nature of defence acquisition. In its desire to create a more collaborative partnership the 
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MoD needs to identify the reasons behind the optimism-bias. The study by Gardener and 
Moffat (2008) provides an explanation looking at the acquisition process at the point of 
equipment planning.  
 
This is at the point where decisions are taken to procure the equipment. This point is 
where the ‘Capability Goals’ flows to ‘Current Capability’ creating the ‘Unidentified 
Capability Gap’. Gardener and Moffat (2008, p.226) state ‘the point at which the 
unidentified gaps become identified, and by whom, is a critical question which lies at the 
heart of trust and communication between integrated customer-supplier project teams. 
The obsolescence rate drains the current capabilities tank in a predictable way’. 
 
When the capability gap has been identified and is ready to be exploited, it is up to the 
MoD and Industry to decide the structure of the programme. Gardener and Moffat (2008, 
p.227) explain ‘in the very broadest terms both MOD and Industry make a choice between 
a realistic strategy or an optimistic strategy when it comes to estimates of performance, 
time and cost for a given project’.  
 
The game they identify is a 2 by 2 matrix of the choice, by the MoD and Industry, to be 
optimistic or realistic. They identify the payoffs qualitatively for each scenario and then 
transform this into numerical format using a mathematical formula which identifies the 
‘degree of realism’, ‘threshold of credibility’, ‘real cost of a project’ to calculate getting the 
Equipment Plan and winning the bid. 
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Gardener and Moffat (2008, p.229) find ‘certainly in the case where both parties are 
knowledgeable, or where the procurement is off-the-shelf, any conspiracy of optimism 
will have little credibility’. This finding is when the ‘threshold of credibility’ is at 95%; 
several games take place at differing levels of credibility.  
 
The ‘threshold of credibility’, denoted as r, is linked to uncertainty. Gardener and Moffat 
(2008, p.229) explain ‘as the level of uncertainty (corresponding to the value of the 
parameter r) varies, we in fact have a family of such games, and we investigated the 
change in payoff to the players as a function of r’.  
 
Uncertainty plays an important role in the way the transacting parties behave. As was 
suggested, when there are higher levels of uncertainty the parties feel they will gain from 
acting opportunistically and creating an optimism-bias. This optimism-bias then distorts 
the cost, time and user requirement targets for a defence project. 
 
Gardener and Moffat (2008, p.230) conclude ‘with certain incentives, the rational strategy 
is to be overly optimistic at the initial stages of a project. Discussion of how pay-offs may 
be changed to influence behaviour in desirable directions has identified uncertainty as a 
key factor. Uncertain contexts provide more opportunity for unreality or optimism in time 
and cost estimates’. 
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While game theory can provide a sense of understanding for the motivations of the 
optimism-bias and what the optimal choice in the game should be; it provides little in 
terms of a solution to the problem. In that, these games are given as pre-determined 
moves rather than changeable situations. This research instead approaches UK defence 
acquisition with the view that by identifying characteristics of the acquisition process, 
recommendations can be made for changes to be made. 
             
3.4 Applying TCE to Defence Acquisition 
3.4.1 TCE in MoD Supply Chain Management 
Humphries and Wilding (2001; 2004a; 2004b) undertook lengthy research on the supply 
chain management of the MoD supply base which involved ‘54 monopolistic, two party 
relationships’ between the MoD and its suppliers. Questionnaires were given to 600 staff 
(including MoD and Industry) and a semi-structured interview with 115 team leaders, 
were undertaken using Williamson’s (1975) framework (Humphries and Wilding, 2004b). 
Williamson’s (1975) framework was adapted by transforming the negative aspects into 
positive proxies, such as changing opportunism into reliability (Humphries and Wilding, 
2001; 2004b). 
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The authors phrased their questionnaire in order to identify the framework in terms of 
the level of negativity in the response to their ‘positive’ questions. Humphries and Wilding 
(2001) list their five dimensions in the questionnaire which they apply in their pilot 
project, as shown in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Humphries and Wilding (2001, pp. 85-88) outlines the ‘drivers that lead to the adoption of 
supply chain management’ which are: search of flexibility, SCM Relationships, Partnering 
for Supply Chain Success and Partnering in Practice. Humphries and Wilding (2001, p.91) 
explain ‘the main obstacle is motivating chain members and company staff by 
communicating a clear vision of the benefits to be achieved in an environment of great 
complexity and uncertainty’.  
 
Humphries and Wilding (2001, p.92) justify their use of TCE by stating ‘although the 
authors can find no empirical research on the Williamson’s economic organization failure 
framework, it seems to have face validity because the factors it represents are readily 
observable in the defence procurement situation’.  
TCE Variable Humphries and Wilding (2001) Proxy 
Bounded rationality  Creativity 
Uncertainty/complexity  Stability 
Information Impactedness  Communication 
Opportunism  Reliability 
Small Numbers  Quality 
Table 3.1: Humphries and Wildings Proxies for TCE Factors 
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Humphries and Wilding (2001) study begins with a pilot project of a $40 million per year 
contract between the MoD and a monopoly supplier of aircraft spare parts and provision 
of repair services. They use the questionnaire mentioned, providing them to team leaders 
and staff on the project. This was followed-up by a 30 minute semi-structured interview 
with two team leaders (Humphries and Wilding, 2001, p.93).  
 
Using the responses Humphries and Wilding (2001) built a conceptual framework which 
mirrors Williamson’s organisational failures framework. Their conceptual framework uses 
the key word responses to represent each of Williamsons TCE factors. Of the findings 
Humphries and Wilding (2001) point out ‘… the lowest scoring aspect (stability and 
reliability) especially highlight a mutual lack of confidence and trust and explain the poor 
performance against the contract. Although the communication dimension rated 58%, 
both team leaders mentioned the poor quality of shared data and their fear that the other 
party would use honest performance figures as a weapon against them’.  
 
Humphries and Wilding classification method is, in my view, problematic. It can be 
contested that the ‘positive’ elements that they have assigned do not provide the 
opposite and equal meaning to the ‘negative’ classification of the original Williamson 
(1975) framework. For example; Williamson (1975) suggests ‘…information problems can 
develop even when parties have identical information and, a fortiori, if information 
differences exist’. Humphries and Wildings (2001) labelling of the ‘positive’ element of 
information impactedness being ‘communication’ seems to be inconsistent with TCE. 
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The existence of communication does not necessarily remove the problem of information 
impactedeness. To explain this further, there are two cases of communication which can 
lead to misrepresentation. The first; information can be deliberately misrepresented by 
being erroneous or incomplete information. The second case is a lack of accuracy in 
‘forecasting’ information which the authors have included in this dimension.  
 
These examples clearly point out that communication can occur, however information 
impactedness still remains, communication cannot represent the opposite effect of 
information impactedness.  The other four classifications can also be deconstructed in a 
similar manner; therefore the questionnaires do not, in my view, provide an accurate 
representation of the Williamson (1975) framework, as suggested by Humphries and 
Wilding (2001).  
 
If the so called ‘positive’ elements do not represent the TCE organisational framework, 
Humphries and Wilding (2001; 2004b) can not make generalisations from their 
questionnaires, only assumptions. However, Humphries and Wilding (2001; 2004a; 2004b) 
do provide a clear and concise discussion of how the TCE framework can apply to the 
defence acquisition case, even if their methodology seems some what flawed. 
 
Humphries and Wilding (2004a) develop the theory further using the finding of the pilot 
project. They identify the changes in the way the MoD does business with Industry in 
terms of the principles of TCE. Humphries and Wilding (2004a, p.101-102) suggest the 
 - 127 -  
consequences of ending the ‘cosy relationship with industry’ is that ‘in seeking to obtain 
public expenditure value for money the UK MoD attempts to drive down industry’s profit 
to a “reasonable” level, and in turn the contractor attempts to inflate the view of his costs 
to ensure the best possible rate of return’.  
 
This situation mirrors that of Williamson’s (1962) explanation of introducing incentive-fee 
contracts in place of CPFF. In that situation, the contractor reacts to the change in 
contracting terms by overestimating costs to ensure they gain on virtual savings. The 
economic problem in the desire to bring the contractor in line with the buyer’s 
expectation is identified as information impactedness by Humphries and Wilding (2004a, 
p.102). This then creates a situation of bounded rationality, where industry loses its 
incentive to perform better and MoD reduces the resources available. The consequence is 
an adversarial relationship between Industry and MoD (Humphries and Wilding, 2001, 
p.102).    
   
Humphries and Wilding (2004a) explain the reasons for the lack of positive outcome in the 
study. Humphries and Wilding (2004a, p.107) suggest ‘information impactedness and 
bounded rationality have been added as negative influences. The model defines “reduced 
propensity to leave” as a significant outcome. However, in a UK DP [Defence 
Procurement] monopoly neither side is free to quit and this would instead provide a 
further negative input to relationship commitment and exclude the beneficial influence of 
relationship termination costs’.   
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Humphries and Wilding (2004b) build on the pilot project and extend it to encompass a 
larger sample of respondents and projects. The ‘exploratory research’ of 54 monopolistic, 
two-party relationships, surveying 600 staff and 115 team-leader semi-structured 
interviews was undertaken. The same theoretical framework using Humphries and 
Wilding (2001) five dimensions was applied to the questionnaires and interviews, and the 
findings are explained below.  
As predicted by the model, lack of investment in specific assets such as workforce stability and 
product/process development, the use of inadequate performance measures, opportunistically 
providing poor goods and services, and using proprietary information as a weapon, reduced the 
chances of achieving interdependence and equitable outcomes. On the other hand, despite the 
adverse monopolistic influences, strong counterbalancing, positive business drivers were able to 
produce examples of relationship-building, specific investments, co-operative behaviour, open 
communications and a desire to reduce the burden of governance through more equitable, long-
term arrangements. 
 
(Humphries and Wilding 2001, pp.266-267) 
 
Humphries and Wilding (2001; 2004a; 2004b) use the TCE framework as a process to 
explain the economic nature of a monopolistic supply chain. They attempt to show the 
factors which greatly affect the relationship between the MoD and Industry, using their 
five dimensions developed from the TCE organisational failures framework.  
 
The study highlights the unique nature of the defence economics that it exists between 
monopoly and monopsony pairings. This particular aspect makes the industrial relations 
an interesting area of economic analysis. While, the findings of their research provide 
interesting insight into UK defence procurement their application of TCE is, in my view, 
over-stretched.  
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3.4.2 Transaction Costs in US Defence Acquisition 
There are more cases of a transaction cost approach to defence acquisition in the U.S as 
compared to the UK. This is to be expected as TCE originates from the US and is more 
widely accepted there. Masten et al. (1991) test the make-or-buy decision in Naval 
Shipbuilding and, Crocker and Reynolds (1993) look at contractual completeness in Air 
Force engine procurement contracts. 
 
A more recent application of TCE in defence acquisition practice is a paper by Melese et 
al. (2007), which applies TCE to the US defence acquisition practice. Melese et al. (2007) 
focus their attention specifically on the question of how TCE can explain and reduce cost 
growth in US defence spending. Franck and Melese (2008) follow-up the 2007 paper with 
a discussion on the make-or-buy dilemma in defence for which TCE, they suggest, is well 
placed to answer.  
 
Furthermore, they explain a second desire, if buy is the answer to the dilemma, how can 
the US Department of Defence (DoD) ensure a ‘better outcome for taxpayers and the 
military’. This is the value for money question posed in UK MoD projects. Angelis et al. 
(2009) build on the theoretical work with a study exploring transaction costs on DoD cost 
estimates.        
 
Masten et al. (1999) case of Naval Shipbuilding is an empirical test of the transaction cost 
approach. Masten et al. (1999, p.2) wanted to directly test the ‘internal organisation costs 
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in integration decisions and identify ways of overcoming the difficulties inhibiting direct 
tests of transaction-costs arguments’. 
 
They state that the basis of TCE is that the analysis of transaction costs of an 
organisational form is focused on identifying minimising costs of governing exchange 
relationships by choosing the most effective organisational arrangements (Masten et al., 
1999, p.2). They assign algebraic expressions to the internal organisation, market 
organisation, and ‘true’ cost of organisation to create mathematical expressions of the 
make-or-buy decision. Masten et al. (1999, p.4) explain ‘the resulting model is amenable 
to qualitative choice estimation techniques such as probit and logit’.  
 
Masten et al. (1999, p.8) apply TCE to the ‘… procurement of components and services by 
a large naval shipbuilder. Whereas previous empirical research on the determinants of 
vertical integration has dealt with manufacturing applications, the process of building a 
ship more closely resembles a construction project. Differences in the nature of 
construction and manufacturing operations, in turn, influence the circumstances that give 
rise to opportunism and that determine the level of organisation costs more generally’.  
 
The hypothesis of the research is that in the first place, the costs of human and physical 
capital specificities on internal organisations would be less than in a market organisation. 
However, it is temporal specificity which is of more consequence to the reason for 
internal organisation. In that the effective use of human and physical asset specificity is 
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reliant on the scheduling, and as such the cost for internal organisation may be of concern 
but are less than the strategic holdups in the market. 
 
The advantages of internal organisations in deploying human and physical capital 
specificities are that they are not dependant on the supplier, but in-house sourcing. As 
TCE theory suggests the cost of transaction in internal organisation is reduced since the 
exchanges are internal and are governed through hierarchical administration. In terms of 
the temporal specificities, it is clear from that, the hierarchical administration has greater 
control over scheduling as compared to out-sourcing from the market. The market as a 
whole is expected to create greater transaction costs when dealing with idiosyncratic 
investments, due to the strategic hold-up by suppliers.      
 
Using Coase’s argument, the final hypothesis is that the shipbuilders primary operation is 
the organisation of low-technology, labour intensive task and thus internal organisation 
costs should smaller and vertical integration more likely (Masten et al., 1999, p.11). 
Masten et al. (1991), however, provide a caveat in terms of the limits in testing 
transaction cost hypotheses using a ‘reduced-form equation’. Such a caveat should 
equally apply to Humphries and Wilding’s studies.  
 
Masten et al. (1999, p.20) conclude ‘the results support some but not all of the standard 
transaction-cost arguments. One of the principal findings is the temporal specificity can be 
a major determinant of organization form in some settings. The results consistently 
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indicate that the prospect of holdups where the timing of performance is critical 
represents a significant hazard of contractual exchange in construction projects and 
increases the likelihood of integrating the corresponding activities’. 
 
The results present a mixed view, while the effect of relationship-specific asset specificity 
makes integration more likely; it is primarily due to internal costs rather than market costs 
as the theory suggests. The effect of complexity on human asset specificity is antithesis to 
the theory. The physical assets specificity findings show that the cost of organisation and 
integration vary and shows a weak indication for the hypothesis (Masten et al., 1999, 
p.22). 
 
The authors suggest that explanation is elusive for this effect. However, I argue that 
Williamson viewed complexity as, on par with uncertainty, a destabilising factor in the 
contract environment and as such would drive the transacting party toward the ‘make’ 
decision. This reduces the effects of complexity and the uncertainties in the transaction, 
by allowing the hierarchical administration to manage these factors. Whereas in the 
market, the transaction will require contract safeguards to be put in place to deal with 
transacting under conditions of complexity and uncertainty.   
 
As for the physical capital asset specificity, Masten et al. (1991) found weak indications for 
a make or buy decision; as such they explain recent theory and evidence suggest a move 
towards “quasi-integration”. This hybrid form of governance is accepted as an alternative 
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form of governance mode. It may not have been appropriately captured in their research 
as they were looking at it in the form of make or buy (i.e. 0 or 1), rather than as a choice of 
alternative governance modes for transactions encompassing varied organisation 
arrangements. 
 
Masten et al. (1999, p.22) make an important point ‘… the independent variables in our 
estimations, with the exception of SCHEDULE, have their principal influence on the costs 
of internal organisation. This both illustrates the hazards of testing transaction-cost 
hypotheses using reduced-form equations and argues greater attention should be paid to 
the determinants of internal organization costs as Ronald Coase has long contended’.   
 
The authors are warning that to start of on the basis of identifying costs rather than the 
causes of costs can create a bias in the results. The determinants of transaction costs in 
internal organisations are of the same-kind as those in the market, however they manifest 
differently in these two forms of organisation. Thus, when identifying the costs it is 
important to focus on how these transaction costs impact the current form of 
organisation and how they may be affected if another form was taken – it is not given that 
changing organisational form will improve the situation. 
 
Crocker and Reynolds (1993) focus their study on the contracting process involved in an 
Air Force engine procurement contract to assess how contractual completeness impacts 
the economic costs of contractual exchange. The arguments of the extent of 
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completeness in contracts are thus explored in this research. Crocker and Reynolds (1993, 
p.128) explain:  
If all potential contingencies are covered by a total complete contract (p = 0), 
then there will be no opportunities for ex post bargaining. Alternatively, a totally 
incomplete contract (p = 1) places no strictures at all on the terms under which 
subsequent trade may be effected. Intermediate degrees of contractual 
completeness specify duties for some contingencies, perhaps the more easily 
anticipated ones, leaving the other possibilities to future resolution as events 
unfold. The degree of specificity actually chosen by the parties in a particular 
contractual setting should reflect an efficient tradeoff between the expected 
costs and benefits of contractual incompleteness.   
 
The investigation into contractual completeness looks at the possible contracting schemes 
(as shown in Crocker and Reynolds (1993, Table 1, p.130)) with varying completeness. The 
data used in the study is of engine procurement by the Air Force from Pratt and Whitney 
and General Electrics for installation in F-15 and F-16 fighters. The contract for this 
procurement used pricing mechanisms spanning all the contract types, as shown yearly 
during the period 1972 to 1991 (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993, Table 2, p.134).  
 
The case study thus presents an opportunity for a comparison looking at the transaction-
cost argument of ex-post opportunism in incomplete contracts which Crocker and 
Reynolds (1993) argue is evident in defence acquisition. This research uses algebraic 
expressions, describing the empirical relationships in the choice of contractual 
completeness as a function of the variables that shift benefit and cost schedules (Crocker 
and Reynolds, 1993, p.138). Crocker and Reynolds (1993) point to a number of 
contributions their research makes to procurement policy.      
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Our results also have several implications for procurement policy more generally. The first 
concerns the emphasis by policymakers in the mid-1980s on firm-fixed pricing in development 
contracts to constrain seller opportunism and to contain cost overruns. While more complete 
contracts certainly mitigate ex post redistributive efforts by contractors, our analysis indicates 
that such benefits may be dwarfed by the costs of drafting truly complete agreements, 
particularly in complex exchange environments. A second and related point is that procurement 
officers should be granted the latitude to craft agreements on a case-by-case basis, where the 
design of a particular contract would depend on the specifics of both the product and the 
contractors’. 
 
(Crocker and Reynolds 1993, pp.144-145) 
 
The authors’ conclude that contract incompleteness creates ex-post opportunism in the 
transaction. However, it is questionable that such behavioural assumptions can be 
measured empirically through purely contractual data. Opportunistic behaviour is difficult 
to identify due to its subjective and psychological nature, even if the authors point to rent-
seeking evidence from suppliers in past incomplete contracts.  
 
Opportunism is a more malign behaviour, which can be explained in terms of decision-
makers self-interest seeking through improper behaviour. While it is true that complete 
contracts may safeguard from opportunistic behaviours, it may be presumptuous to 
suggest that the suppliers have behaved so.    
 
In a more recent study Melese et al. (2007) apply TCE to US defence acquisition. Melese et 
al. (2007, p.357) explain ‘this article uses [TCE] to help characterise, explain, and 
ultimately reduce the cost growth that plagues many of today’s major investments in 
military capabilities’. Cost-estimating is the process in which forecasts are made in 
assessing the cost of the program or weapon system (Melese et al., 2007).  
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The recommendation of the paper is to develop a cost-estimating technique which has 
greater scope than a focus on production costs. It is argued by Melese et al. (2007) that 
transaction-costs should be taken into account when making these cost-estimates, and by 
applying TCE these costs can be better understood.  
 
It is suggested by the authors, that where production plus transaction cost savings can be 
made the make-or-buy decision is in favour of buy (i.e. outsourcing). Once such a decision 
has been made, then the questions left are what transaction costs accrue in dealing across 
the market and how these are represented by contract type. The authors go on to 
demonstrate how different transaction costs can create differing contractual 
arrangements.  
 
The uncertainty/complexity, frequency and asset specificity within defence transactions 
will determine the type of contracting terms used, such as Fixed Price, Performance Based 
Logistics and Fixed Price (cost reimbursement) contracts (Melese et al., 2007). Melese et 
al. (2007) provide a number of recommendations to reduce the cost growth evident in 
defence acquisition to cut the coordination and motivation costs, which they have 
identified in their application of TCE.  
 
In an extension of the study, Franck and Melese (2008) focus their attention firstly, to the 
make-or-buy dilemma, and then on the mechanisms which ensure effective procurement 
projects. Franck and Melese (2008, p.110) explain the decision to make-or-buy hinges on 
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economic co-ordination and motivation. ‘Organizations tend to specialize in “core” 
activities in which they have a comparative advantage, and engage in transactions (or 
outsource) to acquire other resources (e.g. contract labor), intermediate goods (material 
supplies, equipment, platforms, etc.), or services (IT, building, maintenance, etc.)’. 
  
The decision in the military arena comes down to the advantage of outsourcing military 
equipment production. In terms of the coordination of resources the DoD, as does the 
MoD, recognises that Industry is best placed to provide equipment manufacturing 
services. Thus, even though there is transaction costs to be saved from internal 
organisation out-sourcing can provide advantages in managing transaction-specific 
investments.  
 
However, this does not necessarily mean a move to a pure-market orientated transaction, 
rather that the organisation moves from the firm to a bilaterally dependent relationship 
with a private contractor. Therefore, the focus will turn to how the relationship between 
the bilaterally dependent DoD and military contractors can be structured. 
 
As such the second aspect of the decision is motivation. Franck and Melese (2008, p110) 
state ‘TCE predicts that parties involved in a transaction can benefit from co-operative 
agreements, but they are assumed to be self-interested and to have conflicting objectives 
(e.g., DoD – maximizes effectiveness subject to a budget constraint; defence industry – 
maximizes profits). As a consequence, parties in a transaction will not always have the 
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motivation to follow through on agreements – particularly when specific 
asset/investments are involved, and information is imperfect (incomplete and uncertain) 
or asymmetric (one party has an information advantage over the other)’. 
  
In terms of dealing with the motivation problem, transaction governance can provide 
alternative means of structuring the relationship to ensure contractual fulfilment. There is 
the option of creating sanctions to ensure that the supplier is punished for any defaults on 
agreements.  
 
However, there exists a problem in implementing the ultimate sanction, removing the 
supplier from future contracts. The reason for this is due to the “hold-up” problem, as 
Franck and Melese (2008) point out. The Government is locked-in to the supplier, and this 
may attract the supplier to behave opportunistically especially when it comes to pricing. 
 
In TCE, the combination of transaction-specific investments and an absence of ex-post 
competition raises the possibility of a “hold-up”. The “foot-in-the-door” strategy adopted by 
some defense contractors offers an example. In that case, a low bid induces the government to 
hire the contractor, but the contractor anticipates that as it works closely with the government, 
and as it makes specific investments that facilitates that relationship (e.g. human and physical 
asset specificity), the government will become increasingly dependent on that contractor’. 
  
 (Franck and Melese 2008, p.112) 
 
The government can deal with the “hold-up” problem by incentivising the contractor to 
act more efficiently by removing the risk. This can be achieved by the Government 
investing funds in the more risky parts of the project or by taking ownership of some 
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assets. The government can also induce the contractor with attractive rewards through an 
incentive-based contract (Franck and Melese, 2008, p.114). 
 
Franck and Melese (2008, p.119) discuss the governance structures which can enable the 
transaction of defence equipment from Industry to DoD. They suggest that a hierarchy can 
lead to ‘sub-optimisation’ where ‘lower-level goals fail to coincide with the global 
objectives of the organization’.  
 
In order to facilitate cooperation in a situation where Franck and Melese (2008, p.119) 
state ‘… ex-ante competition among suppliers is transformed into an ex-post bilaterally 
dependent relationship, additional governance structures are required to induce 
cooperative adaptation’. These governance structures would look at ‘verifying cost and 
performance information in incentive contracts’. However, such measures can increase 
‘external transaction costs’. 
 
Angelis et al. (2009) build on the theoretical work done in Melese et al. (2007) and to a 
certain extent on Franck and Melese (2008). The focus in Angelis et al. (2009) is a study 
which investigates the possibility of measuring transaction costs on DoD cost estimates. 
They suggest that, as is the case with production costs being identified by a Work 
Breakdown Structure, transaction costs can also be identified. Thus, Angelis et al. (2009) 
hypothesise that transaction costs can be identified prior and during the project, in terms 
of the governance mechanism used.  
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Further, Angelis et al. (2009, p.5) suggest ‘that higher programme costs observed during 
and after the acquisition project are ex-post indicators of hidden or unanticipated cost’. In 
identifying these transaction costs they believe that they can improve cost estimation 
methodology by explaining systematic cost estimation bias and generally improving the 
explanatory power of cost estimations (Angelis et al., 2009, p.6).  
 
The authors used a proxy for transaction costs in their study. The proxy is known as the 
Systems Engineering/Programme Management (SEPM) costs. They decided due to the 
difficulties in identifying costs from the buyer side, the DoD programme manager, they 
used the contractors programme manager cost information.  
 
They were able to gain this from Cost Data Summary Reports. Angelis et al. (2009, p.13) 
explain ‘a ratio of SEPM costs to total program cost (per the CDSRs) was calculated for 
each program. The hypothesis is that a higher ratio could be an ex-post indicator of higher 
transaction costs. To offer a preliminary test of this hypothesis, we developed two case 
studies (Javelin and ATACMS [Army Tactical Missile System])’.  
 
The study looked at which programme had higher transaction costs. It was found that 
Javelin had higher transaction costs than ATACMS. The ex-post indicators identified a 
greater number of contracts used, for the former. There were three sources for the 
Javelin and only one for ATACMS. This indicated that the Javelin programme had greater 
complexity attached to it. Javelin was procured using cost plus contracting, whereas 
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ATACMS was mainly firm- and fixed- price. This indicated more uncertainty resulting in 
greater risk on the Javelin programme (Angelis et al., 2009, p.15). 
  
The calculated SEPM ratio also indicated a higher score for Javelin. Angelis et al. (2009, 
p.15) conclude ‘this supports the hypothesis that programs with more complex, risky 
relationships (as evidenced by ex-ante indicators) will have higher transaction costs as 
evidence by the ex-post SEPM ratio indicator. What is not clear at this point is whether 
the SEPM ratio reflects management’s efforts to control those transactions or if they are 
merely caused by the riskier relationships’.  
 
Whereas identifying transaction costs in defence procurement can be undertaken using 
TCE with relative success. The challenge for TCE in transforming defence procurement is in 
the focus of ‘motivation’. How to bring the interests of private contractors to be aligned 
with the DoD, or in the UK case MoD.  
 
The work by the authors Masten, Meehan Jr., and Snyder; Crocker and Reynolds; Angelis, 
Dillard Franck and Melese, provides an example of how TCE can be applied to defence 
acquisition. There is, however, still a gap to understanding the means of using TCE to 
resolve the defence acquisition challenges of improved transaction governance.  
 
Review of works done by Humphries and Wilding has provided an example of how TCE can 
be applied to the UK case and has highlighted the plethora of discussions it creates. 
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However, the works of the authors have also demonstrated, in my view, the frailties of 
trying to use abstract proxies as equivalents for transaction costs.   
 
From the economic theories of defence procurement policy, presented in this chapter, the 
strengths of TCE as an applied tool has been justified above the others. TCE provides a 
focus on three main areas of procurement: the transaction environment, behavioural 
assumptions of decision-makers and the transaction governance. These three areas are 
key to understanding UK defence acquisition, the challenges and the way forward. 
 
3.5 Comparative Discussion 
The research question in this chapter focuses on assessing the most suitable economic 
theory for defence procurement policy. The choice made from the alternative approaches 
discussed in this chapter is Transaction Cost Economics. While not all economic theories 
have been discussed in this chapter the choice has been made on the basis that TCE is the 
most applicable economic theory in examining UK defence acquisition.  
 
TCE provides discussion on not only how the procurement approach can be undertaken, 
but also post-procurement effects such as bilateral dependency and organisational 
changes. At the procurement phase itself the nature of defence procurement, in that it 
involves monopsony and monopoly players where the power balance is not as straight-
forward as a principal-agent interaction, makes TCE theory more applicable to this study.  
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Game theory looks at optional moves by each player neither focusing greatly on the 
motivation nor the various surrounding factors involved in decision-making. As for the 
competitive theory used in Braddon and Hartley (2007) study, its focus is on the macro-
economic policies at the institutional level. While that plays a role on the transaction, it is 
not the main focus of this study. 
 
There are other economic theories which haven’t been chosen even though they provide 
a basis in procurement policy, such as resource dependency theory or path dependency. 
These theories do not match the transactional focus of this research, while they may 
discuss procurement decision there is less emphasis on the institutional efficiency focus of 
TCE. 
 
Sherer and Lee (2002, p.103) suggest ‘[resource dependency theory] allows scholars to 
see how a standard has implications for change in terms of competition among 
organizations on the resource or input side’. This provides a greater focus on the resource 
than it does on the exchange.  
 
The exchange relationship in the defence industry is not only dependent on the scarcity of 
the resources, but also on the nature of the transaction i.e. the interactions between the 
MoD and the prime contractor. Furthermore, the focus on resources in TCE is satisfied by 
the asset specificity factor. 
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In terms of path dependency theory, Kay (2005, p.553) explains ‘a process is path 
dependent if the initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in that same direction; 
in other words the order in which things happen affects how they happen; the trajectory 
of change up to a certain point constrains the trajectory after that point’. This theory is 
similar to game theory in its emphasis on its choice sets and decision making. 
 
However, it provides a narrow view of defence procurement since it provides sequential 
moves rather than the more complex situational nature of defence transactions. Even 
where similar situations occur, the choices taken for procurement may differ due to 
conditions of say uncertainty. In resource dependency theory and path dependency there 
is a focus on identifying the changes which occur due to resource constraints or decision 
making.  
 
In TCE the aim is to understand changes where they occur or identify where changes are 
required, in terms of organisational failure. To understand the procurement decisions 
made by the MoD TCE provides a better prospective. It may take sometime to exhaust all 
possible economic theories which can be used to apply to UK defence acquisition. Some of 
the more commonly used theories have been presented, with specific studies being 
mentioned, and some have been discussed in this section. Nonetheless, it is clear in the 
comparative analysis, TCE makes for an effective economic theory to apply to this study.   
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TCE has its complexities, and as shown in some of the studies presented, applying TCE, 
there are cases where caution is required in its application (specifically in the use of 
approximations). However, overall it provides the best fit to the purpose of this research; 
that mainly being the interaction between the MoD and defence contractors in UK 
defence acquisition. In the following chapter a more in-depth analysis of TCE will be 
presented. 
 
3.6 Summary 
Hitch and McKean (1960), Peck and Scherer (1962) and Williamson (1967) provide the 
fundamentals in the discussions of defence economics. The focus is on the pervading 
uncertainties in defence acquisition and, the nature and uniqueness of these 
uncertainties. Uncertainty in the economics of defence is due to the scale of the 
complexity in political, strategic, technological and transactional sense.  
 
It is difficult to predict wars, the way adversaries may engage in those wars may change 
and the terrain of the theatre may not be familiar. All these unknowns or unfamiliarity 
create a challenge to those responsible for defining the requirements and equally for 
those procuring the equipment.  
 
Take for example the two wars which the US and UK, with varying coalition forces, are 
engaged in: Iraq and Afghanistan. The strategies in these wars differ due to the differing 
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nature of the adversaries, terrain, political stability and operational requirements. 
However, there have been problems in the deployment of equipment in both these wars.  
 
In Iraq it was the inability to identify the dangers of road side bombs (improvised 
explosive devices). The transport vehicles were not adequately equipped to deal with such 
threats early on. In Afghanistan it was, in addition, the lack of helicopters and a deployed 
aircraft having to be recalled due to it being unable to land on the difficult Afghan terrain. 
 
In these cases, the uncertainty was in the inability to identify the changing nature of the 
operation. It has been suggested on various news media that the post-invasion planning 
did not foresee the rise of militias and the entry of Al-Qaida in the Iraq conflict. Regarding 
Afghanistan, UK and US politicians have argued that changes in Taliban tactics from 
conventional to insurgency warfare transformed the operational requirements. These 
changes have been dealt with by Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) rather than 
conventional acquisition.  
 
These examples illustrate the difficulties in defence acquisition projects as a consequence 
of operational uncertainties. The long procurement and in-service timelines of defence 
equipment makes it challenging to plan contingencies for future missions or 
requirements. The speed of technological change also means that the I.C.T infrastructure 
of platforms or systems may become obsolete sooner than expected. 
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Cullen and Hickman (2001) apply TCE and the Principal-Agent theory to UK defence 
acquisition by presenting the nature of the exchange between the MoD and supplier in 
the form of IPTs. They suggest that IPTs may be used as a monitoring mechanism and that 
the English commercial contract law negatively impacts collaboration in IPTs.  
 
I have presented my disagreements with these views, on the basis that the authors fail to 
provide evidence that the MoD is motivated in monitoring its suppliers using IPTs. I also 
fail to see how the authors have provided an adequate contribution to improving the IPT 
mechanism, rather their focus on contract law negates certain elements of the relational 
contracting approach that IPT emphasises.    
 
Braddon and Hartley (2007) focus their economics description on the UK aerospace 
industry, in terms of its competitiveness with comparable nations. They found that the UK 
has the largest aerospace industry in the EU and its major rival is the US.  
 
The competitive forces argument provides an interesting mechanism for comparing large 
scale industries, or even national companies. However, it is less applicable in 
understanding the defence acquisition process at the micro transactional level of my 
interest. Its purpose is to deal with the macroeconomic issues of defence, at which the 
economic theory of competitive forces best applies. 
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The application of game theory by Gardener and Moffat (2008) however provides a great 
deal of insight to the microeconomics of defence. It delivers a sound theoretical 
understanding of the reasons for the ‘conspiracy of optimism’ in defence acquisition. 
However, apart from stating that this can be solved if the players in the game act in the 
interest of the defence community – it provides very few solutions to resolving the 
problem. 
  
Humphries and Wilding (2001; 2004a; 2004b) studies present a basis in which TCE can be 
applied to defence procurement policy. While, overall I can see the advantages of the 
application of a TCE perspective, I am not convinced they provide appropriate justification 
for the TCE proxies they employ. In fact, I suggest that using proxies for TCE is fraught due 
to the complex nature of the TCE factors and care must be taken in this task. 
 
Masten et al. (1991) explore the make-or-buy decision using a case study in Naval 
Shipbuilding in the U.S. Their findings in the choice of organisation focused mainly on 
three aspects of asset specificity, that of the human, physical and temporal-kind. There 
was support for the transaction cost hypothesis favouring integration for the temporal 
specificity case; the results were mixed for human and physical capital specificity. In terms 
of the human capital specificity integration was favoured for complex components, but 
not so for less complex technologies. 
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Crocker and Reynolds (1993) provide a discussion of the contracting process in the 
procurement of an Air Force engine for the F-15 and F-16 aircraft. They found that the 
early development uncertainties regarding technological difficulties created an incentive 
for incomplete contracts, as it was difficult for the contractor, Pratt and Whitney, to 
predict the potential costs.  
 
The dual source contracts for Pratt and Whitney and General Electric differed in terms of 
the contract type negotiated highlighting the firm specific effects. This I would explain as 
the risk preference of the firms, whether they are risk-averse, risk neutral or risk taking. 
This will depend on how they deal with uncertainty and complexity and on their strategic 
orientation. 
 
Crocker and Reynolds (1993) provide evidence for a more balanced view of procurement 
policy in defence. While, it is attractive to write complete contracts and bind them with 
firm or fixed pricing this may come at greater cost. Removing opportunism may be a 
desire, but this may not be achieved due to the presence of uncertainty and complexity, 
and its effect on complete contracts. 
 
Melese et al (2007) provide an impressive application of TCE to defence acquisition in 
order to design an efficient means of cost estimating. Their methodology can be extended 
not only to look at improving cost estimating, but also to tackle the issue of collaboration 
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and contracting. By identifying the factors which create cost estimating difficulties they 
provide a greater understanding of the reasons for costing failures. 
 
Franck and Melese (2008) continue the work they undertook with their colleagues in 
Melese et al. (2007). They suggest that firstly, it is right to assume that the private sector 
is able to coordinate resources more efficiently than the State. Secondly, mechanisms 
need to be put in place to motivate the supplier to act in good faith. These mechanisms 
come in the form of governance structures, which deals with differing type of transactions 
between the buyer and supplier. 
 
Angelis et al. (2009), the same authors in differing order as Melese et al (2007), continue 
their previous work by providing their findings of a preliminary study. Their study focuses 
on two cases of defence projects, Javelin and ATACMS, using the ‘SEPM costs to total 
program costs’ as a proxy to transaction costs. As with the Humphries and Wilding (2001, 
2004a and 2004b) study, I do not feel their justification for their proxies are fully 
consistent with the TCE approach.  
 
Overall TCE is identified as being the most suitable economic theory for defence 
procurement policy, and is also suitable in application to the full defence acquisition cycle. 
The choice of TCE, over comparative economic theories, is justified on the grounds that it 
matches the research purpose of understanding UK defence acquisition with respect to 
MoD and Industry engagement.  
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4 Transaction Cost Economics 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
Having discussed alternative theories to Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), this chapter 
will focus solely on a review of TCE theory. The research question in this chapter is: what 
are the strengths and weaknesses of TCE as an economic theory? The review of TCE 
theory will, thus, be separated into three sections: the origins, developments and critique 
of TCE.  
 
In the first section I shall trace the beginnings of TCE by discussing the theories of Ronald 
Coase and Oliver Williamson. Coase begins a new way of thinking in institutional 
economics, with his ideas on the nature of the firm and its distinction to the market 
system. He creates the space in which a new economic theory can be introduced, in order 
to explain alternative means of transactions.  
 
Williamson takes on the ideas of Coase to create this new economic theory, TCE, in which 
he develops the idea that the firm and the market are alternative mechanism for the 
transaction of goods and services. Williamson develops TCE beginning with the 
organisational failures framework, presenting the behavioural assumptions of managers’ 
decision making and the environmental factors of transactions. I will explain, using Coase 
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and Williamsons work, how the TCE perspective discusses the economic problem of 
transactions.  
 
The following section looks at developments in TCE by a number of economists and 
sociologists. These authors use the TCE perspective to apply to various case studies, 
surveys and conceptual discussions. There are those who have sought to add to the TCE 
model, others who empirically test TCE, and some use TCE model to describe the trends in 
their case study. This section will critically discuss the studies presented by the authors. 
Williamson introduces the concept of the New Institutional Economics in his most recent 
work on TCE, this will be discussed further.  
 
The third section will present a more critical view of TCE. It is clear within this chapter my 
support for TCE as the main theory for explaining the transaction cost phenomena and the 
explanation for alternative governance structures. My views will bring me into direct 
conflict with some of the papers reviewed in this section. The section will also present 
reviews undertaken of TCE with respect to an evaluation of its empirical success.   
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4.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
4.2.1 The Nature of the Firm 
In understanding TCE, it is important to begin with Ronald Coase discussion of The Nature 
of the Firm. Coase (1937) wrote the paper in order to present a definition of ‘the firm’ in 
economic terms, and to provide a clear understanding of what constitutes a firm.  
 
Coase (1937, p.386) explains ‘economic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to 
state clearly its assumption. Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to 
examine the foundations on which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential 
not only to prevent the misunderstanding and needless controversy which arise from a 
lack of extreme importance for economics of good judgement in choosing between rival 
sets of assumptions’.  
 
The paper provides a starting point for discussions of TCE, as it attempts to understand 
how price movement differs within and outside of the firm (i.e. internal and market 
organisation, respectively). Coase (1937) argues that the view which economists hold of 
the economic system is incomplete in stating that the normal economic system is under 
‘no central control’, this view does not hold true for economic organisation within the 
firm.  
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Coase (1937, p.388) explains ‘outside the firm, price movements direct production, which 
is coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, 
these market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market 
structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who 
directs production’. As such, there is a clear distinction in economic organisation in the 
market and within the firm.  
 
Within the firm production is controlled by the entrepreneur-coordinator, rather than the 
variables effecting market transactions. The distinguishing mark of the firm is thus, the 
supersession of the price mechanism (ibid, p.389). The price mechanism is the defining 
nature of the market. It determines the value of goods and services being provided 
according to the fluctuating price for the demand and supply of the goods and services.  
 
The nature of the firm and that of the market are shown to be alternative modes of 
organisation, in which the choice is between using the entrepreneur or the price 
mechanism as the coordinator of production. When such a choice is faced, the argument 
put forward by TCE is that it comes down to the alternative transaction costs involved 
within the decision. Coase (1937, p.390) begins this discussion by pointing out ‘the main 
reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of 
using the price mechanism’. 
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Transaction costs became the central argument for Coase (1937) in the creation of a firm. 
He provides reasons as to why internal organisation can save on transaction costs as 
compared to the market. There are, for instance, the cost of discovering relevant prices, 
cost of negotiating and concluding individual contracts, and the cost linked to risk 
preference within contracts (i.e. long-term or short-term contracting). Such considerations 
have been discussed further by Oliver Williamson, and will be presented in the following 
sub-section. Coase (1937) definition of the purpose of ‘the firm’ can be described using a 
transaction costs approach.  
 
Three reasons are provided by Coase (1937, p.394-5) as to why the entrepreneur may 
decide that transactions may be more effective within the market or undertaken by an 
alternative entrepreneur. Firstly, as the firm expands in size due to the number of 
transactions which the entrepreneur is coordinating. ‘A point must be reached where the 
costs of organising an extra transaction within the firm are equal to the costs involved in 
carrying out the transaction in the open market, or, to the cost of organising by another 
entrepreneur’.  
 
Secondly, it is a question of production efficiency organised by the entrepreneur as the 
transactions increase. ‘…a point must be reached where the loss through the waste of 
resources is equal to the marketing costs of the exchange transaction in the open market 
or to the loss if the transaction was organised by another entrepreneur’ and ‘finally, the 
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supply price of one or more of the factors of production may rise, because the “other 
advantages” of a small firm are greater than those of a large firm’.  
 
Let us assume that the firm in question is not affected by management problems (i.e. the 
decisions of the entrepreneur) then the firm has reached a point where market 
transaction costs are more favourable. This assumption is based on the fact that the 
transactions which are undertaken within the firm or the market are themselves 
heterogeneous.  
 
Rather than expecting the first and second situation to be a matter of diminishing returns 
to management; it is reasonable to expect the transaction cost of carrying out the 
exchange within the firm may be greater than using the market. Therefore, what Coase 
(1937) does is to provide a preliminary discussion into the make or buy decisions facing 
entrepreneurs (nowadays mangers who are vested with the power to make such decisions 
on behalf of the owner-entrepreneur). Oliver Williamson expands this discussion in his 
book Markets and Hierarchies. 
 
4.2.2 Transaction Cost Economics Variables 
Williamson provides a summary of his general approach to economic organisation, which 
is useful to highlight here: 
(1) Markets and firms are alternative instruments for completing a related set of transactions; (2) 
whether a set of transactions ought to be executed across the markets or within a firm depends 
on the relative efficiency of each mode; (3) the cost of writing and executing complex contracts 
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across a market vary with the characteristics of human decision makers who are involved with 
the transaction on the one hand, and the objective properties of the market on the other; and (4) 
although the human and environmental factors that impede exchange between firms (across a 
market) manifest themselves somewhat differently within the firm the same set of factors apply 
to both’. 
 
(Williamson 1975, p.8) 
 
With these four points he provides the conditions under which the decision for the 
exchange of goods or services should take place in either the firm or the market. 
Whereas, points one and two are straight forward provisions in the decision making 
process; points three and four are the complex factors involved in the decision making 
process, this needs to be taken into account by the decision maker. 
 
The complex factors involved in the make-or-buy decision are a set of interrelated ‘human 
factors’ and ‘environmental factors’. These factors, Williamson (1975, p.9) states, ‘explain 
the circumstances in which complex contingent claims contracts will be costly to write, 
execute, and enforce’.  Contingent claims contracts are contracts in which all 
contingencies or events within the exchange can easily be identified and stipulated within 
the written contract. Such a contract cannot be costlessly formulated due to the 
environmental and human factors pervading an exchange within the firm or the market. 
 
The make-or-buy decision, therefore, becomes a question of which form of economic 
organisation can best economise on the transaction costs resulting from the combination 
of these factors. The purpose of TCE is thus a means for economists to understand 
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alternative governance structures, and for managers to view the variables involved in 
making transaction decisions.  
 
Williamson (1975) began by describing the factors which lead to ‘The Organisational 
Failures Framework’, in which he lays out the environmental and human factors which 
leads to transactional problems, and the break down of the governance structure of a 
transaction. Williamson (1975, p.20) states ‘only to the extent that frictions associated 
with one mode of organisation are prospectively attenuated by shifting the transaction, 
or a related set of transactions, to an alternative mode can a failure be said to exist. 
Remediable frictions thus constitute the conditions of interest’. 
 
The existence of friction in the transaction is created by the joining of human and 
environmental factors, which results in the failure of the organisational mode. The 
remediableness will thus be the adaptations either through contractual changes, where 
possible, or in the transaction governance.  
 
Williamson (1981, p.553) explains ‘the two behavioural assumptions on which transaction 
cost analysis relies that both add realism and distinguish this approach from neoclassical 
economics are (1) the recognition that human agents are subject to bounded rationality 
and (2) the assumption that at least some agents are given to opportunism’. These two 
behavioural assumptions are the human factors which effects a transaction. Bounded 
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rationality is an assumption of the limits of decision makers to make wholly, all 
encompassing decisions, which are seen as rational with hindsight.  
 
What may seem as a rational decision by the decision maker at the point of making the 
decision, can later turn out to be irrational due to unforeseen contingencies. As 
Williamson (1975, p.22) explains ‘bounds on rationality are interesting, of course, only to 
the extent that the limits of rationality are reached – which is to say, under conditions of 
uncertainty and/or complexity. In the absence of these conditions, the appropriate set of 
contingent can be fully specified at the outset’.  
 
It is the introduction of the environmental factors, uncertainty/complexity, when joined 
with the human factor, bounded rationality, which creates the economic problem. This 
creates a comparative institutional choice in which, an analysis of the governance mode 
that can best economise on the transactional problem needs to be decided upon. 
 
With uncertainty/complexity as a condition in the environment of the exchange combined 
with bounded rationality, will the transaction costs be greater within the firm or in the 
market? The costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring transactions (under bounded 
rationality conditions) need to be expressed when faced with the dilemma of choosing 
between these two governance structures (Williamson, 1985, p.46).  
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The second behavioural assumption is that some decision makers are guided by 
opportunism in a transaction. Opportunism involves self-interest seeking with guile, as 
such, making “false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved, threats or promises” in the 
expectation that individual advantage will thereby be realised (Goffman, 1969, p.105).  
 
Williamson (1981, p.554) points out ‘ubiquitous, albeit incomplete, contracting would 
nevertheless be feasible if human agents were not given to opportunism. Thus, if agents, 
though boundedly rational, were fully trustworthy, comprehensive contracting would still 
be feasible (and presumably would be observed)’.  
 
Opportunism is an action taken by one, or both, of the parties in the exchange, taking 
advantage of the presence of uncertainty/complexity. A major effect of opportunism is 
the distorted disclosure of information (Williamson 1985, p.47).  
 
This results in ‘information impactedeness’, which Williamson (1975, p.31) explains as 
being ‘a derivative condition that arises mainly because of uncertainty and opportunism, 
though bounded rationality is involved as well. It exists when true underlying 
circumstances relevant to the transaction, or related set of transactions, are known to one 
or more parties but cannot be costlessly discerned by or displayed for others’.  
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Information impactedeness creates significant problems in writing contingent claims 
contracts. As such TCE poses the question of which governance structure can minimise 
the effects of information impactedeness in the transaction. 
 
Williamson (1975) discusses the issues concerning ‘small-numbers’ bargaining.  An ex ante 
small numbers bargaining can exist if the exchange is undertaken between a single seller 
and a single buyer. As there are no alternative buyers or sellers of this specialised good a 
bilateral monopoly problem exists (e.g. the defence industry) (Williamson, 1975, p.29). 
This situation becomes more relevant to the organisational failures framework for 
recurring transactions.  
 
A merger may become an attractive mode of organisation, internalising the transaction, if 
the transaction costs are favourable. If not, then the exchange may be more suited to the 
market; such a decision will be affected by the information impactedness problem.  Ex 
post small numbers bargaining can also exist even if ‘large-numbers exchange condition 
obtains at the outset’; it is transformed during contract execution (Williamson, 1975, 
p.29).  
 
Williamson (1985, p.61) explains ‘monopolistic terms will obtain if there is only a single 
highly qualified supplier, while competitive terms will result if there are many. Transaction 
cost economics fully accepts this description of ex ante bidding competition but insists 
that the study of contracting be extended to include ex post features. Thus, initial bidding 
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merely sets the contracting process in motion. A full assessment requires that both 
contract execution and ex post competition at the contract renewal interval come under 
scrutiny’.   
 
This is described by Williamson (1985, p.61) as the ‘fundamental transformation’. It is 
through an investment in transaction-specific assets, of many kinds to be described 
further, which provides the initial winner of the bid with an advantage over its rivals. 
Without transaction specific investment the winner has no ex post advantage. If the buyer 
wants to switch supplier then they must attract transaction-specific investment of the 
same kind. Therefore, the fundamental transformation creates post-contract asset 
specificities in the transaction.  
 
In awarding the contract to a specific seller in a competitive large numbers bargaining 
situation, the buyer thus enters into a bilateral exchange relationship. The bilateral 
relationship may then become longer term than desired, by the buyer, due to information 
impactedness suffered by the buyer.  
 
Williamson (1996) points out ‘faceless contracting is thereby supplanted by contracting in 
which the pair wise identity of the parties matters. Not only is the supplier unable to 
realize equivalent value were the specialised assets to be redeployed to other users, but 
the buyer must induce potential suppliers to make similar specialized investments were 
he to seek least-cost supply from an outsider. The incentives of the parties to work things 
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out rather than terminate are thus apparent. This has pervasive ramifications for the 
organization of economic activity’. 
  
The seller can lock-in the buyer by using information disparity opportunistically. The 
switching cost might then become too great for the buyer, or the bounds on rationality 
may make it difficult for the buyer to detect any ‘foul play’ by the seller. The buyer might 
then be forced to undertake the transaction within an internal organisation (the firm) 
either through vertical integration or making the goods/services themselves.  
 
This is explained by Williamson (2002, p.176) as the vulnerability of the bilateral 
dependency as a result of the fundamental transformation. ‘As a result, value-preserving 
governance structures - to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and to realize mutual 
gains - are sought. Simple market exchange thus gives way to credible contracting, which 
includes penalties for premature termination, mechanisms for information disclosure and 
verification, specialized dispute settlement procedures and the like. Unified ownership 
(vertical integration) is predicated as bilateral dependency hazards build up’. 
 
Atmosphere as discussed by Williamson (1975) is an overall consideration of the economic 
problem. While transactions are undertaken through technological separability, this does 
not imply attitudinal separability (Williamson, 1975, p.37). This attitudinal separability 
which will affect the transactions is named ‘atmosphere’ by Williamson (1975).  
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Atmosphere describes the attitudinal interactions and the systems consequence that 
impact the transaction. This in essence discusses the socioeconomic nature of the 
transaction. While the socioeconomics of a transaction may be the same for both internal 
organisations and the market, the way they manifest in each mode can differ and thus 
create the question which we are used to by now: Which governance structure best 
economises on the transaction cost? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus far, uncertainty is an environmental dimension which is of importance specific to the 
effects it has on transaction costs when joined with the human factors explained using the 
behavioural assumptions. Small numbers bargaining has been added to the mix, as an 
environmental factor which facilitates the economic problem, this is clearly shown in 
Figure 4.1.  
HUMAN FACTORS ENVIRONMENTAL 
FACTORS 
Figure 4.1: ‘The Organisational Failures Framework’ (Williamson 1975, f.3, p.40) 
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However, in Williamson (1979, p.239) paper on TCE, he states ‘the three critical 
dimensions characterising transactions are (1) uncertainty, (2) the frequency with which 
transactions recur, and (3) the degree to which durable transaction-specific investments 
are incurred’. I take this to mean that, small numbers bargaining rather than being a 
dimension of the transaction is actually a process within the transaction. Whether the 
transaction is A to B or A to Many, the dimensions is of the same characteristics, even 
though they manifest in different ways.  
 
Of the environmental factors Williamson (1985, p.52) suggests asset specificity ‘is the 
most important and most distinguishes TCE from other treatments of economic 
organisation, but the other two play significant roles’.  
 
He indicates four ways asset specificity can materialise in a transaction. Site specificity is 
the geographical distribution of the transaction, physical asset specificity is the investment 
in physical components for the transaction, and human asset specificity is firm-specific 
knowledge possessed by human resource (Williamson, 1981, p.555).  
 
The fourth Williamson (1985, p.95) explains is ‘dedicated assets, which represents a 
discrete investment in generalised (as contracted with special purpose) production 
capacity that would not be made but for the prospect of selling a significant amount of 
product to a specific customer’.  
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The investment characteristics identified of ‘transaction specific (nonmarketable)’ – i.e. 
asset specificity – are typified by Williamson (1979) as being nonspecific, mixed and 
idiosyncratic. Asset specificity in transactions is the presence of idiosyncratic investment, 
effectively creating a bilateral (or at least quasi-bilateral) exchange relationship for a 
considerable period of time (Williamson, 1981, p.555).  
 
This lock-in effect is different to the one described in terms of information impactedness 
and opportunism conditions, these are post-contract effects. The seller in this case creates 
pre-contract asset specificities in order to establish itself as the main supplier to the buyer 
in the long-term. Asset specific investments are not effective for the investor unless such 
investments are undertaken for a recurring transaction, rather than an occasional 
transaction.  
 
The frequency of the transaction, one-time, occasional or recurrent, plays an important 
role, in combination with asset specificity, in economising on transaction costs. 
Williamson (1979, p.247) explains ‘the frequency dimension refers strictly to buyer activity 
in the market’. The advantages gained by a buyer who undertakes recurring transactions 
in the market, would seem to be that of transaction-specific learning. 
 
Williamson (1985, p.62) explains how frequency can economise on transaction costs. 
‘Additional transaction-specific saving can accrue at the interface between supplier and 
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buyer as contracts are successively adapted to unfolding events and as periodic contract 
renewal agreements are reached’.  
 
However, Williamson fails to highlight the underlining reason why transaction-specific 
savings can be made under recurring transactions, which must be transaction-specific 
learning. This is, instead, developed by Winch (2001) who discusses, briefly, the link 
between recurring transactions and relational-specific learning. Williamson (1979) links 
frequency to transaction-specific investment (asset specificity).  
 
It is asset specificity, which provides the most important characteristics of TCE, for 
Williamson, as he comments: 
To be sure, asset specificity only takes on importance in conjunction with bounded 
rationality/opportunism and in the presence of uncertainty. It is nonetheless true that asset 
specificity is the big locomotive to which TCE owes much of its predictive content. Absent this 
condition, the world of contract is vastly simplified; enter asset specificity, and nonstandard 
contracting practices quickly appear. Neglect of asset specificity is largely responsible for the 
monopoly preoccupation of earlier contract traditions.  
  
(Williamson, 1985, p.56) 
 
As such the behavioural assumptions of manager decision making are bounded rationality 
and opportunism and the environmental factors affecting the transaction are uncertainty, 
asset specificity and frequency. In combination, these transaction characteristics create 
the organisational failures framework. Contracting and governance structures are 
designed to mitigate or diffuse organisational failure. 
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Williamson (1996, p.336) explains ‘the problem with transaction costs in the early 1970s is 
that the concept was too elastic: Anything could be explained by invoking suitable 
transaction costs after the fact. This tautology was overcome by moving the analysis of 
transaction costs from (vague) generalities to the microanalytic particulars of transactions 
and governance: Transactions were dimensionalised; the fundamental transformation was 
explicated; the discrete structural attributes of governance were displayed; and so forth’. 
 
4.2.3 Transaction Governance 
TCE subscribes to and develops the view that economising is the core problem of 
economic organisation (Williamson, 1996, p.55). The principal question which TCE puts 
forward is whether to ‘make or buy’ intermediary goods/services. This is a question of the 
efficacy of alternative means of contracting (Williamson 1990) in search of the most 
profitable means of transacting. 
 
The purpose of ‘make’ is to internalise the production in order to save on transaction 
costs of the market (i.e. the cost of using the price mechanism); and ultimately to use 
those saved transaction costs to gain profit by selling the made goods/services in the 
market to consumers/businesses for a profit.  
 
Alternatively, the transaction costs might be more favourable by procuring from the 
market, in the intermediary stage. The seller in the market might have savings in 
 - 169 -  
transaction-specific costs, which makes contracting in the market more effective and 
profitable.  
 
Williamson (1990, p.15) describes the governance trade-off as ‘the basic trade-off that 
characterises the choice between markets and hierarchies – or, more generally, between 
the use of rules governance and discretion – is between high-powered incentives and 
bilateral adaptability. Rules governance support incentives but sacrifices adaptability. 
Discretionary governance (administration) reverses this relation. Which governance 
structure to employ where is the comparative institutional issue of interest’.  
 
The frequency of the transaction and its asset specificity, play a key role in the governance 
structure. The high-powered incentives and adaptability of the transactions are affected 
by the combination of opportunism, bounded rationality and uncertainty. The alternative 
governance choice between markets and hierarchies (and of course hybrids) is thus 
decided on these factors.  
 
Williamson (1979 p.247) states ‘three broad types of governance structures will be 
considered: non-transaction-specific, semi-specific, and highly specific’. Each governance 
structure is supported by a range of contracting methods to outline the means of dealing 
with disagreements; these are classical contracting, neoclassical contracting and relational 
contracting (Williamson 1979; 1985). For non-transaction-specific governance of 
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occasional and recurrent transactions, market governance is favoured applying a classical 
contracting approach (Williamson, 1979, p.248). 
 
Classical contract law is interpreted in a highly legalistic way; monetised in extreme 
degree; with formal terms superseding informal terms of agreement (Williamson, 1991, 
p.271). Hard bargaining is an important part of this market-based transaction. The parties 
to the transaction, in recurring exchange, use their experience of previous transactions to 
decide on the continuity of the trading relationship.  
 
In an occasional exchange transaction the parties rely upon others’ experience in order to 
ascertain the efficacy of engaging in the transaction (Williamson, 1979, p.248). Reputation 
plays an important role in protecting the parties from opportunistic tendencies from 
prospective partners.  
 
In an occasional transaction of the mixed and highly idiosyncratic kind, trilateral 
governance structure exists. In trilateral governance neoclassical contracting is a 
mechanism to represent the close ties between the buyer and supplier. The transaction 
forms hybrid modes of organisation, which is supported by the nature of neoclassical 
contracting (Williamson, 1991 – e.g. in franchising agreements). 
 
Williamson (1991, p.272) explains ‘By contrast with a classical contract, this contract (1) 
contemplates unanticipated disturbances for which adaptation is needed, (2) provides a 
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tolerance zone (of ±10%) within which misalignment will be absorbed, (3) requires 
information disclosure and substantiation if adaption is proposed and (4) provides for 
arbitration in the event voluntary agreement fails’.  
 
It is in the interest of the transacting parties to deal with disputes in a less formal manner 
due to the investment-specific and long-term nature of the relationship. A third party is 
brought in to arbitrate any disputes and evaluate performance.  
 
The third type of governance structure is transaction-specific governance of which there 
are two kinds: (1) bilateral governance in which the transacting parties maintain their 
autonomy, and (2) unified governance in which the transaction is removed from the 
market and internalised within the firm (Williamson, 1979, p.250). Transaction-specific 
governance tends towards relational contracting.  
 
Williamson (1979, p.238) paraphrases from Macneil (1978) to explain ‘by contrast with 
the neoclassical system, where the reference point for effecting adaptations remains the 
original agreement, the reference point under a truly relational approach is the “entire 
relation as it has developed …[through] time. This may or may not include an ‘original 
agreement’; and if it does, may or may not result in great deference being given it” ’.  
 
Similar to trilateral governance, bilateral and unified governance transactions are of a 
mixed and highly idiosyncratic kind, however they are of recurrent transactions. It is in the 
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interest of both transacting parties in a bilateral and unified governance structure to 
ensure that opportunism is minimised. The cost of opportunistic behaviour by either party 
to the transaction will affect the contract renewal stage adversely.  
 
Due to the bilateral dependency of the transacting parties, under a mixed and highly 
idiosyncratic and recurring transaction, relational contracting creates greater flexibility in 
the relationship and allows the parties to adapt to unforeseen contingencies more 
effectively and collaboratively. In bilateral governance transaction-specific investment is 
of a mixed kind, engendering autonomy for the transacting parties, which encompasses 
‘scale-economy considerations’ and ‘elicit cost control for steady-state supply’ 
(Williamson 1979, p.250).  
 
When the transactions become progressively idiosyncratic, incentives for trading are 
weakened and economies of scale can be realised within internal organisation as much as 
in a bilateral exchange. As Williamson (1979) explains ‘the advantage of vertical 
integration is that adaptations can be made in a sequential way without the need to 
consult, complete, or revise [inter-firm] agreements’ (p.253).  
 
The exchange is therefore between one part of the organisation with another (functional, 
departmental, or divisional, whatever the organisational structure). If disputes arise they 
cannot be taken to court, instead the contract law is that of forbearance (Williamson, 
1991), the hierarchical structures takes on a courts of appeal format.  
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The organisational failures framework is created as a way of understanding how 
transaction governance fails, and as such can be ‘fixed’. The organisational failures 
framework represents the applied nature of TCE. The framework provides an analysis of 
the economic system by putting the existing governance under the microscope and 
looking for the ‘frictions’.  
 
As Williamson (1996, p.58) points out, the framework poses the questions: ‘do the parties 
to the exchange operate harmoniously, or are there frequent misunderstandings and 
conflicts that lead to delays, breakdown, and other malfunctions’. Such an analysis allows 
the transacting parties to decide whether an organisational failure exists in the 
transaction, and if so, does the governance (and the contracting) structure need to be 
adapted in order to best suit the transaction.  
 
4.3 Developments in Transaction Cost Economics 
4.3.1 The Transaction Cost Economics Framework 
I shall now examine contributions made by authors of TCE, to add new knowledge and 
understanding to the TCE framework. First, I examine the work of Graham Winch, who 
contributes to TCE by introducing learning as a behavioural factor in the framework, and 
by creating a spatial visualisation of the ‘appropriate transaction governance’ within a 
generic transaction governance model (Figure 4.2). I shall then look at the validity tests of 
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TCE, as a theory, by Lyons (1995) and Maher (1997). Their contributions are focussed on 
the environmental dimension, asset specificity.  
 
Winch (1989) discusses TCE, by investigating the project application in the construction 
industry. He applies the ‘make or buy’ problem to the case of contracting in the 
construction industry. Winch (1989, p.341) argues UK construction firms would be better 
served internalising construction services, than contracting from the market. ‘Hierarchy 
would economise on bounded rationality due to uncertainty and complexity. In particular, 
the designer/main contractor, and contractor/specialist subcontractor transaction 
interfaces could be beneficially governed by hierarchy rather than the market’.  
 
Winch (1989) supports his argument by suggesting that the expertise required can be 
transferred more easily and effectively from project to project in hierarchical organisation 
and in so doing, better deal with complexity and uncertainty. The transfer of expertise 
from project to project using a feedback loop from construction to design suggests the 
ability to learn from recurring transactions (Winch, 1989, p.341). 
  
From these theoretical discussions he adapts TCE to incorporate learning. Winch (2001, 
p.808) explains ‘Williamson and his followers tend to ignore frequency in their analyses, 
and Williamson himself never associated a behavioural factor with it. I propose learning as 
that missing behavioural factor’.  
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Winch introduces the idea of learning to the model; there has been a lack of focus on 
learning as compared to other transaction cost factors. In terms of learning in a 
transaction cost perspective or an explicit discussion of its purpose, within Winch’s work 
or from other TCE authors, there is a gap. However, the idea of learning being an 
important behavioural aspect of frequent transactions is not a minority view.  
 
Melese and Franck (2008, p.117) state ‘recurrent transactions often justify the setup costs 
of specialized assets and special governance requirements. They also offer the 
opportunity to apply learning curves (cumulative cost-quantity relationships) to lower 
production costs, and for gradual reductions in uncertainty as both parties learn more 
about costs. Recurring transactions also offer the possibility for the accumulation of 
goodwill and to build reputations’.   
 
Winch (2001) graphically presents the behavioural assumptions and environmental factors 
discussed by Williamson, in Figure 4.2. The mutual relationship between the behavioural 
assumptions and environmental factors described in Winch (2001) are best understood by 
analysing Figure 4.2.  
 
Firstly, the behavioural assumptions are indicated as a function of the environmental 
factors (e.g. bounded rationality = f(uncertainty)). Secondly, the space is limited by the 
‘institutional context’, what Williamson described as atmosphere. Lastly, the purpose of 
this framework, unlike Williamson’s Organisational Failures Framework, is to provide an 
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idea of where appropriate transaction governance is placed in the hypothetical spatial 
context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The trouble with this framework and in general with the TCE frameworks, are that it is 
difficult to assign quantitative data to them. As Winch (1989) comments ‘…one of the 
problems with working with Williamson’ framework is that while there is a lot of data 
available on production costs, very little is known about the scope and magnitude of 
transaction costs’ (p.340).  
 
Nonetheless, I would argue that the TCE frameworks can be a useful visualisation tool to 
an important economic problem, of transaction costs. In Winch’s (2001) model, we have 
an updated version of the organisational framework using a new way of thinking about 
the interrelated nature of the behavioural assumptions and environmental factors in a 
transaction, within a specific institutional context. 
Figure 4.2: ‘Transaction Governance Framework’ (Winch 2001, f.1, p.800) 
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Winch (2010) develops the TCE framework further by providing a tectonic approach to the 
transaction cost analysis for project organisations (see Figure 4.3). Kebede et al. (2009) 
use this model to discuss the transaction cost implications of a defence project, within the 
bilateral transaction context of an IPT.  
 
The levels are analysed separately in order to describe their effects on the project. The 
interactions of the levels are then explained in ascending in terms of the ‘shaping of the 
structure’ and descending the ‘structuring of action’ of the project organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: ‘The Tectonic Model’ (Winch 2010, f.1.5) 
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Winch makes a major contribution to TCE by proposing a relationship with the frequency 
of the transaction and learning opportunities for decision-makers. While, some authors 
have mentioned learning when discussing transaction-cost approach, a more thorough 
empirical research is required to solidify learning as a TCE variable. 
 
Lyons (1995) work on the TCE framework is to discuss the connections between asset 
specificity and, economies of scale and scope. Lyons (1995, p.432) begins his discussions 
by describing Williamson’s make-or-buy decision as a result of the presence or absence, of 
asset specificity, and how that is related with economies of scale or scope. ‘A trade-off 
between asset specificity and economies of scale or scope is central to the transaction 
cost theory of vertical integration as developed by Oliver Williamson’.  
 
Economies of scale and scope are production cost factors in which savings can be made 
according to the quantity of the units and the reuse of goods, processes or equipment in 
the production process, respectively.  Transaction cost savings can be achieved through 
investment into asset specificity such as physical, human and site specific assets. 
 
Lyons outlines his interpretation of this situation as being a deciding factor of whether 
transactions are undertaken in the market or within the firm. Lyons assigns an 
independent variable, k, as the specific asset specificity and measures its effect on the 
dependent variable, C, the transaction cost advantage of the market. Lyons (1995, p.433) 
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finds ‘in the absence of economies of scale or scope, the make-or-buy decision is simple: 
produce in-house if optimal asset specificity exceeds k, and buy-in otherwise’ (p.433).  
 
The advantages gained from economies of scale or scope is specified in terms of the 
investments in specific assets. Where the firm has invested in specific assets in-house 
production becomes preferable. If such investments are not sought the market is able to 
aggregate demand, and thus create economies of scale or scope through market 
conditions.  
 
Lyon (1995, p.434-435) uses stochastic formulation to produce three testable hypotheses: 
H1: Inputs requiring a specific production technology are more likely to be produced in-house 
 
H2: Inputs requiring a technology which exhibits economies of scale or scope are less likely to be 
produced in-house. 
 
H3: Economies of scale or scope have a greater impact on the make-or-buy decision in the 
absence of specific assets  
 
Lyons (1995, p.438) finds that ‘overall, in the absence of economies of scale, specific 
assets do not significantly affect the organisation, and in the presence of specific assets, 
economies of scale have no influence’. The findings suggest a strong support for TCE, with 
the important exception that specific investments only affect the make-or-buy decision in 
the presence of economies of scale or scope (Lyons, 1995, p.442). 
 
Lyons (1995) findings are questionable. Specifically, in that, the significance of asset 
specificity in the transaction cost approach can be viewed in the same way as a 
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production cost approach, of economies of scale and scope. The importance of asset 
specificity in the transaction cost approach, as outlined by Williamson, is on its influence 
on the mode of governance.  
 
It is therefore, more a question of how transaction cost savings can be accrued under 
differing levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. Rather than whether the 
production cost variables of economies of scale or scope will determine the make-or-buy 
decision.  
 
The make-or-buy decision in terms of the transaction cost approach is a description of the 
transaction-specific investments which creates the boundary choice dilemma, regardless 
of economies of scale or scope – since production costs are held as constant. This suggests 
that the underlining effect of asset specificity in TCE is the affect it has on the buyer-
supplier relationship dynamic. I am, therefore, sceptical of the value of Lyons (1995) 
contribution to TCE. 
  
Maher’s (1997) contribution is in the empirical tests of the TCE model, put forward by 
Williamson, by investigating a number of case studies across four industries. She describes 
opportunism as the most important aspect of TCE. She suggests that contracting between 
buyer and supplier is designed to mitigate opportunism. The case studies are in the 
automobile, mechanical engineering, electronics, and gas industry.  
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The findings, in terms of the contractual governance between buyer and supplier, almost 
fully follow the TCE model. However, she argues that the model ignores one important 
aspect of the institutional context of the exchange relationship, this being the market 
structure of the industry.  
 
In the automobile industry she suggests that the lock-in effect for suppliers is due to the 
cost of switching linked not to asset specificity but due to difficulties in seeking alternative 
buyers. Maher (1997, p.155) explains ‘in terms of asset specificity, suppliers tended to be 
less locked-in, since if they had to find an alternative buyer it would not require any new 
investment on their part. However, it would take time to replace the buyer and the 
supplier would lose volumes’.  
 
If the buyer accounts for a substantial amount of the transactions of the suppliers’ 
business, the loss in volume if the exchange is terminated can have detrimental effects for 
the suppliers’ accounts. This Maher (1997) believes is a lock-in effect due to market 
structure, rather than asset specificity.  
 
Temporal asset specificity is introduced by Masten et al. (1991) as an addition to 
Williamson’s four distinctions of physical asset specificity, site specificity, human asset 
specificity, and dedicated assets. Temporal asset specificity is defined as: 
Where Timely performance is critical, delay becomes a potentially effective strategy for exacting 
price concessions, knowing that interruptions at one stage can reverberate throughout the rest 
of the project, an opportunistic supplier may be tempted to seek a larger share of gains from 
trade by threatening to suspend performance at the last minute. Even though the skills and 
assets necessary to perform the task may be fairly common, the difficulty of identifying and 
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arranging to have an alternative supplier in place on short notice introduces the prospect of 
strategic holdups. Expanding Williamson’s original four way classification, we refer to this latter 
source of holdups as temporal specificity.  
  
(Masten et al. 1991, p.9) 
 
The fact that switching costs are incurred due to the time taken to find a replacement 
buyer is a crucial aspect of the temporal asset specificity explanation. Winch (2001, p.801) 
comments ‘thus clients are exposed to the costs of opportunistic behaviour up to the full 
replacement costs of the supplier or, conversely, suppliers make transaction specific 
investments which would have to be written-off if they abandoned the project’.  
 
The link between market structure and temporal specificity can be further argued in 
Maher’s case study of the mechanical engineering industry. Maher (1997, p.158) explains 
‘in this case the degree of lock-in was practically zero and the market provides for 
effective alternatives. In the event that the buyer had to find a new supplier it would not 
take him/her very long and would not really require any new investment’.  
 
In the mechanical engineering industry case, it seems that the temporal specificity is low. 
TCE reasoning suggests that under a low asset specificity condition, the lock-in effect is 
removed making it easy to find alternative transacting partners; this is inline with her 
comments.  
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In the electronic industry case study, she identifies a different explanation for the effects 
of market structure on transactions. The explanation for market structure is in fact more 
applicable to the fact that the firms were transacting within the defence industry, than 
being a typical case of the electronic industry. Maher (1997, p.162) points out that, even 
though the transaction should be characterised by monpsonistic terms, in which TCE 
would predict that the buyer would behave opportunistically, this does not occur. 
 
Maher’s (1997) case study of the defence sector, I believe, does not take into account 
what Williamson (1975) describes as atmosphere, and Winch (2001) elaborates as the 
institutional context of transactions. The defence industry is, compared to other 
industries, highly influenced by the institutional context – i.e. social, political and 
economic consideration will have a major effect on the transaction governance.  
 
The monopsonist in the defence industry, the MoD in the UK case, may be reluctant to 
behave in an opportunistic manner with its suppliers due to the national interest of the 
transaction. If the MoD were widely seen to be an opportunistic buyer and deterring 
suppliers from the electronic industry to provide their services, this would have a negative 
effect on the defence sector and consequently national production and even security. This 
would not be the same as say, Microsoft behaving opportunistically towards its suppliers 
due to its monopsonist buying powers.  
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Similarly, the case Maher (1997) puts forward as an example of market structure in 
transactions, in the electronic industry case study, is an example of the effects of the 
institutional context of the transaction.  While, I agree that market structure is an 
important part of the lock-in effect, this does not necessarily remove it from the realm of 
asset specificity. In fact, I would suggest the lock-in effect described purely as market 
structure, may be a more general manifestation (in this case) of temporal asset specificity.  
 
Maher (1997) quite rightly identifies Williamson’s model as not explicitly specifying the 
factors of market structure. However, I do not agree that this is as important as she 
suggests. The discussion she presents of market structure within the paper can quite 
easily be identified in terms of either asset specificity (the temporal case, in her paper) or 
in the institutional context (where market structure plays a greater role). 
 
4.3.2 Relational Contracting 
Other TCE authors have focussed their discussions of TCE on governance structures. Of 
these governance structures, relational contracting has been the most discussed by 
authors. In fact, Williamson (1979, p.250) himself suggested ‘bilateral structures have only 
recently received the attention they deserve and their operation is least well understood’.  
 
The first paper to be discussed is by Pilling, Crosby and Jackson (1994); this paper looks at 
long-term relationships in manufacturer-supplier exchanges in the aerospace, electronics, 
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and defence industries. Pilling et al. (1994, p.248) state ‘this research is both the first 
experimental test and an extension of the TCE framework’.  
 
They use relational exchange theory to provide greater understanding in, what they see, 
as the gap between the market-based exchange and vertical integration. Their view is that 
TCE does not provide much enlightenment on the relational aspects of the transaction 
(Pilling et al. 1994, p.238).  
 
I agree that TCE has not developed relational contracting as a mechanism for bilateral 
governance in great enough detail, and as such identify their work as an important step in 
this direction. Nonetheless, I would argue that TCE has identified aspects of bilateral 
governance which require a relational style of governance using concepts of trust, 
cooperation and communication as an important safeguard to opportunistic behaviour. 
 
 
Pilling et al. (1994) present an empirical test of the TCE dimensions of uncertainty, asset 
specificity and frequency along with relational dimensions within the exchange, 
contracting, information sharing and they test these dimensions for transaction costs. Of 
the transaction dimensions, Pilling et al. (1994, p.242) they state ‘overall, it is predicted 
that increasing levels of transaction costs will enhance the relative attractiveness of long-
term exchange arrangements’. 
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Their method is to test the hypothesis on transaction cost and relational dimensions using 
a between-groups factorial design of 2 x 2 x 2 of Factor A, B and C assigned as asset 
specificity, environmental uncertainty and frequency, respectively. The sample chosen 
were mid-level purchasing personnel in the aerospace, electronics and defence industries 
of which twenty firms agreed to participate (Pilling et al. 1994, p.243). 
 
The findings were mixed in terms of the support of the model, with the tests on asset 
specificity providing the strongest support for their hypothesis. Pilling et al. (1994, p.248) 
make an interesting comment on the limitation of their study. ‘The theory predicts that 
increased relationalism will be the logical response to increasing costs of guarding against 
opportunistic behavior. However, the subjects apparently viewed relationalism 
unfavourably in anticipation of the possibility of opportunistic behavior on the part of the 
hypothetical supplier. If a purchasing agent knew in advance that a company would 
behave opportunistically, he or she would quite likely not want to have a relationship with 
that company’. 
 
This is interesting because the purchasing agent would have prior knowledge to the 
transaction of the suppliers’ behaviour. This may be through the reputation of the firm, if 
that is the case then it is reasonable to assume that the firm would lose many more 
contracts and lose its business opportunities.  
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If the supplier possesses transaction-specific investments and, thus, the purchaser is 
dependent on the supplier then relational contracting is the best safeguard for the 
purchasing agent. If there is environmental uncertainty in the transaction, even where 
classical or neoclassical contracting (with its stronger formal safeguards) is deployed the 
purchaser can not cover all contingencies and opportunistic behaviour hazards can easily 
follow.  
 
Relational contracting instead provides greater incentive for the supplier to persist from 
taking an opportunistic route because of the long-term nature of the business and the 
bilateral dependency, which links the health of the relationship to the mutual success of 
the transactors. If the aim of the business is to gain profit, it is unlikely that the manager 
of a company (following shareholder interests) would harm the profit margin by harming 
its most important customers.  
 
Therefore, the response of the purchasing agents to this hypothetical situation does not 
portray the most crucial reason for using relational contracting, which is the bilateral 
dependency factor. Relational contracting is a safeguard designed to deal with the lock-in 
effect of high asset specificity transactions.  
 
In the early part of this decade there are two papers which have discussed the issue of 
relational contracting in bilateral governance further. Artz and Brush (2000, p.338) discuss 
the ‘ex-post costs of periodically renegotiating and adjusting [contracts]’. They use 
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transaction cost and relational exchange theories in discussing coordination costs in 
collaborative strategic alliances. Poppo and Zenger (2002) discuss the idea that formal 
contracts can act as a complement to relational contracts in bilateral governance, rather 
than the presumed substituting function.  
 
Artz and Brush (2000) support the traditional TCE idea that relational contracting can 
reduce transaction costs in a bilateral governance exchange. They present their findings 
by investigating the exchange relationship between original equipment manufacturers 
(OEM) and their, self-selected, supplier.  
 
A survey of purchasing managers from the OEM, with two years experience as sole/lead 
negotiator, was undertaken. Their empirical study is a test of Williamsons (1975; 1979) 
description of relational contracting in the TCE perspective. They chose, as their principle 
variables relational norms, investment in transaction specific assets, and environmental 
uncertainty.  
 
Artz and Brush (2000, p.356) conclude ‘first, in support of the traditional TCE research, we 
find that both OEM asset specificity and environment uncertainty directly increase the 
cost of conducting interfirm exchange… Second, the study finds that all the relational 
norms, i.e. collaboration, continuity expectations, and noncoercive communications, 
effectively reduced the impact of OEM assets specificity on OEM negotiation costs’. 
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The first concluding point supports Williamson’s framework, and the second suggests 
relational contracting as the appropriate approach for bilateral exchange, under the 
specified conditions. Poppo and Zenger (2002), however, undertook a study which aimed 
to extend TCE towards a different direction. 
 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) suggest that relational contracting can be combined with formal 
contracting to provide a more effective and efficient form of bilateral exchange. Poppo 
and Zenger (2002, p.708) define formal contracts as ‘the more complex is the contract, 
the greater is the specification of promises, obligations, and processes for dispute 
resolution’. Poppo and Zenger (2002, p.710) explain ‘for such relationally-governed 
exchanges, the enforcement of obligations, promises, and expectations occur through 
social processes that promote norms of flexibility, solidarity, and information exchange’.   
 
They build their hypothesis by suggesting that increases in exchange hazards encourage 
complex contracts, and relational governance. They hypothesise the use of both relational 
and complex contracting complementarily will enhance exchange performance. The 
survey supports their hypothesis by indicating that relational governance complements 
complex contracting. 
 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) report their findings as showing relational governance 
complimenting complex contract formulation, from the survey. There are, however, some 
challenges I wish to outline to their concept.  
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Firstly, they do not discuss the actions taken by the purchaser under situations where 
supplier performance is low or/and the contract has been breached. The use of relational 
governance and contract complexity has diverging consequences for this situation. Under 
relational governance the purchaser would be inclined to resolve such situations through 
soft relation-specific mechanisms such as communication or joint problem-solving, to 
agree a resolution in support of the long-term relationship.  
 
Whereas if complex contracting is available, the cost of the low quality performance 
and/or breach of contract can be recouped more easily (and without additional costs) 
using more coercive means such as litigation/arbitration.  
 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) argue that the combination of these two contracting methods 
would still be able to deal with such disputes in harmony and more satisfactorily. If so, the 
second challenge is, why have they not discussed the costs associated with each form of 
contracting, and how this would be affected in a combined situation?  
 
Relational contracting is an attractive mechanism under bilateral governance, due to the 
transaction cost economising which can be gained through adaptability, as shown by Artz 
and Brush (2000). If complex contracting is added to the transaction then adaptability is 
lost and precedence is given to the contract rather than the relationship. 
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4.3.3 Governance, Performance and Organisational Form 
Masten (1993) approaches governance in a more general manner, in which he develops 
the idea that the governance structure is aligned to strategic orientation. He suggests that 
the selection of governance arrangements needs to be appreciated in terms of the 
performance expectations of such a choice.  
 
Masten (1993, p. 119-120) states ‘a central message of this article is that the relation 
between governance and performance cannot be accurately assessed without an 
appreciation of the factors that lead transactors to adopt one form of organisation over 
another. What is needed, therefore, is an approach that combines transaction-cost 
economics’ insight regarding the selection of governance arrangements with strategy’s 
orientation towards performance’.  
 
TCE, in Masten’s view, has attempted to influence decision-making in business strategy, as 
well as public policies. Masten (1993, p.120) argues that TCE is focused on observed 
behaviour, ‘if managers are mistaken or ill-informed, investigations into the determinants 
of observed behaviour will say little about a variable’s actual influence on performance’.  
 
Masten (1993, p.120) suggests ‘observed behaviour reflects the belief and judgement of 
decision makers and will reflect true performance relations only to the extent that those 
beliefs are accurate’. He contends that if they continue to underperform managers will be 
removed due to market forces, but suggests such action is a slow process. 
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Masten (1993, p.124) attempts to provide a link between governance and organisational 
form by assuming ‘since the problem with estimating the effects of governance on 
performance derives from the systematic selection of organisational form, two ways of 
overcoming this problem suggest themselves. The first is to defeat the selection process 
somehow, and the second is to control for it’.  
 
Masten (1993) suggests that to defeat the selection process a controlled laboratory 
experiment is less prohibitive than real-world experiments. However, laboratory 
experiments are unlikely to capture the complexity of the problems with organisational 
choices. Instead, he suggests that the second option would be to control the selection 
process.  
 
Masten (1993) identifies externalities which create a controlled selection process as 
regulation or a court. A comparison of the controlled situation and an example of a free 
selection process would provide the link between organisational form and governance 
(Masten 1993, p.124). Masten (1993) provides a number of studies on the relationship 
between governance and organisational form.  
 
Collectively, the studies described above, though limited in number and scope, suggest that 
savings of 10-20% from choosing organisational arrangements discriminately are not unrealistic. 
Of course, the potential gains from choosing the correct organisational form will depend on the 
nature of the transaction; potential savings for ‘close calls’ (transactions for which the costs of 
organising under alternative arrangements are similar) will obviously be smaller. Nevertheless, 
managers stand to benefit from a framework that can help identify situations where the 
allocation of managerial attention and resources to refining organisational choices is warranted. 
 
Masten (1993, p.126-127) 
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There is a valid contribution to TCE theory in relating it to performance. It is recognised 
that TCE needs to advance towards a view of how an appreciation for transaction costs 
can improve the performance of managers. This strategic view of TCE has become more 
important as TCE theory has become more established. Williamson responds to these 
developments in TCE theory and empirical research by identifying TCE as part of a New 
Institutional Economics.  
 
4.3.4 The New Institutional Economics 
Williamson has continued to develop his ideas on TCE and has in his most recent work 
placed it as part of the ‘new institutional economics’ (NIE). The NIE proposes four levels of 
social analysis (shown in Figure 4.4), of which TCE is most pronounced in Level 3.  
 
Williamson (1998, p.29) explains ‘transaction costs economics operates at Level 3. Taking 
the rules of the game at Level 2 as shift parameters, Level 3 deals with the play of the 
game. Alternative modes of organisation are described as syndromes of attributes that 
differ in discrete structural ways. Second-order economising applies: get the governance 
structures – markets, hybrids, firms, bureaus – right. The period over which such decisions 
come up for consideration is of the order of a year to a decade’. 
 
Williamson (1998, p.25-26) explains ‘the solid arrows that connect a higher with a lower 
level signal that the higher level imposes constraints on the level immediately below. The 
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reverse arrows that connect lower with higher levels are dashed and signal feedback. 
Although, in the fullness of time, the system is fully interconnected, for my purpose here, 
these feedbacks are largely neglected. The NIE has mainly concentrated on action at level 
2 and 3’. Each level is allocated a theory(ies) which Williamson suggests represent the 
functions of the level. 
L4 
L3 
L2 
L1 
EMBEDDEDNESS: 
INFORMAL 
INSTITUTIONS, 
CUSTOMS, 
TRADITIONS, NORMS 
RELIGION 
INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT: 
FORMAL RULES OF 
THE GAME – ESP. 
PROPERTY (POLITY, 
JUDICIARY, 
BUREAUCRACY) 
GOVERNANCE: PLAY 
OF THE GAME – ESP. 
CONTRACT (ALIGNING 
GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURES WITH 
TRANSACTIONS) 
RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION AND 
EMPLOYEMENT 
(PRICES AND 
QUANTITIES; 
INCENTIVE 
ALLIGNMENT) 
ECONOMICS OF INSTITUTIONS 
LEVEL FREQUENCY PURPOSE 
102 TO 103 
10 TO 102 
1 TO 10 
CONTINUOUS 
OFTEN NONCALCULATIVE 
SPONTANEOUS (CAVEAT: SEE 
DISCUSSION IN TEXT) 
GET THE INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT RIGHT. 1ST-
ORDER ECONOMISING 
GET THE GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE RIGHT. 2ND-
ORDER EONOMISING 
GET THE MARGINAL 
CONDITIONS RIGHT. 3RD-
ORDER ECONOMISING 
L1: SOCIAL THEORY 
L2: ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
L3: TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
L4: NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS/AGENCY THEORY 
Figure 4.4: ‘Economics of Institutions’ (Williamson 1998, f.1, p.26) 
 - 195 -  
My interest and that of Williamsons is specifically at the third level, the economic 
governance of institutions. Williamson (1998, p.28) explains ‘the third level is where the 
institutions of governance are located. Although property remains important, a perfectly 
functioning legal system in order to enforce contracts is not contemplated. Instead of 
costless court ordering, a comparison of costly court enforcement with costly private 
ordering is needed. Much of the relevant governance actions moves to the latter’. 
 
Williamson goes on to discuss the ideas of TCE, which have already been explored in 
length, in the context of its place in the ‘economics of institutions’. However, the 
interesting development is the creation of a ‘simple contract schema’ which Williamson 
(1998; 1999a; 1999b; 2000, 2002, 2005) uses to frame the alternative modes of 
governance. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
administrative 
s=0 
k=0 
B (Unrelieved 
hazard) 
C (Hybrid) 
D (Hierarchy) 
A (Unassisted market) 
k>0 
s>0 
credible 
contracting 
Figure 4.5: ‘The Simple Contractual Schema’ (Williamson 2005, f.1, p.12) 
 - 196 -  
The ‘simple contracting schema’ is a kind of decision tree in which a governance mode is 
path dependent. Within this decision tree there are two variables, transaction specific 
assets or asset specificity (denoted k) and contract safeguards (denoted s). In Williamson 
(2000, f.2, p.602) k is reassigned as h which represents contractual hazards. This in effect 
is the same as describing asset specificity, in that investment in transaction-specific assets 
creates the ‘lock-in’ hazard. 
 
Williamson is also fluid with his terms of the points (A, B, C and D) in the schema; this 
however does not change the meaning of each point. Figure 4.5 represents his latest 
representation of the ‘simple contracting schema’.  
 
Williamson (2005, p.11-12) suggests ‘assume that a firm can make or buy a component 
and assume further that the component can be supplied by either a general-purpose or a 
special-purpose technology, where k is a measure of asset specificity… Let s denote the 
magnitude of any such safeguards, which include penalties, information disclosure and 
verification procedures, specialised dispute resolution (such as arbitration), and in the 
limit, integration of the two stages under unified ownership’.  
 
Williamson has always argued the key to TCE lies in its application of asset specificity. In 
Figure 4.5, he represents the way in which asset specificity plays an important role in 
determining the contractual governance of a transaction. Williamson (2000, p.602) 
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explains ‘because each generic mode of governance possesses distinctive strengths and 
weaknesses, there is a place for each yet each needs to be kept in its place’.  
 
Having addressed the positioning and elaboration to TCE which Williamson represents in 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5., it is appropriate to look at some other substantial discussions. Firstly, 
it is important to look at Williamson’s (1999a, pp. 1103-1105) comments on ‘learning’. 
This is of interest as it delivers on what I perceive to be a lack of discussion on learning in 
TCE. Then I shall review his recent papers on Public and Private Bureaucracies (Williamson, 
1999b) which argues that the public bureaucracy is a legitimate governance choice, and 
should not be disregarded as many do. 
  
Learning has been discussed fleetingly by Williamson; it was Winch (2001) who first brings 
it into the TCE framework. However, a focused discussion and empirical research on the 
effects of learning on transaction costs has yet to be realised.  
 
Williamson (1999a, p.1103) acknowledges this. ‘Although transaction cost economics 
made early provision for the difference between explicit and tacit knowledge (Williamson, 
1971) and thereafter developed the contractual/organisational ramifications of firm-
specific human capital, in that both worker and firm have incentives to craft added 
contractual safeguards as human asset specificity builds up (Williamson, 1975, Chap. 4), it 
makes only limited contact with the subject of learning. Learning being a large subject, it is 
not possible to relieve this lapse here’. 
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The discussion of learning in the paper is placed in the overall discussion of TCE and 
strategy. Even though Williamson (1999a) briefly addresses the question of learning, it 
provides an indication of how he sees it in a transaction cost perspective. Learning 
provides the basis for the firm to ‘learn from experience’ and put in safeguards for future 
transactions (Williamson, 1999a, p.1104). This demonstrates the ex post nature of 
learning in transactions.  
 
As for the ex ante nature of learning, this comes in the form of the decision to make or 
buy. Williamson (1999b, p.1104) addresses the case ‘…where both the firm and its 
suppliers have pre-existing strengths and weaknesses for producing a good or service. 
Assume, in particular, that the firm has not yet made the requisite specialised investments 
itself and that outside suppliers are partly qualified in this respect. Out of considerations 
of timeliness and the costs of self-learning, the firm decides to procure from one of these 
outsiders. A contract of medium duration is agreed to’.  
 
What results, Williamson (1999b) explains is that the firms will learn about the contractual 
hazards evident in the transaction and also the nature of the specialised investments 
required. This will thus affect the contract renewal decision. It has been suggested by 
Winch (2001) that the frequency of the transaction will determine the learning gained. 
 
Williamson (1999b, p.1104-1105) states TCE has a bearing on studies which have shown 
‘biased learning. ….unsurprisingly, these learning mechanisms come at a cost, of which 
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myopia is salient. Three myopic tendencies are distinguished: (1) ignore the long run, (2) 
ignore the larger picture, and (3) overlook failures’. However, ‘the upshot is that while 
competence research on learning and path dependency is especially good at uncovering 
biases, the lens of transaction cost economics (with special emphasis on the 
remediableness criterion) affords comparative institutional perspectives. Both are 
needed’.  
 
Williamson (1999b) discusses the public and private bureaucracy using a TCE perspective. 
Williamson (1999b, p.307) comments ‘transaction cost economics views the public agency 
as a candidate mode of governance that is well-suited for some purposes, poorly suited 
for others. For which transactions is the public agency well-suited and why? Where does 
the public agency fit into the overall scheme of economic organisations?’ 
 
The criterion used to answer these questions is the remediableness criterion. Williamson 
(1999b, p.316) explains ‘the remediableness criterion holds that an extant mode of 
organisation for which no superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented 
with expected net gains is presumed to be efficient. Although some may believe an extant 
mode enjoys an undeserved advantage by this presumption of efficiency, such 
presumption is favoured by the rough-and-ready test that an extant mode has survived a 
comparative institutional competition’.  
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There are some cases in which competition can be defective and render the competition 
null. Under such conditions the efficiency presumption can be rebutted (i.e. under 
conditions of corruption, totalitarian regimes etc). Williamson (1999b) explains 
‘contingent practices that have the purpose and effect of defeating or deterring actual and 
potential rivals but do not confer benefits more generally are, at the very least, 
troublesome and may warrant withdrawing the presumption of efficiency’.  
 
In applying the remediableness criterion, in which alternative governance is chosen, 
Williamson warns of rash judgements. Williamson (1999b, p.318) explains ‘to denounce 
public agencies because they have lower-powered incentives, more rules and regulations, 
and greater job security than are associated with a counterpart private bureau completely 
misses the point if those features have been deliberately crafted into the public bureau, 
thereby mitigating contractual hazards, albeit at a cost’.  
 
Williamson (1999b, p.322) goes on to discuss how the public transaction differs to the 
private. In so doing, he brings up the example of the foreign services which he suggests as 
a public bureaucracy contains ‘considerable specificity’ in human assets. He also suggests 
that probity (‘loyalty and rectitude’) plays an important role in distinguishing the public 
bureaucracy to the private. 
 
Williamson (1999b, p.322) states ‘one could argue, correctly, that probity is important for 
all transactions, public and private alike. That it has not hitherto “surfaced” is, I 
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conjuncture, because the importance of differential probity becomes evident only in 
conjunction with extreme instances (of which sovereign transactions/foreign affairs is 
one) and because probity is delivered through leadership and management attributes of 
governance that have hitherto been outside the ambit of comparative contractual 
analysis…’.  
 
Williamson (1999b) argues the case that public bureaucracies can in some cases be 
justified, where transaction cost arguments are put. He uses the transaction specific 
investments made in human assets and the expectation of an extremely high probity as 
reasons why public bureaucracies are preferred and can be justified. There can, as has 
been seen in the past and present be a reason for privatising public bureaucracies. 
However, it seems that there are some special cases for which the argument is firmly on 
the public bureaucracy side (e.g. the foreign office). 
 
4.4 Critique of Transaction Cost Economics 
4.4.1 Critics of the Transaction Cost Approach 
Granovetter (1985) focuses his critique on Williamsons (1975) work Markets and 
Hierarchies (discussed at length in 4.2.2). The article is concerned with understanding how 
economic behaviour is embedded in structures of social relations. Granovetter (1985, 
pp.482-483) explains ‘I assert that the level of embeddedness of economic behaviour is 
lower in nonmarket societies than is claimed by substantivists and development theorists, 
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and it has changed less with “modernization” than they believe; but I argue also that this 
level has always been and continues to be more substantial than is allowed for by 
formalists and economists’. 
 
Williamson (1998, pp.26-27) highlights the social embeddedness level in his economic of 
institutions framework (shown in Figure 4.4) and his comment of it is that ‘…it is taken as 
given by most economists’. As such, this is the view which Granovetter (1985) argues 
against and instead see’s social embeddedness as more substantial than Williamson’s 
(1998) description. 
 
There is, in Granovetter’s view, a skewed understanding of economic action and social 
structure, in the extremes of ‘undersocialized’ and ‘oversocialized’ accounts. In the 
former, proponents disallow theoretical arguments by hypothesis any impact of social 
structure and social relations on economic actions. Whereas, the latter suggests that 
social constructs have been dictated to provide consensual systems of norms and values 
embedded through ‘socialization’ to an extent where ‘obedience is not perceived as a 
burden’ (Granovetter 1985, pp.483-483). 
 
The NIE provides an undersocialized account of human action, in that it argues for social 
institutions and arrangements to be viewed as efficient solutions to certain economic 
problems rather than being a result of legal, historical, social or political forces 
(Granovetter 1985, p.483). Granovetter (1985) argues that Williamson (1975) in his 
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explanation of the organisational failures framework fails to appropriate enough 
importance to social constructs, such as trust, and instead substitute these for effective 
use of institutional arrangements. 
 
Granovetter (1985) critique of Williamson (1975) is that the hierarchal power within the 
firm is oversocialized and the trust and reputation in the market is ignored and as such 
undersocialized. The social nature of the market is evident in everyday business life and as 
such trust, reputation and expected behaviour play a major role in the way the market 
functions. Thus, he believes the role of governance mechanisms to lower opportunistic 
tendencies in transactions is overemphasised, at the expense of social constructs 
(Granovetter 1985, pp.494-497).  
 
As for hierarchical power, Granovetter (1985, pp.500-501) claims ‘thus, the oversocialized 
view that orders within a hierarchy elicit easy obedience and that employees internalized 
the interests of the firm, suppressing any conflict with their own, cannot stand scrutiny 
against these empirical studies [Dalton 1959; Eccles 1983] (or, for that matter, against the 
experience of many of us in actual organizations)’. 
 
Furthermore, Granovetter (1985, p.505) rejects any sense of TCE being an approach that 
addresses the negation of institutional and transactional issues in neoclassical economics 
and thus appearing closer to the sociological perspective. ‘But the main thrust of the “new 
institutional economist” is to deflect the analysis of institutions from sociological, 
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historical, and legal argumentation and show instead that they arise as the efficient 
solution to economic problems. This mission and the pervasive functionalism it implies 
discourage the detailed analysis of social structure that I argue here is the key to 
understanding how existing institutions arrived at their present state’.    
 
Madhok (2002) aim is to provide the view of ‘the nature of the firm’ as being a 
compliment of the transaction-cost approach and resource-based theory by hypothesising 
a triangular alignment of transaction particular, governance structure particulars and 
resource particulars. His critique is that the transaction cost approach, which he mainly 
attributes to Coase, needs to be aligned with the resource-based perspective of the firm 
to result in a more wholesome understanding of the firm. 
 
Madhok (2002, p.537) state ‘there are two principal questions with respect to the 
organization of economic activity. The first is ‘Why is an activity organized within firms 
and not purchased through the market?’ The other, equally important question is ‘Why is 
an activity organized within a particular firm (or firms) and not any other?’ That is, how is 
economic activity distributer among firms?’ The first question refers to the transaction 
cost approach and the second is a resource-based perspective. 
 
Williamson (1998, p.47) clearly outlines his views on a group of theories – competitive 
forces, strategic conflict, the resource-based perspective, and dynamic capabilities. ‘Much 
of this literature is preoccupied with ex post rationalizations of ‘successes’ (the object 
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being to uncover what explains ‘excellence’). Although this can be informative, efforts to 
predict success are rarely made. Empirical work on success management rarely gets 
beyond cases and anecdotes’.  
 
However, Williamson (1998, p.48) does not dismiss the importance of the second 
question. Rather he states that TCE has to provide a solution to questions such as ‘How 
should firm A – which has pre-existing strengths and weaknesses (core competencies and 
disabilities) – organize X’ and ‘How does firm A compare with extant and potential rivals 
with reference to the market niche (X) in question?’ Williamson (1998) develops a generic 
level (of governance choice) and resource-based levels (of which there are three firm-
specific choices) to emphasise a strategic approach to TCE to respond to firm-specific 
transaction considerations. 
 
Madhok (2002, p.547) concludes ‘while TC [Transaction Cost] economics has undoubtedly 
made important contributions to strategic management theory, particularly in the realm 
of economic organization, it is nevertheless only a partial solution since it provides, at 
best, a tenuous link with competitive advantage, arguably the key issue of concern for 
strategy… the triangular alignment hypothesis offers scope for a more comprehensive 
theoretical solution’. However, it would seem Williamson has other ideas – instead he 
sketches his own view on the resource-based perspective, as a way to align TCE with 
strategic management thinking. 
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4.4.2 Critics of Uncertainty and Opportunism 
Slater and Spencer (2000, p.61) focus their criticism of TCE on a dimensional level. They 
suggest ‘the founding figures of transaction cost economics, Ronald Coase and Oliver 
Williamson, have steered away from offering a detailed explanation of the nature and 
origins of uncertainty… Williamson’s approach places great emphasis on bounded 
rationality, creating problems in distinguishing uncertainty from complexity’. Thus, the 
paper is based on the flaws and insufficiencies of, what the authors view is, the TCE 
approach to uncertainty. 
 
In my view, Williamson (1975) provides a clear distinction between complexity and 
uncertainty. In his example of the complexity of a chess game, Williamson (1975, pp.23-
24) provides a clear indication that complexity is an issue of limits on knowledge due to 
the extreme level of understanding required which goes beyond (current) human 
capability e.g. computational or mathematical knowledge. Whereas, the conditions of 
uncertainty differ in that it is not a question of understanding rather it is a matter of 
unforeseen contingencies (unknowns), whether that be due to reasons of foresight 
(future vision) or probability (statistical variations).  
 
The presence of uncertainty and/or complexity becomes important at the point where 
bounded rationality exists for the human decision-maker. If it were not for the limits of 
rationality, on the part of the human decision-maker, the choices of organisation would 
be uninteresting as there would be a clear group of contingencies in place to deal with 
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complexity and uncertainty. Instead, the realistic situation is that decisions are made 
under conditions of bounded rationality with uncertainty/complexity present, and thus 
the TCE governance trade-off takes centre place (Williamson 1975, pp.22-23). 
 
Slater and Spencer (2000, p.69) put forward to questions: ‘first, how are boundedly 
rational agents able to devise and implement the efficient, transactions costs minimizing 
governance structure for all transactions? And following on this, how can agents know 
what they have selected the most efficient governance structure when they confront 
calculating limits?’ and ‘the question remains how it is in Williamson’s theory that 
governance structures associated with lower transaction costs come to dominate in the 
absence of complete knowledge’. 
 
In response to the first question, I would argue that the decision-maker makes a choice on 
specific transactions, not all transactions, or at least its primary transaction (its core 
product). In so doing, the question, therefore, of how a boundedly rational agent makes 
the governance choice becomes a transaction-specific question. In this, Williamson (1975; 
1979) has talked of the importance of the asset specificity dimension. The agent accepts 
that s/he is boundedly rational, s/he cannot change this fact.  
 
The agent can, however, reduce uncertainty/complexity through an investment with its 
transacting partner i.e. relation-specific investments, to reduce the effects of 
uncertainty/complexity on the boundedly rational decisions s/he will make. The agent will 
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have to make decisions, according to the uncertainty/complexity, asset specificity, 
frequency of the transaction, having taken to account issues of bounded rationality and 
any opportunistic behaviours that may occur, to seek appropriate transaction governance. 
Thus, the agent has at its disposal a number of factors in the transaction to consider in 
making the governance choice. 
 
Of the second question, Slater and Spencer (2000, p.70) elaborate further their query by 
stating ‘thus, Williamson seemingly attempts to uphold two incompatible positions. On 
the one hand, there is uncertainty and complexity; on the other, apparent certainty about 
the hazards that uncertainty may give rise to. This allows problems to be pre-empted and 
for governance structures to be devised that are pre-adapted to disturbances’.  
 
A choice of governance structure is not one which will bring the agent certain success 
against issues of uncertainty/complexity rather it is the best alternative to deal with the 
existence of such conditions. Similarly, choosing a specific transaction-governance does 
not mean that the problems of opportunism are removed rather it puts in place a 
mechanism to resolve it, if it occurs. Thus, it is not a matter of certainty in the face of 
uncertainty, more resilience under conditions of uncertainty/complexity. 
 
Slater and Spencer (2000, p.77-78) put forward an interesting discussion of the future 
nature of uncertainty, in that they suggest ‘reality is transmutable, yet its actual path of 
development remains uncertain, in a radical sense. The future is understood as a created 
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process, rather than an endpoint in an otherwise preordained world’. They suggest that 
the future is dependent on the actions of human beings. ‘Determining the world of 
tomorrow is the intricate amalgam of social interactions that fuse human society’. 
 
Their approach takes on the ‘socialization’ perspective of Granovetter (1985); as such they 
suggest that Williamson has undersocialized uncertainty. However, I find it questionable 
that humans make the future, the future by its nature is undetermined. While the future 
may be affected by our choices, at present, the future is changeable and, unconsidered 
and unforeseen events may occur. Therefore, humans are boundedly rational in 
understanding the future because the future is uncertain! However, we can make certain 
choices, in the present, to influence the future such as the choice of transaction 
governance.        
 
Slater and Spencer (2000, p.82) conclude ‘imposing closure on reality in this way 
promotes fatalism such that history appears to occur by a (certain) logic of unavoidable 
necessity. By adopting a closed-system approach, transaction cost economics sidesteps 
radical uncertainty and opts instead for a form of conservative certitude wherein there 
exists no possibility for fundamental change under existing (capitalist) institutions’. 
 
Firms are dynamic or they can not survive as entities in a dynamic nature, they must react 
to the conditions within which they transact. Therefore, there are no certainties in 
decision-making only best of the alternatives. If situations change then the firm will have 
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to change the way they undertake their transaction or organisational failure may result. 
Thus, TCE does not create a static situation for transactions, but rather a situation which 
best fits the transaction until the point where it no longer achieves the desired outcome, 
and then change is required.    
 
Hill’s (1990) criticism is levelled at TCE use of contractual governance to protect from 
opportunistic behaviour of prospective exchange partners. His main argument is against 
the tendency to move towards hierarchical governance under high asset specificity, which 
he views as an unnecessary move. 
 
Hill (1990) argues that the invisible hand of the market protects transactions from 
opportunistic behaviour from either/both exchange partners, due to the mechanism of 
firm reputation. Reputation plays an important role in mitigating opportunistic behaviour 
within the market suggests Hill (1990) and where the bureaucratic costs of internalisation 
are unreasonable, markets should be chosen. 
 
 Hill (1990, p.503) states ‘thus, the invisible hand of the market mechanism selects 
organisations on the basis of their repertoires of behaviour, suggesting that the 
distribution of cooperative and opportunistic actors is not exogenous to the economic 
system.’.  
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Hill (1990) accepts the TCE theorists’ view of the market; while their may be actors who 
are trustworthy and collaborative in the market, finding those who behave 
opportunistically can be difficult in the first instance. His argument is that these firms will 
ultimately be recognised over time, and their tendency towards opportunism will become 
an integral part of the firms’ reputation.  
 
Firms who behave opportunistically find that their reputation is sullied and thus due to 
social networks in markets their future business will be threatened. Furthermore, for 
those who want to diversify their businesses to other areas of the market will find the 
capitalist markets difficult to navigate with a bad reputation. Therefore, his point is that 
due to the impact of the negative repertoire firms are unlikely to behave 
opportunistically, and as such the TCE make-or-buy choice should not focus on asset 
specificity and opportunism.  
 
Hill (1990, p.508) comments ‘it is also important to note that the use of hierarchy, as a 
response to the threat of opportunism, also dissipates some of the composite quasi rent 
that is inherent in the exchange’. While, relational governance may be supported by 
reputation safeguards, unitary governance is not a response to opportunism threats. 
  
Hill’s (1990) argument on the effects of repertoire is reasonable, but rather redundant in 
the TCE perspective. The main argument is on the consequences of high or mixed 
transaction specific investments on governance structure. Bilateral exchange occurs under 
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conditions which foster relational contracting. Relational contracting would have 
repertoire as a central part of its governance. The reputation of a firm will provide an 
indication of the potential success of relational governance, where trust and collaboration 
is being sought.  
 
Williamson (1985) describes unitary governance as being preferable when the transaction 
becomes idiosyncratic, and removing it from the market becomes advantageous due to 
dissipating costs of inter-firm organisation. Thus, the decision of internalising or vertically 
integrating is made due to transaction cost saving considerations, rather than purely to 
mitigate opportunistic behaviour – this is a second-order effect.  
 
The main advantage for relational governance is that the transacting parties can save on 
transaction costs (negotiation, control and monitoring) due to the trust and collaborative 
nature (as well as savings on writing complex contracts) in the relationship. The most 
effective mechanism to mitigate opportunistic behaviour in relational governance is the 
possible loss of reputation. The consequences of acting opportunistically can be 
detrimental to both parties, who are engaged in frequent transactions using the market 
mechanism. 
  
The reduction in opportunistic behaviour is a consequence of firm structure, in which it is 
argued such behaviour can be better monitored and controlled; it is an ex ante factor. If 
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opportunistic behaviour was the main concern then we expect the invisible hand to play 
its role in relational governance as Hill (1990) has argued.  
 
Hill (1990) has not, therefore, provided an alternative thinking to TCE. In fact, his criticism 
provides an explanation for relational governance in terms of the invisible hand and 
provides an effective distinction for why relational contracting may be a good contract 
choice for market transactions.  
 
Even though switching cost might be high in a high asset specific relationship, creating a 
lock in effect, this does not necessarily mean that the parties will automatically become 
opportunistic. As well as the reputation, the cost of contract termination to the supplier 
will be high, and maybe damaging, due to the transaction specific investment made. The 
lock-in effect is bilateral, both parties are mutually dependent and this is the reason why 
relational governance may be preferred. 
 
There may also be examples where firms believe that they can control the opportunistic 
behaviour of their supplier(s) and continue the transaction due to the supplier’s ability to 
deliver at favourable prices. In this case the buyer will find that the cost of creating 
contractual safeguards in order to protect and monitor from opportunistic behaviour will 
gradually dissipate the gains of the favourable prices. The supplier will also find itself with 
a reputation for poor behaviour and may find it difficult to gain contracts with other 
buyers.  
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Ghoshal and Moran (1996) make an uncompromising critique of Williamsons TCE theory 
in their paper. They base their critique heavily on Williamson’s use of opportunism 
(interest seeking, with guile). They state that opportunism has been given greater 
attention than it deserves. This means, they suppose that the explanation for the firm as a 
boundary choice in TCE is misrepresented.  
 
Opportunism, they suggest, plays an important role in internalising the transaction. In 
their critique of opportunism as a behavioural assumption and what they view as its role 
in the internalisation decision, they argue that TCE is ‘bad for practice’ due to what they 
see as ‘misleading’ managers in boundary choice decision.  
 
Ghoshal and Moran (1996, p.17-18) explain ‘without specifying the mechanisms through 
which opportunism is created or is reduced, Williamson assumes human nature to be its 
sole cause. By attributing opportunism solely to the “human condition” rather than to 
technology or to the institutions themselves, and the control of opportunism solely to 
imposed safeguards, Williamson turns a relatively common yet unexplained phenomenon 
into a behavioural assumption that has been described as an “extreme caricature,” even 
by those who have made important contributions to advance the cause of TCE’.  
 
Opportunism is a behavioural condition specific to the human condition, it is a moral 
hazard faced by the decision maker (Williamson, 1975). The technology or institution in a 
transaction can not be described as opportunistic, as Ghoshal and Moran (1996) intimate, 
 - 215 -  
as they are inanimate objects or human constructs, it is the decision makers within the 
transaction who are effected by or behave with opportunism.  
 
They suggest that Williamson saw opportunism through two lenses, one as ‘opportunistic 
attitudes’ and the other as a ‘type of behaviour’. They argue that Williamson does not 
discuss the distinction between the two aspects of opportunism in his formal theorising, 
and it is due to the absence of explanation that opportunism is allowed to continue its 
validity in the theory (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996, p.18). 
  
The purpose of this argument is to suggest that while behavioural opportunism is seen as 
a variable changing depending on asset specificity, or the sanctions assigned in the 
governance mechanism, attitudinal opportunism is not defined distinctively. Thus, they 
assume that attitude is either a ‘fixed trait’ or ‘a single construct’ with behaviour. 
 
Williamson (1996b, p.50) responds to Ghoshal and Moran by stating ‘the main purpose 
served by invoking opportunism are these: (a) it avoids the contractual naivety that arises 
when contract as mere promise (unsupported by credible commitments) is invoked and 
(b) it invited the identification, explication, and mitigation of hazards that have their 
origins in opportunism’.  
 
He argues that the purpose of opportunism is not to say that there are those who have 
the mentality of ‘Machiavellian grabbing or Get them before they get us’ attitude. It is 
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instead that decision makers should be aware of the hazards of opportunism and should 
look to ‘give and receive credible commitment’ (Williamson 1996, p.50). 
 
Yet, Moran and Ghoshal (1996, p.59) continue to argue Williamson ignores the positive 
nature of human behaviour. ‘…how he believes that either balance or realism is achieved 
by augmenting self-interest with opportunism while at the same time choosing to ignore 
those qualities that justify esteem and confidence! We suggest that the view of human 
nature that stems from this approach is neither balanced nor realistic’. 
 
As for opportunism being an extreme caricature, even if that is true it still highlights its 
existence. However, its extremity is exaggerated especially in an economic system which 
promotes self interest seeking (i.e. capitalism). In such a system, one would expect that 
self interest seeking, with guile, would be a common occurrence with managers under 
intense pressures to perform. The authors concentrate their criticism in what they view as 
an unclear definition of opportunism by Williamson, its description as an attitude and 
behaviour.  
 
It is quite clear to me, as it is to them in their discussions, that attitude is not the same 
variable as behaviour. The wording they use to describe attitude ‘proclivity, inclination, 
propensity’ demonstrates intention based conditions, whereas behavioural opportunism 
are their manifestations. Their argument centres on the idea that a separate 
understanding of attitudinal opportunism can not be found by viewing it as either a fixed 
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trait or a single construct, however they do not suggest a separate more accurate view of 
attitudinal opportunism.  
 
Do they suggest it does not exist at all? It is evident in using attitudinal and behavioural 
opportunism; Williamson is trying to distinguish between opportunism before and after 
the transaction has been negotiated. Ex ante to the transaction, opportunism takes on an 
attitudinal form, parties to the transaction must be aware that in certain circumstances 
attitudinal opportunism will be present in varying degrees.  
 
In order to reduce the ex post opportunism, the behavioural manifestation, governance 
choices must be made. Thus, attitudinal opportunism can not be ‘controlled or 
sanctioned’ by the transacting parties due to the fact that it is beyond their control. An 
attempt can be made using governance mechanisms to ‘control or sanction’ the 
manifestation of these attitudes in the behaviour of the transacting parties. It is due to 
this capability of influencing behavioural opportunism that Williamson puts a greater 
emphasis in describing it in the construction of his theory.  
 
The attitudinal and behavioural opportunism have an important element of temporality, 
which makes the arguments of Ghoshal and Moran (1996) limited, in my view. It is due to 
the ex post manifestation of behavioural opportunism which makes it an important 
behavioural assumption in boundary choice decisions. 
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It is quite clear that Williamson has built on the ideas of Ronald Coase’ Nature of the Firm, 
to distinguish the institutional characteristics of the firm and market, and through this has 
constructed the TCE theory which provides decision makers with clear boundary choices. 
They have not outlined any new requirements of an institutional theory which, in my 
view, TCE has not already addressed.  
 
Williamson (1996b) argues the question of opportunism is not one which suggests that 
decision-makers should respond in kind. Rather, that the decision maker should be aware 
of the opportunism hazard and mitigate for it with contractual safeguards. He argues that 
internalising may become a necessary move, where transaction-specific investment can 
be pursued and in dealing with moral and cognitive hazards.  
 
Moran and Ghoshal (1996) explain ‘our argument in “Bad for Practice” is grounded in the 
assumption that human behaviour is shaped by both disposition (“prior conditioning”) and 
situation (“feeling for the entity”). We believe that in social organisations, disposition and 
situation evolve interdependently in an iterative manner, each influencing and being 
influenced by the other’.  
 
Beyond the criticisms they present on the definition of opportunism as attitudinal or 
behavioural, they discuss the use of social controls in mitigating opportunism. Ghoshal 
and Moran (1996, p.27) suggest ‘… TCE cannot account for the efficacy of social controls in 
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most realistic settings, managers guided by TCE are likely to avoid their use and, 
consequently, forego their potential for enhancing efficiency’.  
 
Trust and collaboration have, especially, received a lot of attention in the role they play in 
the relational contracting and bilateral governance structure. Ghoshal and Moran (1996, 
p.33) go on to say ‘although Williamson recognised the role of coordination in 
organisational adaptation [Williamson 1996b], he failed to recognise the role of shared 
purpose in inducing such coordination’. Williamson (1996b) addresses the question of 
organisational adaptation.  
 
Because transactions differ in the degree to which they require coordinated adaptation, the 
alignment of governance structures with transactions in a discriminating way has economising 
consequences. Specifically, because generic transactions have little need for coordinated 
adaptation, yet would incur bureaucratic costs if removed from the market and organised 
internally, such transactions are better managed by markets. Transactions, by contrast, where 
parties bear a strong bilateral dependency relation to each other are ones for which coordinated 
adaptation yields real gains. The bureaucratic costs of internal organisation not withstanding, the 
(coordinated) benefits of hierarchy here may well exceed the added (bureaucratic) costs. 
  
(Williamson 1996b, p.51-52) 
 
Moran and Ghoshal (1996, p.64) instead exclaim ‘ we, in contrast, view the organisation as 
creating the environment that fosters a sense of mutual dependency on and between its 
members in the sense that they are attracted to its unique incentive context, the 
organisation effectively transforms the market context, which favours certain activities 
over others, into an alternative context that (explicitly or implicitly) favours economic 
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activities that are disfavoured by the market and other institutions and that would be 
unproductive and inefficient if carried out in those institutions’.  
 
Moran and Ghoshal (1996) recognise that an alternative organisational theory is required 
if they are found to be, somehow, correct in their views of TCE being ‘bad for practice’. 
Williamson (1996b, p.52) criticises them for not providing an explanation for their 
‘concept of inefficiency’.  
 
Moran and Ghoshal (1996, p.64) are defiant and state ‘however, to demand a definition of 
inefficiency as a precondition for challenging Professor Williamson’s assertion that 
“economising is all” is to make that challenge a prisoner of his framework. Despite the 
altar on which it has been placed, the concept of efficiency, as used by Professor 
Williamson, is a weak one. It rests on an act of faith that inefficient organisational forms 
will be selected out over time by more efficient ones’.    
 
They admit not to have an alternative theory, but explain how such a theory should be 
constructed. Ghoshal and Moran (1996, p.32) explain ‘to explicate the potential 
advantages of organisations over markets, therefore, it is necessary to understand the 
differences in the institutional logics of firms and markets and how those differences 
influence the ways in which each can pursue the objectives of efficiency and adaptation. 
Any normative prescriptions to managers of firms can only follow this understanding… ’.  
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Williamson (1996b, p.55) exclaims ‘transaction cost economics is an empirical success 
story. Ghoshal and Moran should come to terms with that’. This does not, however 
convince them. Moran and Ghoshal (1996, p.66) instead suggest ‘we argue that the state 
of this body of empirical research is such that even though it may be “broadly 
corroborative” (i.e. not disconfirming) of TCE’s predictions, it also does not disconfirm 
either our criticisms of TCE or the alternative logic we propose’. 
 
4.4.3 Reviews of Transaction Cost Economics 
The question of the ‘empirical success of TCE’ has been addressed by three studies, which 
review the empirical body of work on TCE and its associated variables. David and Han 
(2004) provide a focussed and detailed account of empirical research into TCE using a 
sample of 63 studies. Carter and Hodgson (2006) specify their review on what they 
identify as the most influential and highly cited studies, giving a sample of 27 studies. 
Macher and Richman (2008) instead undertook a more comprehensive review of empirical 
studies in TCE, choosing to include both published articles and book chapters, creating a 
sample size of approximately 900 articles. 
 
David and Han (2004, p.39) begin by commenting on the debate between Ghoshal and 
Moran, and Williamson by stating ‘what is intriguing about this debate is that neither side 
brings much solid evidence to bear regarding the actual empirical support for TCE’. 
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Therefore, the purpose of their review becomes quite clear to the reader, which is to 
assess the support, or not, for TCE theory. 
 
The method David and Han (2004) use to review TCE is a systematic search for empirical 
research into TCE. They employ a number of search techniques, of which includes 
choosing only published journal articles from ABI/Inform Global and EconLit database and 
choosing keywords in to search the articles in the database. The concluding sample of 63 
articles were chosen to represent the empirical tests of TCE and its associated variables 
(David and Han 2004, pp.42-44). 
 
David and Han (2004, p.44) report the results: ‘The 63 articles thus selected for analysis is 
contained 308 statistical test of core TCE relationships. These statistical tests are our ‘units 
of analysis.’ Overall, of the 308 tests of core TCE, 144 (47%) were statistically supported, 
133 (43%) produced statistically nonsignificant results, and 31 (10%) were statistically 
significant in the opposite direction to the theory’. 
 
The authors provide a break down of the findings by grouping the tests into independent 
variables, dependent variables, independent-dependent variable pairs, journals and years 
(David and Han 2004, p.44). This break down provides some interesting insight into 
empirical tests of TCE variables. 
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Empirical tests of Uncertainty as an independent variable was the second most analysed, 
with 87 statistical tests. Of these tests the only 24 percent supported the TCE view of 
Uncertainty and 16 percent rejected, thus the majority of the empirical tests were 
inconclusive.  
 
David and Han (2004, p.45) argue that these test were counter to the complete view of 
TCE, which specifies that it is in the presence of asset specificity that uncertainty affects 
governance form. Such ignorance of this relationship leads to misinterpretation of the 
kind seen in Slater and Spencer (2000) view of uncertainty. Where there are studies of 
uncertainty in conjunctions with asset specificity, the success rate increases to 13 
supporting results out of the 30 tests. 
 
Another interesting break down of the results was the independent-dependent variable 
pairs. Thus, 21 tests were undertaken of the interaction between uncertainty and asset 
specificity on the market-hierarchy choice (the classical make-or-buy dilemma) of which 
52 percent were supportive.  
 
The interesting part of this independent-dependent variable pair was, however, on the 
nonexistence of studies on applying it to a hierarchy-hybrid or hybrid-market. There 
seems to be a gap in research seeking to see how uncertainty and asset specificity may 
lead towards a hybrid governance form, from a transition from hierarchy or market 
position. 
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David and Han (2004, p.51) comment on the significance of year publication ‘thus, while 
the theory has become increasingly influential over time, there has been no convergence 
of empirical finding that would indicate agreement on baseline relationships’. This might 
indicate the persuasive nature of TCE as a theory, which has yet to be matched with 
empirical findings of the theory. As such, David and Han (2004) hesitate to agree with 
Williamson (1996) on the empirical success of TCE theory due to their mixed findings. 
 
Carter and Hodgson (2006, p.462) state ‘here we adopt a different methodology and focus 
on a smaller number of the most influential and highly cited studies. This permits a slightly 
more detailed discussion of the empirical tests and their interpretation. We concur with 
the ‘mixed’ verdict of David and Han, but we go further and argue that the results of test 
of the role of asset specificity, which seem to be among the more successful for TCE in 
empirical terms, are also consistent with the competence approach’.  
 
The focus of the review is the application of Williamson’s framework regarding the nature 
of the firm debate. The review uses citations as a means of identifying the significance of a 
study on the empirical tests of TCE. 27 studies were chosen using these criteria, of which 
12 dealt with vertical integration research and 15 with ‘hybrid relationships’ (Carter and 
Hodgson 2006, pp.463-464). 
 
All 12 studies looking at vertical integration found support for TCE, with 9 of the studies 
identifying human asset specificity as the key component. The results for the empirical 
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test into hybrid relationships are less convincing, and highlight some gaps in the 
understanding of the hybrid governance form in TCE (Carter and Hodgson 2006, pp.464-
468). 
 
Carter and Hodgson (2006) test the consistency of the findings with TCE principles 
classifying them as fully consistent, partly consistent, partly consistent and partly 
inconsistent, inconsistent, and inconclusive to TCE theory (Carter and Hodgson 2006, 
pp.467-468). Table 4.1 provides a break down of the results for these consistency tests 
with respect to vertical integration and hybrid relationships. 
 
 
 
The empirical tests in the 27 studies, selected by Carter and Hodgson (2006), of TCE 
theory, regarding vertical integration and hybrid relationships are neither fully consistent 
nor inconsistent with TCE theory. The lack of consistency with TCE theory is identified as 
being mainly due to the fact that the researchers ignored the frequency dimension of the 
transaction.  
 
 Fully Consistent Partly Consistent Partly Consistent 
and Partly 
Inconsistent 
Inconsistent Inconclusive 
Vertical 
Integration 0 5 6 0 1 
Hybrid 
Relationships 0 3 2 0 10 
Table 4.1: Consistency of Empirical Tests with TCE theory (compiled from Carter and Hodgson (2006, pp.464-472)) 
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This is inconsistent with Williamson’s theory of TCE, which makes the recurrent feature of 
the transaction as important to the vertical integration decision. However, the fact that 
none of the studies are inconsistent with TCE theory demonstrates that tests of other 
transaction dimensions were supportive (mainly for vertical integration). 
 
Of significance in Table 4.1 is the higher rate of inconclusive results for TCE empirical tests 
for hybrid relationships. Carter and Hodgson (2006, p.468) explain ‘compared with vertical 
integration, there is less of a consensus over the nature and causes of hybrid 
relationships. Many empirical researchers regard the understanding of hybrid 
relationships as a major challenge, and propose that Williamson’s TCE framework is 
inadequate to this task’. 
 
I disagree with this view of hybrid governance; I am of the view that it is not a matter of 
TCE providing an understanding for hybrids, rather that it is up to further research to 
provide classifications and identifications for the hybrid form. TCE provides a clear basis 
for the hybrid form; it is in essence the compromise between the market or vertical 
integration positions.  
 
The hybrid form is one where alliances between firms which are frequent transactors, 
with medium asset specificity can use third party arbitration to provide trilateral 
governance under conditions of uncertainty/complexity.  
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At the time Williamson was formulating TCE theory, in the early 70s, the hybrid form was 
less prevalent in the organisational context, therefore while theoretically it was justifiable 
it was yet to be popular in practice. However, there are a number of joint ventures and 
such alliances between firms nowadays which may provide richer empirical tests (e.g. 
SonyEricsson, Nokia Siemens and many others). 
 
Two-thirds of the studies prove to be inconclusive for finding the hybrid relationship as 
theorised by TCE. Carter and Hodgson (2006, pp.470-471) explain that this is because ‘a 
common feature of many of these studies is that they test a governance mechanism that 
does not fit within Williamson’s classification of governance forms’. 
 
Even where the results corroborate with TCE theory, it is possible to reinterpret the 
findings with the competence approach, argue Carter and Hodgson (2006, p.473).  They 
suggest that the human asset specificity findings of the vertical integration studies can be 
viewed using resource-based theories, and that empirical research in TCE should seek to 
distinguish or align with the competence approach. 
 
Marcher and Richman (2008, p.2) approach the review of TCE empirical studies 
differently:  
First, while prior reviews focus on a limited number of published articles, our data collection 
approach is more comprehensive and includes both published articles and book chapters. 
Second, the earlier reviews focus mainly on empirical applications that test the main tenets of 
TCE… Third, most of the reviews limit their analyses to “well-regarded journals known to publish 
TCE research” (David and Han 2004: 44)… Fourth, most but not all of the previous reviews limit 
their analysis to quantitative studies, whereas we include both quantitative studies, as well as 
qualitative (so called descriptive) studies. 
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Marcher and Richman (2008) provide a break down of TCE empirical studies on a subject 
basis. Table 4.2 provides a brief description of the research, which is undertaken in this 
diverse business and non-business subjects. The varied subject area of TCE empirical 
studies provides support for the theory, due to the wider acceptance of TCE as a valid 
theory. 
 
 
Some subject areas have more empirical research into TCE (e.g. Economics, Marketing, 
Finance, Organisational Theory, Strategy and, Law and Public Policy), whereas in other 
subjects the body of work is new and growing. The reason Marcher and Richman (2008) 
have narrowly defined Strategy is to differentiate it from the other business subjects, 
Subject Area Empirical Studies 
Economics Practices providing efficiency benefits, make-or-buy decision, vertical integration, and 
long term contracting. 
Marketing Distribution and product exchange. 
Accounting Cost containment, relationships between accounting policy and contract behaviour. 
Finance Role of governance structures in diversifying or reducing financial risk, the choice of 
debt versus equity financing. 
Organisation Theory Efficiency considerations, institutional theory, strategic alliances between firms, and 
population ecology. 
International Business How firms organise enter into new international markets. 
Strategy (narrowly defined) Performance implications for relation-specific investments and organisational form. 
Non-Business Areas 
Law and Public Policy Response to natural monopoly rationales for regulation, particularly with respect to 
public utilities; rationale for and implications of various modes of organising 
government agencies and legislatures and; development and reform. 
Health Economics and Policy Research into recent dramatic organisational changes affecting the health care industry. 
Agricultural Economics and 
Policy 
Long-term contracting in agriculture, downstream food markets, forestry and 
environmental taxes. 
Table 4.2: Subject areas for TCE Empirical Research (compiled from Marcher and Richman (2008, pp.12-38)) 
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which can also be viewed as strategic management, in a wider context, when applying the 
TCE approach.  
 
My own research fits in with this narrow definition of strategy. As my focus is on 
performance in terms of value for money and how that affects the organisational choices 
in the UK defence industry. 
Taken together, the papers surveyed provide considerable support for the main propositions 
derived from transaction cost economic theory… There is also considerable support for many of 
the specific transaction-level factors identified in the theory as influencing contracting costs… 
The critical dimensions along which governance structures differ are also elucidated in the 
empirical literature surveyed… Like earlier surveys of TCE research, our review of the articles 
finds a strong convergence between the theoretical predictions of TCE and the results of 
empirical applications within several social science fields and in a variety of applications. 
 
(Marcher and Richman 2008, p.38) 
 
This outcome is a much more positive one for TCE, as compared to the previous two 
reviews presented here. Marcher and Richman (2008) seem to be satisfied by the focus of 
the empirical studies into TCE, and the multidisciplinary nature of the TCE empirical body 
of work. Their review provides a more comprehensive approach rather than the 
systematic and focussed reviews of David and Han (2004) and Carter and Hodgson (2006). 
 
Marcher and Richman (2008, p.41) point out some issues, which require attention in TCE. 
‘In addition to the problems associated with the use and measurement of transaction cost 
proxies, a second important gap in the existing empirical literature concerns the 
endogeneity of transaction cost variables, most notably asset specificity. Virtually all of 
the studies examined in this survey treat the specificity of assets and the level of firm’s 
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investment in those assets as exogenous… Firms’ make decisions regarding whether or 
not to invest in specialized assets and the scale of those investments. Strictly speaking, 
these variables should therefore be treated as endogenous’.  
 
The complexity of assigning proxies to TCE has already been acknowledged, in the 
previous chapter, with respect to studies by Humphries and Wilding (2001) and Angelis et 
al. (2009). 
 
Marcher and Richman (2008, p.42) make an insightful comment regarding the most 
criticised aspects of TCE, the formality of the dimensions. It is in the lack of formal 
definitions that a number of critical attacks have been directed towards TCE theory (e.g. 
Ghoshal and Moran 2006; Slater and Spencer 2000).  
 
They state ‘finally, empirical TCE research would benefit greatly from additional effort to 
formalize its theoretical foundation… Among the principle advantage of a more formal 
theory is that it forces researchers to define with greater precision the concepts that are 
central to the empirical analysis. Currently, a handful of core ideas in TCE suffer from 
multiple and, at times, competing definitions’. 
 
Uncertainty/complexity requires a broader definition to allow for the diverse forms in 
which it appears in differing transaction environments. It is also difficult to formalise the 
human behavioural assumption of opportunism, which is a highly psychological aspect 
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within the transaction. Williamson has identified the motives behind opportunism; it is 
however more challenging to identify opportunistic behaviour in empirical studies due to 
its subjective nature. 
 
The reviews presented in this section provide a differing approach to the question of 
empirical success of TCE theory. David and Han (2004) and Carter and Hodgson (2006) 
agree that support for TCE is mixed, Macher and Richman (2008) argue there is support 
for TCE theory and it is strengthened by the multidisciplinary aspect of TCE empirical 
studies. 
 
The reviews point out some important flaws in TCE empirical studies. David and Han 
(2004) point out that more studies reject, than support, uncertainty as a dependent 
variable in transactions due to a lack of proper appreciation of the TCE point of view of 
uncertainty, and they also point to a lack of research in hybrid governance choice. 
  
Carter and Hodgson (2006) focus on the nature of the firm and find that no studies in their 
review include frequency when testing TCE hypothesis resulting in, at best, partially 
consistent findings with TCE theory. They find that a majority of the studies looking at 
hybrid governance are inconclusive. 
 
Macher and Richman (2008) find that empirical studies of TCE are on the whole consistent 
with the theoretical perspective and cover a multidisciplinary area in business and non-
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business subjects. The authors cover a more comprehensive study than the previous two, 
but with less rigour than the other two reviews. 
 
Williamson, based on these reviews, is justified as the father of TCE, to argue forcibly of its 
empirical success! However, critics of TCE are justified in questioning gaps within the 
empirical body of research. This should galvanise, rather than discourage, TCE theorists to 
put greater effort to illuminate those parts of TCE which require greater focus. I am of no 
doubt of the merits of TCE as a theory, and find it even more powerful as an explanatory 
tool. 
      
4.5 Summary  
Williamson has convincingly argued for nearly five decades that the transaction cost 
approach to understanding the economic problem defines a new way of thinking in 
institutional economics. He argues that a transaction involves a number of complex 
factors connected with environmental considerations and human behavioural 
assumptions.  
 
Williamson uses Coase (1937) description of the ‘Nature of the Firm’, the supersession of 
the price mechanism and the alternative (to the market) coordination of goods/services, 
to discuss the economic problem of ‘make-or-buy’. This economic problem hinges on the 
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transaction cost elements, which will make the exchange of goods/services dependent on 
a number of explainable variables. 
 
Williamson goes on to discuss the variables which affect the make-or-buy choice, and 
which ultimately will result in the failure of an organisational framework, in favour of an 
alternative governance structure. This is the remediable criterion in which there will be a 
feasible alternative to governance in favour of an efficient transaction.  
 
The environmental factors uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity, are developed as 
the main factors affecting organisational failure. These environmental factors are 
troublesome in combination, and are intensified when joined by the behavioural 
assumptions, opportunism and bounded rationality, affecting decision makers.  
 
These behavioural assumptions are human limitations in a neurophysiologic and a moral 
hazard sense. The combination of the environmental and behavioural factors creates 
frictions in the transaction, in which managers and decision makers must seek to mitigate 
these contractual hazards by creating safeguards.  
 
Williamson discusses the contracting methods as being classical, neoclassical and 
relational contracting, which create a set of governance structures ranging from market 
governance to unified governance. The governance mode will be a function of the 
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safeguards and the transaction specific investments. The parties in the transaction will 
decide the appropriate transaction according to these factors. 
 
A number of authors have sought to contribute to TCE by elaborating, empirically testing 
and applying the theory. Winch (1989; 2001) has contributed to TCE theory by 
incorporating learning to the organisational failures framework. Learning can combine 
with frequency in a transaction, in the sense that with recurring transactions the capacity 
to gain transaction-specific learning increases. 
  
This addition to the behavioural assumption is valuable and provides strength to the TCE 
perspective. Williamson (1999a) has discussed the role that learning plays in the 
transaction, but has admitted there has been a lack of proper analysis of learning.  
Empirical work on transaction-specific learning is required to support Winch’s 
contribution to TCE.  
 
Lyons (1995), and Maher (1997), both provide interesting discussions on the make-or-buy 
choice. They concentrate on asset specificity and opportunism as the key factors for the 
decision. As is to be expected, when discussing the boundary choice using TCE factors in 
isolation there are bound to be some arguably fraught ideas. 
 
Williamson has emphasised that the factors characterising the TCE perspective are to be 
viewed in combination, therefore it makes little sense to discuss these factors in isolation 
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and ignorant of their counterparts. I therefore presented my objections to some of the 
conclusions made by Lyons (1995), and Maher (1997). 
 
Further developments in TCE have been identified in transaction governance. Relational 
contracting is an important part of the discussion on alternative modes of governance 
choice. Other governance structures have been less interesting because of their 
developed stage in law, economic and organisation literatures. Relational contracting is an 
underdeveloped area of contracting. Pilling et al. (1994), Artz and Brush (2000) and, 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) have contributed to this area of the TCE framework. 
 
Masten (1993) discusses the idea of aligning TCE to strategic decision making for 
alternative governance arrangements. He develops a relationship between governance 
and performance as the way to make the alternative governance choice. Whilst he 
acknowledges governance choice will be determined by the transactional considerations. 
He states that performance and organisational choice will determine governance where 
there is a close call and the transactional considerations are of a similar kind. 
 
Williamson has responded to developments in TCE research by emphasising its position as 
part of a New Institutional Economics perspective. He places TCE on the third level of the 
analytical framework for economics, in which the governance of an institution becomes 
the focus.  
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The governance of an institution becomes a set of alternative modes which prove to be 
efficient for certain transactions, and not so for others. Williamson has explained, with the 
aid of his ‘simple contractual schema’ how alternative choices of governance can be 
made. The focus is on two aspects of the transaction: the asset specificity of the 
transaction and the contractual safeguards designed to mitigate the negative effects of 
uncertainty, bounded rationality and opportunism.  
 
Williamsons has also recently discussed public bureaucracy governance, in order to dispel 
the widespread discredit of such institutions. He argues using a transaction cost approach, 
there are cases where public bureaucracy is an effective and necessary mode of 
governance. This means that the government will be right to, in some cases, internalise its 
transactions (i.e. nationalise). Williamson gives the US Foreign Service as an example of an 
appropriate public bureaucracy. He explains that in public bureaucracies there are high 
human asset specificities and probity, which make it more attractive as a governance 
form.  
 
A critique of TCE theory is presented in the third section of the chapter. The views of 
authors who are more critical of TCE are discussed. I presented my response to these 
criticisms of TCE and offer some points of defence. 
 
Granovetter (1985) and Madhok (2002) see weaknesses in the transaction cost approach. 
While, Granovetter (1985) believes that TCE approaches social constructs in an 
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oversocialized and undersocialized manner. Madhok (2002) argues that TCE is not 
sufficient, on its own, to provide answers on the nature of the firm and as such suggests 
that it is combined with resource-based theory. Other authors have attacked the 
dimensions of TCE theory, specifically uncertainty (Slater and Spence, 2000) and 
opportunism (Hill, 1990; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996).  
 
Slater and Spencer (2000) question the definition of Uncertainty, and the role it plays with 
respect to Complexity and Bounded Rationality. While Hill (1990) attempts to use 
reputation as a reason to why opportunism is unimportant; Ghoshal and Moran (1996) 
suggest Williamson’s definition of opportunism is erroneous. Williamson (1996) defends 
his use of opportunism and the empirical strength of TCE. He makes a bold statement that 
“it is an empirical success”. This statement is tested through a number of reviews on 
empirical research on TCE. 
 
Three reviews of TCE empirical research is discussed (David and Han, 2004; Carter and 
Hodgson, 2006; Macher and Richman, 2008) providing an analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of TCE. The overall findings are that the success of TCE empirical research is 
mixed and there are some gaps in research which need to be filled. There is a gap in TCE 
research for an understanding of the role played by frequency in transaction costs, the 
governance choice of hybrid governance from a market or hierarchy position, and the 
operationalisation of TCE dimensions.   
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However, as argued by Williamson and shown by Macher and Richman (2008) TCE is an 
established and multidisciplinary theory. TCE demonstrates a versatile yet testable theory, 
which can be applied in hindsight for economic forensics or used to design present or 
future transactions. In 2011 it shows as much applicability to real life situations as it did in 
1975.  
 
There is space for a new crop of TCE theorists to provide an explanation to our current 
economic problems, and to provide possible solutions to the current regulatory crisis. 
There is an opportunity for researchers to look at the lessons to be learnt from the sub-
prime mortgages fiasco and see what regulatory frameworks could be designed to reduce 
opportunistic behaviours having such damaging effects in the future. It is time to take the 
scalpel to the banking sector. 
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5 Major Projects Reports 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
The National Audit Office (NAO) prepares the Major Projects Report under Section 6 of 
the National Audit Act 1983. The Report is produced and submitted to Parliament 
annually by the Comptroller and Auditor General of the NAO. This chapter will analyse the 
Major Projects Reports in order to ascertain the developments in defence acquisition in 
the last two decades. The research question posed is, thus: what are the main themes in 
the delivery of major defence projects? 
 
Whilst the previous chapters focused on theoretical and historical literature, this chapter 
will highlight documented defence acquisition practice using previous and current 
defence projects. The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the state of 
defence acquisition to frame the issues facing defence acquisition today.   
 
The Major Projects Reports have been chosen from the publication period of 1993 to 
2010. The Major Projects Report 1993 (MPR1993) was the first to use a report structure, 
as previous analysis of defence projects were presented as a Major Projects Statement. It 
is therefore appropriate to start with the 1993 publication.  
 
 - 240 -  
This chapter will focus on three areas of analysis of the reports. Firstly, the focus will be on 
the Reporting Structure. The reporting structure will explore the selection of projects 
appearing in the reports; the procurement route taken for the projects; and the measures 
adopted for assessing project performance. 
 
The second section of the chapter will assess the overall Project Performance in each 
report with the aim of identifying any trends in performance over the years. Most reports 
assess project performance at two stages: the initial phase of the project and the midlife 
stage of the project. This section will be separated into two: the first will look at the 
performance of the major projects during the 1993 to 1999 reports and the second on the 
2000 to 2010 reports. The separation is due to changes in reporting structure, as a result 
of procurement policy changes in the form of the Smart Procurement Initiative. 
 
The third section will look at the Project Assessment and Capability of major projects. The 
assessment phase is discussed in the second part of the reports, and was first included for 
discussion in MPR2000. The second part of this section will be on capability; it is the focus 
of discussions in nearly all the projects. The consequences on the Armed Forces defence 
capability under conditions of project slippage will be addressed. 
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5.2 Reporting Structure 
5.2.1 Project Selection and Performance Criteria  
The earliest of the reports, MPR1993, was the first to be presented in a report format. 
Previous defence audits were delivered in a statement format and were thus known as a 
Major Projects Statement. Defence statements/reports came about due to the Committee 
of Public Accounts in their 9
th
 Report, Session 1981-82, highlighting the requirement for 
more information on defence projects - in order to develop a format in which the 
Department would be obliged to inform Parliament about the cost of major defence 
projects (NAO 1993, p1). 
 
The National Audit Act 1983 was soon to follow to enforce the delivery of the Major 
Projects Statement to a Parliamentary Committee and following that the MPR was 
initiated in 1993. NAO (1993, p1) explains ‘the National Audit Office report on the 1991 
Major Projects Statement might be improved to provide a more meaningful analysis of 
cost overruns and time slippage and suggested fundamental changes to its structure’.  
 
MPR1993 provided a more extensive discussion of defence projects with a few restrictions 
due to commercially sensitive information. The reporting structure made a few changes to 
the project selection process. MPR1993 is based on 25 of the largest projects, in terms of 
expenditure, whereas previous statements included all projects with Treasury approval for 
expenditure in excess of £250 million (NAO 1993, p.4). 
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With the introduction of a comprehensive report there were limitations on the number of 
projects included due to limits on the size of the report. NAO (1993, p.4) specifies 
‘projects are chosen for inclusion within the Major Projects Report according to their 
budgeted spends over the next ten years. However, the budgets or the overall expected 
project costs are not disclosed within the project summary sheets and cannot, in most 
instances, be discerned from other data in the sheets. The Department do so because 
disclosure may encourage tenderers to quote a higher price than would otherwise be the 
case’. This demonstrates that the level of transparency by the Department is reflected by 
the adversarial nature of defence negotiations at the time, as discussed in chapter two. 
 
The selection criteria for projects were slightly altered for MPR1995, in which it was 
stated that at least £10 million had to have already been spent for a project to be 
included. Five of the projects in MPR1994 were replaced with five which satisfied this new 
requirement (NAO 1995, p.1).  
 
This change remained for five reports (MPR1995 – MPR1999) and was replaced by new 
project selection criteria in MPR2000. In MPR2000, the project population was changed to 
the largest 30 projects. From these 30 projects, 20 projects had already gone through the 
main investment decision (post-Main Gate) and the remaining 10 are in their Assessment 
Phase (pre-Main Gate). 
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This change reflected the implementation of the Smart Procurement Initiative, which was 
introduced in 1998 and first implemented for projects in MPR2000. The Smart 
Procurement Initiative, which has been discussed at length in chapter two, introduced a 
new project lifecycle for defence projects, CADMID, to replace the Downey Cycle. Previous 
to MPR2000, the projects which were included in the reports were analysed together in 
one section of the report.  
 
MPR2000 distinguishes between the pre-Main Gate and post-Main Gate projects in order 
to highlight the different nature of spending and project management during the two 
acquisition periods. In the MPR2001, Smart Procurement Initiative was renamed Smart 
Acquisition Principles to emphasise the entire acquisition life-cycle and introduced a 
number of principles aimed at improving defence acquisition. 
 
As well as the changes implemented in acquisition policy during the reporting under the 
1990s and 2000s; projects can also be differentiated in terms of their procurement route. 
In the 1990s, the reports analyse project performance by differentiating between the non-
competitive and competitive based contracts. This distinction is less important in the 
2000s reports as most, if not all, projects are based on competition. 
 
The various changes to project selection and procurement in the reports are mirrored by 
changes to project performance indicators.  Project performance criteria were highlighted 
in the new reporting structure as, NAO (p.5, 1993) explains, ‘the new format contains a 
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wealth of information on the cost and time position of projects which was not previously 
made available. It also contains useful ancillary information on the nature of the contract, 
the procurement route and quantities to be purchased’.  
 
Performance criteria were based on two specific measures, cost and time variations. Cost 
and time variations are explained under a number of categories, these categories are 
presented in Table 5.1. The categories provided the explanation for the changes in the 
estimated cost and time from the budget and schedule assessments.  NAO has revised its 
categories to reflect changes in the way it assessed the projects in the reports. 
 
Cost Variance Time Variance 
1993 1995 2000 1993 1995 2000 
Price variations Contract 
pricing 
Contracting 
process 
Technical 
difficulties 
Technical 
difficulties 
Technical 
factors 
Poor cost 
estimation 
Under/over-
estimates  
Change in 
associated 
projects 
Procurement 
delays 
Collaborative 
process  
Procurement 
strategy 
Volume 
variations 
Quantity 
variations 
Changes 
budgetary 
priorities 
Budgetary 
constraints 
Budgetary 
constraints 
Changed 
budgetary 
priorities 
Programme 
delays 
Programme 
changes 
Procurement 
strategy  
Project 
definition 
Project 
definition 
Redefinitions  
Specification 
changes 
Specification or 
requirement 
changes 
Changed 
requirements 
Reliability 
problems 
Delays in 
associate 
projects 
Change in 
associated 
projects 
Technical 
problems  
Collaborative 
process  
Technical 
factors  
Other  Other Changed 
requirements 
other Accounting 
changes  
Accounting 
adjustment 
 Contract 
negotiation 
Contracting 
process 
 Inflation 
adjustment 
Inflation     
 Exchange rates  Exchange rates     
Table 5.1: NAO Cost and Time Variance Categories (NAO 1993; 1995; 2000) 
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The inclusion of the time and cost variation categories was an addition to the MPR1993. 
NAO (1993) suggested the headings previously used in the Major Projects statement did 
not provide ‘meaningful information’.  
 
The NAO consulted the Department on changes to be made to the categories in order to 
improve the clarity of the information. However, NAO (1994b, p.8) was still not satisfied 
with the adapted categories as ‘some explanations for cost variations still do not convey 
adequately the nature of the factor leading to variance… ’.  
 
Changes were made to the category names and new categories were added, for MPR1995 
and consequently MPR2000. Whilst the reports state that the categories are not 
analogous, there does not seem to be too great of a departure from previous categories. 
As Table 5.1 shows, some categories have been slightly changed in name but they infer 
the same analyses.  
 
However, there were additional categories in MPR1995 – for cost variance the categories 
went from seven to nine, and six to seven in time variance. The new categories were a 
response to the changes in monetary value (in terms of inflation and exchange rate) which 
were affecting major projects. Some of the new categories were also due to internal 
financial changes, such as the accounting adjustment category. The new categories in time 
variance were a result of better understanding of what was creating delays.     
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In MPR2001 a new category ‘risk differential’ was added to cost variance. This was 
brought in specifically, and only, to apply to ‘Smart projects’ (NAO 2001, p.5). Similarly a 
new category was added for time variance to reflect the change in procurement strategy, 
‘risk provisions’ (NAO 2001, p.12) was added to the list. 
  
A third type of performance indicator, Key User Requirements, was introduced as part of 
the Smart Procurement Initiative in MPR2000 to assess the Departments ability to meet 
the military customers’ requirements.  
 
NAO (2000, p.11) explains ‘under Smart Procurement, Key User Requirements are agreed 
at Main Gate and form a contract between the Integrated Project Team and the 
equipment capability customer. The new format of the post-Main Gate project Summary 
Sheets in the 2000 Major Projects Report includes, for the first time, a section on technical 
performance which reports whether projects currently expect to meet Key User 
Requirements specified by the military customer’. 
 
In MPR2004 the focus changed from reporting the cost and time variance in detail to an 
in-depth analysis of the implementation of Smart Acquisition Principles and its affect on 
defence projects.  
 
NAO (2004a, p.12) comments ‘where the Department has not fully applied sensible 
acquisition principles, cost increases and delays have often resulted. The aim of the 
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Assessment Phase is to spend the right amount of time and money before the main 
investment decision to reduce project risks to an acceptable level. In practice, the right 
proportion to be spent will be determined by factors such as the nature of the equipment 
(such as an upgrade or a completely new capability), the maturity of the technology 
involved, the scale and length of production, and the likely procurement strategy 
(collaborative, non-competitive or off-the-shelf, Private Finance Initiative or Public Private 
Partnership)’.  
 
However, the Report emphasised that Smart Acquisition principles are effective where 
applied rigorously. MPR2005 returned to discussions on cost and time variations and the 
reasons behind them. 
 
5.2.2 Smart Acquisition Projects 
The introduction of projects in their Assessment Phase in MPR2000 brought about some 
major changes to the report structure.  In its first analysis of the Assessment Phase NAO 
(2000) had to equate the Initial Gate approval point in the CADMID cycle to an 
approximation of the Downey cycle, due to the fact that all ten projects in the MPR2000 
were conceived prior to the introduction of the Smart Procurement Initiative (NAO 2000, 
p.13). 
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In MPR2001 assessment measures for projects were first reported. Three-point cost 
estimates introduced by the MoD were first reported by the NAO (1994b, p.5) for the 
purpose of ‘… a reduction in overly optimistic estimates by translating the identified risks 
into upper and lower costs (with confidence limits) about an expected figure. The 
tolerance band will provide an indication of the uncertainty present in the estimate of 
future costs’. They measure the level of risk affecting cost and timing of projects and 
became mandatory under Smart Acquisition in 2001 (NAO 2001, p.15).  
 
NAO (2001, p.16) states ‘under Smart Acquisition, the range of cost and time covered by 
three-point estimates is expected to narrow between Initial Gate and Main Gate as risks 
are reduced. It is not clear to what extent the range is expected to narrow during the 
Assessment Phase or how wide a range is acceptable for a project to proceed through 
Main Gate. These parameters are unlikely to be standard across projects. They will 
depend on factors such as the nature and complexity of individual projects, which affect 
the risks involved and because of this the Equipment Approvals Committee review each 
project on a case by case basis’.  
 
There is a great amount of uncertainty during the initial phase of projects creating risks on 
cost and time controls. The Department, in the earlier years of reporting on the 
Assessment Phase, were unable to provide much guidance on how to deal with the risk. 
The Department investigated the possible introduction of Technology Readiness Levels to 
address technological risks.  
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NAO (2001, p.17) explains ‘Technology Readiness Levels have the potential to better 
support and give added confidence to the Department’s decision making during the 
Assessment Phase and at Main Gate. Used in conjunction with the narrowing of the cost 
and time ranges covered by three-point estimates, Technology Readiness Levels would 
enable the amount of risk reduction achieved and the risk remaining before reaching an 
acceptable level to be better quantified’.  
 
Technology Readiness Levels use a quantified scale – from basic concept technology at 
Level 1 to mature and proven technology at Level 9 – as a measure of technical maturity 
and to target risk-reduction activity before Main Gate. This was made mandatory for the 
Assessment Phase as part of an essential part of the ‘Main Gate Business Cases’ (NAO 
2002b, p.23-4). 
  
Thus, in MPR2002, nine pre-Main Gate projects had full three-point risk estimates for cost 
and time (the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft only has cost estimates) and eight were 
using Technology Readiness Levels (Bowman and Skynet were approved before the 
mandate).  
 
These measures are in place in order to ensure the most effective and efficient decisions 
are made in the Assessment Phase. NAO (2002b, p.24) explains ‘the objective of the 
Assessment Phase is to spend the right amount of time and money to reduce risks to an 
acceptable level for Main Gate approval… Under Smart Acquisition, spending more money 
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in the Assessment phase and postponing Main Gate may, in some circumstances, be the 
right thing to do if it reduces risk to an acceptable level for Main Gate. However, there is 
also a requirement to be more accurate with time estimates of the Assessment Phase to 
avoid any unplanned capability shortfalls that may result in the long run’.  
 
A guide of 15 per cent of the total procurement costs is suggested, before Main Gate 
approval, but it may depend on the circumstances and the risk involved in individual 
projects. In terms of Technology Readiness Levels, the Investment Approvals Board 
expects projects to reach Level three at Initial Gate and Level seven at Main Gate (this was 
not mandatory: NAO 2003, p.22).  
 
In MPR2003 the Department investigated the possibility of using System Readiness Levels, 
to measure the maturity of complete systems including the integration of all components. 
System Readiness Levels were to assess the readiness of the design, development and 
testing regimes of systems or sub-systems to represent the risk to timely integration, 
these levels were to have the same scales as the Technology Readiness Levels (NAO 2003, 
p.22).  
 
There was scant mention of Technology Readiness Levels and System Readiness Levels, 
nor were any figures given, in MPR2004. The focus in that report was assessing how Smart 
Acquisition principles can be more effectively implemented.  
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In MPR2005, the report discussed the importance of the Technology Readiness levels on a 
project basis, making the point that legacy projects would not have passed most of the 
assessments were they assessed retrospectively. There was no mention of overall 
performance in terms of these indicators.  
 
NAO (2005b, p.20) did, however, comment ‘from the start to the end of the Assessment 
Phase, the department expects a project’s technology readiness to progress from around 
level three to level seven and its system readiness to progress from level one to four. 
From next year, there is potential for the Major Projects Report to track technology and 
system readiness levels’. This was not to be. 
  
The Assessment Phase in MPR2006 onwards has been relegated to a one page summary, 
with a table presenting the ‘current forecast costs of Assessment Phase projects’ in the 
Appendix. In-depth analyses provided in previous reports have been negated. The 
information provided in the Appendix provides, compared to previous arrangements, 
minimal performance indications. 
 
The explanation offered by NAO (2006b, p.18) of this change is: ‘The Department has 
changed the format of the Pre-Main Gate Project Summary Sheets to bring them into line 
with its policy on the release of information on equipment projects. Cost for the 
Demonstration and Manufacture phase and In-service dates are not set until the main 
investment decision is made at Main Gate Approval. Forecasts prior to this Approval are 
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for internal planning purposes only and publicly declaring these limits the Department’s 
ability to make trade-offs and to conclude satisfactorily commercial arrangements’.  
 
It is clear that the Department has changed its reporting structure over the years to reflect 
the changes made in the acquisition process; this has had a knock-on effect on the 
performance measures applied to the projects. The project population has encompassed a 
wider and varied group of projects to reflect the gradual implementation of Smart 
Acquisition. The performance indicators have evolved over the years for cost and time; a 
number of categories were used to explain the cost and time variations.  
 
The introduction of post-Main Gate and Assessment Phase projects have provided greater 
insight into projects at these two crucial phases of the lifecycle. Another effect of the 
introduction of the Smart Procurement Initiative is the addition of Key User Requirement 
as a performance measure, alongside cost and time, in MPR2000.  
 
In the Assessment Phase performance measures were introduced to improve the 
preparation for the demonstration and manufacturing stage. These measures include cost 
and time estimates, and technology and system readiness levels. However, reporting of 
projects in the Assessment Phase has become less detailed and more restrictive from 
MPR2006 onwards. The descriptive discussion of projects in the Assessment Phase, 
introduced in MPR2000, was replaced with a one page graphical summary of the costs of 
projects in their Assessment Phase. 
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5.3 Project Performance 
5.3.1 Project Performance (1993-1999) 
Table 5.2 records the in-year cost and time performance of the major projects in the 
reports of 1993 to 1999. The table records the progression of the major projects in terms 
of the ‘cost change’ and ‘percentage cost change’ for all projects and common projects in 
the population. NAO (1994, p.3) explains the values are given as ‘… the difference 
between the total of original cost estimates made at the first approval of each stage, and 
current cost estimate’. Each year this value is recalculated using the current cost 
estimates for each project. The in-year in-service date delay is presented for all projects 
and the common projects in the same report population. 
 
 
                                            
1
 Excluding Eurofighter 
2
 Based on 24 projects rather than the usually 25 projects in MPR 
Cost Variance on  Yearly Costs Average In-Service Date 
Delay 
Yearly Value for all 
projects (NAO, 1993,…, 
1999) 
Yearly Value for common 
projects1  (NAO 1999, f.11, 
p.23) 
Yearly Value (NAO 1999, 
f.14, p.29) 
Year 
Cost (£m) Percentage 
(%) 
Cost (£m) Percentage 
(%) 
All 
projects 
(months)  
Common 
projects 
(months) 
1993 -1856 (6.0) 48 1 322 31 
1994 -1680 (5.3) 392 5 34 38 
1995 -1650 (4.9) 843 9 31 44 
1996 -694 (2.0) 990 11 37 50 
1997 3084 9.1 1137 12 37 51 
1998 2819 8.0 1147 12 43 58 
1999 2731 7.8 1646 18 472 64 
Table 5.2: Cost and Time Variation 1993-1999  
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Cost Variance: MPR1993 is a good example of how exceptionally large and new projects 
can affect the overall result. MPR1993 reports an over spend of £1209m on 13 projects, 
nil variance on 3 projects, and under spend of £3605m on 9 projects (NAO 1993, p.6). If 
we were to exclude Eurofighter and Trident, which skew the results greatly, the net cost 
variance would be £158m under spend over 23 projects. Just over 90 per cent of the cost 
variation is attributable to the Trident and Eurofighter projects.  
 
However, even with the skew in the total and percentage cost change, the total cost 
change indicates the ability of the Department to meet, or in these cases miss, its budget. 
The percentage cost changes for the yearly values is a mixed result. From 1993 to 1996 
each MPR suggests the gap in missed budget targets as closing. During this period the 
Department were spending under the forecasted cost.  
 
This is then dramatically changed to over spending in 1997 with a leap in 11.1 percentage 
points from the under spend value in 1996. Thus, not only has the Department started to 
overspend, its cost variance has grown dramatically. NAO (1997, p.3) explains ‘the major 
factor in this difference is that the Trident programme no longer qualifies for inclusion in 
the Major Projects Report. At 31 March 1996, Trident had a forecast cost reduction of 
£3,498 million, which offset the variance on the other 24 projects’.  
 
The MPR1997 figures are also affected by the large net forecast cost increase in the 
Eurofighter project (£1,595m), excluding that project the net percentage forecast cost 
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increase is 7.5 per cent which is favourable compared to the 8.7 per cent increase in 
MPR1996.  
 
A better indication of the budgeting performance of the Department might be to look at 
the figures for the seven comparable major projects. Those figures compiled in Figure 11 
of NAO (1999) report shows a gradual increase in the forecast cost since approval, for the 
seven major projects. There is a levelling in the transitions from MPR1997 to MPR1998, 
and then a large increase at MPR1999.  
 
NAO (1999, p.23) explains ‘the major increase from 12 per cent in 1998 to 18 per cent in 
1999 is largely attributable to a cost increase of £326 million on the Merlin Mark 1 project 
(£161 million of which results from an internal Ministry of Defence budgetary transfer) 
and the £189 million advanced expenditure on Bowman risk reduction’.  
 
Price Variations and Poor Cost Estimation
3
 account, mainly, for cost increases and Volume 
Variations predominantly for cost reductions, in MPR1993. NAO (1993, p.13) explains ‘for 
the 23 projects, “price variation” taken with “[poor cost estimation]”, account for 56 per 
cent of total cost variance by value’. 
 
Inflation Adjustment was introduced as a category for cost variance in MPR1994 and in 
each year since it was identified, constantly, as the second major reason for cost 
                                            
3
 Estimates Incorrect  in MPR1994 and Under/Over Estimate thus forward 
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increases. Poor Cost Estimation was also a major contributor to cost increases in defence 
spending. It was in the top three reasons for cost variances until MPR1997. 
  
Programme Changes was introduced as a category in MPR1996, to replace Programme 
Delays, most likely to increase the scope for the reason for cost variance related to the 
programme management. Since 1993 the overall affect of Programme Delays have 
steadily increased costs.  
 
In MPR1996 to MPR1999 Programme Changes accounted for the primary reason for cost 
increases. Specification Changes accounted for a large portion of cost increases in defence 
spending throughout MPR1993 to MPR1999. The increases in cost variance of defence 
spend can therefore be attributed to four factors: Programme Changes, Inflation 
Adjustment, Under/Over Estimate and Specification Changes. 
 
Time Variance: The ‘average in-service date delay’ over the MPR1993 to MPR1999 period 
shows a gradual increase in the delay of the average forecast dates for the yearly values. 
The reason for the drop in 1995 is due to the introduction of five new projects (NAO 1995, 
p.4). However, as is evident in the figures for the eight comparable major projects the 
average delay has increased year-on-year. 
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The major categories causing time variance are: Technical Difficulties, Budgetary 
Constraints, Project Redefinition (renamed Project Definition in MPR1995 onwards) and 
Procurement Delays (emphasised as Collaborative Process in MPR1995 onwards). Table 
5.3 provides a break down of the causes of in-service date delay, showing the years in 
which each factor was a major cause of delays ranking from 1
st
 to 4
th
. The rank shows the 
top 4 reasons from a possible of 8 factors responsible for in-service date delays.   
 
Technical Difficulties has consistently been the most troublesome in causing delays – 
there have been a few changes in the top four reasons for project delays as shown in 
Table 5.3. These delays are comparable in the magnitude of the delays and make up more 
than 80 per cent of the total delays each year. 
 
There are a few interesting trends to gather from Table 5.3. Firstly, the reason for Project 
Definition jumping from being the fourth most common reason for project delay to the 
first and second in MPR1998 and MPR1999, respectively. The increase in in-service date 
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Technical Difficulties 93-97 and 99 98 - - 
Procurement Delays / 
Collaborative Process 
- 93-94 95-97 98-99 
Budgeting Constraint - 95-97 93-94 and 98-
99 
- 
Project Re/Definition 98 99 - 93-97 
Table 5.3: Largest Causes for In-service Date Delays in MPRs 1993-1999  
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delay due to Project Definition in MPR1998 by 75 per cent from MPR1997 figures is largely 
attributed to the inclusion of the Air-Launched Anti-Armour Weapon (AAAW). The AAAW 
had been delayed by 118 months mainly due to the feasibility study finding the project to 
be ambitious but achievable with an extended project definition phase (NAO 1998, p.16-
17). 
 
The Procurement Delays category was a major contribution to delays in the earlier report. 
NAO (1995, p.15) comments ‘the collaborative process continues to cause problems with 
some 16 per cent of slippage attributable to procurement delays caused by the 
collaborative process, for example protracted negotiations between partners on the 
COBRA project’. In MPR1999, it was the Common New Generation Frigate which was most 
affected by the Collaborative Process. 
 
Budgeting Constraints has consistently been the second or third largest cause of in-service 
delay. NAO (1998, p.20) explains ‘the delays reflect the effect on the projects of the re-
profiling of the overall annual procurement budget to address the problems of over-
programming which occurs when forecast annual procurement costs exceed the annual 
procurement budget. Over-programming may reflect pressures on the Department’s 
budget as a whole or changes in the proportion of the Defence budget committed to 
procurement as well as overruns on projects, or over-optimistic initial estimates of the 
cost of programmes’. 
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Technical Difficulties has consistently been the major cause for in-service delay, bar 
MPR1998. NAO (1997, p.17) explains ‘technical difficulties occur for a range of reasons, 
most of which relate to the specific nature of each project, and so it is not possible to 
identify any single underlying cause. The reasons for the decrease in delays between 1996 
and 1997 Reports is that projects new to the 1997 Report have less slippage due to 
technical difficulties than the projects they replaced. It is too early to identify a trend but 
this is an encouraging development and demonstrates that the newer major projects are 
less prone to technical difficulties than the older one’. This does not seem to be the case 
since the slippage attributed to Technical Difficulties continued to grow in following years.   
  
The trend in MPR1993 to MPR1999 represents an increase in terms of the cost and time 
variance for major defence projects. The Department realised there was a lack of control 
in cost and time targets and sought to change its acquisition practices. Smart Acquisition 
principles were introduced due to the poor cost and time performance and to create 
processes which would control estimates and project lifecycle management.  
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5.3.2 Project Performance (2000-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost Variance: The mixture of legacy and new projects in the Reports make it difficult to 
see the true nature of the advances made in project performance in the early stages of 
the 2000s. However, the trends in costing since the introduction of Smart Acquisition can 
be crudely identified in Table 5.4.  
 
It has been difficult to track the performance of the in-service date delays for the 2000s 
due to inconsistent metric used in the Reports. I was therefore unable to provide a list of 
the in-service date slippages in Table 5.4. The NAO provide some comparative studies in 
                                            
4
 18 projects - Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) and Support Vehicle (Cargo and Recovery) has been excluded from costs 
analysis due to commercial sensitivity. 
5
 19 projects - Support Vehicle (Cargo and Recovery) has been excluded from costs analysis due to commercial sensitivity. 
6
 19 projects – Typhoon has been excluded from costs analysis (in 2006-2008) due to commercial sensitivity.  
  
Cost Variance on Yearly Costs Year 
In-year Monetary Value (£m)  Percentage Cost Variance (%) 
2000 2400 5.7 
2001 2630 6.6 
2002 -200 (0.4) 
2003 3000 6.14 
2004 6000 13.65 
2005 2700 106 
2006 2970 11 
2007 3080 11 
2008 3360 12 
Table 5.4: Cost and Time Variation 2000-2008 (NAO 2000,…, 2008) 
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MPR2002 and MPR2003 which I shall discuss. However, they do not provide a 
comparative case of common projects, as they did in MPR1999.  
 
Table 5.4 presents the cost variance for defence costs from 2000 to 2008, similar to the 
exercise in Table 5.2. The trends in cost variance are difficult to identify due to the project 
mix. However, the table provides the in-year monetary value and percentage difference 
for the cost change each year.  
 
Whilst Table 5.4 indicates an increase in forecast costs from MPR2000 to MPR2001, this 
negates the introduction of two new projects in MPR2001. The cost performance of the 
18 common projects in these two years actually saw a reduction in total forecast costs – 
from a 6.23 per cent cost variance in MPR2000 to 5.73 per cent in MPR2001 (NAO 2001, 
p.5). NAO (2001, p.4) notes ‘over 90 per cent of the cost increases of £3.07 billion are 
accounted for by cost overruns on three programmes, Eurofighter, Merlin Mk.1 and 
Tornado Mid-Life Update’. This highlights the affect newer and exceptionally larger 
projects can have on the net cost variance.  
 
The difficulty with making comparisons in reports purely on net cost forecast variance is 
that it does not take into account the constant change in project population. The nature 
of defence projects are that they can last a number of years, typically the longest being 
between 10 to 20 years.  
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While Smart Acquisition was implemented in 2001 its effectiveness is difficult to track in a 
mixed project population. There were a number of legacy and ‘Smart projects’ (projects 
approved under Smart Acquisition principles) during the earlier reports, it was not evident 
until the middle of the decade the affect of the new acquisition policy. The performances 
of the Smart projects were masked by the legacy projects. 
 
The project population since 2001 has gradually seen the introduction of a number of 
Smart projects in the reports. There were three Smart projects in MPR2001, ten in 
MPR2002, and thirteen in MPR2003, which received Main Gate approval. The legacy 
projects were reported using Smart Acquisition processes, retrospectively, applied to 
them.  
 
The result of MPR2002 shows a reduction in forecast costs against approval. With an 
equal balance of legacy and smart projects, it can be inferred from the figures given by 
NAO (2002b) that the Smart projects had improved the net forecast cost against approval. 
Of the ten legacy projects the net forecast cost was £959m beyond approval, this takes 
into account the £1,114m above approval of the Eurofighter project. The Smart projects 
were £1,348m within their forecast cost approval. A much better performance even if 
Eurofighter was discounted (£155m within approval) (NAO 2002b, p7). 
 
The challenge for the following year for the Department was to ensure it could keep the 
newly introduced smart projects within time and cost approval. However, the 
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improvements seen in MPR2002 were radically reversed in MPR2003, where the net 
forecast cost against approval returned almost to the MPR2001 levels. NAO (2003a, p.5) 
reports ‘the 16 projects common to both reports were £237 million over approval in 2002 
and are £3.3 billion over approval in 2003. These figures suggest a reversal of the 
improvements in cost control indicated over the last few years’. This almost fourteen fold 
increase in cost is a major blow to the cost performance of the Department. 
 
NAO (2003a, p.5) explains ‘there has been a total cost increase of £3.1 billion on the 18 
projects in the Major Projects Report 2003 in the last year. Of this, £2.7 billion relates to 
Legacy projects and is virtually all accounted for by the four Legacy projects [Astute, 
Advanced Air-Launched Anti-Armour Weapon, Nimrod and Typhoon]. Excluding the four 
Legacy projects from the analysis, the remaining 14 projects in the Major Projects Report 
2003 are £839 million within approval and there has been a £382 million increase in cost 
on these projects in the last year’.  
 
Comparing the results of MPR2002 and MPR2003, there are some stark differences which 
highlight the radical transition. Using NAO (2002, p.6-7, f.2 and f3) figures and comparing 
with the figures in NAO (2003a, p.8, f.5) it is clear there has been a major cost increase in 
smart and legacy projects. For example, the smart project Type 45 Destroyer has an in-
year variation of £28m in 2002 and £124m in 2003. In terms of legacy projects Astute goes 
from an in-year variation of £9m in 2002 to £1003m in 2003. These cost increases are 
evident in nearly all the 16 common projects in MPR2002 and MPR2003. 
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The MPR2004 result was a more than double increase in the net forecast cost against 
approval to 13.6 per cent over budget. NAO (2004a, p.8) explains ‘not all of the cost 
increases reflect extra payments to industry; some £530 million (31 per cent) of the in-
year variation is an interest on capital charge which reflects the additional length of time 
for which money will be tied up because of delays or revised deliveries on projects. Some 
of these delays and revised deliveries may result from deliberate Departmental planning’. 
 
In MPR2005, the results were more assuring for Smart Acquisition with forecast costs 
decreasing by £0.7 billion. NAO (2005b, p.9) states ‘the implementation of Smart 
Acquisition is an ongoing process which the Department is actively trying to embed fully. 
The cost decreases reflect application of one of the key principles of Smart Acquisition, 
namely trading-off performance, time and cost, and greater realism on the part of the 
acquisition community’.  
 
Whilst there was an improvement in cost this had come by trading off time and 
operational requirements; project delays increased by an average of two and a half 
months. The requirements trade-off meant that the customer requirements were being 
redefined. The requirement changes and in-service delays coupled to create a capability 
gap for the Armed Forces. This had to be filled by extending and upgrading existing 
capability, which created maintenance, support and upgrade costs. I will explore this 
situation further in the following  section. 
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During MPR2005 to MPR2008, cost variance was constant at a level of 10 – 12 per cent 
overspend. That is a 2 percentage point difference in the three year period. This suggests 
that the cost increases of related projects, in this period, were constant. This is may be a 
result of the successful implementation of the trade-off policy, but is also a part of the 
Department’s cost reallocation programme. Costs were reallocated from the DPA to other 
parts of the Department during MPR2006 and MPR2007. This was done in order to 
remove the pressure from the DPA budget and allocate cost to more appropriate areas in 
the MoD. 
 
NAO (2006b, p.7) comments ‘we recognise the rationale underpinning the resulting 
measure is sensible. A consequence is, however, that because of the basis upon which the 
Major Projects Report is compiled, some of these measures appear as a cost reduction to 
the individual project, but these costs will now be incurred elsewhere in the Department’.  
 
Such accounting practices are common in most commercial businesses, which spread 
costs around their organisation to improve annual results; this may be seen as hiding the 
costs through clever accounting methods. Being a Government Ministry this option was 
always likely to be untenable for the Department. Whilst the NAO could recognise the 
financial sensibility in the Departments reallocation programme, the Committee of Public 
Accounts disagreed with the political consequence of the programme.  
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NAO (2008b, p.10) reports ‘the Committee of Public Accounts, in its  report on the Major 
Project Report 2007, criticised the Department for continuing to reallocate budgets and 
costs, as this reduces transparency to Parliament of the full picture of the cost of bringing 
equipment into service. The Department has not reallocated money outside the scope of 
the Major Projects Report 2007-08’. Whilst the NAO deemed cost reallocation a sensible 
policy, the PAC deemed it to be against the public interest due to the lack of transparency.  
  
MPR2002 provides a comparative analysis of cost variation by factor during the three year 
period starting with MPR2000 (NAO 2002b, f.8, p.12). The bar chart highlights the 
percentage cost variance against approval across each factor, with separate bars for each 
report, identifying factors in which the Department had most influence, from left to right. 
 
Three factors attributed more than one per cent cost variance against approval: Changed 
Requirements, Technical Factors, and Inflation (in order of most to least influence). 
Technical Factors demonstrates the largest of the cost variance; the bar shows just over 2 
per cent cost variance in 2000, which increases to 3 per cent in 2001 and drops 
dramatically to just over 1 per cent in 2002.  
 
Similarly, Changed Requirements and Inflation, percentage cost variance against approval 
increased from 2000 to 2001 and then dropped dramatically in 2002. In fact for Changed 
Requirement went from incurring costs in 2001 to cost savings in 2002 (NAO 2002b, f.8, 
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p.12). These transitions in cost variance provide an indication into the reason for the 
dramatic drop in net cost variance against approval in MPR2002. 
 
In MPR2003 the same analysis was undertaken in comparing the 2002 and 2003 results 
according to each factor. A bar chart was presented, but in this case each bar 
differentiated between legacy and smart projects using colour coding (NAO 2003, f.9, 
p.13). The striking result of this bar chart was the large increase from MPR2002 to 
MPR2003 with respect to Technical Factors. There was a five fold jump from just over one 
per cent cost variance against approval to over 5 per cent. 
 
Most of the factors were showing an increase from 2002 to 2003, which was mainly 
attributed to continuing cost increases in legacy projects. Receipts, Inflation and Exchange 
Rates were the only factors which showed a reduction in this period. This was not 
surprising as they were unlikely to vary greatly in a year. These categories represent 
factors where the Department has least influence. Whereas, the increased cost variance 
factors were those which, predominantly, the Department could influence. 
 
The discussions in MPR2004 focused mainly on the failure to implement Smart Acquisition 
principles in the running of the projects. NAO (2004a, p.7) comments ‘…many so called 
Smart projects have failed to apply Smart Acquisition principles consistently, thus they 
have failed to deliver the expected benefits of Smart Acquisition’.  
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There were brief descriptions of where the cost variances originated from. The main 
reason for large cost overruns were attributed to Technical Factors in five of the twenty 
projects, Contracting Process in three, Changed Budgetary in three, Procurement Strategy 
in two and Exchange Rate in two. Of course, a single project can be affected by more than 
one factor. The influence the Department has on each factor varies. It has greater 
influence on Procurement Strategy, medium influence on Technical Factor and no 
influence on Exchange Rate.  
 
NAO (2005b, p.9) explains the basis of the reduction in cost variance in MPR2005. ‘The 
decreases in forecast cost this year were primarily due to reductions in the number or 
capability of the equipment driven by changed budgetary priorities and changed 
Customer requirements. These causes of cost variation are essentially measures the 
internal Customer can take to manage the portfolio of projects and they, along with 
exchange rates, were the largest causes of cost decrease in the last year. They also 
occurred on projects that, overall, had a net forecast cost increase’. This in effect was the 
implementation of a key principle in Smart Acquisition – tradeoffs! 
 
The focus on how to control cost variances in MPR2006 was on cost reallocation. NAO 
(2006b, p.8) explains ‘the Departmental Review process identified 18 occasions in seven 
projects, where activities included in the Equipment Plan allocations and worth £448 
million, should be moved to other budgets within the Department where they can be 
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more effectively managed’. As mentioned above, these cost reduction methods were not 
sustainable for the Department.  
 
Cost variance during MPR2006 to MPR2008 stayed within a two percentage point, this 
was in essence due to the more effective management of Technical Factors which created 
cost growth on the newer projects. MPR2007 was able to show that Technical Factors 
originated mainly from legacy projects (NAO 2007b, f.10, p.16).  
 
MPR2008 highlighted the fact that cost growth due to Technical Factors was at its greatest 
during the second quarter of the project length. Such understanding has aided the 
Department in how it should target project investment. Specifically, there is a tacit 
understanding that early investment in the Assessment Phase can help control technical 
difficulties better.  
 
Figure 5.1 represents the trend for percentage cost variance over the 1993 to 2008 
period. The lowest absolute value being 0.4 per cent in MPR2002 and the highest is 13.6 
per cent in MPR2004. These two points represent the Departments best and worst 
performance in meeting its budget, respectively. It is important to state that these figures 
represent differing calculations in terms of the project population in each report. 
However, it makes for interesting comparison in the Departments budgeting capability.  
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The trend line in the graph of Figure 5.1 shows the gradual transition from cost under-runs 
to cost overruns in the percentage cost variation. This graph brings together sixteen years 
of major project performance. The areas of interest in the graph are where the points 
migrate away from the trend line. The trend line represents the expected performance of 
each year by providing the expected progression once all the points are taken into 
account.   
 
There are two areas of interests the first is the points of 1996 to 2001 and the second is 
the 2002 to 2005. These two areas can be explained using the information in the reports 
and with hindsight looking at the overall picture. The other points are close to or move 
closely to the trend line. 
 
Figure 5.1: Percentage Cost Variance in the MPRs 1993-2008 (NAO 1993,...., 2008) 
Percentage Cost Variance in the MPRs 1993-2008
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The stark rise in overall project performance from -£990m (2.0% under cost) to £1,137m 
(9.1% over cost) can be explained by the change in project population. This transition is 
mainly accounted for by the removal of Trident and the large net forecast cost increase in 
the Eurofighter project. The Trident project accounted for £3,498m forecast cost 
reduction in 1996 which accounted for the low cost variance. Its removal and the £1,489m 
forecast cost increase for Eurofighter accounts for the stark rise in the percentage cost 
variation in 1997. 
 
The percentage cost variation thereafter, for 1998 to 2001, moves towards the trend line. 
Comparing the actual cost changes in MPR1998 and MPR1999 there is an improvement in 
cost variation. There are 16 projects which exceed their forecast cost in 1998 and only 9 in 
1999, and 9 which meet or are below their forecast cost in 1999 and 12 in 1999 (NAO 
1998, f.4, p.9; NAO 1999, f.7, p.13). This improvement is the reason for the points 
migrating towards the trend line. The results of 2001 and 2002 are closer to the trend line, 
providing evidence of the costs being closer to the projection.  
 
The second area of interest is in the radical drop in percentage cost variation in 2002. This 
cost variation of -£200m (0.4% under cost) is a consequence of the introduction of 10 new 
smart projects (half the project population). Newer projects tend to exhibit less adverse 
time and cost variation against approval (NAO 2002, p.19). These newer projects had a 
major affect on the overall performance. NAO (2002) prematurely summarised that the 
performance was as a result of the Smart Acquisition policy. With hindsight it is possible 
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to dismiss this conclusion and attribute this anomaly result to the major change in project 
population.  
 
If the conclusion that the Smart Acquisition policy impacted project performance was to 
stand, the results of 2003, 2004 and 2005 would have to have been much lower. Even if 
there were still cost increases in these years, a relatively lower level of cost increases 
would have forced the trend line down. Consequently, the cost increases in 2005, 2006, 
2007 and 2008 are closer to the trend line and keeping it higher to nullify the effects of 
the 2002 result.   
 
Time Variance: As with cost variance, time variance was mainly attributed to Technical 
Factors. A bar chart comparing time variance for the 2000-2002 periods (NAO 2002b, f.9, 
p.14) showed the bars representing Technical Factor towering way above the rest at 
almost three times the height of the nearest factor (Changed Budgetary Priority). 
However, the delays in months fell each year from 2000 to 2002, with a dramatic fall to a 
third in 2002 as compared to 2001.   
 
The improvements made during the 2000 to 2002 period were reversed in MPR2003. 
There was a sharp increase in delays attributed to Technical Factors, the majority of which 
was a result of legacy projects (NAO 2003, f.12, p16). The increase due to Technical 
Factors has contributed to further delays in projects.  NAO (2003a, p.7) reports ‘the total 
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delay equates to an average of 18 months delay per project. This compares to an average 
of 9 months for projects in the Major Projects Report 2002’.    
 
MPR2005 outlines the reasons for time increases in-year, in a three year (2003 to 2005) 
comparative bar chart. The results show Technical Factors and Contracting Process 
contributing significant proportions of project delays each year. Technical Factors 
contributed five times the amount of delays compared to the Contracting Process in 
MPR2003.  
 
In the following years, 2004 and 2005, it was mainly Technical Factors which contributed 
to project delays. The net time increases had, however, decreased from 140 months in 
2003 to between 40-50 months in 2004 and 2005. Even so, the majority of the time 
increases were attributable to Technical Factors (NAO 2005b, f.7, p.11).  
 
NAO (2005b, p.10) comments ‘these causes of variation relate to key areas that should be 
addressed during the Assessment Phase, such as technology maturity or commercial 
arrangements, and we would therefore expect them to become less prevalent although 
the occurrence of these factors should be seen against the backdrop of ongoing problems 
experienced by older projects’.  
 
Similar to the cost results, time variations were stable during MPR2006 to MPR2008. The 
period had in-service date slippage at 34 – 36 per cent increase, since Main Gate approval. 
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Most of these time scale slippage were ‘historic’ (i.e. were due to delays previously 
reported). 
 
Key User Requirement: Project performance trends in terms of meeting Key User 
Requirements is more challenging to identify. The Key User Requirement targets were first 
introduced in MPR2000, and the way they have been reported has changed since. NAO 
(2000, p.11) reported ‘the department are forecasting that the equipment being procured 
will meet or exceed all of the minimum Key User Requirements specified by the 
equipment capability customer on 17 out of 20 post-Main Gate projects’.  
 
In MPR2001 to MPR2003 the number of Key User Requirements ‘to be met’ was given in a 
more detailed manner: 169 out of 181 (93 per cent), 173 out of 176 (98 per cent) and 173 
out of 174 (99.4 per cent), respectively. Thus, the Key User Requirements from MPR2001 
to MPR2003 shows a positive movement, an increase from 93 per cent in 2001 to 98 per 
cent in 2003. The MPR2004 to MPR2008 results show the Department has met Key User 
Requirements in 18 out of 20 projects in MPR2004 and MPR2005; in 17 out of 20 project 
in MPR2006 and MPR2007; and a mere 15 out of 20 projects in MPR2008. 
 
NAO (2008b, p.15) explains ‘as reported previously, the Department does not expect to 
meet one Key User Requirement on the Sting Ray torpedo, one on the Typhoon aircraft, 
and three for Support Vehicle. Two additional projects are reporting this year that a Key 
User Requirement will not be met. The Advanced Jet Trainer project is not expected to 
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meet a Key User Requirement relating to the detection range of the radar on the training 
aircraft simulator, and the Watchkeeper project is not expected to meet a Key User 
Requirement relating to data exchange. In both cases, the original Key User Requirement 
has been redefined as the Department has assessed it is no longer necessary to meet the 
original high standard and performance at a lower standard is acceptable. Both projects 
are expecting to meet their revised Key User Requirements’. 
 
The trend in meeting Key User Requirement targets for MPR2004 to MPR2008 shows a 
gradual decline. However, due to the inconsistencies in the reporting style it is difficult to 
ascertain how many Key User Requirements are being missed for these projects.  
 
The explanation given for the poor performance in meeting requirements in MPR2008 is 
in the redefinition of the ‘high standard’ requirements. There is evidence of trade-offs 
being made in performance requirements, to meet cost and time targets. Thus, as there 
was a gradual improvement in the 2005MPR to 2008MPR results for time and cost, there 
was a gradual decline in Key User Requirements.  
 
MPR2009/MPR2010: I will make brief comments on the most recent reports, MPR2009 
and MPR2010. These Reports are analysed separately due to the major changes made to 
the reporting structure. The Reports included only fifteen largest equipment projects and 
five major commercial support contracts (NAO 2009, p.10). Comparisons will be made to 
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performance in previous years, however the population change should be kept in mind as 
large projects will have even more greater effects on the budget of a small sample.  
 
The fifteen projects in MPR2009 are shown to have an in-year cost increase of £1.2bn. 
This figure, however, includes two of the largest projects in the population which are new 
to the report: the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft and the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft 
carriers. In-year cost increases doubled in MPR2010 to £3.3bn. However, the Department 
specifies the cost increases are due to £2.7bn additional investment into the Typhoon 
procurement programme and £650m of cost increases in the Queen Elizabeth Class 
aircraft carries. If these two projects are discounted then the remaining projects show no 
or minimal cost increases.  
 
It is difficult to make a comparison to the results of MPRs 2000-2008, shown in Table 5.4, 
since those figures are of cost variances in forecasted budget and the figure for MPR2009 
and MPR2010 are of in-year cost variances of the projects. However, NAO (2009) provides 
a figure of 0.1bn for in-year cost increases in 2008. This shows that the in-year cost 
increases have been dramatically growing within the last three years. Although, the 
explanation provided for these in-year cost growths are due to specific exceptionally large 
projects.  
 
Estimated equipment expenditure for the last seven years is shown to have continually 
increased (except for estimates for 2010, where expenditure is down by £212m) according 
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to figures in the 2010 DASA Report. Expenditure is shown to be gradually increasing each 
year, from £10,886m in 2003/04 to £13,174m in 2009/10 (DASA 2010, p.20). Therefore 
while the in-year budget deficit has been growing for the last three years, expenditure has 
been increasing with only £212m worth of cuts identified for 2010.   
 
NAO (2009, pp.11-12) points out ‘…two thirds (66 per cent) of gross cost increases in 
2008-09 are due to Budgetary Factors, largely reflecting decisions made by the 
Department to reduce the short term cost of the ten-year Equipment Plan to try to make 
it affordable whilst reprioritising resources to current operations… The other principal 
reasons for cost increases in the last year have been Inflation and Exchange Rate, over 
which individual teams have limited influence once projects are under way’.  
 
The MoD was able to make savings on a forecast overspend of £15bn as part of the 
Equipment Examination and subsequent Planning Round, which it instead shift future 
military requirement spending to support current operations.  Five projects (Queen 
Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers, Astute Class submarine, Lynx Wildcat helicopter, Merlin 
Mk2 helicopter and Falcon communications systems) are affected by these budget 
reductions, however the Department is still overcommitted in its defence programme by a 
potential £6bn to £36bn (depending on the defence budget) over the next ten years.    
 
In-year in-service date slippage is reported at 93 months, an average of 7 months per 
project in MPR2009. This has fallen dramatically to 27 months slippage in MPR2010, 
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which is an average of 2 months per project. In MPR2009, there are 185 of 192 Key User 
Requirement (renamed Key Performance Measures) “To be met” across 15 post-main 
investment decision projects, of which 21 across 6 projects are “At risk” and 7 not to be 
met across 4 projects. A slight change in the figures for MPR2010, 189 of 193 Key 
Performance Measures across 15 projects are “To be met” of which 27 across 9 projects 
are “At risk” (NAO 2010, p.5, f.1).   
 
The reasons for 48 months of slippage, in MPR2009, are classified for the A400M project. 
Terrier has suffered 16 months of slippage due to Changed Requirements. The Queen 
Elizabeth Class has suffered a net slippage of 10 months, UK Military Flying Training 
System 8 months, and Watchkeeper 2 months due to Change in Budgetary Priorities. 
Astute Class and Falcon have suffered 10 and 5 months delay, respectively, due to 
Technical Factors. Whereas, Watchkeeper and Type 45 have saved 2 and 4 months, 
respectively, due to Technical Factors. Five other projects of the thirteen included in the 
time variance study show no slippage (NAO 2009, f.8, p.16). 
 
NAO (2010, p.6) explains the improved performance for MPR2010 on MPR2009 by 
highlighting the use, by the DE&S, of a project monitoring system called Sentinel. ‘This 
system uses a number of metrics to quantitatively assess the overall ‘health’ of selected 
projects. by providing early warning of emerging issues Sentinel is a potentially important 
step forward for the Department as it seeks to sustain the emerging trend of improving 
project performance’. There is not much information of how Sentinel (not to be confused 
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with the long range surveillance aircraft) works as a project monitoring system beyond 
this. However, it looks like it may become a key part of the MoD project management 
process. 
 
5.4 Project Assessment and Capability 
5.4.1 The Assessment Phase 
Whilst the Department has been concerned with appropriate investment in the initial 
phase of a project lifecycle; it was not until the introduction of Smart Acquisition 
principles that it was given due importance. In fact the Downey Report (1996) and the 
Rayner Report (1971) promoted the need to understand risk in the early stage of projects. 
They suggested that 15-25 per cent of overall project expenditure should be spent on a 
feasibility study and project definition phase of a project (NAO 1993, p.28). 
 
The Assessment Phase is a preparatory stage in order to ensure the projects can meet 
their Main Gate approval targets. It is a Smart Acquisition principle to invest in the earlier 
stage of the acquisition process, in order to drive out risk and to prepare projects for the 
post-Main Gate stage.  
 
The Assessment Phase of the acquisition cycle of defence projects is a crucial phase. Once 
passing Initial Gate approval the project undergoes rigorous assessment such as three-
point cost and time, technology readiness level and system readiness level examination to 
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assess the projects fitness for Main Gate approval. The results of the cost and time 
variance, three-point cost and time estimates, technology readiness levels and system 
readiness levels of the ten largest major projects in the assessment phase are presented 
in the second part of the Reports. 
 
When applying the Smart Procurement lifecycle, CADMID, MPR2000 had to equate Initial 
Gate approval approximate to the Downey cycle. This was due to the fact that all ten 
Assessment Phase projects in MPR2000 were conceived prior to the introduction of the 
Smart Procurement Initiative (NAO 2000, p.13).  
 
The indications in the performance of the ten projects showed variations in cost and time 
since Initial Gate approval. NAO (2000, p.14) reports ‘the average forecast variation from 
approved cost across the 10 projects is 74 per cent. However, this overall picture is 
adversely affected by the very large variations on two of the 10 projects, BOWMAN and 
MLS’.  
 
Three-point cost and time estimates were first introduced in 1994; they measure the level 
of risk affecting cost and timing of projects and became a mandatory requirement under 
Smart Acquisition in MPR2001 (NAO 2001, p.15). Only four projects had a full three-point 
cost estimate and four projects had a full three-point time estimate in 2001.  
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NAO (2001, p.16) states ‘under Smart Acquisition, the range of cost and time covered by 
three-point estimates is expected to narrow between Initial Gate and Main Gate as risks 
are reduced. It is not clear to what extent the range is expected to narrow during the 
Assessment Phase or how wide a range is acceptable for a project to proceed through 
Main Gate. These parameters are unlikely to be standard across projects. They will 
depend on factors such as the nature and complexity of individual projects, which affect 
the risks involved and because of this the Equipment Approvals Committee review each 
project on a case by case basis’. 
 
There is a great amount of uncertainty in the Assessment Phase resulting in greater risk. 
The Department in the earlier years of reporting on the Assessment Phase was unable to 
provide much guidance on how to deal with the inherent project risks. 
 
In MPR2003, the Department investigated the possibility of using System Readiness 
Levels, to measure the maturity of complete systems including the integration of all 
components. System Readiness Levels were to assess the readiness of the design, 
development and testing regimes of systems or sub-systems to represent the risk to 
timely integration, these levels were to have the same scales as the Technology Readiness 
Levels (NAO 2003, p.22).  
 
There were some concerns in MPR2001 that the Department was not investing an 
appropriate level of funding in the Assessment Phase. The average expenditure in the 10 
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pre-Main Gate projects was forecast at 4 per cent of the total procurement cost, this was 
much lower than the suggested 15 per cent (NAO 2001, p.15). Similarly, in MPR2002 the 
figure was a 5 per cent average (NAO 2002b, p.24).  
 
NAO (2003a, p.23) reports ‘in total terms, nine of the Assessment Phase projects 
(excluding Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft for which a Private Finance Initiative solution is 
being sought) are forecasting to spend £423 million in the Assessment Phase. This 
represents 4.8 per cent of the total forecast procurement expenditure for the nine 
projects (£8.8 billion). To achieve the suggested 15 per cent would require an increase of 
£838 million in Assessment Phase expenditure’. It is a challenge for the Department to 
meet the investment targets, outlined below, and one which, as extensively reported in 
MPR2004 it has failed to meet.  
 
As a guide, successive studies by the Department over the last 40 years have suggested, 
depending on the nature of the equipment, around 15 per cent of the initial procurement cost of 
a system should be spent before reaching Main Gate. In some cases, spending more money or 
time in the Assessment Phase than originally planned may be the correct thing to do if it results 
in better risk mitigation for the post-Main Gate phase of the project, when most money is spent. 
Calculating the average Assessment Phase expenditure as a percentage of the total procurement 
expenditure for the non-Private Finance Initiative projects in the Assessment Phase this year, the 
average is 5 per cent. 
  
(NAO 2004a, p.13) 
 
MPR2005 identified some improvements in the Assessment Phase. The Department was 
able to gain a mature understanding of the project and how they can be effectively 
delivered. Realistic estimates of what a project is likely to cost were still a challenge for 
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the Department. It was being realised that identifying the trade space (the cost, time and 
performance boundaries) was an important part of de-risking and scoping activity of the 
projects. The Department recognised that it needed to have a more constructive 
engagement with industry (NAO 2005b, p.18).  
 
In MPR2005 there were indications of improved investment during the Assessment Phase, 
over half of the projects in the report were spending more time and cost in the 
Assessment Phase (NAO 2005b, p.20). The Assessment Phase in MPR2006 onwards has 
been relegated to a one page summary in the Appendix; with such minimal information 
further comment cannot be made on the Assessment Phase. 
 
5.4.2 The Capability Gap 
The effects of cost and time variations of defence projects on the UK defence capability 
are of major concern in defence acquisition. The reports highlight a number of cases 
which make it abundantly clear that in-service delays and a lack of investment in projects 
have a major and negative effect on defence capability. The consequences of in-service 
delays on defence projects are that existing equipment, of comparable capability or 
previous model, have to be kept in-service for longer than envisioned denying the Armed 
Forces of new capability.  
 
 - 284 -  
The first issue with extending an existing equipment shelf life is that the Armed Forces are 
deprived of the improved capability in operations and may miss out on important 
strategic advantages. Secondly, the Department incurs costs due to maintenance and 
urgent upgrade costs, which are needed to keep the equipment operationally capable in 
order to defeat current and emerging threats.  
 
The retention of older equipment has an impact on the operational capability of the 
Armed Forces. The delays to the Eurofighter forced the Department to extend the use of 
Tornado F3 in a defence role, and Jaguar in an offensive role which effectively means two 
platforms are being used when one could suffice. Similarly the delays to Merlin meant 
that Sea King Helicopters had to be used resulting in run-on costs of £147m (NAO 1996, 
p.28). 
 
In MPR1997 the Department reports that 8 out of the 25 projects have run-on costs
7
. A 
majority of the cost is attributed to Eurofighter (£101m). However, for some projects it 
can be difficult to quantify the run-on costs and for others, such as COBRA, in MPR1997 
savings can be made on deferred support costs. These savings are not a positive sign if it 
results in capability gaps, created by the delay in bringing the equipment to theatre. 
 
In MPR1999, the Department had to cover a cost of £753m mainly due to the cost of 
sustaining or improving existing equipment. Whilst existing equipment can be in some 
                                            
7
 Reported on all projects with in-service data slippage beyond 24 months 
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cases cheaper to support than new equipment, this is offset against the lower capability 
available to the Armed Forces (NAO 1999, pp. 35-36).  
A specific example of capability shortfall was presented in MPR2000, in the case of 
Brimstone (Air-launched Anti-Armour Weapon). NAO (2000, p.17) points out ‘the 
unavailability of Brimstone has had an adverse effect on the ability of the Royal Air Force 
to prosecute operations against armoured threats in operations during the 1990s’. This is 
especially worrying since the UK Armed Forces were engaged in a number of high profile 
operations in the 1990s. 
 
In MPR2006, the Department identifies savings which are made by ‘trading quantities’ in 
equipment acquisition. NAO (2006b, p.9) explains ‘trading quantities to remain within cost 
is often a difficult decision to take. The Department assessed that there was a risk that the 
quantity changes on projects like Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System could have 
unwelcome consequences and prevent the Department meeting its assessed requirement 
in these areas for Large Scale Operations. But, as we have commented previously this is 
something the Department must be willing to do to live within its means’.  
 
The response to cost increases in certain projects by the Department was to reduce the 
quantities in other projects, in order to balance the books. Examples are seen in the 
halving of Type 45 destroyers from an initial twelve frigates to six (HM Government, 2010) 
and the reduction of Nimrod MRA4 reconnaissance aircrafts from twenty-one to nine 
(NAO, 2010). Cuts to defence programmes will have major ramifications for UK defence 
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capability, as acknowledged by the Department, however the NAO point to its necessity. 
This point highlights the complexity and uncertainty facing defence projects and 
acquisition decisions. 
  
From the contractors’ perspective, its current or future supply arrangements can be 
adversely affected (through quantity reductions or project cancellations) by projects 
competing for funds, which it may not have any control over. This can be unsettling for 
the defence industry as a whole. This can have a knock-on effect on the investments for 
future projects, jobs, their supply chain, and ability to enter new markets internationally. 
 
Defence companies rely on investment on large projects in order to fund new technology 
research. Cuts on one of their projects can have adverse effects on their entire operation. 
This is especially true for defence companies which rely heavily on MoD defence 
contracts. Some may be able to recoup most of their losses from cancellations; this will 
not, however, replace the lost opportunities for new investments.  
 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed seventeen MPRs from its introduction in 1993 to the most 
recent report released, at the time of writing (MPR2010). The reports have been 
transformed in style and substance within the last two decades. The reports have gone 
from including twenty-five of the largest projects with excess expenditure of £250m 
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(reduced to £10m in MPR1995) in the 1993-1999 period. To examining the thirty largest 
projects, twenty in the post-Main Gate Phase and ten in the Assessment Phase since 2000. 
 
In assessing the performance of the projects in the reports the NAO have employed a 
number of indicators. Performance indicators have been mainly cost and time variances 
for project beyond post-main gate, and cost and time three point risk assessment, 
Technology Readiness Levels and Systems Readiness Levels for projects in their 
Assessment Phase.  
 
The cost performance indicators have focused on the yearly forecasted expenditure 
against cost at the approval stage. This variation provides information on how the 
Department are able to stay within the budgeted costs. The time performance indicator 
focuses on the forecasted delays or timely delivery of projects to their in-service phase.  
 
These variations in time and cost are thus assessed applying a number of categories which 
explain the reasons for variation. Table 5.1 presents the cost and time variance categories, 
when introduced in 1993, first changed in 1995, and the final list in 2000. Where possible, 
the analogous categories have been aligned. Some changes are superficial such as the 
renaming, of cost variance category, specification changes to specification and 
requirement changes in 1995 and changed requirements in 2000. 
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Other changes serve the purpose of focusing the category on specificities such as 
renaming, of cost variance category, price variation to contract pricing in 1995 and 
contracting process in 2000. In MPR2001, risk differential was added as a category to time 
and cost variance, due to the focus on risk assessment as part of the changes in 
procurement process due to Smart Acquisition. 
  
Smart Acquisition principles affected not only the introduction of Assessment Phase 
projects in the MPR, but also the performance indicators used for this phase. Whilst three 
point risk assessment of cost and time were used since 1994, they were not commonplace 
until MPR2002 reported nine projects had undertaken risk assessments.  
 
Similarly, Technology Readiness Levels provided an assessment of the technical maturity 
of a technology and indicating required risk-reduction work. Eight projects had such 
assessments in MPR2002. Systems Readiness Levels were introduced in MPR2003, this 
assessment would measure the maturity of completeness of a system and its integrated 
components. 
 
The cost and time performance of projects have been presented in the second section of 
this chapter. The overall results do not look promising! The cost variance of forecast costs 
against approved costs has risen since 1993 to present time. Whilst some of the results 
have been skewed unfairly by exceptionally large projects such as Eurofighter and Trident, 
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the tracking of common projects across these reports provide a clear indication of cost 
increases.  
 
As such, Table 5.2 provides clear evidence of cost increases in the common projects during 
the 1993-1999 reporting period (excluding Eurofighter). There is an increase from one per 
cent cost variance in these projects in 1993 to eighteen per cent in 1999. This is a huge 
increase in cost variance over a seven year period.   
 
Cost increases during this period have largely been attributed to four causes, Programme 
Changes, Inflation Adjustment, Under/Over Estimate and Specification Changes. It is clear 
that the Department can influence most of these cost increases, however it has minimal 
control over changes in the rate of inflation.  
 
Along with cost increases there is a clear indication that the projects during the 1993-1999 
reporting period have suffered in-service date delays. Comparing the results of the 
common projects time variance to the overall time variance, there seems to be some 
major projects which are on time or near delivery. Discounting these projects and looking 
at the progress of the common projects, it is clear that in-service delays have worsened. 
The in-service delays for these common projects have doubled from 31 months in 1993 to 
64 months in 1999. 
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Technical factors are by far the most troublesome to a project meeting its scheduled in-
service date. This is compounded by procurement delays due to the collaborative process 
in international projects, budgeting constraints and project redefinitions. These four 
factors account for around 80 per cent of in-service delays during the 1993 to 1999 
reporting period. 
 
In the early stages of the 2000s there were improvements in budgeting and scheduling for 
projects. MPR2001 reported a cost reduction in eighteen common projects for 2000 and 
2001. The introduction of the Smart Procurement Initiative and its successor Smart 
Acquisition had revised acquisition practice for the better, it seemed. There were new 
projects using these revised acquisition process, known as ‘Smart projects’. In MPR2001 
there were three Smart Projects, this rose to thirteen in MPR2003.  
 
Smart projects were praised for their cost controls, and were responsible for £1348m cost 
saving in MPR2002. Legacy projects were identified as being the reason for cost increases. 
This was in hindsight found to be an inaccurate conclusion. Instead it was found that 
newer projects exhibit less cost increases and thus showed cost reductions.  
 
The bad results of MPR2003 and MPR2004 in which there was a fourteen fold increase on 
sixteen common projects and a more than double increase in the overall cost variance, 
respectively, created a rethink of strategy.  MPR2004 focused on assessing lessons to be 
learnt on the management of major projects. The conclusion was that the principles of 
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Smart Acquisition were effective and adequate. A major criticism was on the way the 
Department had handled the implementation of Smart Acquisition. Many principles were 
not effectively implemented, specifically the principle to invest money in the early stages 
of the project – during the Assessment Phase. 
  
There were some improvements in MPR2005 and until 2008 the cost variance was held at 
a 10 – 12 per cent overspend. It is clear the Department has a lot of work to do to close 
the gap on cost increases, but there do seem to be improvements in the management of 
newer major projects.  
 
It is clear that the major cause of cost increases during the 2000 to 2008 reporting period 
is Technical factors. In some cases Technical Factors account for cost increases in a 
quarter of projects in the reports. Changed Requirement has also been identified as a 
major reason for cost increases. The Department can influence these two factors by 
implementing better risk reduction or working closely with the military customer. 
However, there are two factors which the Department cannot influence which have 
caused major cost increases, the Exchange Rate and Inflation. 
   
Time variance in the 2000s was difficult to track due to the various parameters used to 
present the results. However, comparisons can be made in certain period. In the 2000 to 
2003 reporting period the delays in in-service dates were worsening as a result of 
Technical Factors predominantly originating from legacy projects. 
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During 2003 to 2005 period Technical Factors and the Contracting Process contributed 
significantly to in-service delays. However, the magnitude of the delay was reduced 
radically by nearly a third during this period. In the 2006 to 2008 reports the in-service 
delays have remained at 34 – 36 per cent increase since Main Gate approval. Most of 
these delays are historic and result from legacy projects. 
 
In the 2000s report we were also able to look at the progress of project teams meeting 
their Key User Requirements. Again, here the parameters vary making it difficult to make 
an overall comparison. However, we can state that the trends in two periods show a 
worsening in the performance of project teams. In the first period, 2001-2003 provides 
evidence of positive results in meeting the Key User Requirements which improved from 
93 per cent of Key User Requirement being met overall in 2001 to 98 per cent in 2003.  
 
In the second period, 2004-2008, there was a clear reduction of the number of projects 
meeting Key User Requirements. From 18 of the 20 projects meeting their Key User 
Requirements in 2004, to a drop of 15 out of 20 projects in 2008. The Department has 
reassessed its Key User Requirements, for two projects in 2008 (Advanced Jet Trainer and 
Watchkeeper) as a result and has lowered the high standards set. 
 
In order to improve the performance of its cost, time and Key User Requirements the 
Department needs to ensure it has invested an adequate amount in its Assessment Phase. 
It is clear in the conclusions made in MPR2004, this was not being achieved.  It was 
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reported in MPR2001, the average level of funding in the Assessment Phase for the ten 
projects was a lowly four per cent of the total procurement. This is much lower than the 
suggested fifteen per cent. By MPR2005 there was a more positive report of Assessment 
Phase spending as more funding and time was given to the crucial work of project 
definition and risk reduction.  
 
In order to address the cost and time variances one of the principles of Smart Acquisition 
is to trade-off cost, time and requirements. The Department has traded off by reducing 
quantities and capability of some projects. This has resulted, in some cases, in creating a 
gap in operational capability for the Armed forces. This is also a consequence of delays in 
projects in-service dates.  
 
Cost increases and in-service slippages have resulted in cuts to defence programmes and 
extensions of legacy projects to fill the inevitable capability gap. Examples include: the 
delay in Eurofighter resulting in the in-service extension of the Tornado and Jaguar 
aircrafts; the unavailability of Brimstone in the 1990s created a capability gap for the 
Royal Air Force; and budget shortfalls meant a reduction in frigates for the Type 45 
Destroyer and helicopters for Nimrod MRA4 programmes.  
 
It has been argued that the delays and trading-off requirements have created savings in 
support costs for the more costly new capabilities, but this comes at a heavy burden for 
the Armed Forces when they need these new capabilities for their operations. 
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6 Research Methodology 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
The methodology chosen for this research is content analysis using a mixture of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. Content analysis has been chosen as the 
research method which best suits the data available in this research. The research is based 
on documentary evidence, which communicates to the readers (Parliament, Defence 
Select Committee and the Public Account Committee) the findings of a Value for Money 
(VfM) assessment of defence acquisition.  
 
The purpose of the study is to gain insight and learning through a cross-analysis of 
seventeen VfM reports on defence. This chapter will, in the first section, provide 
justification for the chosen methodology. In justifying my methodology I shall look at 
other methods used in defence acquisition research.  
 
The second section will focus on providing a review of the content analysis methodology. 
This will assess the qualitative and quantitative approach to content analysis. As my 
research uses a combination of these two approaches, I will discuss how this is achieved. 
There will also be a discussion of the reliability, validity and objectivity of a content 
analysis study.  
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The research design will be discussed in the third section of the chapter. This section will 
look at the data, qualitative software and the design (of the tree and relationships) 
applied to the research.  
 
6.2 Methodological Justification 
6.2.1 Common Methodologies in Defence Studies 
The area of defence studies is specialised, in that there are security restrictions which 
make it difficult for empirical research. Four specific research methodologies have been 
identified in a literature review of defence research: documentary study, questionnaires, 
semi-structured interviews and case studies. Questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews are usually used in combination.  
 
Crocker and Reynolds (1993) undertook a documentary study of contracts. Bishop (1995b) 
employed a postal questionnaire method with a brief follow-on case study. Humphries 
and Wilding (2001, 2004a, 2004b) combined the questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews method in their studies. Sadeh, Dvir and Shenhar (2000) employed a similar 
methodology in the Israeli defence context.  
 
Angelis, Dillard, Franck and Melese (2009) and Kebede, Maytorena, Lowe and Winch 
(2009) use case studies of defence projects in the US and UK, respectively. My own 
research uses content analysis of documentary evidence in the form of VfM reports. 
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6.2.2 Documentary Studies 
Documentary studies such as the one by Crocker and Reynold (1993) can be a more 
effective form of research when the objective is to undertake an analysis of process. In 
their study they are looking at the contracting process in terms of ‘the efficiency of 
incomplete contracts’. Crocker and Reynold (1993, p.132) explain ‘we have constructed a 
panel dataset consisting of contracts under which the Air Force procured jet engines from 
Pratt and Whitney and General Electric for installation in F-15 and F-16 fighters’.  
 
Using the contract datasets they use a quantitative approach to examine the efficiency of 
incomplete contracts. They did, however, use a qualitative approach in terms of 
formulating their variables. Crocker and Reynold (1993, p.135) state ‘several Air Force 
contracting officers with whom we spoke perceived the behaviour of a defence contractor 
to depend on companywide policies set by the parent for all its subsidiaries’.  
 
Using the variables, some of which they ascertained through conversation with experts, 
they produced quantitative results to explain efficiencies which can be gained from 
incomplete contracts. Whilst I also use documentary evidence for my research my 
methodology is skewed more towards a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach is, 
however, supported by quantitative descriptions. I, on the other hand, am not as 
interested in the technical detail of contracts. The role of contracting in my research is in 
the way it facilitates the relationship between the buyer and supplier, as explained in the 
Introduction chapter. 
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6.2.3 Questionnaires and Semi-Structured Interviews 
It seems that the most popular methodology of the studies is the use of questionnaires 
with further insight sought from semi-structured interviews. Bishop (1995) used postal 
questionnaires in his study of the diversification strategy of defence companies. Postal 
questionnaires were sent in 1993 to 209 suppliers, in Devon and Cornwall, of DML and 
British Aerospace establishments in Plymouth, excluding those with business under £1000 
(Bishop 1995, p.59).  
 
The survey was Bishop (1995b, p.59) states ‘to ascertain the extent and nature of local 
supply linkages, companies were also asked to provide information concerning their plans 
for diversification in response to changes in defence business’. The response rate was 42 
per cent, 88 questionnaires. Bishop (1995b) followed up the results of the postal survey 
with a brief case study of a company, Northern Telecom, involved in the survey using it as 
an example of a successful diversification strategy. 
 
The findings of the survey show that a majority of the companies had yet to diversify fully, 
and as such Bishop (1995b) found it impossible to comment on their success. However, 
Bishop (1995b) focused on the companies responses regarding the implementation 
process towards diversification and found that the majority had problems due to market 
conditions (recession) and demand (in decline).  
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Also mentioned was the level of competition in the specialised markets companies sought 
to enter, which created a barrier to entry for many. In terms of Northern Telecom, the 
reason for their success according to their managing director was due to their ability to 
enter the market at the right time and apply competitive pricing. 
  
It seems to me that with questionnaires there are limits to the learning, especially since it 
is usually uniform questions to all respondents. A more effective approach could have 
been using unstructured or semi-structured interviews in order to gain greater insight or 
investigate further certain elements of the survey results. In doing the follow-up case 
study, the author has attempted to do this. However, the focus is on a successful strategy 
for diversification – which is a minority result.  
 
Sadeh et al. (2000) study looks at defence projects performed over the last twenty years 
in Israel. Sadeh et al. (2000, p.16) describe the method: ‘The questionnaires included 
about 400 data items related to the various phases of the project, and were filled out by 
at least three key personnel, representing the various stakeholders who were accessible 
at the time of the research. In cases where one key person was not available, another 
person from the same organisation familiar with the project was approached’.  
 
The research was partially funded by the Israeli Ministry of Defence, thus one would 
suspect that access was usually forthcoming. It seems that expert knowledge was to be 
the primary data requirement of this study. With access granted through the sponsors and 
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the focus on expert knowledge, it is surprising that the questionnaire was not followed-up 
with a more in-depth interview method. Unstructured or semi-structured interviews 
might have provided a more in-depth conversation with the experts, providing greater 
insight and explanations.  
 
Humphries and Wilding (2001, 2004a) use a set of questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews in a pilot study. The study attempts to use the TCE framework to describe 
defence procurement in the UK, similar to my own study. The research question 
Humphries and Wilding (2001, p.83) pose is ‘how to improve sustained economic 
relationships within UK defence procurement in a monopoly market’. 
 
Humphries and Wilding (2001, p.92) explain ‘a pilot project has been carried out, which 
examined both industry and MOD perspectives of a current, defence procurement 
relationship. This was a true monopoly worth $40 million per year for the purchase of 
aircraft spare parts and the provision of repair services’.  
 
This study is thus focusing on a particular case using questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews. Humphries and Wilding (2004a, p.114) state ‘questionnaires were 
administered to both team leaders and their staffs and a 100 per cent response was 
received from the 50 respondents. The survey was followed-up by 30-minute semi-
structured interviews with the two team leaders’.  
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The pilot study was then expanded with a larger scale of questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews. Humphries and Wilding (2004b, p.263) explain ‘an exploratory 
research project was designed which used the key informant methods of surveys (600 
staff questionnaires – five-point Likert scales) supported by 115 team-leader semi-
structured interviews’. The project has grown and so has the breadth of the research. The 
research focused on 54 monopolistic relationships accounting for £575.8m annual spend 
of the Defence Procurement Agency (Humphries and Wilding, 2004b, pp.263-264). 
 
The conclusions of the three papers by Humphries and Wilding focus on the applicability 
of TCE, supply chain and relationship marketing theories to the decision making process of 
defence procurement managers in monopolistic buying situations. The findings have 
developed from the preliminary pilot study of a single case to a study of 53 monopolistic 
relationships. In general the authors find that the selected theories are applicable to the 
business environment and they suggest would benefit defence procurement managers 
(Humphries and Wilding 2001, 2004a, 2004b). 
     
Their study is as all encompassing as one can hope for in a defence study; they have 
gained a great deal of access in their research. They support the questionnaire by 
undertaking semi-structured interviews with team leaders. This adds to the richness of the 
data by allowing the researcher to delve deeper into certain findings of the questionnaire. 
I have my misgivings of their use of TCE in the study, which I outlined in Chapter 3; 
however they demonstrate how in-depth research in defence can be undertaken. 
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In a questionnaire there are pressures to simplify and normalise some research 
terminology, which they attempted to do, and this can create the problem of 
misinterpretation. It is my view that the TCE framework was interpreted to the extent that 
it was diluted. The alternatives to TCE used in the questionnaire do not address the true 
nature of TCE factors, and so cannot be used as opposites. However, the implications of 
their study show TCE to be a theory which can be used for defence research although as I 
have noted – care needs to be taken in the way TCE is applied.  
 
6.2.4 Case Studies  
Angelis et al. (2009) and Kebede et al. (2009) employ a case study methodology in their 
studies. Whereas Angelis et al. (2009) look at two defence projects in the U.S; Kebede et 
al. (2009) look at a defence project in the U.K. Angelis et al. (2009) investigate the effects 
of transaction costs on the U.S DoD cost estimation of defence project. Kebede et al. 
(2009) investigate the collaborative approach in a MoD IPT acquisition of an Advance 
Military Vehicle. 
  
Angelis et al. (2009) use as their case studies the Javelin and the Army Tactical Missile 
System (ATACMS) projects. Angelis et al. (2009, p.15) explain ‘one of the authors was 
fortunate to have served as the Assistant Project Manger for Research and Development 
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for each of the programs and was thus well qualified to examine transaction cost 
indicators for the two programs’.  
In the Javelin and ATACMS case studies, TCE theory is applied by using System 
Engineering/Program Management costs as proxies for transaction costs. The case study 
relies heavily upon the experience of one of the authors, who worked in the projects. The 
arguments for using TCE for cost estimation in defence was put forward in a previous 
study, Melese et al. (2007), (reviewed in section 3.4.2).  
 
I argue the step towards using project costs as proxies for TCE in this way creates similar 
difficulties experienced in the Humphries and Wilding studies. TCE is diluted by the 
proxies or misrepresented as they simplify the complex nature of the theoretical concepts 
of TCE in order to provide practical approximations. 
  
Kebede et al. (2009) provide a different perspective in using TCE for defence case studies. 
Rather than measuring TCE, we used TCE to contribute to our conceptual framework to 
explain the findings of the case study. The conceptual framework consisted of a three-tier 
‘tectonic model’ which was made up of the institutional, governance and process levels 
(as shown in Figure 4.3, section 4.3.1).  
 
It is in the governance level where the TCE concept is used to describe the transaction 
governance of defence acquisition. Kebede et al. (2009, p.311) explain ‘in the governance 
level section, we use a transaction cost approach to examine the choice of relational 
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contracting, demonstrating how the IPT structure and ethos favours relational contracting 
practices’. 
The case study is of an Advanced Military Vehicle project in the demonstration phase of 
the CADMID process being delivered by an IPT. The data collection for the governance 
level comes in the form of 19 field interviews. TCE was used as an explanatory tool to 
describe the findings of the interviews, to understand the way the relational contracting 
took place in the IPTs. Therefore, the focus is not how TCE can be measured but rather 
using TCE to describe the phenomenon being measured. 
 
Kebede, Maytorena, Lowe and Winch (2009) case study, along with Humphries and 
Wilding (2004b) and the US study of Angelis, Dillard, Franck and Melese (2009), provide 
support for the use of TCE in my own research. Kebede et al. (2009) provides a closer and 
more recent example of how TCE can be used in the defence case. However, these studies 
also provide reason for caution in how TCE is implemented when used in defence 
research. 
   
6.2.5 Justifying Content Analysis 
The research methodology is content analysis. Content analysis relies heavily upon 
documentary data, whether that is interview transcripts, newspaper articles or in this 
research – defence reports. In the following section content analysis will be discussed in 
greater detail. At this moment it is pertinent to justify its use in the first place.  
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The use of documentary data was not the first choice of data collection. In fact the 
research methodology was originally to be a comparative case study of defence projects. 
This research methodology was chosen due to the original access opportunities to 
defence projects.  
 
It is due to unfortunate circumstances that I was unable to undertake my original research 
plan. BAE Systems decided to end the NECTISE program due to a lack of desired outcomes 
from affiliated groups. This created the problem of closing many access points for my own 
research, due to the unified group identity. Those who were participating from BAE 
Systems no longer had the incentive to contribute research time. After many phone calls 
and meetings to gain research access it was decided, with my supervisor, that an 
alternative methodology was required.  
 
Our focus thus turned to a methodology used initially by Dalton (2007), who used 
documentary data in the form of NAO reports. Dalton (2007) used VfM reports to identify 
the risk management process in public infrastructure projects. She employed the use of 
computer software, QSR N6, to analyse the reports. This inspired my own use of defence 
VfM reports and NVivo 8 (an updated version of QSR N6). In my research, however, I take 
the analysis one step further by applying content analysis to the NVivo 8 analysis and 
understanding the findings using a TCE perspective.  
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It is in the ease of using content analysis in conjunction with TCE theory that the 
methodology is suitable to this research. Unlike methodologies such as grounded theory, 
which is more suitable to developing new theory from data (Myers, 2009), content 
analysis can be used in conjunction with existing theory. It was not my purpose to seek 
new theory from my analysis of the VfM data, but rather to apply TCE theory to the 
analysis of the VfM data. In applying TCE to the VfM data, the aim is to provide answers to 
the research questions focused on the transactional issues surrounding defence 
acquisition.   
 
The use of documentary data has enabled me to apply the TCE framework to a wider 
range of defence projects using a number of acquisition processes. This would not have 
been possible with three case studies, which more than likely would have been limited to 
similar procurement routes. The documentary data is secondary data by its nature; the 
original data collection was undertaken by the NAO.  
 
Due to the NAO legislative powers (of scrutiny and auditing of public spending) I suggest 
that their data collection is more thorough and representative of involved parties than 
most academic researchers could achieve. Whilst primary sources are usually preferable 
to most researchers, where there is a lack of access I believe that the methodology I have 
used is justifiable.  
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There are, however, certain considerations which must be taken when relying upon 
secondary sources such as the purpose, language and involvement of the organisation 
involved in the primary data collection and analysis. These concerns will be addressed 
further when looking at the role of the NAO and the use of ‘value for money’ reports, in 
the following sections.  
 
I was able to return to the NAO with my preliminary findings and gain valuable feedback. 
This feedback, coupled with more data provided by the NAO, was applied to the final 
study. Content Analysis provides two solutions for my study: first, it removes the problem 
of access and second, it is more appropriate for larger documented data sources.     
 
6.3 Content Analysis 
6.3.1 Definition 
What is content analysis? This is the question I shall address in this part and the purpose 
of addressing this question is to understand the what. It is also, however, important to 
address the why; why we use content analysis in general and in this study specifically. 
First, it is appropriate to tackle the definition of content analysis.  
 
Weber (1990, p.9) definition is ‘content analysis is a research method that uses a set of 
procedures to make valid inference from text. There inferences are about the sender(s) of 
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the message, the message itself, or the audience of the message. The rules of this 
inferential process vary with theoretical and substantive interest of the investigation… ’. 
  
The definition provides specific insights: firstly it places inference at the heart of content 
analysis; second it describes the data being analysed as a message; and thirdly it outlines 
that there are procedures and rules in the inference process. Holsti (1969, p.2) definition 
is that ‘content analysis is a multipurpose research method developed specifically for 
investigating any problem which the content of communication serves as the basis of 
inference’.  
 
Again the word “inference” is key to the definition of content analysis. However, in this 
definition the word communication is used rather than message. The purpose of a 
communication is of course to send a message to the recipient. In fact, Berelson (1952), 
one of the earliest commentators on content analysis focused his book on Content 
Analysis in Communication Research. This would seem logical since the central aim of 
content analysis is to understand what is behind the content of any communication 
whether that be verbal or written communication. 
  
This then poses the question, what can be categorised as communication in written 
documents. If communication is a transfer of information between one/many to 
one/many (in all variations) then all written documents can be seen as communication. 
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Take a poem: it is transferring the information possessed by the poet, whether that 
information comes in the form of emotions or dictums, to the reader(s).  
 
Neundorf (2002, p.17) remarks ‘the term content analysis is not reserved for studies of 
mass media or for any other type of message content. So long as other pertinent 
characteristics apply (i.e., quantitative, summarising), the study of any type of message 
pool may be deemed a content analysis’. 
  
In my research the written document comes in the form of reports. The reports are 
authorised by the NAO and produced for the scrutiny of parliamentarians. The secondary 
use is to communicate the findings to the public, through a policy of transparency, 
allowing for those interested to access the information within the report.  
 
I am one of those in the public, in my role as a researcher, who is interested and attempts 
to understand the information. It is therefore possible to say that the authors, the NAO, 
are communicating to the primary, parliamentary defence committee, and secondary, the 
public, users. The focus of my research is to understand the information which the NAO 
are providing in terms of the defence acquisition process and analyse it according to my 
propositions. 
  
Content analysis provides further advantages than just purely understanding the message. 
There is its ability to disseminate and organise large amounts of information. Defence 
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reports are technical, composed of large text and a variety of topics; it is possible to get 
lost in the mass information. Content analysis provides clarity and order to the message of 
the reports.  
 
Weber (1990, p.12) affirms ‘a central idea in content analysis is that the many words of 
the text are classified into much fewer content categories. Each category may consist of 
one, several, or many words. Words, phrase, or other units of text classified in the same 
category are presumed to have similar meaning’.  
 
When attempting a cross-analysis of a number of sources, in the form of defence reports, 
it can be useful to see what similar themes exist in the reports – categorisation allows for 
that purpose. Berelson (1952, pp.18-20) points out three general assumptions which need 
to be made for all content analysis: 
 Content analysis assumes that inferences about the relationship between intent and content or 
between content and effect can validly be made, or the actual relationships established. 
 
 Content analysis assumes that study of the manifest content is meaningful. 
 
 Content analysis assumes that the quantitative description of communication content is 
meaningful. 
 
 
The first assumption focuses on the coder of the information and the decision that coder 
makes in his/her inference. This is stating that the coder can make inference on the intent 
of the author and the content of the unit being analysed. It is best to exemplify this point 
using my own coding.  
 
 - 310 -  
When deciding the categorisation of a passage of text in any report, it was not simply a 
word search. It was a more cognitive process of understanding the message of the 
process, the intent of the author and how that is represented by the content of the 
passage. An inference is therefore a decision-making step of the categorisation. 
  
Decision-making regarding coding has in its essence a subjective nature; however its 
objectivity can be anchored by the ability to define the rules and procedures, as 
mentioned by Weber (1990). In the research the objectivity is in terms of the clear 
definition assigned to each category to identify to those critiquing the methodology of 
what each category represents, in the eyes of the coder. This of course, does not remove 
(but reduces) the subjective nature of the inference of the individual.  
 
Weber (1990, p.13) explains ‘there is no simple right way to do content analysis. Instead, 
investigators must judge what methods are most appropriate for their substantive 
problems. Moreover, some technical problems in content analysis have yet to be resolved 
or are the subject of ongoing research and debate… ’. I shall return to this idea of 
objectivity in content analysis later, and discuss it in more detail.  
 
The second assumption points to the meaningfulness of the content under analysis. In the 
cross-analysis of the VfM reports the focus is outlined by the primary category, that being 
the defence acquisition process, the focus of the analysis concentrates on this subject. 
This does not disregard other information present in the seventeen reports. In fact there 
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is a separate heading, with a separate branch of investigation, which categorises the 
‘other’ information present in the reports. The fact that both branches are analysed in 
detail is to highlight that the data has been fully exhausted and utilised. 
  
The quantification of content analysis and its importance, the third assumption, is a 
central part of my own research. A quantitative description provides insight into the 
importance of certain categories and their prevalence in the reports. However, whilst the 
quantitative information is important, it will be argued in this chapter that the qualitative 
findings also play an important, if not greater, role in providing insight. The following 
section will look at the use of content analysis in quantitative, qualitative and combined 
methods. 
 
6.3.2 Content Analysis Methods 
Weber (1990, p.70) states ‘content analysis procedures create quantitative indicators that 
assess the degree of attention or concern devoted to cultural units such as themes, 
categories, or issues. The investigator then interprets and explains the results using 
relevant theories’. 
  
Content analysis, in its original format, was heavily based on the quantitative nature of 
the content, specifically on the frequencies of words or categories. In my research 
quantification takes on the form of the frequencies of categories and categorical 
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relationships, in order to make statements on emphasis. Weber (1990) suggests the 
prevalence of certain categories thus provides an indication of their importance or the 
concern devoted to them by the authors and/or for the readers.  
 
Kassarjian (1977, p.9) says of the quantification, ‘this requirement is perhaps the most 
distinctive feature of content analysis. Quantification of judgements distinguishes content 
analysis from ordinary critical reading. A measurement of the extent of emphasis or 
omission of any given analytic category is what content is all about’. 
  
With the quantitative approach there has been a proliferation of content analysis 
computer software to calculate the frequency and other statistical variables of content. 
McTavish and Pirro (1990, p.246) explain one such quantitative method. ‘This vector of 
normed scores (called “emphasis” scores or E-scores) permits an investigator to examine 
the over- and under-emphasis on idea categories relative to the norm of expected 
category usage’. 
  
This may seem like an overcomplicated form of content analysis quantification but there 
are much simpler formats used in political science, journalism and other areas where 
content analysis is popular (Kassarjian, 1977). In any given national election media 
coverage, in the US and UK, there is the presentation of frequently used words as a way of 
understanding the priority of politicians.  
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In the first ever televised debates in British election history, the three leaders of the major 
political parties discussed their political views and policies in front of an audience of 
millions. One of the content analyses of the debates highlighted as a major news story 
was the number of times the two front runners, (at the time the Labour leader Gordon 
Brown and Conservative leader David Cameron) stated “I agree with Nick” (the Liberal 
Democrat leader, Nick Clegg).  
 
The media suggested through their quantitative content analysis that the two leaders 
were attempting to win favour with Nick Clegg in order to gain support for their own 
policy priorities. Thus, it is clear the way insight may be developed in quantitative 
description of content analysis.  
 
In my research the quantitative approach to the content analysis focused on using 
frequencies. I look to see how the frequency of a category evidences its importance to its 
parent category or to the entire tree. As I have separated the tree into four sub-levels 
with three branches, the emphasis of a category in the content takes on three 
dimensions: in the context of the levels, branches and the entire tree.  
 
Neundorf (2002, p.15) suggests ‘the empiricism of a careful and detailed critical analysis is 
one of its prime strengths and may produce such a lucid interpretation of the text as to 
provide us with a completely new encounter with the text’. It is possible to find 
information which may have been buried upon the masses of text in the content analysis 
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providing new insight. In terms of the quantitative approach this may come in the form of 
identifying the emphasis of the wider reporting through the cross-analysis method.  
 
There are four key aspects of the quantitative content analysis process: 
1. Measurement – the assignment of numbers that stand for some aspect of the text 
 
2. Indicators – the inference by the investigator of some unmeasured quality or characteristic of the 
text from those numbers 
 
3. Representation – techniques for describing syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic aspects of texts 
 
4. Interpretation – the translation of the meaning in the text in some other abstract analytical or 
theoretical language. 
   
(Weber 1990, p.70) 
 
Measurement has been discussed at length, in its ability to provide insight through the 
measurement of frequency in occurrence (or omission contrarily). Indicators concerns ‘the 
message behind the message’ this is the latent (or hidden) information in the 
communication. This is a difficult part of the process, since it can be difficult to reliably 
infer the latent message such as the attitude or purpose of the author(s) in writing a 
certain passage.  
 
Representation looks at the way syntactic or semantic features of language or text are 
deployed (Weber, 1990, p.76). Interpretation is described as the transformation of the 
text, from many to few, into a theoretical structure using social science theory or theories 
(Weber, 1990, p.79). 
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There are two important points here. First, the transformation of ‘many to few’ and 
second, the application of theory to the few. In the process of quantifying the mass into 
categories the information is disseminated into manageable volumes which represent 
specific ideas or themes. Therefore, the movement of many to few is an organisational 
process of the content which provides a clear and concise means of viewing the 
information and thus allowing us to discern the message.  
 
The second point is of applying scientific theory to the categorised information. The 
categorisation process provides an easier way to apply the theoretical labels to specific 
categories or to understand the presence of certain categories in conjunction with the 
expectations of the theory. 
 
TCE theory is applied to the categorised content analysis of the defence acquisition 
process in order to further analyse the initial findings. Applying such theoretical 
approaches to a mass of data in the reports would be a tall order. By categorising the 
defence acquisition process into identifiable factors, it allows me to use TCE to understand 
the presence or prevalence of certain factors or categorical interrelatedness.  
 
The quantification of the data from many to few categories eases the way to applying 
theoretical insight.  It is important, however, to understand as Kracauer (1952, p.631) puts 
it ‘overemphasis on quantification tends to lessen the accuracy of analysis’. The 
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theoretical approach will thus rely upon the qualitative findings of the content analysis, as 
much as the quantitative.  
 
Berelson (1952, p.114) points out ‘a great number of non-numerical content studies call 
for attention by virtue of their general contribution in insight and interest’. The frequency 
of categories may tell us a lot about the prevalence of the category, but little of the 
significance. To understand the significance of a category we need to delve further into 
the content itself. 
 
Morgan (1993, p.113-5) discusses the divisions between those researchers who follow the 
quantitative and qualitative approach:  
Because most current applications of content analysis are highly numerical approaches to texts - 
a sort of quantitative analysis of qualitative data - many qualitative researchers justifiably feel 
that such techniques are an affront to their own analytical goals… Many qualitative researchers 
will undoubtedly be surprised to learn that there once was a tradition of qualitative content 
analysis… A generation ago, the early proponents of content analysis had difficulty recognising 
the value of qualitative approaches to their concerns. Today, I am more likely to encounter 
qualitative researchers who have difficulty recognising the value of content analytic approaches 
to their concerns. 
  
Mayring (2000, p.3) suggests ‘but within the framework of qualitative approaches it would 
be of central interest, to develop the aspects of interpretation, the categories, as near as 
possible to the material, to formulate them in terms of the material’. One problem with 
quantitative content analysis is that it does not discuss how category formulation comes 
about. It may be straight-forward to undertake a frequency of words or categories, but 
how do you go about creating the category itself.  
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Mayring (2000, p.4) poses this question and suggests the inductive approach, as 
described, or a deductive approach ‘prior formulate, theoretical derived aspects of 
analysis’. I undertook an inductive approach in which I used the reports to recognise the 
main topics of discussion to come up with the categories. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) 
provide three approaches to qualitative content analysis ‘conventional, directed, and 
summative’. 
  
In my research, the approach taken was that of a conventional content analysis (as 
described below). The study focused the analysis on the nature of defence acquisition 
using the process as a basis of investigation. The description provided for the conventional 
content analysis process mirrors the approach taken in my study.  
 
Data analysis starts with reading all data repeatedly to achieve immersion and obtain a sense of 
the whole… Next, the researcher approaches the text by making notes of his or her first 
impressions, thoughts, and analysis. As this process continues, labels for codes emerge that are 
reflective of more than one key thought. These often come directly from the text and are then 
become the initial coding scheme… Depending on the relationships between sub-categories, 
researchers can combine or organize this larger number of sub-categories into a smaller number 
of categories. A tree diagram can be developed to help in organising these categories into a 
hierarchical structure. 
  
(Hsieh and Shannon 2005, p.1279) 
 
From the careful reading and making notes of the data through to the organisation of 
subcategories into a hierarchical tree diagram, these steps were taken in the content 
analysis of the VfM reports. An additional step was taken in which TCE theory was applied 
to the content analysis, in order to achieve focussed insight.  
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The directed approach uses existing theory or prior research of the phenomenon to 
deductively analyse the content. The summative content analysis approach, however, 
identifies and quantifies certain words or content, in the text, to contextualise the words 
or content (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, pp.1281-3).  
 
McTavish and Pirro (1990, p.249) explain ‘contextual information is also contained in the 
focus upon some words or word groups compared to others. This can be seen in 
probability distribution patterns across idea/word categories. Individuals use ideas/words 
in distinctive, patterned ways which reflect role and location within a social system as well 
as individual socialisation and other individual factors’.  
 
Steps in the content analysis have been briefly identified as reading, coding and 
categorising. After the researcher has immersed him/herself in the content and made 
adequate inferences as on the purpose of the message this must be coded.  
 
Holsti (1969, p.94) explains ‘coding is the process whereby raw data are systematically 
transformed and aggregated into units which permit precise description of relevant 
content characteristics’. For the purpose of my content analysis the defence reports are 
seen as raw data. Whilst they have been processed by the authors and presented in their 
format. For our case they have not been processed using the system of content analysis 
and thus are in a raw form.  
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The focus then turns to the units to be used, the categories, and the enumeration of the 
codes. The codes can be in the form of the categories selected to represent the topic, 
however how is the data codify in terms of units?  
 
Neundorf (2002, 71) explains ‘in content analysis, a unit is an identifiable message or 
message components, (a) which serves as the basis for identifying the population and 
drawing a sample, (b) on which variables are measured, or (c) which serves as the basis for 
reporting analyses. Units can be words, characters, themes, time periods, interactions, or 
any other results of “breaking up a ‘communication’ into bits”’. 
  
In choosing the unit for the VfM report content analysis I made the decision that the unit 
had to be large enough to properly represent the category it was being coded into, but 
fairly compact to show focus. The reports are highly descriptive and due to that nature it 
was not possible to identify the category simply through words or a single sentence. 
Theme in a passage was chosen to represent the unit of analysis. Therefore, the unit 
chosen can be labelled as a passage with an undetermined length, but can be reasonably 
estimated as a number of sentences but not a paragraph.  
 
Finally, the categories were chosen for two reasons, first the focus of the research is the 
defence acquisition process and through that there were expectation of certain topics; 
and second, with the first requirement in mind, in the process of reading the seventeen 
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reports the common factors describing the defence acquisition process were chosen to 
categorise the data.  
 
Kassarjian (1977, p.12) comments ‘content analysis is no better than its categories, since 
they reflect the formulated thinking, the hypotheses and the purpose of the study. The 
categories are, in essence, the conceptual scheme of the research design’. With that in 
mind, it is clear the categorisation process is the key to the successful implementation of 
the research.  
 
As part of the categorisation process there are important steps such as defining, 
organising and relating the categories. Hsieh and Shannon (2005, p.1279) state ‘next, 
definition for each category, subcategory, and code are developed. To prepare for 
reporting the findings, exemplars for each code and category are identified from the data. 
Depending on the purpose of the study, researchers might decide to identify the 
relationships between categories and sub-categories further based on their concurrence, 
antecedents, or consequences’.  
 
This process was aided by the use of the qualitative software, NVivo 8, and was 
instrumental to the categorisation of the content. Each category and sub-category, 
coding, relationship and other queries of the content analysis is defined and explained.  
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Having presented the case of the quantitative and qualitative approach to content 
analysis, I shall now argue that the use of both approaches creates the best of both worlds 
for the researcher. In my research, the approach taken was to first understand the 
quantitative description evident in the content analysis and use that to support and 
extend the qualitative aspects of the content analysis.  
 
Kracauer (1952, p.637) argues ‘quantitative analysis includes qualitative aspects, for it 
both originates and culminates in qualitative considerations. On the other hand, 
qualitative analysis proper often requires quantification in the interest of exhaustive 
treatment. Far from being strict alternatives the two approaches actually overlap, and 
have in fact complemented and interpenetrated each other in several investigations’. 
 
The quantification process in some cases can take on a heavily statistical approach, 
however in most cases it can simply be a matter of identifying the emphasis of categories 
or sub-categories within the content using frequency calculations.  
 
Morgan (1993, p.115) points out ‘in quantitative content analysis, counts and tabulations 
of the codes summarise what is known about the data, and the analytic effort typically 
stops with the presentation of these numerical results. In qualitative content analysis, 
however, such counting leads to the crucial further step of interpreting the pattern that is 
found in the codes’.  
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In my study the frequency of categories, sub-categories and relationships provided clear 
identification of the emphasis of certain factors in the reports. Beyond the point of 
emphasis, and in some cases omission or infrequence, there is the question of how this 
count affects the overall picture, in terms of the defence acquisition process.  
 
If the emphasis is on one sub-category, how does this play out with the other sub-
categories or the hierarchical tree? If there is an omission of certain factorial relationships, 
what does that mean for expectations of the defence acquisition process? These are the 
inferential questions posed in the qualitative analysis using counts in content analysis. 
There is also the overall connection of the content analysis with the transaction cost 
perspective. 
 
There are some qualitative researchers who are uneasy (Morgan, 1993) with 
quantification in qualitative research. However, Holsti (1969, p.9) points out ‘a further 
advantage of quantification is that statistical methods provide a powerful set of tools not 
only for precise and parsimonious summary of findings, but also for improving the quality 
of interpretation and inferences’.  
 
When trying to identify the crucial areas of focus for the defence acquisition process it is 
important to identify what the authors are trying to communicate to us, the message, the 
frequencies provides a clear indication of their focus. Moving beyond simply counting and 
interpreting the count, the focus moves towards the meaning of the message. This is 
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undertaken by providing a summation of the theme in the factorial relations or a 
discussion of common categories.  
 
The factorial relations provide a clear identification of the cause and effect of certain 
factors in the defence acquisition process. Their interrelatedness makes them an 
important aspect of the categorisation. In the quantification the emphasis is identified and 
in the qualification the meaning is presented. The use of quantitative content analysis 
without further analysis using a qualitative approach would be limited in its ability to 
provide proper conclusions in the research. 
 
6.3.3 Reliability, Validity and Objectivity 
Weber (1990, p.17) identifies three types of reliability for content analysis ‘stability, 
reproducibility, and accuracy’. Stability refers to the ability of multiple coders to record 
the same classifications for the code. Reproducibility regards the ability of multiple coders 
to classify the text in the same categories.  
 
Whereas stability measures the capability of the coders to understand the classifications, 
reproducibility is the degree to which their understanding is coherent. These reliability 
tests are weak for content analysis where usually the coder is a single person, as in my 
case. Accuracy is the extent to which the classification of the text corresponds to a 
standard or norm; a stronger form of reliability (Weber, 1952, p.17).  
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The accuracy of the research can be tested by creating a standard, in most cases the 
definition or boundary of the category, and investigating each code to see whether they 
conform to the standards assigned. There can be hundreds of coded references within a 
category, but a sample of these can be taken to review the accuracy of the coding process.  
 
Neundorf (2002, p.12) suggests ‘reliability has been defined as the extent to which a 
measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials’. It is explained, this is 
again down to multi-coder consistency. Kolbe and Burnett (1991, p.248) comment 
‘interjudge reliability is often perceived as the standard measure of research quality. High 
levels of disagreement among judges suggest weakness in research methods, including 
the possibility of poor operational definitions, categories, and judge training’. A major 
factor of this ‘interjudge reliability’ is the objectivity of the research, which I shall discuss 
further shortly but first let’s look at validity. 
 
Neundorf (2000, p.12) states ‘validity refers to the extent to which empirical measure 
adequately reflects what humans agree on as the real meaning of a concept (Babbie, 
1995, p.127). Generally, it is addressed with the question, “Are we really measuring what 
we want to measure?”’. This question goes to the heart of the researchers purpose, is the 
research satisfying his/her own curiosity properly.  
 
In order to ensure there is focus in the research, it is important to highlight the purpose of 
the research. The purpose of my research is to understand the UK defence acquisition 
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process by focusing on specific elements of the transaction between the MoD and its 
prime contractors. With that in mind the choice of the VfM reports as the dataset 
provides a logical link to that purpose. It is then a matter of defining what the defence 
acquisition process represents and then defining how the categories and sub-categories fit 
in with that purpose. The test is then whether the codified unit represents the category it 
has been placed in.  
 
Weber (1990, pp.18-19) states ‘a category has face validity to the extent that it appears to 
measure the construct it is intended to measure. Even if several expert judges agree, face 
validity is still a weak claim because it rests on a single variable… Unfortunately, content 
analysts often have relied heavily on face validity; consequently some other social 
scientists have viewed their results sceptically’.  
 
It is difficult to provide multiple variables for a single category, especially since the whole 
point of that category is to measure the occurrence of a specific factor. However, I do 
attempt to view the categories or the relationships they exhibit in a different light using 
the TCE theory. This is less to do with validity and more to do with providing a second 
layer of analysis. This may, however, provide a greater justification of my conclusions. 
 
In the last two methodological tests, reliability and validity, a constant theme has cropped 
up on the critique of content analysis, that being how objectivity is ensured. This idea of 
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‘interjudge reliability’ or ‘agreement’ comes from the desire to objectively outline the 
rules, procedure and standardisation of the coding, units and categories.  
 
This objectivity might be achievable in terms of choosing a specific unit type (words, 
themes, characters, etc.) and the way the categories are outlined (through definition or 
boundary explanations), but the real test comes from the coding.  
 
In the definition of content analysis inferential judgement is at the heart of the process. By 
their nature inferences are subjective; each person will make decisions on whether the 
category definition or even the unit style is adequate to the rules outlined.  
 
As Holsti (1969, p.3) argues ‘objectivity stipulates that each step in the research process 
must be carried out on the basis of explicitly formulated rules and procedures. Even the 
simplest and most mechanical forms of content analysis require the investigator to use his 
judgement in making decisions about his data’.  
 
It is impossible to remove judgement from the process of content analysis and even 
through the creation of rules and procedures this judgement can only be confined to a 
certain extent. It is therefore difficult to satisfy the classic view of objectivity, but the 
process of inter-subjectivity provides an attempt to be objective.  
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Beyond the coding process, the analysis of the categories using qualitative content 
analysis further disturbs this so-called need for objectivity. Earlier the focus was on what 
approach to use for content analysis, qualitative or quantitative, the argument put 
forward was that there is advantages in combining the two. Some would argue that the 
use of qualitative analysis would create greater subjectivity.  
 
Kracauer (1952, p.641) however argues that disciplined subjectivity can be achieved. ‘The 
believers in exact science among the social scientists are inclined to exaggerate, along 
with the objectivity of quantitative analysis, the danger which qualitative techniques incur 
because of their subjectivity. Any historical period produces only a limited number of 
major philosophical doctrines, moral trends and aesthetic preferences, and if qualitative 
analysis operates, as it should, below the level of sheer opinion, these influences can be 
discerned and controlled’.  
 
I believe in my study there is a clear understanding of the purpose (as explained in the 
Introduction Chapter) and this ensures the focus on the way the categories are defined. It 
is through these definitions that I have made my inference as to which categories the 
references are coded. Through this purpose and research objectives I identify the 
relationships amongst categories and subcategories (which are to be explained below), 
and discern with disciplined subjectivity my interpretations of the findings. 
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6.4 Research Design 
6.4.1 Research Data 
The research data comes in the form of seventeen VfM reports, produced by the NAO, 
focussing on defence projects delivered by the MoD. The NAO scrutinises public spending 
on behalf of Parliament under the powers given to them by Section 6 of the National 
Audit Act 1983, for presentation to the House of Commons in accordance with Section 9 
of the Act. The VfM reports provide a number of aspects of the acquisition process for the 
delivery of defence equipment and services to the Armed Forces. The reports are from a 
variety of dates and projects, as shown in Table 6.1. 
 
Nine of the reports, from HC 1246 downwards, were sourced from the NAO website 
(www.nao.org.uk, accessed 18
th
 March 2009). The older reports were sourced directly 
from the NAO by agreement with the Head of Defence in the NAO, Tim Banfield. My 
supervisor, Prof. Graham Winch, and I met with Mr. Banfield at NAO Headquarters to 
discuss the aim of the research and the need for greater resources.  
 
Mr. Banfield’s office provided me with a number of defence reports from the NAO, 
including the eight remaining VfM reports and many other useful reports for reference. 
The access to these original data sources provide a contribution to defence research, in 
that it is the first time such data has been analysed and presented.  
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On my part, I produced a report discussing the initial findings of the analysis of the 
seventeen reports. I received some useful feedback from Mr. Banfield in response to my 
presentation. 
 
 
Session Report Report Title 
Feb 1984 HC 287  Trident Project 
Mar 1985 HC 291 The Torpedo Programme 
Jul 1993 HC 864 The Awarding of the Contract for the Landing Platform for Helicopters 
1994-1995 HC 692 Procurement Lessons for the Common New Generation Frigate  
1994-1995 HC 724 Eurofighter 2000  
1998-1999 HC 738 The Procurement of Non-Combat Vehicles for the Royal Air Force  
1999-2000 HC 328 The Private Finance Initiative: The Contract for the Defence Fixed 
Telecommunications System 
2001-2002 HC 840 Helicopter Logistics 
2001-2002 HC 1246 Building an Air Manoeuvre Capability: The Introduction of the Apache 
Helicopter 
2002-2003 HC 90 The Construction of Nuclear Submarine Facilities at Davenport 
2005-2006 HC 1050 Delivering Digital Tactical Communications through the Bowman CIP 
Programme 
2006-2007 HC 825 Transforming Logistics Support for Fast Jets 
2007-2008 HC 512 Chinook Mk3 Helicopters  
2007-2008 HC 627 Hercules C-130 Tactical Fixed Wing Airlift Capability 
2007-2008 HC 788 The Defence Information Infrastructure  
2007-2008 HC 1115 The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability 
2008-2009 HC 295 Providing Anti-Air Warfare Capability: the Type 45 Destroyer 
Table 6.1: Defence Value for Money Reports 
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Keen (1999, p.509) points out ‘the UK National Audit Office (NAO) is responsible for the 
external audit of government departments, agencies and other public bodies. The NAO 
carries out two main types of work, financial audits of government expenditure and Value 
for Money (VFM) reports on specific programmes, projects and other activities’. 
 
VfM reports are common for all other government procurement projects such as 
transport infrastructure, public service buildings, government accommodation projects 
etc. The VfM reports in defence provide a number of purposes: 
 They allow the NAO to scrutinise the performance of the MoD in delivering the 
acquisition of specific projects;  
 The reports provide a vital part of the UK democratic process in that they make 
civil servants accountable to elected officials in the defence parliamentary 
committee;   
 The NAO are tasked with determining the value gained for the taxpayer and the 
Armed Forces on specific defence projects, as well as providing recommendations 
for improved acquisition practice.  
 
Lonsdale (2000, p.73) states ‘unlike the regular audit of sets of financial statements, value 
for money (VFM) work is usually undertaken on discrete subjects on an ad hoc basis, with 
results often appearing in a published report containing recommendations for 
improvements in practices or procedures’.  
 
VfM reports also differ to regular audits, in that they are not really seen as audits. Keen 
(1999, p.510) explains ‘at the NAO, VFM studies are not usually referred to as audits, 
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though in almost all cases they are undertaken by auditors. VFM studies typically focus on 
specific topics, which might include the awarding of a contract, the implementation of a 
new programme or the management of a service. Topics are investigated periodically, 
perhaps only once every few years, rather than yearly’.  
 
VfM reports go beyond financial audits in their remit, they investigate the practice of the 
audited body not only its financial information. It is the fact that the scrutiny is focused on 
a wide variety of management and acquisition practices, whilst specifying individual 
projects, that the VfM reports represent a rich source of research data. 
 
There have been few discussions on the work of the NAO, in the academic sphere. 
However, those which do make mention of the NAO provide insight into the background 
and focus of the institution. In terms of its inception the NAO in its institutional format 
was a product of a private members bill during the Thatcher government (Roberts and 
Pollitt 1994; Lapsley and Pong 2000). It is not, however, alone in its ability to scrutinise 
public expenditure.  
 
In their study, Bowerman et al. (2003, p.2) present the role the NAO plays alongside other 
auditing bodies. ‘The present framework of public audit in the UK is the product of a 
patchwork of legislation enacted over the past 150 years. The result is huge diversity of 
purpose, power, organisation and methods between the public audit bodies. Briefly, there 
are four national audit agencies, covering central government departments and agencies 
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in England and Wales (the National Audit Office), local government and health bodies in 
England and Wales (the Audit Commission), an audit body for Northern Ireland and one 
for Scotland’.  
 
In 2011, it was announced by the coalition Government that the Audit Commission is to 
be disbanded and a new arrangement for auditing local public bodies is intended to be 
implemented by 2012/13 (www.audit-commission.gov.uk, accessed 22/02/11). 
  
Bowerman et al. (2003) suggest these institutions compete for influence and power. The 
NAO are the definitive voice in the evaluation of defence projects and thus the focus of 
my study lies with them. Roberts and Pollitt (1994) study provides some interesting 
discussions on a study of the NAO, specifically the limitations they identify of the 
institution, they present three such limitations. 
 
The first, Roberts and Pollitt (1994) suggest, is a format limitation, of which is largely self-
imposed, in which the NAO is constrained by the ‘politeness of Whitehall speak’. This 
states that the NAO while giving recommendations on ‘continued efforts’ or ‘further 
consideration’ or ‘review’ are not heavily critical of failings. 
 
The second limitation is largely (but not wholly) self-imposed upon the NAO by its 
founding legislation, and its relationship with the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). This 
limitation is that it is concerned mainly with the financial aspects of reporting rather than 
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the managerial issues, and when management practice is discussed it is only where a link 
to expenditure decisions can be highlighted. 
 
The third limitation is on its reporting style. They argue that in order to satisfy the 
interests (or lack of) the audience, parliamentarians and the PAC, the methodological and 
technical details are usually exorcised or limited. Furthermore, due to the time limitations 
of parliament the length of the VfM studies are constrained (Roberts and Pollitt, 1994, 
p.546-7). 
 
The first limitation may in the whole be true, but in my experience of reading the NAO 
reports on VfM and MPR, in the defence context, there doesn’t seem to be too much 
restraint in criticising the MoD where mistakes or lack of development is perceived by the 
NAO. In terms of the second limitation it is true that some VfM reports rely too heavily on 
providing financial information, especially the earlier reports.  
 
In my study the more detailed financial information was not much use in understanding 
the defence acquisition process, as they did not provide much evidence towards the 
process but instead were more statistical based. The financial information, those which 
made no reference to the effect on the acquisition process, were thus categorised in a 
separate tree – the ‘Other’ tree. It is, however, obvious there was a rich source of data in 
terms of the acquisition process and managerial decision-making, which was the focus of 
my study and most NAO VfM reports.  
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The last of the limitations is, of course, a part of the nature of a parliamentary democracy 
where elected official are not expected to be experts and their time in parliament can be 
limited, this fact cannot be helped. The information which the NAO presents is mainly 
subject to scrutiny of current parliamentarians and not for future intakes. This is proper as 
the electorate are only able to judge those in power at the time of the projects in terms of 
how they accounted for the taxpayer’s expenditure. 
  
It should, however, be noted that Roberts and Pollitt (1994) study used a case study of job 
creation and safeguard in Wales and so the reporting of this case study is likely to differ 
from that of defence reports. Their conclusions are, however, based on a general 
overview of NAO working. The NAO as an institution will have its own purpose and 
objectives, it is difficult to ascertain how that is influenced by politics but it would be naïve 
to think that it was immune to such considerations. 
  
Beyond the NAO as an institution there is an interesting study of the ‘value for money’ 
philosophy in public auditing, conducted by Lapsley and Pong (2000). The study looks at 
the opposing views of ‘modernisation and problematisation’ of value for money audits. 
The argument centres on the different use of language and perception in what can be 
justified as ‘best practice’. 
  
The modernisation path views ‘value for money’ as a way to move towards the language 
of seeking ‘best practice’ and how such practice can be applied. The path taken by the 
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problematisation view is to question the basis of what ‘best practice’ stands for and how it 
can be defined or identified (Lapsley and Pong, 2000).  
 
The study was conducted using interviews with ‘expert’ groups. Lapsley and Pong (2000, 
p.562) suggest ‘these VFM auditors did suggest that both operational and strategic 
benefits arose from the conduct of VFM audits’.  
 
Lapsley and Pong (2000, p.563) caution ‘the major difficulty of VFM audit as perceived by 
this expert group is that of the determination of what constitutes ‘best practice’… The 
above analysis of the views of the expert group of VFM auditors depict the process of 
determining VFM as problematic, challenging, even messy, with a strong emphasis on the 
experiential’. 
  
In this problematisation view of VfM language, there is also the question of whether the 
search for value for money itself is a highly politicised discourse. In my view, such 
considerations are difficult to resolve, the research instead focuses on the learning of the 
transactional issues regarding defence acquisition. While value for money plays the role of 
the ‘bottom line’ in these reports, my purpose is more to highlight whether value for 
money is being achieved rather than question its basis.   
 
The conclusions of the paper provide a stark warning for my own research to be cautious 
of promoting ‘best practice’. The research provides a great amount of data on acquisition 
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practice; it does, however, have its own limitation. The research methodology focuses on 
understanding the meaning behind the message of the reports rather than appraising the 
reports. 
 
In the first instance, of my content analysis, the research method focuses on what can be 
extracted from the reports. The second phase is applying the theoretical basis, TCE, to 
explain how it applies to the findings of the content analysis. These research objectives 
are far removed from the arguments of what VfM reports should recommend as best 
practice, but it is something to bear in mind. 
     
6.4.2 NVivo Coding Process 
The content analysis of the VfM reports were undertaken using an initial process of 
textual analysis using qualitative software NVivo Version 8 (NVivo 8). The purpose of the 
qualitative software is to undertake the first step of the content analysis, which is to 
organise the data into discrete areas of focus.  
 
As Richards (1999, p.413) explains ‘much of what is in NVivo responds to user requests for 
ways of extending the accepted code-based theorizing methods. These include major 
changes to document handling and coding and in visual displays’. Therefore, NVivo 8 has 
allowed me to organise the data into the chosen categories within a hierarchical tree 
structure and produce models to represent this. 
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The first step is downloading the data into the software. The data comes in the form of 
the published reports, which are downloaded as a portable document folder (pdf) files. It 
is possible to download these files onto the NVivo 8 software as sources. In some cases, 
the pdf files were too large due to the numerous figures and pages in some reports. They 
therefore had to be copied into a word document and downloaded in document format.  
 
Figure 6.1 represents the process for importing a source into NVivo 8. The document is 
chosen from the required folder, in this case that is the ‘NAO VfM Reports’ folder and 
imported into the internals section. 
 
 
Using the importing function it is possible to download all seventeen reports into the 
internals section of the Sources. As can be seen in Figure 6.1, all seventeen reports are 
Figure 6.1: Importing a Source into Internals 
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shown in alphabetical order list with a paper style icon to the left. This icon can be 
selected in order to open the document; this action will open the full document with all 
the text and figures. In some cases the data were slightly corrupted, in terms of the 
spacing or order of text: this was easily overcome by editing the text using the paper copy 
for proofing.  
 
The next step was to create categories to compartmentalise the text, according to 
interpretation. The unit, as has already been mentioned, was chosen to be multi-
sentences (or passage) based. This first required the creation of the categories. Richards 
(2002, p.201) points out ‘categories are not coding, categories are entities in their own 
right that can be related to each other, commented on in memos, and defined. Coding, if 
you want to do it (and many don’t) can be stored in the relevant category or node to 
provide links to evidence texts’.  
 
Figure 6.2 represents the process of creating categories, known in NVivo 8 as Nodes, in 
the first place as Free Nodes. As free nodes they are stand alone categories. These free 
nodes can be selected and dropped into the Tree Nodes and in this section the tree 
structure can be organised. 
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The purpose of the hierarchical tree in the tree node is to start the analysis from a wide 
perspective to a more focused area. In Figure 6.2 the free node begins with ‘Defence 
Acquisition Process’, this is the principal category for the entire research. The nodes can 
then be generated in more focus and with a range of topics covering the purpose of the 
research. The hierarchical tree provides a description of how each factor has been 
exhausted downwards using sub-categories. 
 
 Bazeley (2002, p.239) explains the benefit of the tree in his work. ‘Selective inclusion of 
nodes from different levels of a tree in a matrix allowed for sub-categorisation within 
trees without loss of flexibility in conducting analysis. The ease of generating complete 
Figure 6.2: Creating a Free Node 
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tables in NVivo thus prompted a series of analysis to examine the stability of the inferred 
underlying structure of the data across different subgroups… ’. 
 
The process of creating a tree is a part of the exhaustive analysis in the early stage of 
content analysis; this is aided greatly by the use of the software which provides visuals of 
this. Figure 6.3 demonstrates the full hierarchical tree of the Defence Acquisition Process 
tree.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 6.3, the Defence Acquisition Process tree is represented by the 
categories I had chosen through my analysis of the seventeen reports. Consequently the 
category is sub-divided until I was satisfied enough detail was captured. These categories 
and sub-categories are of course not empty. The data from each source is placed in the 
appropriate category. Each category has a number next to it to identify the number of 
sources which reference it. 
  
In total, there are 28 nodes included in the Defence Acquisition Process tree. The process 
of coding the data begins with the parent nodes, with the data being taken from each 
source, selected and ‘dropped’ into the node. The data are transformed into a reference, 
in that they reference the existence of the factor they describe. Each tree node will have a 
number of references, with the higher up the tree having a larger number of references. 
The references are filtered down the tree structure and placed in the appropriate nodes. 
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The table shown in Figure 6.3 under the Tree Nodes represents the number of sources 
(reports) which make reference to the categories and sub-categories named on the left. 
The results of this frequency count and its importance to the research will be discussed in 
greater length in the Research Findings chapter. 
 
At the bottom of Figure 6.3, it is possible to see a separate tree to the Defence Acquisition 
Process – this is the ‘Other’ tree, shown in Figure 6.4. The ‘Other’ represents all references 
which do not refer to the Defence Acquisition Process. The analysis of the research data is 
satisfied when all possible text has been disseminated to the categories it references.     
 
Figure 6.3: Defence Acquisition Process Tree Nodes  
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Crowley, Harre and Tagg (2002, p.195) state ‘…the Tree structure is simply an organising 
system in the software that enables more efficient interrogation of its databases; it can be 
restructured very simply at any time and it can also be completely ignored and not used’. 
It makes the analysis of data easier, but it also allows the user to visualise the structure of 
the analysis which can be of great help in the next stage of identifying category 
relationships. 
 
 
In the content analysis section, I pointed to what Hsieh and Shannon (2005) discussed as 
the process of identifying the relationships between categories and sub-categories based 
on their ‘concurrence, antecedents, or consequences’. This process can be aided using 
NVivo 8, since the data has been compartmentalised into their respective categories.  
 
Figure 6.4: The ‘Other’ Tree Nodes  
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The investigation becomes a matter of identifying the hypothesised relationship, the type 
of relationship and the reference to evidence its existence. These relationships are placed 
in Relationship Nodes by selecting the reference and dragging it to the relationship node. 
Figure 6.5 shows the listed relationship nodes and as an example one is opened, 
‘Frequency with Learning’ relationship. The references evidencing the existence of such a 
relationship are listed below. 
 
 
In the relationship section there are a number of columns to describe the relationship in 
detail giving information such as the type, the name, the tree nodes represented and the 
number of sources and references. The results will be explained further in the Research 
Findings. 
Figure 6.5: The Relationship Nodes  
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In terms of relationship types there can be associative, one-way or symmetrical 
relationships; our interest lies with the one way or symmetrical relationships as shown in 
Figure 6.6: x, y and z represent a category, with n representing their respective coded 
node.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the last step to coding the data in order to represent the initial stage of the content 
analysis, in terms of organising the data. NVivo 8, as already pointed out, provides another 
advantage in terms of its visualisation techniques. Apart from the obvious tabular form it 
provides as shown in all the Figures, it can also be used to create models representing 
these tabulate forms in Figures. Using shapes and arrows a diagram of the hierarchical 
tree and factorial relationships can be drawn with hyperlinks to the original coding. 
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Figure 6.6: How Factorial Nodal Relationships Are Developed 
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6.4.3 Formulating Categories and Relationships 
I shall now describe the process for creating the categories within the Defence Acquisition 
Process tree and the structure with which it is designed. The first process of identifying 
the major factors in the VfM reports was undertaken by a full reading of the seventeen 
reports. Having read the reports and with the findings of the MPRs in Chapter 5, the main 
themes describing the defence acquisition process were identified.  
 
The categories describing the defence acquisition process are separated into three parts: 
 Selection Process – this describes the procurement strategy used to identify the 
method of procuring the platform from a prime contractor or in-house production. 
 Contracting Process – once the selection process has been fulfilled the buyer and 
supplier have to agree to certain exchange parameters. These parameters are in 
the type of contract, negotiating the contract and the environment under which 
the contract takes place. 
 Uncertainty, Complexity and Risk – a major part of the defence acquisition process 
during selection, contracting and delivery. Uncertainty and Complexity can be seen 
as twinned factors creating the same effect, namely Risk.  
 
These three factors represent the first sub-categories to the Defence Acquisition Process 
category. There are three branches to the tree and four levels, as is shown in Figure 6.7. 
The Selection Process, Branch 1, has five sub-categories, in Level 3, describing the 
procurement routes chosen for the acquisition. The Contracting Process, Branch 2, splits 
into three in Level 3 and a further 10 factors in Level 4. The Uncertainty, Complexity and 
 - 346 -  
Risk factor, Branch 3, split into two in Level 3: Uncertainty and Complexity which is 
definitive and Risk which is of four types in level 4.  
 
The tree model is colour coded to represent the fact that there exist three distinctive 
branches of the tree. The arrows in the model point upwards from one circle to another 
indicating the parent node. In the coding process the parent category is first analysed and 
all reference to its existence is placed in the parent node. The sub-categories are 
therefore selected from the references in the parent node.  
 
This process is reiterated until the content of the text has been fully exhausted 
analytically. The unit of analysis is constant for all factors and no changes are made in the 
way the analysis is conducted for parent or child nodes. Examples of the coded references 
for each Defence Acquisition Process nodes are provided in Appendix 1. 
 
The model provides a visual representation of the defence acquisition tree which provides 
clear and concise recognition of the origins of the nodes. It is from looking at the 
references in the tree and linking that with the research propositions that the next stage 
of identifying relationships between the factors is formulated.  
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The Defence Acquisition Tree represents only one part of the VfM reports. It represents 
the part in which my research interest lies. However, there is a second part of the reports 
which play no part in the research question. These are categories in a separate tree, the 
“Other” Tree – shown in Figure 6.8. Passages, in which the information relates to 
references other than defence acquisition are categorised into the “Other” node and its 
sub-categories.  
Figure 6.7: Defence Acquisition Tree Model 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
Level 4 
Branch 1 Branch 3 Branch 2 
Figure 6.8: ‘Other’ Tree Model 
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The second level nodes are independent from each other for the purposes of my analysis. 
They represent the categories which are of no consequence to the defence acquisition 
process in the context of my research (e.g. financial is a category for all financial 
information such as pricing or technical which discusses technical information in the 
product development). These factors do not provide insight, as say the contracting 
process or technical risk categories might do. 
 
These two trees are simply organising the VfM reports into the appropriate categories and 
sub-categories to be used when analysing the research questions and propositions. The 
TCE perspective, thus, is implemented at the analysis stage where the references from the 
Defence Acquisition Tree are used as evidence to support or refute the propositions. 
Aiding this process is the formulation of factorial relationships, which show causal 
relationships between the factors and provide further insight when analysed using the 
transaction cost perspective. 
 
Factorial relationships are the name that has been assigned to describe the proposed 
relatedness of the categories and sub-categories in the Defence Acquisition Tree. The 
relationship types have already been discussed. However, Table 6.2 presents the eleven 
relationships proposed from expected cause and effect relationships in defence 
acquisition.  
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Of the eleven relationships there are seven one way relationships and four symmetrical 
relationships. The one way relationships are inferred by looking for references which 
identify the causal factor in a category (i.e. in the Contract Risk node I looked for 
references which mention the effect of the Selection Process). In terms of the symmetrical 
relationships the process is similar, but rather than collecting the references of just one of 
the nodes the relatedness is evident where references occur in both nodes. 
 
These factorial relationships will allow me to investigate in great detail the cause and 
effect of certain defence acquisition processes. They allow me to look in detail at certain 
expected relationships such as: how Information Transfer Issues may symmetrically affect 
Relationship Relationship Type 
Selection Process can affect Contract Risk One Way 
Selection Process determines the Contract Type One Way 
Selection Process can affect In-Service Risk One Way 
Contract Type will affect Contract Risk One Way 
Technical Risks creates Delivery Risks One Way 
Information Transfer Issues creates Delivery Risks One Way 
Uncertainty and Complexity can create Technical Risks One Way 
Contract Type will determine the In-Service Risk Symmetrical  
Uncertainty and Complexity with Information Transfer Issues Symmetrical 
Monopoly and Monopsony with Negotiation Power Symmetrical 
Frequency with Learning Symmetrical 
Table 6.2: Factorial Relationships 
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the Uncertainty and Complexity of the acquisition process OR that the Contract Type 
chosen for a certain acquisition may be determined by the Selection Process of the 
supplier. 
 
These investigations will open up, it is hoped, a number of exchanges in the factors 
describing the defence acquisition process. The analysis will look at the statistical 
significance in terms of looking for emphasis, omission and infrequence. The qualitative 
content analysis will be even more important, as it will provide insight to how the 
relatedness of certain categories affects the overall defence acquisition process. The 
references from the factorial relationship, along with the defence acquisition factors, will 
be used to analyse the support, or not, for the propositions and to answer the research 
questions linked to them.  
 
6.5 Summary 
There has been a variety of research methodologies used in the study of defence 
acquisition. Amongst the commonly used methods are documentary studies, postal 
questionnaires, field-based questionnaires, questionnaires followed-up by semi-
structured interviews and case studies. My own research combines documentary study 
with content analysis.  
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I justify the use of the content analysis methodology in terms of the limited access to 
primary data sources. However, I believe I have benefited from this limitation. The 
plentiful access to secondary sources, thanks to the NAO, has allowed me to use a larger 
sample of documentary data to analyse a wide-range of acquisition practice.  
 
Content analysis has enabled me to decipher the information from the VfM reports. To 
infer the acquisition process represented in the reports and to present them through 
categorisation. The fact that the sample represents a wide-range of projects from the past 
and present allows me to analyse a range of acquisition practice.  
 
I am also confident that the reports will represent a wide range of groups and individuals 
who have been interviewed and consulted by the NAO for the report. This allows me to 
use a data source which represents a wide range of views on defence acquisition. The 
focus of each report, however, is on a particular project and its value for money to the 
taxpayer. Unlike the MPRs this provides me with the opportunity to view a greater 
breadth of the project, as the reports explain all aspects of the project at the time of the 
report.  
 
In my research I use a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to the 
content analysis. The reason being an analysis which addresses the case of emphasis, 
omission or indifference to categories is initially described. This is then backed up by a 
qualitative understanding of the overall message using the summative process. In 
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combination these two approaches provided a clearer picture of what is occurring in the 
content analysis. 
 
Content analysis is subject to three methodological tests: reliability, validity and 
objectivity. Each test has been explained in their own context and how they apply to 
content analysis research. However, not all have been accepted in their stated form. Some 
have been adapted to the case of content analysis. It is no use trying to use tests which go 
against the nature of content analysis. However, it is also useful to ensure there is an 
attempt to adhere to these methodological requirements. 
 
Reliability tests are difficult for content analysis because they require replicable actions, 
which can prove difficult when a single coder is used as in my case. Three types of 
reliability have been explained: stability, reproducibility, and accuracy. The first two types 
look at whether other coders can repeat the actions or inferences of the original coder. 
This is difficult to prove, since a single coder was used in my research and to have other 
coders analyse my data would be time consuming due to the large dataset.  
 
The third type, accuracy, focuses on the way the coder provides standardisation in the 
coding process. This can be proven, since the standardisation is based on ensuring the 
meaning and boundaries of categories are standardised so that all the references belong 
to their category. This I have ensured by providing a definition of each category.  
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Validity looks at whether the purpose of the research has been addressed. The purpose of 
the research is to understand the defence acquisition process at the points in which the 
buyer-supplier interactions determines the transaction governance. This has been done by 
understanding the defence acquisition process supported by Chapters 2 and 5, and the 
economics of the defence acquisition using Chapters 3 and 4. I then combine the 
knowledge gained from these chapters with an analysis of the VfM reports to address the 
research objective, the purpose of my research. 
 
Objectivity, it has been argued, goes against the nature of content analysis which relies 
heavily on the inference of the coder. Inference is a subjective interpretation of the 
evidence. Thus, instead of objectivity we look for what has been termed ‘disciplined 
subjectivity’. Disciplined subjectivity ensures that the coder is consistent with the 
interpretation that is being made. This consistency relies upon a clear set of principles. 
These are that the unit of analysis, the definition of the category and the structural 
discipline of the tree. 
  
The unit of analysis is a passage of text which describes a particular action, explanation or 
recommendation of the defence acquisition process. The definitions of each category and 
relationship has been provided and explained. The structure of the tree ensures that the 
information is continually reduced to its determinant category. Where the passage does 
not belong in the defence acquisition tree, a separate ‘Other’ tree has been constructed 
with its own categories.  
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The research data relies upon the analysis of the NAO VfM reports. These reports are 
based on a parliamentary legislation, which gives the NAO powers to audit the value 
gained from defence projects led by the MoD. The reports are provided for the scrutiny of 
parliament and in an era of transparency, for the public. The independence of the NAO 
provides it with a great amount of credibility and the wide range of contributors to the 
report makes them an invaluable source of research data.  
 
NVivo has been useful software in that it can deal with a large amount of data and allow 
the researcher to analyse the entirety of the data. It has also been valuable in that it can 
allow the researcher to build models from the data. It also allows the user to manipulate 
the data by creating certain commands, such as the factorial relationships which have 
been proposed. 
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7 Research Findings 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will present the findings of my research. It will be separated into two 
sections: Results and Analysis. The chapter will focus on the central research question: 
how does transaction cost economics provide insight to the defence acquisition process?  
 
In the results section, the findings of the NVivo analysis of the VfM reports will be 
presented being separated into the Defence Acquisition Process Tree results and the 
Factorial Relationship results. This will then be followed by the analysis the findings of the 
defence acquisition tree using the research questions and propositions (outlined in 
Chapter 1).  
 
The focus will be on the references to each category and how they provide a basis to 
interpret the propositions using TCE. The three propositions will be assessed using the 
appropriate factors and factorial relationships, with evidence being presented to support 
or reject for each proposition. This evidence will rely upon the inferences made of the 
passage coded in the defence acquisition tree and factorial relationships. A conclusion will 
be made after evidence of the proposition has been analysed. 
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7.2 Results 
7.2.1 Defence Acquisition Process Tree Results 
Table 7.1: Defence Acquisition Tree – Factors against Sources 
 
Level 1 
 
Level 2 
 
Level 3 
 
Level 4 
 
Factor Sources Factor Sources Factor Sources Factor Sources 
Technical Risk 13 
In-Service Risk 10 
Delivery Risk 14 
 
 
 
Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
Contract Risk 14 
 
 
Uncertainty, 
Complexity 
and Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 Uncertainty and 
Complexity 
16 
 
 
Traditional 
Procurement 
8 
Smart 
Procurement 
and Acquisition 
11 
PPP and PFI 3 
International 
Collaboration 
Projects 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Selection 
Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 In-House 
Procurement 
3 
 
Incentive 
Based 
Contracts 
9 
Fixed Price 
Contracts 
8 
Cost Plus 1 
 
 
Contract Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
Contracting 
for Availability 
5 
Negotiation 
Power 
9 
Learning 5 
 
 
Contract 
Negotiations 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
Information 
Transfer 
Issues 
11 
Monopoly and 
Monopsony 
9 
Human 
Resource 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defence 
Acquisition 
Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contracting 
Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contract 
Environment 
 
 
 
14 
 
 Frequency 5 
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Each of the 17 VfM reports were coded into factors from the first to the final level of the 
branch, as shown in Figure 6.7, using NVivo. Table 7.1 represents the results of the 
Defence Acquisition Process tree model. Each factor is referenced in a number of sources. 
 
It is self evident that the Level 1 factor, Defence Acquisition Process, would be present in 
all seventeen VfM reports since all the reports were selected on that basis. All the Level 2 
factors are also present in all seventeen VfM reports. The three factors in Level 2 were 
then disseminated into their sub-categories; Uncertainty, Complexity and Risk is split into 
two factors, the Selection Process into five factors, and the Contracting Process into three 
factors.  
 
Figure 7.1 is a bar chart representing the Frequency (the number of sources) of the Factors 
(tree nodes) for Level 3. Figure 7.1 shows that the most frequent factor in the VfM reports 
is Risk and the least frequent is International Collaboration Projects, for Level 3. 
 
Figure 7.1: Presence of Level 3 Factors in VfM Reports 
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The Uncertainty, Complexity and Risk factors show a high presence in the reports. Risk is 
the only factor in Level 2 to be present in all reports, with Uncertainty and Complexity in 
all but one (Chinook Mk3 Helicopters, HC825). The Contracting Process factors show a 
high presence in a majority of the reports. Contract Negotiations is the highest with 
presence in all reports bar one (Trident Project, HC287). The other two factors, Contract 
Type and Contract Environment, are present in 13 and 14 reports, respectively. Here is an 
example of the references made to Risk: 
Under a privately financed contract, best value for money is most likely to be achieved when risks 
are allocated to the party best able to manage them. Under the terms of this contract, which were 
initially drafted by BT, risk transfer is more limited than in other privately financed contracts we 
have examined. The retention of these risks means that elements of the contract are more like a 
traditional outsourcing contract than a privately financed contract. The Department, therefore, may 
have missed opportunities for better value for money by not seeking greater transfer of these risks 
where BT are best able to manage them. The Department believe that all risks considered 
appropriate for transfer at the time they were developing this project have been transferred to the 
contractor, and that transferring further risks would have been at a price which would have reduced 
value for money. 
The Private Finance Initiative: the Contract for the Defence Fixed Telecommunications 
System, HC 328, 2000 
 
This passage represents a Risk factor reference in which the transfer of project risk within 
the contract is being evaluated by the NAO. The passage highlights the significance of risk 
in a defence project and how contracting can affect the reduction or transfer of risk. The 
NAO points out that the MoD had an opportunity to reduce the contract risk by 
transferring a large extent of the risk to BT, a common practice in PFI projects. Similarly, 
the passage below provides an example of Risk – this time in the form of technical risk: 
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As with the rollout of hardware, the Department and ATLAS assumed that the design of software 
functionality would be relatively straightforward. Most of the software requirements relating to 
functionality for users of DII were already available, albeit in earlier versions, to users of 
DII(Convergent). The software tools necessary for ATLAS to monitor and manage the system are, for 
the most part, standard in the IT service industry. The risk analysis that helped the Department to 
decide to fund DII stated that ‘work to integrate, test, assure and accredit the detailed technical 
design presents a low technical risk’. 
The Defence Information Infrastructure, HC 788, 2008 
 
In this passage, the NAO are discussing the risk analysis undertaken for technical risk 
describing the process taken rather than evaluating the effectiveness. Each passage has its 
own message; however they all provide evidence of the discussions on Risk in the VfM 
reports. 
 
The Uncertainty and Complexity factor is significant within the 17 VfM reports, second to 
Risk in frequency count, providing evidence for strong emphasis for the factor in the VfM 
report. However, the factor is in the same category as the Risk factor – let us instead look 
at Contract Negotiation. Contract Negotiation is joint second in Level 3; within this 
category Information Transfer Issues scores highest in Level 4 within the Contracting 
Process category. Below is a passage from this factor: 
The interface between the Department’s and Lockheed Martin’s spares software systems is poor. 
There is a lack of visibility of spares held and stocks are sometimes reported inaccurately as being 
unavailable. This delays the process of getting the right stock to the right place. As a temporary 
solution, the information transfer is replicated manually which is time consuming and inefficient. 
The proposed software for automatic transfer is yet to be fully developed and implemented. 
Hercules C-130 Tactical Fixed Wing Airlift Capability, HC 627, 2008 
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It provides evidence of the existence of Information Transfer Issues in the VfM reports and 
demonstrates the effects ineffective transfer of information can have on a defence 
project. As highlighted by the factor score, it seems that Information Transfer Issues is a 
common difficulty in the defence acquisition process of the VfM report projects. 
 
The spread of the Selection Process types is of medium to low presence in the reports. 
The highest of the Selection Process is the Smart Procurement and Acquisition factor (11 
reports) and the lowest is the International Collaboration Projects factor (2 reports). 
  
The Selection Process factors have a lower probability of overlap (the same factors in one 
or more reports). It is unlikely more than two procurement strategies are used in the 
lifetime of a project. Figure 7.2 is a pie chart of the Selection process result, highlighting 
the share in the procurement strategy followed by the MoD. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Selection Process in VfM Reports 
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The Selection Process factor represents a number of possibilities in which a single or 
multiple procurement strategy (-ies) was followed in the acquisition decisions reported in 
the VfM studies. The highest share, 41%, of the acquisition decision followed a Smart 
Procurement and Acquisition process. While the second highest share, 30%, is a 
traditional procurement route this may be seen in terms of the legacy projects in the 
project population rather than a way of business for the MoD.  
 
It is suggested that the MoD will be taking on less in-house based procurement, which in 
the project population represented mainly logistic projects. References to in-house 
procurement highlighted an eventual or current transition to outsourcing, with the MoD 
moving towards a buy decision. 
 
As such it is less likely that the MoD will take on many in-house projects especially as it 
has privatised most of its research, development and technology centres. In-house work 
will most likely in the future be focused on in-theatre maintenance and support, being 
provided through training and development provided by the private sector.  
 
The other two procurement routes, international collaboration and PFI projects are 
influenced by political direction towards greater private finance or strategic alliances in 
defence acquisition. These two procurement routes will be followed where there is a will 
in government to procure with strategic allies in the EU or US, and whether PFI projects 
are seen as viable for value for money.  
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The use of PFI projects by the previous government has been highly criticised for their cost 
escalations, and as such there may be political and economic pressure to reduce this 
procurement route. It is also evident in the VfM reports that the MoD has not been wholly 
able to transfer risk in PFI projects to the prime, and as such, goes against the raison 
d’être of PFI. 
 
The reason for a greater spread in the frequency scores for the Selection Process is not 
due to a lack of emphasis, but more due to the nature of the factor. In a VfM report the 
project may exhibit a selection process using one or two procurement strategies. There is 
less overlap with the factors so there is more spread in the frequency. However, some 
projects may exhibit all four risks throughout their lifecycle and therefore there is greater 
overlap of these factors.  
 
However, projects which start off as Traditional Procurement may take on a Smart 
Procurement or Smart Acquisition procurement strategy, but are unlikely to overlap with 
any other Selection Process factors. The passage below provides an example of a Selection 
Process factor: 
To ensure the delivery of these facilities, at the same time as the sale of the dockyard and after four 
years of negotiation, the Department entered into a Prime Contract with DML for the design, 
construction, commissioning and licensing of the facilities in accordance with nuclear safety 
requirements. For its part, to ensure the project’s successful delivery, DML adopted partnering 
arrangements with its key sub-contractors. The Department was not part of these arrangements 
and kept its relationship with DML on a more traditional, contract-orientated basis.  
The Construction of Nuclear Submarine Facilities at Davenport, HC 90, 2003 
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This passage provides indication of a traditional procurement basis, in which the MoD 
keeps its relationship at an arms-length contractual term with the contractor. Another 
reason for the overlap is because the MoD practised some procurement process previous 
to their inception. For example, the passage below describes the ‘whole-life costing’ of 
the Eurofighter project. Whole-life costing is an important principle within the Smart 
Procurement and Acquisition process and as such the passage is included in that category 
as well as the Traditional Procurement category.  
 
Typically, well over half of the overall cost of an equipment is incurred after it has entered service. A 
key factor in the Eurofighter 2000 procurement strategy has therefore been to minimise costs across 
the whole life cycle of the aircraft and not just in the procurement phase. The use of Integrated 
Logistics Support (ILS) techniques has been a major plank in this strategy. 
Eurofighter 2000, HC 724, 1995 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the effective procurement strategies were kept on and 
encompassed in more recent defence acquisition policies. It is therefore, I would argue, 
quite reasonable to show an overlap between the traditional form of procurement and 
the Smart Acquisition process. 
  
Figure 7.3 presents the results of the Level 4 factors, Uncertainty, Complexity and Risk, 
and Contracting Process factors, which excludes the Selection Process branch as it has 
reached its conclusive point at Level 3. There are four factors presented of the former and 
ten of the latter. The graph provides the frequency count of the factors with regard to the 
number of sources the factors are referenced within.   
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The Level 4 factors represent the Level 3 Risk, Contract Type, Contract Environment and 
Contract Negotiation sub-categories (as shown by the colour of the bars). Overall, the Risk 
factors show a much higher presence than their counterparts. However, no factor in Level 
4 is present in more than 14 reports.  The highest presence is the Contract Risk and 
Delivery Risk factors in 14 reports. The lowest in the Risk category is In-Service Risk, which 
is present in 10 reports. 
 
This result suggests that the risks, most often identified in the VfM reports, are contract 
and delivery risk. This puts the focus of risk in defence acquisition on these two factors; 
however technical risk and even in-service risk are not far off in the frequency count. Risk, 
as a whole, is a major challenge for defence acquisition, originating from the level of 
uncertainty in the transaction. The solution to reducing the risks in these factors may be 
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Figure 7.3: Presence of Level 4 Factors in VfM Reports 
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to address issues of uncertainty in the transaction, as will be discussed further in the next 
section. 
 
The rest of the factors show, overall, a much lower presence in the reports. In the 
Contract Type category, Incentive Based Contracts has the highest score at 9 reports and 
Cost Plus is the lowest with presence in only 1 report. The Contract Type results are 
presented in the pie chart in Figure 7.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is not surprising that cost-plus contracts are the least followed contract type in the VfM 
reports. In fact there is only one mention of it, this being in the oldest project in the 
population, the Trident Project, reported in February 1984. The purchase was US led and 
the use of cost-plus was quite common for major development projects during that 
period. 
Figure 7.4: Contract Type in VfM Reports 
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However, as has been discussed in Chapter 2 and shown in Table 2.1, the UK has reduced 
its use of cost-plus contracting dramatically since the Leven reforms. The excessive profit 
gained under cost-plus contracting has been a major controversy in the past. The 
tendency of suppliers to increase the costs of a defence project in order to gain greater 
cost reimbursable payments (Peck and Scherer 1962; Williamson 1967) discouraged the 
MoD from awarding cost-plus contracts. 
 
The MoD has awarded more incentive-based contracts in its more recent projects. The 
MoD has followed this model because it believes it’s the best way it can link payment to 
deliverables in order to align its interests with that of the supplier. Using mechanisms such 
as key performance indicators the MoD attempts to ensure that the supplier is delivering 
key user requirements. Williamson (1967), however, warns that incentive-fee contracting 
leads to contractor over-estimation of project costs, since the contractor attempts to gain 
on ‘virtual’ savings and increase their profit margin.  
 
There is a larger share of incentive-based contracts in the research sample than the 
‘population’ figures (shown in Table 2.1). However, there is a distinction in these two 
datasets. This research uses the category contract type as defining the contract 
mechanisms used for delivering the project, in all aspects. 
  
DASA uses contract type specifically in terms of the pricing mechanism followed. Thus, a 
contract negotiated using competitive pricing in the research can still have incentive-
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based mechanism for delivering value for money. My definition of incentive-based 
contracting is therefore broader, and this explains the discrepancy between sample and 
population.  
 
In the Contract Negotiation category, Information Transfer Issues scores the highest 
frequency count, 11 reports, and Learning is the lowest with a presence in 5 reports. The 
Contract Environment category frequencies are lower, with its highest category being the 
Monopoly and Monopsony factor at 9 reports and the lowest is the Frequency factor at 5.   
 
The presence of the factors in the VfM reports as a frequency count has been presented. 
This information indicates which factors the NAO address in terms of their audit of the 
MoD defence acquisition process with respect to a value for money focus. The result is 
that Risk is of great interest in the VfM reports as it scores highly, as well as the Contract 
Negotiation process. Contract Risk and Delivery Risk is a common factor in the reports, 
closely followed by Technical Risk. Information Transfer Issues is given the most focus in 
the contracting process. Smart Procurement and Acquisition strategies are the most 
common Selection Process referenced by the NAO. 
 
7.2.2 Factorial Relationship Results 
The results thus far have focused on the factors chosen for investigation in the Defence 
Acquisition Process category. I will now discuss the results of the factorial relationships. 
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These relationships are as a result of the textual analysis of the VfM reports. Their 
existence is less frequent than individual factors, but their existence provides for a richer 
investigation into defence acquisition. The literature reviews especially that of the Major 
Projects Reports and the textual analysis of the VfM reports directed the search for these 
relationships. The relationships are coded and searched within each node; the results are 
shown in Figure 7.5. 
 
 
The first seven bars (from Left-to-Right) represent one way relationships and the last four 
bars represent the symmetrical relationships. There is a lower frequency count, in terms 
of references in the VfM reports, for the factorial relations, as compared to individual 
factors.  
 
The highest frequency score in the factorial relationship is the ‘Selection Process can 
affect Contract Risk’, which is evident in 9 reports. This relationship looks at the way the 
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Relationship Relat ionship 
T ype 
Frequency of 
Source s 
Frequency of 
refere nces 
Summ ary 
Selection Process 
can affect Contract 
Risk 
One  Way 9 17 
The contract risk may be de termine d by the  
procurem ent route taken by MoD. Some 
re ferences show a transfer of r isk to the contractor 
via the PPP/PFI model, shared risk through Smart  
Acquisition or MoD taking on the contract r isk in 
traditional procureme nt  a nd cost-plus. 
Selection Process 
dete rmines the 
Contract Type 
One  Way 8 11 
The contract type  will be  a result of the sele ction 
process. In the international collaborat ion 
procurem ent of CNGF it was specifie d that the  
contract should ‘maximise the use  of competition, 
taut contract ing, and the concept of prime  
contractor-ship’.   
Contract Type  w ill 
affe ct Contract Risk 
One  Way 7 7 
Contract risk is spec ified in the contract type , 
whether it is transferred to industry through Firm  
Price contract ing or is ta ken-on by MoD in the case 
of ‘contracting for availability’.   
Uncerta inty and 
Complexity with 
Information 
Transfer Issues 
Symmetrical 6 13 
Political, econom ic, requirement uncertainty and 
complexity is compounde d by information tra nsfer 
issues. They can be present in tandem and can also 
be a factor for the pre sence of each other.  
Selection Process 
can affect In-Service 
Risk 
One  Way 6 8 
In-Service r isk m ainly comes in the form of the 
support provisions re quire d for the through-life  
management of equipment. The risk to the proper 
support and m aintenance contra cts is determined 
by the sele ction process. 
Monopoly and 
Monopsony with 
N egotiation Pow er 
Symmetrical 4 6 
Supplie rs gain m onopoly powers through 
inform ation-based and standardisa tion monopoly. 
MoD tries to use  compet it ive contracting to 
re duce m onopoly powers. 
Technical Risks 
cre ates Delivery 
Risks 
One  Way 3 3 
The t imely delivery of the  equipme nt is based on 
the ability of the contractor to prope rly identify 
and manage the te chnical r isks within the project , 
or associated projects. 
Frequency with 
Learning 
Symmetrical 2 3 
Learning is demonstrated by supplier through 
re pea ted production capabilitie s. MoD ident ifie s 
learning possibilities through ge nerational 
knowledge of def ence equipment. 
Information 
Transfer Issues 
creates Delivery Risk 
One  Way 1 1 
A single re ference to the la ck of informat ion 
transfer on standardisation by the MoD in the  
Chinook Helicopters case, this is further 
compounded by the  requirem ent not being 
specified in contra cting. 
Uncerta inty and 
Complexity ca n 
create T echnical 
Risks 
One  Way 1 1 
The level of uncertainty a nd complexity in the  
CNGF project  created a number of te chnical 
challenges for the project team. 
Contract Type  w ill 
Determine the In-
service Risk 
Symmetrical 0 0 
There  were no refe rences to the existe nce of this 
re la tionship, even though it would seem intuitive.  
This may be  due  to the fa ct that the re are  few  
mentions of contracting at  the in-service sta ge. 
 
choice of procurement strategy may affect the risks in the contracting process. As an 
example, if a PFI procurement route was taken, the risks in contracting are meant to be 
transferred to the supplier-side. The lowest score is zero, a non-existent relationship, for 
‘Contract Type will determine the In-Service Risk’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.2: Summary of Factorial Relationships 
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Table 7.2 provides the relationship, the type, the frequency of sources (number of VfM 
reports), frequency of references (number of passages) and a summary of the content. 
This provides a summary of the qualitative content analysis for the factorial relationships 
 
The most frequent factorial relationship is the one way relationship ‘Selection Process can 
affect Contract Risk’. This provides relatively strong evidence of this relationship. The 
relationship also shows that it has the most frequent references (as shown in section 
6.4.3, Table 6.2). The focus of this relationship is to assess how the procurement strategy 
is affected in relation to contract risks. 
 
Below is an example of the relationship between the Selection Process (as the 
determinant factor) with contract risk: 
In line with the normal methods of procurement of outsourced services, the project was not defined 
following a comprehensive analysis of the allocation of risks. It is standard practice in PFI projects 
for an attempt to be made to allocate risks optimally in the sense of placing each major risk on the 
party best able to manage it. In this deal, by contrast, the payment mechanism implicit in the 
invitation to tender would share volume risk between the Ministry and the contractor, but does not 
provide incentives for the contractor to minimise the number of vehicles required. 
The Procurement of Non-Combat Vehicles for the Royal Air Force, HC 738, 1999 
 
This passage is a reference to the allocation of risk in a PFI contract. The NAO suggests 
that the MoD could have transferred greater risk towards the contractor. This reference 
provides evidence that the procurement strategy can have an affect on the way contract 
risk is handled. Of course, in this case, I infer that the NAO believes the effect was not 
maximised in the MoD’s favour.  
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Another example of a one way relationship is the relationship of ‘Contract Type will affect 
Contract Risk’. This relationship has a frequency of 7 reports, the highest outside of the 
Selection Process as the determinant. The Contract Type will determine the effect of 
Contract Risk in this one way relationship; an example is given below: 
The contract placed the risk of the volume of repairs on the contractor, in return for a firm price of 
£55 million. As with the Contractor Spares Package the risk to the contractor has so far been less 
than envisaged. The level of usage of the facility has been low because of the reduced flying rates. 
However, the current contract provides this special repair facility for a further two and a half years. 
Building an Air Manoeuvre Capability: The Introduction of the Apache Helicopter, HC 1246, 
2002 
 
In this passage the contractor negotiates a firm price contract in order to accept the 
contract risk connected to the volume of repairs as part of the deal. This is providing 
evidence that the relationship can be determined by the Contract Type.  
 
However, there is a distinction between the relationship Contract Risk has with Contract 
Type and Selection Process. The Selection Process is the first stage of determining 
Contract Risk and the Contract Type being the second stage. The Selection Process is the 
procurement strategy chosen to select prospective buyers, within that there will be an 
appreciation for approaching risk sharing. The Contract Type, however, will be the method 
in which the risk is apportioned.  
 
For example, if a PFI procurement strategy is chosen there is an expectation that the 
prospective supplier will take on the risks of development work. The method used for 
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pricing the risk will be determined by the type of contract – the contractor may be 
awarded an incentive-based contract or contracting for availability, which provides a 
premium for taking on risk. 
 
In terms of the other one way relationships the frequency is quite low; these relationships 
are mentioned in a range of 1 - 3 reports. The number of passages referring to such 
relationship is also in the same range. These relationships are omitted in the majority of 
the reports and this reflects their insignificance in the VfM reports.  
 
This may be due to a lack of impact in the defence acquisition process or that such factors 
have been ignored by the NAO review. However, looking at some of these categories such 
as ‘contract type will determine the in-service risk’ it is surprising that it is not mentioned 
in a single report. It would seem logical that if there are certain risks in the contract it 
would manifest in the in-service phase.  
 
As for the symmetrical relationships they are less frequent in comparison to the one-way 
relationships. This may be due to the difficulty in finding references which are present in 
both factors rather than just one. The symmetrical relationship ‘Uncertainty and 
Complexity with Information Transfer Issues’ is the most frequent relationship, with 6 
reports.  
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Below is an example of a reference of the relationship:  
Inability to provide accurate information meant that bidders were likely to have increased their 
contingencies for uncertainties, in turn increasing their bid prices. The Department made available 
more and better information as they obtained it as the competition progressed, and this enabled bid 
prices to be improved. Racal believe they could have reduced their bid prices further if more 
accurate information had been available.  
The Private Finance Initiative: the Contract for the Defence Fixed Telecommunications 
System, HC 328. 
 
This passage provides an illustration that the uncertainties involved in defence make it 
difficult for contractors to make appropriate bids. In this case, the contractor chooses to 
cover the uncertainty by placing a contingency price in the bid.  
 
The MoD is able to influence the bid price by providing information, such as specifications, 
requirement and so on, to the bidder. It is clear that there is an issue with the transfer of 
the information to all bidders, as Racal has informed the NAO they feel that they could 
have submitted a better bid if they received better information from the MoD. 
 
The lack of information in these defence project can create greater uncertainty and 
complexity. It is this problem which is at the heart of the defence acquisition process and 
one of the reasons why the MoD has expressed its desire to create a more collaborative 
relationship with Industry, with communication as a core principle. 
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7.3  Analysis 
7.3.1 The Fundamental Transformation 
Research Question 1 asks: How is the relationship between the MoD, as buyer, and 
Industry, as supplier, affected by the fundamental transformation in the acquisition 
process? The proposition is: 
Proposition 1: If the Prime makes transaction-specific investments then the 
fundamental transformation results in a bilateral dependency, between the MoD 
and the Prime, in defence acquisition. 
 
The proposition is focused on the transaction-specific investments made by the prime in 
the transaction with the buyer. These transaction-specific investments are made during 
the contract and are designed to gain an advantage for the supplier over its future 
competitors. 
 
Where the supplier has made effective transaction-specific investments, they are able to 
gain the desired advantage over their competitors to transform the situation to a sole-
supplier condition, hence the fundamental transformation is observed.  
 
The fundamental transformation, thus, creates the post-contract asset specificities in that 
the buyer has no alternatives for their supply arrangement due to the high switching 
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costs. Therefore, the buyer is dependent on the supplier to deliver those specific assets 
which are crucial to the transaction.  
 
The contribution made in this research is that the source of the post-contract asset 
specificities has been identified as originating from the buyer, in the case of defence 
acquisition. It will be shown that the MoD is responsible for major transaction-specific 
investments, such as building dockyards, which transfers the post-contract asset 
specificities to the supplier, by granting them ownership (through privatisation).    
 
The focus, thus, turns to the existence of pre-contract asset specificity in defence 
transactions. This feeds from the post-contract asset specificities, in that the supplier will 
make transaction-specific investments (i.e. physical assets, dedicated assets, site-specific 
assets) in order to ensure that they capture the buyer in a long-term supply arrangement. 
 
This results in a bilateral dependency between the buyer and supplier, since the buyer is 
dependent on the delivery of the transaction through these asset specificities and the 
supplier is dependent on the long term supply arrangements. This sequence of events has 
occurred over the last few decades, in defence acquisition, since the beginning of 
privatisation in the UK (see Chapter 2).  
 
This insight is a unique contribution to the transaction cost economics perspective, as 
applied to the defence case. The unique nature of defence procurement, in that the buyer 
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(MoD) makes transaction-specific investments, provides this new insight in TCE theory. 
The suppliers in defence are unable to fund the large scale investments required of major 
defence projects, since the risks are too high and the customer-base too low (at the 
national level) for it to be financially viable. Therefore, it is necessary to view the impact of 
this unique buyer-supplier arrangement using Winch’s (2010) tri-level tectonic model (see 
section 4.3.1).   
 
At the Institutional Level, it is the UK’s industrial policies that begun with Thatcher’s 
Government privatisation programmes, which was implemented in a way that created 
dominant suppliers in sectors such as telecommunication, nuclear, shipbuilding and 
defence. In the UK Defence Acquisition Chapter, I outlined how the MoD has contributed 
to the dominant supplier situation in following policies such as ‘Buy British’ and Prime 
Contracting. 
 
The Governance Level is the focus of this analysis and it is in the causal link of the pre-
contract and post-contract asset specificity that the bilateral dependency, as a function of 
the Fundamental Transformation, results. While a major part of the pre-contract asset 
specificity is due to the legacy of privatisation, it is also due to the continued investments 
made in physical, dedicated, site, human and temporal asset specificity usually by the 
MoD and sometimes by the Prime.  
The Process Level is observed at the IPT level, or a similar MoD-Industry interface, in the 
way the MoD interacts with the Prime. It is the level at which a solution is required to the 
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negative effects of the bilateral dependency, e.g. in dealing with the tendency towards 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
In the analysis of Proposition 1, evidence of a symbiotic relationship between pre-contract 
and post-contract asset specificity in the governance level of defence transactions, 
supported at the institutional level and implemented at the process level, is sought. 
Where the MoD attempts to mitigate the fundamental transformation the result is usually 
counter-productive and fails to remove the bilateral dependency; instead the 
consequences filter through to the process level in a negative manner. 
 
Evidence for Proposition 1: 
The fundamental transformation can be observed in the PFI procurement of the Defence 
Fixed Telecommunications System. The reference below, taken from the Monopoly and 
Monopsony node, explains how BT was able to win the bid for the contract, due to its 
position as the ‘dominant telecommunications supplier’. 
Prior to the competition for this new contract BT were the dominant telecommunications supplier to 
the Department, providing most of their network and equipment and the Department were BT’s 
biggest single customer. This meant that BT had a greater knowledge of the Department’s fixed 
telecommunications requirements than any other bidder. In addition, BT are the only 
telecommunications supplier with a network covering the entire UK, and other bidders for the 
contract would have to use part of the BT network or invest large sums in laying their own network. 
Bidders told us that using BT’s network would increase their business risks compared with BT and 
would limit their scope for innovation, as they would be relying on another supplier’s equipment to 
deliver some of their services. 
The Private Finance Initiative: The Contract for the Defence Fixed Telecommunications 
System, HC 328, 2000 
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The reference is an example of how contract execution is affected not only by post-
contract asset specificity (which emanates from the fundamental transformation), but 
also how pre-contract asset specificity leads to bilateral dependency. The transaction is 
characterised by post-contract asset specificity in the physical assets owned by BT, in 
terms of its network coverage in the UK (a legacy of the privatisation of the 
telecommunication industry).  
 
BT has an advantage over its competitors at contract execution due to its existing supply 
relationship with MoD (its major customer) and the pre-contract asset specificities it 
invested in to win further contract tenders. 
 
Even though BT had a clear competitive advantage over its rivals, the Department 
continued with a competitive tender, by inviting Racal and Nortel to compete with BT for 
the Defence Fixed Telecommunications System contract. The tendering process, it seems 
from the reference below in the Contract Negotiations node, was a way to enforce 
competitive pricing. 
The Department retained the interest of both bidders until they selected BT as preferred bidder in 
November 1996. This was despite BT’s dominance and the fact that the Department requested two 
further bidding rounds after the first Best and Final offer. 
The Private Finance Initiative: The Contract for the Defence Fixed Telecommunications 
System, HC 328, 2000 
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In this reference, the NAO discuss the MoD’s competition for the final and best offer 
between BT and Racal. It, however, seems that the bid was always likely to go in favour of 
BT even though the MoD profess otherwise. This in effect was pseudo-competition  since 
all parties were aware or at least suspected that the contract was going to be won by BT. 
The MoD seem to be using this strategy to mitigate the effects of the fundamental 
transformation (buyer lock-in). 
 
The Department can re-tender the contract at the end of the period, but BT will have advantages 
over other bidders due to their experience in operating the contract, if they perform satisfactorily 
during the current contract price. But the Department have told us that they intend to generate 
competition, possibly by including other service in which BT are less dominant. 
The Private Finance Initiative: The Contract for the Defence Fixed Telecommunications 
System, HC 328, 2000 
 
The reference above suggests that BT would have a likely chance of winning the re-
tendered contract if it is able to provide a satisfactory service. MoD acknowledges BT has 
pre-contract advantages due to the asset specificity in the transaction; however they 
suggest that this can be eliminated by changing the nature of the transactions (i.e. 
through requirement or capability change).  
 
However, BT will still be the favoured supplier by the MoD due to the high switching costs 
involved. Capability change requires a great deal of investment, which will deter 
competitors and the MoD, the investments that they would be needed to create a new 
capability may not be worthwhile in the long-term on a value for money basis.  
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There is, therefore, a clear bilateral dependency between the MoD and BT in the 
telecommunications. For BT, the MoD may not be its sole customer due to its civilian 
business. Although, the MoD is a major customer for BT and the project may allow it to 
diversify its business in the defence sector to create separate revenue streams, thus BT 
will view the transaction as vital to its business. 
The contract requires BT to make certain information available to enable a full and open 
competition towards the end of the ten year period. This information does not include data on BT’s 
methods and mechanisms for delivering the services, which is commercially sensitive. Despite the 
requirements to make information available for a further competition, BT’s ten years’ experience of 
operating the Department’s fixed telecommunications will mean that they will be the only supplier 
with full knowledge of the Department’s service requirements. This could place them at an 
advantage in the future competition, and other telecommunications suppliers have told us that they 
are unlikely to bid against BT as they would expect BT to retain the contract. 
The Private Finance Initiative: The Contract for the Defence Fixed Telecommunications 
System, HC 328, 2000 
 
The contract for the Construction of Submarine Facilities at Devonport is an example of 
the MoD creating post-contract asset specificity in the transaction. The sale and capital 
investment (by the MoD) in the Devonport dockyard to DML is a classic example of post-
contract asset specificity in defence. The contract also guarantees submarine refitting 
work and since it is a key docking area for the MoD, DML can rely on a long-term supply 
arrangement. This pre-contract site specificity leads to a bilateral dependency between 
DML and MoD. 
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The Department required new and upgraded facilities at Devonport for the refitting and refuelling 
of its nuclear- powered submarines. As part of the sale of Devonport dockyard in 1997 the 
Department agreed to fund the provision of these facilities which, when completed, would then be 
owned and operated by the new dockyard owners, DML. The provision of these facilities by the 
Department, together with the guaranteed submarine refitting workstream underpinned DML's 
business case for its purchase of the dockyard. 
The Construction of Nuclear Submarine Facilities at Devonport, HC 90, 2003 
 
This example demonstrates how in certain cases the MoD contributes to the bilateral 
dependency situation. The MoD is responsible for the post-contract asset specificity by 
transferring ownership and providing capital investments to the contractor. They then 
wish to reduce their dependency on the contractor. The MoD has contributed greatly to 
the situation but is unable to manage it.  
 
As will be shown in later analysis, this project was highly problematic and the MoD had 
major disagreements with the contractor. Unfortunately for the MoD by the time the 
problems surfaced the bilateral dependency had fully manifested. 
 
In the Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability programme, the MoD has inadvertently 
created a bilateral dependency situation due to the post-contract temporal asset 
specificity. The reference below highlights the fundamental transformation is due to small 
numbers bargaining in the nuclear capability sector.  
 
The MoD through a number of policy initiatives, which includes a ‘Buy British’ philosophy 
and investment in prime contracts, has allowed a monopoly to exist in the sector. In 
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outlining the in-service dates, which the MoD must stick to due to the nature of the 
capability they have increased their dependency on the contractor to meet that date. 
  
In addition to being bound to its monopoly suppliers, the Department has disclosed the forecast 
acquisition cost and set a deadline for the entry into service of the first of the new submarines which 
cannot be missed if continuous at sea deterrence is to be maintained. This gives the Department 
little manoeuvre in contractual negotiations with its suppliers. 
The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability, HC 1115, 2008 
 
It is clear that even after the MoD follows a competitive procurement route (UK vs. US 
contractor); the winner of the bid gains an advantage in the sector and is able to solidify 
their position through pre-contract asset specificities. This can be through investments by 
the supplier in technical capabilities such as dedicated assets or physical assets (as in the 
reference of the Torpedo project). What results is a bilateral dependency between the 
buyer and supplier, creating a monopoly market condition for the supplier and first-mover 
advantage in future tenders. 
 
The company, now Marconi Underwater Systems Limited (MUSL), is currently in a monopoly 
position for torpedo development and production in the United Kingdom, supporting MOD in the 
three on-going projects referred to above. 
The Torpedo Programme, HC 291, 1985 
 
In the following reference the MoD discusses the cost of sustaining a competitive 
industrial base in the shipbuilding sector. This strategy is focused on mitigating the 
bilateral dependency. However, as is explained by the MoD, such a strategy may not 
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equate with the benefits of competition and they therefore indicate that such decisions 
should be made on a case-by-case basis.  
 
The MoD is thus caught in a situation where it may not be able to mitigate the bilateral 
dependency. This reference also demonstrates the fragility of certain defence sectors, 
where business sustainability is dependent on continued business from the Monopsony 
buyer. 
Much has been said about the prospects for future competition should Swan Hunter cease 
shipbuilding, given the Government’s current policy of building warships only in the United Kingdom. 
The Department have been monitoring the situation for several years and in January 1993 
considered that, if Swan Hunter were to close, VSEL might be left with a United Kingdom monopoly 
for “big ships”. The Department also recognised that, whilst the retention of a competitive industrial 
base required keeping a high level of industrial capacity, the cost of maintaining this capacity - 
which may be passed on to the Department in prices quoted in competitions - had been more than 
outweighed by savings from competition. Overall, the Department concluded that these problems 
could only be addressed in the context of individual procurements and not as part of an abstract 
wider strategy. 
The Awarding of the Contract for the Landing Platform for Helicopters, HC 864, 1993 
 
The reference from the selection process node for the Bowman CIP programme (below) 
demonstrates that the MoD follows a competitive route where one is not necessarily 
needed. The MoD had already contracted General Dynamics UK to deliver the Bowman 
project. Rather than adding CIP to the Bowman contract, the MoD tendered a separate 
contract for CIP. 
Given the operational imperative to deliver secure voice communications capability and the 
relatively immature state of the CIP requirement, the Department chose not to invite bids for the 
Bowman and CIP projects as a single programme. Rather, it ran a separate competition for CIP, 
after General Dynamics UK had been contracted to deliver Bowman. General Dynamics UK won the 
CIP competition and, in December 2002, were contracted to deliver the project, with an approved In 
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Service Date of December 2004, (although meeting this date was not a contract deliverable). In 
October 2005 the Department and General Dynamics UK reached agreement in principle to a recast 
programme for Bowman and CIP with an increased cost and timescale, recognising the difficulties 
they had encountered and that the technical solutions, as expressed in system requirements, 
needed to meet users’ requirements had evolved in the intervening four years. 
Delivering Digital Tactical Communications through the Bowman CIP Programme, HC 
1050, 2006 
 
It must have been highly likely that General Dynamics were the front runners (if not 
certain) for the CIP contract. The key user requirement in the CIP project, as in most 
communications software systems, must have been integration with Bowman.  
 
The fact that General Dynamics won the Bowman project meant that they possessed pre-
contract asset specificities which gave them an advantage in the CIP project; integration 
issues were always likely to favour General Dynamics in the competition. Thus, the only 
reason for MoD to run a separate competition for the Bowman CIP programme was to 
mitigate a bilateral dependency situation.  
 
The fundamental transformation could have been reduced temporarily had the contracts 
been tendered separately, but simultaneously. Integration issues might still have favoured 
the award to a prime contractor; however, the competition would not have favoured any 
of the competitors. Post-contract asset specificity would have been removed temporarily 
allowing for realistic competition. 
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Interestingly, post-contract asset specificity returns as soon as the contract for the 
Bowman CIP programme is awarded. It is not possible to remove post-contract asset 
specificity permanently, since the fundamental transformation always exist where the 
transaction requires idiosyncratic investments to be made. Furthermore, pre-contract 
asset specificity will remain for future tenders of support or upgrade contracts for the 
Bowman CIP programme. 
  
General Dynamics has deployed its advantage through pre-contract asset specificity by 
offering to integrate the Bowman CIP communication systems of the ground troops to the 
communication systems in the Apache Helicopter (HC 1246, 2002). This demonstrates the 
way the advantages that a supplier can gain through the fundamental transformation 
leading to a bilateral dependency. 
  
The MoD has recently indicated its desire to implement NEC (see section 2.5.1) as part of 
its defence modernisation policy; making communication and systems integration central 
to achieving this new defence capability. General Dynamics would be right to feel 
confident that it could take advantage of this opportunity, as the Bowman CIP programme 
could play key role in this defence networking revolution.  This exemplifies how defence 
contractors can use their advantage through pre-contract asset specificities in future 
supply opportunities. 
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In the Defence Information Infrastructure project, the MoD implemented a number of 
strategies to mitigate contractor failure. The MoD explains that it is due to major cases of 
contractor failure in the commercial sector that it has taken these steps. Below is a 
reference outlining the MoD strategy to reduce the chance of contractor failure. 
The Department devised a robust commercial structure for the DII contract. The structure includes 
contractor shadowing, incremental acquisition and payment on performance to manage the risks of 
the Programme and drive contractor performance.  
The Defence Information Infrastructure, HC 788, 2008 
 
While ‘incremental acquisition’ and ‘payment on performance’ are incentive-based 
contracting terms ‘contractor shadowing’ is a mechanism for terminating and replacing 
the contractor. Contractor shadowing seems to be a mechanism designed to mitigate 
bilateral dependency. It attempts to reduce the pre-contract asset specificity by removing 
the contractor’s ability to take advantage of its transaction-specific investments. There is a 
competitor ready to step into the contract, where the original winner fails to deliver. 
The Department sought to protect against potential contractor failure or withdrawal from the 
contract by requiring each contractor in the consortium to be shadowed by a competitor with 
equivalent capability that would be able to step in to deliver the Programme requirements if 
required. At the time of contract negotiations for DII during 2003 and 2004, the generic risk of 
contractor failure was a pertinent issue following a number of high-profile corporate failures. 
However, including competitors within the same consortium can generate issues for cooperative 
working. 
The Defence Information Infrastructure, HC 788, 2008 
 
However, there are certain weaknesses with contractor shadowing. Firstly, as pointed out 
by the NAO, there are issues with competitor cooperation (as the Japanese call it ‘enemies 
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in the same boat’). Secondly, the MoD will incur greater costs as it will have to reimburse 
the shadow contractors for investment cost and expenses. Thirdly, the MoD will have to 
manage all these stakeholders which may be difficult where there is a lack of technical 
knowledge or human resources. The policy of contractor shadowing is aimed at changing 
the transaction governance; however there are problems at the process level which 
makes it unsuccessful in this aim.  
 
The planning for the Common New Generation Frigate looks at the risks involved in the 
delivery of national variants, in the collaborative programme. The winner of the 
collaborative procurement will have gained an advantage to supply national variants to 
the nations involved in the collaborative project. This is discussed in the reference below; 
however it is also an example of bilateral dependency in a collaborative procurement. 
A Prime Contractor will be responsible for the design and construction of the first three CNGF 
platforms, and for the configuration and installation of equipment systems. There are, however, 
several major equipments that may be procured under separate programmes, either as 
collaborative ventures or as national variants; it is essential that the Joint Venture Company has a 
clear understanding of all the equipments to be provided as national variants before commencing 
detailed design of the ships’ platform; the prime contractor’s assumption of integration risk in 
respect of these separate procurements will be reflected by a premium in the price which they 
propose to charge for the programme. The Department should look carefully at this premium and 
assess whether it offers best overall value for money given the prospect that, in practice, 
programme constraints may result in at least part of the risk being borne by the collaborative 
partners. 
Procurement Lessons for the Common New Generation Frigate, HC 692, 1995 
 
There is an element of post-contract asset specificity in the form of the dedicated and 
physical assets the Joint Venture Company has acquired (through investments made by 
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the collaborating nations – UK, France and Italy). The national procurement agencies (as a 
single buying entity) are bilaterally dependent on the Joint Venture Company.  
 
In the Apache and Chinook helicopter procurements there is a clear case that the MoD 
became reliant on the suppliers to deliver the specified assets. The primes have, in these 
cases, used the pre-contract asset specificities (design rights in Apache and source codes 
in Chinook) to determine the nature of the transaction.  
 
In the Apache case, McDonnell Douglas ensured that due to its design rights, it will be 
involved in any future training contract packages; while Boeing has ensured that its source 
codes can only be accessed with its permission. In each case the bilateral dependency is 
due to a lack of contractual specifications in the transfer of the specific assets. The prime 
contractor is able to use its contractual rights of asset ownership to enforce terms on the 
MoD. 
The Department intended to hold a separate competition for the training package but McDonnell 
Douglas' ownership of the design rights, and the tight timetable made the competition unattractive 
to other bidders. 
Building an Air Manoeuvre Capability: The Introduction of the Apache Helicopter, HC 1246, 
2002 
In order to meet the Department’s airworthiness standards, (Appendix 4), analysis and testing of 
the software source code for the Mk3 cockpit was required to reduce the possibility of unforeseen 
system and safety problems during flight. The Department had failed to specify access to the source 
code in the original procurement and therefore had no leverage with which to negotiate with 
Boeing for release of the source code. Boeing and its sub-contractors, for their part, in seeking to 
protect their intellectual property rights, resisted the Department’s requests for access to the source 
code. Even if it had been able to access the source code, the Department estimated that it might 
take up to two years to analyse the source code with no guarantee that the code would be written 
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in a way which might make it comprehensible for analysis purposes. 
Chinook Mk3 Helicopters, HC 512, 2008 
 
The reports which focus on the support phase of the acquisition (Hercules C-130, Logistic 
Support for Fast Jets and Helicopter Logistics) mention how support contracts may be 
undertaken. The contracts are awarded to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). 
The pre-contract asset specificity in the projects is high and favours the initial winner of 
the competition (the OEM).  
The Department characterises its historical relationship with providers of logistic support as 
adversarial. It believed that incentivising and partnering with repair providers was therefore the 
only way that contracting for availability could become a realistic mechanism for the support of RAF 
aircraft fleets. Subsequently the Department decided that it would be most efficient to focus on 
prime contracts with the original equipment manufacturers, an approach that is now wholly 
consistent with the Defence Industrial Strategy. 
Transforming Logistic Support for Fast Jets, HC 825, 2007 
 
The transition towards providing prime contracts to the OEM was initiated at the 
institutional level. This policy has seen the transfer of assets (manufacturing capacity) and 
skills (engineering/technical) to industry. This creates a lack of knowledge and skills on the 
buyer side.  
 
At the governance level, this was implemented through partnering and incentivising the 
Prime. The relationship, however, becomes bilaterally dependent as the prime desires 
continued business and the MoD is reliant on the prime to undertake these support 
services, due to a gap in technical skills. 
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The report on the Trident project mainly focuses on the financial expenditure rather than 
the contracting. In the Eurofighter 2000 report, there is mention of a lack of competition 
in the procurement process however this is mainly attributed to work-share agreements 
between the collaborating nations. 
  
As for the report on the Non-Combat Vehicles for the RAF, the procurement is of a non-
specific kind and thus there is a lower switching-cost than normal in defence acquisition. 
These three reports, as a whole, show few indications of the fundamental transformation 
leading to bilateral dependency.  
 
Conclusion to Proposition 1: 
The MoD becomes highly dependent on the Prime to deliver the project due to the 
transaction-specific investments the MoD makes in defence projects. These post-contract 
investments can also be delivered in the form of the transfer of assets from the MoD to 
the Prime, as well as monetary investments in physical, dedicated and/or site-specific 
assets. The prime makes transaction-specific investments of its own post-contract to 
further ‘lock-in’ the MoD to the contract and gain advantage in future opportunities 
through pre-contract asset specificities in the transaction. 
 
The MoD becomes bilaterally dependent on the Prime due to the fundamental 
transformation. The MoD has contributed to the bilateral dependency situation due to its 
role in the creating post-contract asset specificities.  
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The MoD attempts to remedy the negative effects (in the form of lock-in and 
opportunism) of the bilateral dependency, using three main mechanisms identified in the 
analysis: pseudo-competition, contractor shadowing and capability change. These 
mechanisms are usually counter-intuitive since they either do not succeed to deliver the 
desired outcome, create further costs in the tendering process (which is transferred to the 
MoD), or are seen as pointless exercises by those involved. 
 
7.3.2 Transaction Costs in Defence Contracts 
Research Question 2 asks: Is the presence of the environmental dimensions (uncertainty, 
asset specificity, and frequency) in the contract responsible for the cost and time variations 
and poor performance in customer requirements? 
Proposition 2: The presence of transaction costs in the contract contributes to the 
failure to meet value for money criteria. 
 
This research question is based on the major projects reports findings of an overall trend 
towards cost and time variations and missing key user requirements in major defence 
projects. It is due to this trend that the question is posed: where does the ‘poor project 
management’ originate from? The proposition is that it is due to the presence of the 
environmental factors – uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency – which create 
transaction costs due to a lack of safeguards in the contract design. 
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The presence of the environmental dimension is not wholly responsible for transaction 
costs. Rather it is their combination with behavioural assumptions of human decision 
makers – bounded rationality, opportunism and learning – which creates the contractual 
hazards.  
 
However, the behavioural assumptions are a part of the human decision making process, 
which are inherent in any transaction and are not unique to defence. Such behavioural 
assumptions are difficult to identify in this type of research, which relies on documentary 
evidence. An interview-based research would be more appropriate, and even in that case 
psychological reasoning would be required. 
 
The focus is instead on the way the environmental dimensions manifestations are 
symptomatic of the difficulties arising in defence acquisition. The proposition states that it 
is due to these environmental dimensions that failures in project control are observed in 
the acquisition process. 
 
There are three elements to the proposition, thus I have created three lemmas to test 
Proposition 2: 
Lemma 2.1: The presence of uncertainty in the contract contributes to the failure to 
meet value for money criteria; 
Lemma 2.2: The asset specificity in the contract contributes to the failure to meet 
value for money criteria; and 
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Lemma 2.3: The frequency of the contract contributes to the failure to meet value for 
money criteria. 
 
Within the VfM reports, the categories which represent the TCE environmental factors 
are: Uncertainty and Complexity, Monopoly and Monopsony (where a majority of the 
Asset Specificity proof is found) and Frequency. Within these categories there are 
references to the presence of the environmental factors coinciding with descriptions of 
project failure in time, cost and user requirements – the proposition coincides with these 
references. 
 
Evidence for Lemma 2.1: 
The reference below, coded in the Uncertainty and Complexity node, provides evidence of 
how uncertainty can affect the scheduling of a project. Political uncertainty was a major 
factor in the Eurofighter project due to its procurement strategy being an international 
collaboration with four other nations.  
 
There seems not to have been proper safeguards for these uncertainties, in light of the 
importance of getting agreements in the contracts at the national level. This has created 
the situation where the project is delayed due to the political uncertainty and a lack of 
expediency in reaching agreement. 
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Although difficult to quantify, the uncertainties over whether, and in what form, the Eurofighter 
2000 project should continue have affected progress on the programme. For example, political and 
financial uncertainties have delayed the formal agreement of the re-orientated programme by 
nations, principally Germany, by more than one year. If these uncertainties continue they are likely 
to have an impact on the achievement of the currently projected timescales for completion of both 
the development and later stages of the programme. 
Eurofighter 2000, HC 724, 1995 
 
The reference below is of a different nature, in that it is a national procurement project 
using a traditional procurement strategy of arms length contracting. In this case, the 
uncertainty comes in the form of design changes being made in the project. This creates 
the difficulty in making estimates of total forecast costs, which are required for 
contracting and budgeting purposes. 
 
The Department and DML had problems identifying the forecast total costs of the contract. This 
uncertainty arose as the extent of the work remaining to be undertaken was changing, due to the 
large amount of design changes and reworking in response to the regulators' observations and due 
to the correction of instances of poor DML and subcontractor performance. 
The Construction of Nuclear Submarine Facilities at Devonport, HC 90, 2003 
 
Changes to requirement are one of the most common reasons for uncertainties in 
defence contracting. The MoD has to make a number of changes to its requirement, from 
contract conception to execution due to a number of reasons such as political, policy, 
budget, technical, and security changes amongst other reasons.  
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The supplier can find it difficult to adapt to the changes and this can have consequences in 
budgeting, scheduling and performance. In the reference below, the supplier is clearly 
finding it difficult to cost the changes being demanded of it from the MoD. This is having a 
knock-on effect on the budgeting and scheduling, hence a lack of project control is 
observed. 
Costing Change: ATLAS has been slow to provide the Department with costs for change requests, 
including updated rollout schedules. It has never met the contracted timescales to cost change, 
although the Department agrees that for complex changes these timescales are challenging. In such 
cases, the Department agrees a specific date with ATLAS, but these revised deadlines are not met in 
the majority of cases. Consequently, the Department has agreed to proceed with some changes 
without knowing the full cost, but has agreed a set liability with ATLAS to allow work to commence. 
The Department and ATLAS have established a joint team to improve the timeliness of costing 
Requests for Change.  
The Defence Information Infrastructure, HC 788, 2008 
 
As well as requirement changes, technical factors have been identified as a major reason 
for difficulties in defence acquisition projects in the Major Project Reports reviewed in 
Chapter 5. In the reference below, there is evidence of how technical factors can impact a 
project. It is mainly due to the inability of the transacting parties’ inability to foresee or 
create contingencies for uncertainties in the technical challenge which they may face, that 
makes project control difficult in defence. 
This project suffered delays in design and construction work because of difficulties in delivering 
technically challenging components whilst meeting exacting nuclear safety standards. As a result, 
total project costs at the time of our report were estimated at £933 million, 31 per cent more than 
the approved budget. Rolls-Royce’s view is that the new manufacturing plant is less complex than 
the D154 project, although they are aware of the risks involved. 
The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability, HC 1115, 2008 
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The challenge of uncertainty is usually in the planning stage, although it manifests in the 
delivery stage, where the schedules, budgets and resources are outlined. In some cases, 
as in the Type 45 Destroyer, the planning can be overly optimistic and the project starts 
badly and will continue to do so until corrections are made. This optimism-bias has been 
discussed in the defence literature (reviewed in section 3.3.3). It appears due to 
uncertainties in the transaction, it makes it challenging for the parties to create an 
accurate picture of the project development. 
The Department and its commercial partners were over-optimistic in their predictions of the time 
and resources required to procure the first six ships, and did not establish the project on a suitable 
basis given the levels of risk and uncertainty and the immaturity of the design of the ships and the 
PAAMS missile system. 
Providing Anti-Air Warfare Capability: the Type 45 Destroyer, HC 295, 2009 
 
Evidence for Lemma 2.2: 
The evidence in support of Lemma 2.2 is more difficult to identify than the previous 
proposition, however the evidence leads directly from the test for the bilateral 
dependency condition in Proposition 1. The reason for failure due to asset specificity 
considerations result from the unattractive switching costs which lead to a “lock-in” with 
the supplier. There are three specific projects (Chinook, Torpedo programme and 
Submarine Facilities in Devonport) which demonstrate a failure to meet time, cost or 
performance demands due to asset specificity conditions. 
 
The disagreement surrounding the source codes impacted the schedule of the Chinook 
procurement, and due to the high transaction-specific nature of the procurement, the 
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contract negotiations were prolonged. A consequence of high asset specificity in the 
contract is a balancing of the negotiating powers of the buyer and supplier. 
  
The MoD as the largest buyer of defence equipment and services can exercise its 
Monopsony powers in negotiations. However, the supplier - in this case Boeing - poses a 
highly specific capability, which the MoD desires and that Boeing can use to negotiate a 
more favourable outcome for itself. This power play, due to the transaction-specific 
nature of the procurement, is the reason for a prolonged contract negotiation and 
schedule over-run i.e. failure to meet time targets. 
It took longer than expected to agree on a programme of work with Boeing. A detailed work project 
in which all parties could have confidence was not agreed by the Department and Boeing’s senior 
management until April 2005. This meant the preparation phase was extended to July 2006.  
Chinook Mk3 Helicopters, HC 512, 2008 
 
The difficulties in the Construction of Submarine Facilities in Devonport are evident in the 
references made in Proposition 1. This project is an example of the effect asset specificity 
can have on the buyer-supplier relationship. Each party is trying to gain advantage over 
the other to the detriment of the project. This project, in my opinion, was the closest to 
total failure in delivery of all the reports that I read. It resulted in what I infer as a 
breakdown in the relationship between the supplier, DML, and the MoD.  
 
The reference below provides an example of how the MoD used the temporal asset 
specificity in its favour to create pressure on DML to honour the contract. However, in the 
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end it was the MoD which had to incur the majority of the cost increases. The MoD was in 
a situation where while it was threatening to terminate the contract, the reality was that 
the MoD had invested a significant amount and was locked-in with DML. 
The Department recognised that there were pressures on DML to settle. DML was keen to complete 
the Vanguard facilities on time to allow the revenue stream from the contract for the refit of 
Vanguard submarines to commence (paragraph 1.8). To exert further pressure, the Department 
made it clear to DML that it had other options to the contract's renegotiation and would be 
prepared to use these if it were left with no acceptable alternative. For example, the Department 
threatened to suspend the contract.  
The Construction of Nuclear Submarine Facilities at Devonport, HC 90, 2003 
 
The effect of the bilateral dependency was significant in this case. The MoD had planned 
to continue the contractual relationship with DML in future. Since it had sold the port to 
DML and the port was important to its strategic needs, the switching costs were high. This 
situation was hampered by the ‘arms-length’ contracting in the project, which led to a lack 
of control on the project for the MoD – more of which will be discussed in the third 
proposition.  
 
It is in the lack of viable competition resulting from the fundamental transformation, 
which makes the switching costs challenging. The MoD invests considerable amounts of 
funds in these large and complex projects and if they were to terminate the relationship, 
some of the investment would be lost and greater investment might be required to 
initiate a new contract.  
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Compounding this problem is the nature of defence markets where monopolies exist in 
specific sectors, thus the substitute supplier may not exist in the certain sectors such as 
nuclear submarines, war ships, and fighter aircrafts and so on. However, in some generic 
sectors such as information communication technology, substitute suppliers exist due to 
their dual civilian-defence business models (which make them less reliant on the defence 
business for survival). 
  
While in the communication project of the Bowman CIP contract a substitute (General 
Dynamics) was found to replace Archers Consortium (comprising BAE Systems, Racal and 
ITT) due to their failures to meet the demands of the MoD. In more specific areas of 
technology (such as Torpedoes), the MoD are restricted in replacing suppliers. This then 
hampers the ability of the MoD to negotiate a contract, which will provide value for 
money. 
The examination also indicated that the problems encountered and the lack of competition for the 
main contractor role in the United Kingdom have created difficulties for MOD in ensuring fully that 
value for money is obtained for the resources invested. 
The Torpedo Programme, HC 291, 1985 
 
These three cases may not be statistically significant in a population of seventeen reports, 
however the overall lessons they provide is significant for defence acquisition as a whole. 
Failure to meet the value for money requirements of defence acquisition can be seen in 
the spectra of a failure to create sufficient competition in UK defence acquisition. The 
underlying reason for a lack of competition (or viable competition, where certain 
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companies do not have first-mover advantages) is due to the transaction-specific nature 
of defence. 
 
Evidence for Lemma 2.3: 
The presence of Frequency in the contract i.e. the unique, occasional or recurrent nature 
of the transaction is not mentioned as a concern in the failure to meet value for money 
requirements. In fact, examining the references to frequency and learning (which results 
from frequent transactions) the opposite seems to be true. It is due to the lessons learned 
from previous contractual experience that measures are put in place to mitigate contract 
failure – as is the case in the reference below.  
Recognising the difficulties inherent in estimating costs and timescales on complex defence 
equipment projects, the Department has, since 2005, required major equipment projects to include 
historical cost trend analysis to act as a check on the realism of cost estimates when the main 
investment decision is taken on projects. 
Providing Anti-Air Warfare Capability: the Type 45 Destroyer, HC 295, 2009 
 
The nature of defence transactions are more a case of occasional transactions, where 
there may be a 20 year (or more) gap between the procurement of say a nuclear 
submarine and its next generation – such projects are expected and planned ahead, as in 
the case of the Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability report. 
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Conclusion to Proposition 2: 
The evidence for Proposition 2 is not as statistically significant as Proposition 1; however 
the evidence provides some general indications of the challenges in meeting value for 
money in defence acquisition.  
 
Uncertainty is the most common reason given for project failure, in terms of value for 
money criteria, in the reports. Uncertainty is varied in its presence and impact. Asset 
specificity may be a factor in the failure of defence acquisition projects; this is mainly 
when it creates a situation where there is a lack of cooperation or partnership between 
the transacting parties.  
 
Due to the fundamental transformation and transaction-specific investments post-
contract and pre-contract in future contracts, the transacting parties become bilaterally 
dependent and locked-in to a long-term contract. Negotiations become prolonged and 
opportunistic behaviour may result. The project may deliver, but it will not meet its value 
for money requirements in time, cost and performance. 
 
While the references to the Fundamental Transformation were high in Proposition 1, 
there was a lack of evidence that this resulted in project failure as proposed in Proposition 
2. This suggests that the Fundamental Transformation effect is prevalent in defence 
acquisition; however this does not necessarily result in project failure. 
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The search for evidence of project failure due to the Frequency of a transaction failed to 
provide any support for the proposition. Instead, there was some indication that the 
evidence showed the reverse was possible. Frequent transactions foster greater learning 
opportunities for the transacting parties, which result in better project planning and 
management. This was rarely mentioned, since defence transactions are of an occasional 
kind reducing the possibility of learning to be gained.  
 
7.3.3 The Transaction Governance of Defence Projects 
Research Question 3 asks: What is the response, by the buyer (MoD), where project 
failures exist, in terms of the transaction governance? 
Proposition 3: If defence projects fail due to transaction-cost considerations in 
organisation then a governance trade-off is expected in defence acquisition. 
 
This research question and proposition is investigating the buyer’s response to an 
organisational failure situation. The TCE perspective suggests the buyer to respond by 
remedying such a situation by moving to more appropriate transaction governance. In 
seeking evidence of such actions being taken by the MoD, references to the Selection 
Process category have been analysed. This category most commonly codes references to 
transaction governance issues, as well as other selection processes.  
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Evidence for Proposition 3: 
The references in the Selection Process category are of four types regarding the transitions 
in transaction governance within defence projects: (1) successful changes; (2) 
unsuccessful changes; (3) no changes; and (4) no/minimal mention regarding transaction 
governance. The classifications of these references have been interpreted for each project 
and are shown in Figure 7.6. 
 
As was the case in the analysis of the Fundamental Transformation, changes at the 
governance level is impacted by and structures the focus at the institutional level and 
process level. When changes are made at the governance level, the cause may be due to 
institutional changes such as policy change towards a new selection process e.g. PFI 
procurement or Smart Acquisition. The transformation at the governance level is then 
implemented at the process level e.g. IPTs. 
 
 
Type 1 
Bowman CIP 
Future Nuclear 
Deterrent Capability  
Helicopter Logistics 
 Hercules C-130 
Logistic Support for Fast 
Jets 
Type 45 Destroyers 
Type 2 
Apache Helicopters 
Defence Fixed 
Telecommunication 
System 
Non-Combat Vehicles for 
the RAF 
Nuclear Submarine 
Facilities at Devonport 
Type 3 
Common New 
Generation Frigate 
Defence Information 
Infrastructure 
Eurofighter 2000 
Type 4 
Chinook Helicopters 
Landing Platform for 
Helicopters 
The Torpedo 
Programme 
Trident Project 
Figure 7.6: Transition Types of VfM Projects 
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There is an almost even spread of projects in Figure 7.6. The success or not, or no change 
to transaction governance has been interpreted according to the NAO report of the 
project transitions. Type 4, which is no or minimal mention of transaction governance 
considerations has four projects. There is not much which can be learnt about MoD 
transaction governance decision making in these reports. Type 3, no changes, is the least 
populated by a mere margin of one. 
 
In the majority of projects in the report population, the MoD made a decision to make a 
change in the transaction governance of the project – either in the acquisition mechanism 
itself or through policy (i.e. moving from in-house to market governance) which then 
filtered to the governance level, by creating partnerships. These are then followed-
through to the process level by creating IPT structures and incentive-based contracts. 
  
Type 1 projects show a successful organisational change, a transition from poor to good 
project transaction governance. As in the case of the Bowman CIP project the non-
competitive award to Archers Consortium was terminated after failures to deliver and 
General Dynamics won the competitive tender for the project.  
 
The success of this competition policy was evident in the working relationship created 
with General Dynamics. Competition created a better bargaining position for the MoD, 
and it was thus able to start off in a position of strength and then negotiate its desired 
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outcomes. It resulted in a long-term view of the contract, where discussions focused on 
future integration possibilities for the Bowman CIP capability. 
In parallel, the Department have established a Joint Networks Integration Body involving General 
Dynamics UK, EADS and Paradigm, which is a joint venture to ensure end to end communications 
between the Department’s communications systems, Bowman CIP, SkyNet, FALCON and Cormorant. 
Finally, an Interim Design Authority has been set up by the Department and General Dynamics UK, 
to integrate Bowman CIP into future platforms. 
Delivering Digital Tactical Communications through the Bowman CIP Programme, HC 1050, 
2006 
 
The changes to industrial relations policy have impacted the governance and process 
level. The MoD has changed its relationship with industry in its logistics projects. This is 
seen in the Helicopter Logistics and Logistic Support for Fast Jets projects. The support 
contracts between MoD and its industrial partners, especially in aircraft manufacturing, 
are more recurrent than most other defence contracts. 
  
It is therefore important that the MoD moved from its traditional adversarial relationship 
with Industry to one of partnership. This has been achieved mainly due to the changes 
implemented as part of the Smart Acquisition principles and specifically due to the 
creation of the IPT mechanism. 
 
In Helicopter Logistics, this change in governance to having a closer partnership with 
Industry has created a positive impact on the way support contracts are delivered for 
Helicopter maintenance and services. The IPT mechanism has been an important change 
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in the process of delivering the contract, especially due to the co-location of the support 
teams. 
The Defence Logistics Organisation is committed at senior levels to transforming relations with 
industry and incentivising key suppliers to perform better. Much of this high level aim is being 
implemented by Integrated Project Team leaders, who are seeking to replace excessive numbers of 
contracts either with single contracts or reduced numbers. These new contracts are being designed 
as much broader packages that will reward effective performance. In the past manufacturers have 
not been incentivised to build in reliability in equipments. 
Helicopter Logistics, HC 840, 2002 
 
A similar change is reported in Logistic Support for Fast Jets; the MoD moved from a 
traditionally adversarial relationship with Industry to one of partnership. This institutional 
change has created improved relational contracting governance, which is evident at the 
process level in terms of co-located project teams and communication processes. 
The Department’s Integrated Project Teams have broadly followed the best practice 
recommendations outlined in the Gold Standard contracting practices report, such as joint teams 
with a common aim, open book accounting and the sharing of information and benefits between 
projects. In particular, the use of collocated teams has improved the pace of communications and 
decision making. In addition, Prime Contractors have been willing in many cases to invest, take on 
work and share information prior to contract signature, based on an informally agreed behavioural 
charter and the knowledge and trust that was built up during the course of contract negotiations.  
The Department has been successful in incentivising Prime Contractor behaviour, to move from a 
traditional model of supplying spares and undertaking repair, to one where industry provides 
technical knowledge and innovation whilst minimising cost. 
Transforming Logistics Support for Fast Jets, HC 825, 2007 
 
In the Hercules C-130 project, the change observed is of a similar transition in the 
transaction governance involving the support contracts. The change at the institutional 
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level is to seek greater partnership with Industry, however at the governance level it is a 
move from unified to bilateral governance.  
 
Where the MoD used to undertake operational support through its internal service 
personnel it transferred this task to Industry through an integrated support contract 
involving key suppliers of Hercules. At the process level this is, again, undertaken through 
co-located teams. 
The costs of running and basing the fleet at RAF Lyneham have decreased since May 2006. This 
reduction is in part due to the Hercules Integrated Operational Support contract because the 
responsibility for some of the more minor repair and maintenance activity, which had previously 
been undertaken by Service personnel, has been transferred to industry. 
 
Co-location of the staff from the Department and industry, at Marshall Aerospace’s site in 
Cambridge and at RAF Lyneham, has been central to enabling more effective team working to 
resolve issues. 
Hercules C-130 Tactical Fixed Wing Airlift Capability, HC 627, 2008 
 
In the Type 45 Destroyer and Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability projects, the MoD 
implemented a partnership approach to deal with the uncertainties pervading the 
acquisition process of these projects. Again, this is an organisational change from the 
traditional adversarial contractual relationship to one with greater collaboration to deal 
with the political and technical uncertainties present in these projects. 
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Policy changes at the institutional level through the introduction of competitive tenders 
for prime contracts, created a relational contracting approach at the governance level 
implemented at the process level in the way the contract was delivered.  
 
Contrary to the effect of the changes implemented by the MoD in Type 1 project, Type 2 
projects show a trend towards unsuccessful changes in transaction governance. The 
change from traditional to PFI procurement in the Apache Helicopters, Defence 
Telecommunication Systems and Non-Combat Vehicles for the RAF was an unsuccessful 
change.  
 
The failure in the fourth project, Nuclear Submarines Facilities at Devonport, was due to 
the use of traditional classical contracting transaction. Rather than change the transaction 
governance in this project, the MoD continued the project by renegotiating the terms of 
the contract.  
 
PFI procurements are a part of the defence policy reforms introduced in the early 90s. 
There implementation has been mixed in terms of success. It is argued here that one of 
the reasons for the failure to successfully implement PFI is due to a failure to match it with 
an appropriate transaction governance. 
 
In the Apache (training equipment and services contract) and Defence Telecommunication 
Systems procurement the problem was that the MoD made the decision to change to PFI 
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too late and was therefore unable to maximise the benefits of PFI procurement, while the 
failure in the Non-combat Vehicles for the RAF procurement was that the MoD did not 
transfer an appropriate amount of project risk to the contractor. 
We found that the late decision to select a PFI route may have reduced the scope for potential PFI 
benefits. The benefits of the PFI approach are maximised when the contractor can offer innovative 
solutions to the requirement, which is presented as an output specification. Because the delivery of 
Apache training services began as a conventional procurement, the benefits from PFI have in this 
case been limited. For example, ATIL inherited detailed equipment specifications against which the 
contract was let which has restricted the scope for innovation. 
Building an Air Manoeuvre Capability: The Introduction of the Apache Helicopter, HC 1246, 
2002 
 
The changes to the procurement process (at the institutional policy level) from traditional 
contracting to PFI contracting did not structure the way the MoD were engaged with the 
supplier at the governance level. A lack of flexibility or risk sharing is symptomatic of a 
market-based approach.  
 
If the MoD moved towards a hybrid or bilateral form of transaction, then the success of 
the PFI procurement may have differed. The MoD may have implemented a policy which 
they thought would create benefits in terms of value for money; however they did not 
match PFI with an appropriate transaction governance mode or effective processes. 
 
In terms of the Construction of Nuclear Submarine Facilities at Devonport, the failures of 
this project have been discussed in all the propositions. The effects of the fundamental 
transformation and the bilateral dependency, as well as the effects of asset specificity on 
 - 410 -  
value for money requirements have been discussed. However, it is in the decisions made 
at the governance level which has most created project difficulties.  
 
There was a breakdown in the relationship between the MoD and DML, mainly due to a 
lack of control on the project by the MoD. This lack of control comes in the form of an 
‘arms-length contracting’ policy (used more often in market governance) followed by the 
MoD in this project. This results in a lack of control, guidance or monitoring by the MoD, 
which led to a number of disagreements in the project finally resulting in contract 
renegotiation. 
To ensure the delivery of these facilities, at the same time as the sale of the dockyard and after four 
years of negotiation, the Department entered into a Prime Contract with DML for the design, 
construction, commissioning and licensing of the facilities in accordance with nuclear safety 
requirements. For its part, to ensure the project's successful delivery, DML adopted partnering 
arrangements with its key sub- contractors. The Department was not part of these arrangements 
and kept its relationship with DML on a more traditional, contract-orientated basis. 
The Construction of Nuclear Submarine Facilities at Devonport, HC 90, 2003 
 
As is clear by the reference, there is a lack of partnering and monitoring. The project 
results in a failure to meet buyer demands and due to the governance arrangement 
remedying this situation becomes challenging. The poor performance of DML in the 
project resulted in cost increases and disputes in the contract regarding customer 
requirements. The MoD rather than terminating or changing the nature of the contract 
failed to react to the situation, which resulted in it having to take on most of the burden 
of the cost increases. 
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The third type of projects are characterised by no changes made to the transaction 
governance of the projects. There are three projects in Type 3 – Common New Generation 
Frigate, Eurofighter 2000 and Defence Information Infrastructure. The first two are 
international collaborations, where the procurement is undertaken by a multinational 
programme. 
 
There are relatively few considerations made in TCE theory of the impact of a buying 
situation with more than one stakeholder. However it is clear that there is some 
transaction costs involved due to the rigidity of such buying situations from the analysis of 
collaborative procurements. 
 
It is difficult to make changes to the transaction governance of such buying practice due 
to: (1) the slowness to react by the buyers due to the complicated organisational (i.e. 
political) structures; and (2) work sharing agreements which create rigidity in the contract 
tenders. Change, where there is failure, is more demanding in such acquisition projects 
and is less forth-coming. 
In practice, overly rigid adherence to the worksharing requirements has compromised the price 
benefits that would have been expected to accrue from competition for the equipments and engine 
accessories. In particular, the preference to select bids from specially created consortia rather than 
single companies has led to proposals being constructed to meet worksharing requirements rather 
than to match technical expertise and achieve best value for money. This has impacted on 
timescales and costs since the consortia arrangements have necessarily been far more complex, and 
management far more unwieldy than would have been the case if contracts had been awarded to 
single companies. 
Eurofighter 2000, HC 724, 1995 
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The Defence Information Infrastructure project, on the other hand, is an example of a 
project which had the appropriate transaction governance. It required no changes as the 
MoD had put in place the required mechanisms of partnership in the beginning of the 
contract. This is an example of good governance arrangements in defence transactions, 
from the outset. 
 
While Departments must make every effort to avoid problems through good planning, procurement 
and management, they must also put in place measures to address problems when they occur. For 
the most part, the governance structures set up at the outset of the DII Programme have remained 
robust. In addressing the problems that have affected the implementation of DII, the Department 
and ATLAS have tried to work jointly wherever possible and have adopted a partnership approach.  
The Defence Information Infrastructure, HC 788, 2008 
 
As for Type 4 projects, they are negligible to the proposition as there are no/minimal 
information regarding transaction governance in the reports. The reason for this case in 
the Chinook and Landing Platforms for Helicopters reports are due to a lack of focus on 
governance arrangements. In the Torpedo and Trident reports, changes in governance 
arrangements were limited at the institutional level and so were limited at the 
governance and process level. 
 
In the 1990s, there were major changes at the institutional level focused on process – 
with the introduction of Smart Procurement, Smart Acquisition, Prime Contracting and 
PFI. This was less so in the 80s where changes were mainly focused on market conditions 
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– competition and liberalisation. The reporting for the earlier projects therefore has less 
focus on the governance arrangement between the MoD and Industry. 
 
The focus in the Chinook report was on the issues surrounding the airworthiness 
standards of the helicopter. This was a major issue in the report because of the high 
impact this had on the procurement as a whole. In fact, the report states that the Public 
Accounts Committee labels the Chinook project as the worst example of equipment 
procurement (HC 512, 2008). While there is mention of a ‘fast track procurement 
arrangement’, this is not explained further and the governance arrangement as a whole is 
neglected in the report. 
 
In the Landing Platforms for Helicopters report, the focus is on the tendering process. The 
majority of the report is therefore evaluating whether value for money was gained in the 
selection process of the contract. The evaluation of value for money is therefore focussed 
on the competition for the contract. Since the report looks particularly at the contracting, 
it makes minimal mention of how the governance arrangements are made post-contract.  
 
The Torpedo Programme report mentions governance arrangements of Torpedo 
procurement as a historical study of previous procurements. It mentions the transition 
from in-house to private design and manufacturing of Torpedoes. There is, however, 
minimal mention how such arrangements take place in the three Torpedo projects 
mentioned in the report. While creation of a prime contractor role is suggested as a move 
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forward, there is a fear of losing expert knowledge in-house. It is clear that governance 
arrangements are an important consideration for future procurement of Torpedoes; 
however it is not the focus of the 1985 report. 
 
The previous analysis is also true of the Trident project, however even future 
considerations of governance arrangements are limited. The Trident project report 
focuses mainly on the financial aspect of the project and in some cases the technical 
considerations. 
 
Conclusion to Proposition 3: 
There is an interesting trend in the spread of projects of the four types. The more recent 
reports published in 2002-2009 are clustered in Type 1; Type 2 is populated with projects 
from 1999-2003 reporting period; and Type 3 and 4 are predominantly in the 1984-1995 
period. The exception is the DII project in Type 3 and Chinook Helicopters in Type 4, both 
being from 2008.  
 
This trend is interesting because it indicates that the MoD became more focused on 
governance within the last decade. It success has been in the more recent projects this 
may be due to the introduction of successful acquisition strategies. The trend on the 
whole shows that the MoD has become more willing to intervene in projects where the 
transaction governance is failing to deliver the desired outcomes. The evidence also 
indicates that the MoD has moved to focus on partnering arrangements with its suppliers.  
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There is however a clear failure in the MoD’s ability to apply PFI contracting to defence 
projects. The main reason for failure seems to be a lack of transaction governance 
consideration in these PFI projects. The MoD may see PFI as a useful tool to transferring 
greater project risk to suppliers. However, its ultimate success to achieve this aim will be 
in how the MoD combines this with effective transaction governance.  
 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the findings of the NVivo analysis of the seventeen VfM 
reports selected for the research. The results of the Nvivo analysis provide clear evidence 
of where the focus in defence acquisition is in terms of value for money. The NAO in their 
reports have presented the Risk factor in all seventeen reports, this being the most 
frequently discussed factor in Level 3 of the Defence Acquisition Process tree.  
 
This focus continues at the following level, with the Contract Risk and Delivery Risk being 
discussed in 14 reports. The Risk sub-categories in general score highly in their presence in 
the VfM reports. This result emphasises the importance of risk management in defence 
acquisition. 
  
The Contracting Process is split into three sub-categories, of which Contract Negotiation is 
the most referenced in the report population, in Level 3. In Level 4, it is a Contract 
Negotiation subcategory which scores highly. This being Information Transfer Issues, 
present in 11 reports, is the third most frequent factor. The emphasis on this factor 
 - 416 -  
provides evidence that the MoD has in some projects had issues with the way it 
communicates with its contractors.  
 
The frequency of the Selection process subcategories in Level 3 provides greater spread. 
There are overlaps in the Traditional Procurement and, Smart Procurement and 
Acquisition factors. As such these two factors have the highest frequency within the 
group, with the other factors showing a low level of frequency. It is evident that the 
majority of projects have been undertaken using a Smart Procurement and Acquisition 
route. 
 
In the factorial relationships, the emphasis was on the one way relationships between the 
Selection Process, Risk and Contract Type factors. These combinations showed a higher 
frequency than the other relationships. Uncertainty and Complexity with Information 
Transfer Issues was the most frequent of the symmetrical relationships. The qualitative 
analysis of the relationships provides evidence on how the relationships affect the 
defence acquisition process. 
 
There is supporting evidence that the Fundamental Transformation effect exists in 
defence transactions. This Fundamental Transformation leads to bilateral dependency for 
the MoD and Prime post-contract. The consequence of which is a lack of viable 
competition, due to the first-mover advantage gained by the initial winner and the high 
switching cost for a substitute. 
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The main factors identified in the existence of the bilateral dependency resulting from the 
fundamental transformation are the pre-contract and post-contract asset specificities in 
defence transactions. The MoD provides investments (or transfers ownership) to the 
prime, which leads to post-contract asset specificities in the transaction.  
 
These investments or ownership of specific assets play a key role in the prime winning 
further contract tenders due to the advantage gained from the pre-contract asset 
specificity. The consequences of the combination of post-contract and pre-contract asset 
specificities is they provide the initial winner of the bid with first-mover advantage for 
future tenders and it increases the switching costs for the MoD. Thus, through sequences 
of moves the bilateral dependency condition is created in defence transactions. 
 
The MoD has made some attempts to mitigate the effects of the bilateral dependency by 
following policies of (pseudo-)competition, contractor shadowing and capability change to 
slow the progression of the fundamental transformation. These policies have, however, 
on the whole failed to achieve their desired outcomes; instead, it is more likely that they 
increase the cost of the tender, which will be passed on to the MoD. 
 
Proposition 2 is separated into three sub-propositions, each addressing the three 
elements of the environmental dimension: uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency. 
Support for Proposition 2, as a whole, was underwhelming. While, the existence of these 
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factors are clearly shown in the result of the defence acquisition tree and factorial 
relationships, the cause and link to failure in defence projects is less forthcoming. 
 
Of the three factors, Uncertainty had the greatest support as a cause and link for project 
failure in terms of the value for money criteria. The evidence presented in the analysis of 
the effect of uncertainty on project success provided insight into the varied nature of 
uncertainty in defence acquisition and the extent of the disturbance it creates to reaching 
the cost, time and performance targets. 
 
While supporting evidence for the Fundamental Transformation in the VfM reports was 
significant, the proposition that this leads to project failure was less convincing. The three 
examples providing support for the proposition demonstrate the strenuous effect that 
asset specificity, under conflict, can create for the buyer-supplier relation and on 
achieving value for money.  
 
This however was not a common trend in the reports as a whole. The reason for this may 
in part be due to the findings of Proposition 3 - in that the hazards in bilateral dependency 
are mitigated through the use of (or transition towards) appropriate transaction 
governance. 
 
The analysis of the Frequency node content rejects Proposition 3 as there is no evidence 
to suggest that the frequency of the transaction is responsible for project failures. In fact, 
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there is more of a case for the opposite to be true. Where defence transactions are 
recurrent (even in long intervals, as is common in defence acquisition), the opportunity to 
learn from previous transactions can contribute to successful projects. Transaction-
specific learning can enable the MoD to strengthen its project planning and management. 
 
In Proposition 3, the aim was to assess the MoD’s response to project failure in terms of 
transaction governance. The transaction governance is the mechanism created for the 
interaction between the buyer (MoD) and the supplier (the Prime). The trend shows that 
the MoD is likely to intervene, where project failure seems likely or occurs, and this 
intervention has been predominantly successful. 
 
The success of the governance trade-off is referenced as being one which has been a 
transition from the classical contracting stance to a relational contracting approach, with 
partnership as the main mechanism. In six out of the ten reports where a governance 
trade-off is observed it has been successful, and in one where no change has been 
required, this has been due to a partnership approach being taken.  
 
I infer that the lack of evidence for project failure due to asset specificity (mainly that of 
the Fundamental transformation kind) is due to this partnership approach, which applies 
mechanisms to deal with the long-term nature of the transaction and mitigates the 
negative impacts of bilateral dependency (namely that of opportunistic behaviour). 
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An interesting trend has also been identified in the six projects, where governance trade-
off has been observed. All six projects are from reports post-2000, the same time that 
Smart Procurement Initiative and Smart Acquisition Principles policies were implemented. 
I suggest that this is no coincidence; rather that it is evidence of the success of these 
policies for defence acquisition. I shall discuss these ideas further in the next chapter. 
 
The answer to the central research question of how TCE provides insight into defence 
acquisition is thus shown in the way it allows a greater depth to the content analysis of 
the value for money reports. TCE goes beyond looking at what is happening in defence 
transaction to why it is happening. This is has been achieved, especially, in testing 
Proposition 1 and 3 and to a certain extent Proposition 2. 
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8 Discussion 
8.1 Chapter Overview 
The discussion in this chapter will focus on three themes of UK defence acquisition: 
bilateral dependency; risk, uncertainty and complexity; and the IPT mechanism. Applying 
a transaction cost approach to defence acquisition has highlighted the importance of 
these three aspects in defence transactions.  
 
The Bilateral Dependency section will explore the engagement part of the acquisition – 
the buyer-supplier relationship. This will, therefore, look at important procurement 
processes such as the buyer’s selection choice, contract negotiations and supply 
agreements. The purpose of looking at these three specific areas is to highlight how 
market conditions, contract tender, buyer-supplier relations and contract terms are 
affected by the bilateral dependency in the acquisition of defence equipment.  
 
Uncertainty and Complexity is an ever present condition in defence transactions. There 
are clear indications, from the analysis, that the presence of uncertainty and complexity 
leads to project failures in achieving value for money criteria. The VfM reports have 
identified Risk to be an important factor in defence projects.  
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The concept of risk is on the whole sidelined by Williamson as he developed the TCE 
theory. Risk is mentioned only in terms of the behavioural assumption of risk neutrality on 
the part of the decision-maker. In the VfM report risk is seen as an important element of 
the acquisition process, this is also evident in the defence acquisition and MPR chapters. 
However, the risk identified by the NAO differs to the definition given by the Carnegie 
School. The difference is important in understanding how risk is observed and interpreted 
by the NAO and the impact this has on defence acquisition.  
 
The impact the IPT Mechanism has had on the MoD’s desire to create a partnering 
approach with Industry has been identified in the analysis section of the previous chapter. 
The IPT structure will be examined using the findings of the VfM reports. The purpose will 
be to see what strengths and weaknesses exist in IPTs. How the MoD can improve and 
highlight the collaborative elements of the IPT mechanism. To assess whether the IPT 
mechanism effectively addresses the nature of defence procurement and whether it is 
able to efficiently deal with risk in defence acquisition. 
 
8.2 Bilateral Dependency 
8.2.1 Buyer’s Selection Choice 
The selection choice is one where the buyer must decide which seller to engage with in 
the market. The buyer’s selection choice is a crucial part of the acquisition process in 
defence transactions. A large proportion of defence transactions, of the major projects 
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type, are under a bilateral dependency situation. While there are cases of competition-
based procurements, these are the exception rather than the norm for major projects. 
This research contributes to new knowledge in identifying the reasons behind the bilateral 
dependency situation in defence transactions.  
 
In the analysis of Proposition 1 it was shown that bilateral dependency is a function of the 
fundamental transformation in the transaction. This research has highlighted, as its major 
contribution, the effect of pre-contract asset specificity on the bilateral dependency 
situation. Even more consequential is the role played by the MoD in this situation through 
its acquisition policy and investment decisions, which leads to post-contract asset 
specificity. 
 
In this discussion the existence of the bilateral dependency situation will focus on the 
presence of post-contract asset specificity leading to pre-contract asset specificity in 
future contracts. In that aim, the former is identified by a combination of the buyer’s 
investment decisions and market conditions, which have emerged due to economic policy 
at the institutional level. The latter is a consequence of the transaction-specific 
investments made by the supplier in order to lock-in the buyer to the transaction.  
 
The combination of these two factors thus completes the sequences of events leading to 
the bilateral dependency condition in defence transactions. The impact of the post-
contract asset specificity is more immediate to the selection choice facing the buyer. 
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However, the consequence of the resulting pre-contract asset specificity is in future 
selection choices.  
 
The market conditions impact the selection process in that they determine the chances of 
the buyer seeking alternative sources of supply i.e. monopoly vs. competition. In the 
analysis of Proposition 1 it was clearly shown that market conditions can play a central 
role in the transaction (e.g. BT’s bid for the Defence Fixed Telecommunication System), 
since where monopolies exist seeking alternative suppliers is no longer viable and the 
buyer is placed in a non-competitive supply situation, thus the fundamental 
transformation. 
 
The monopoly condition in the UK defence sector is a legacy of the privatisation 
programme in the 1980’s by the Conservative administration of Margaret Thatcher; 
consolidation moves by large defence contractors in the defence sector; and the high 
capital investments which the MoD must make in defence acquisition programmes when 
procuring from its domestic supply base. The combination of these market and 
investment conditions causes the fundamental transformation in defence contracting. 
 
The MoD contributes to this situation, in its role as investor as well as buyer in the 
acquisition project. The high capital intensity of defence acquisition means that the buyer 
must play a dual role of investor and buyer of the goods. It is in the buyer’s role as 
investor, where asset specificity becomes an important part of the transaction. The MoD 
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provides a great deal of the capital investment in the early phases of the project in 
research and development.  
 
The MoD, therefore, makes transaction-specific investments for a product for which it is 
the sole buyer (where export is ruled out, at least in the short-term). This creates an 
interesting situation, where the buyer plays a role in the bilateral dependency condition 
through its own investments decisions. Williamson’s discussion of asset specificity is 
usually from the seller’s perspective.  
 
As pre-contract asset specificity creates the bilateral dependency situation; post-contract 
asset specificity leads from the fundamental transformation and the transaction-specific 
investments, which result in the transaction. While the MoD play a crucial role in post-
contract asset specificity, it is the supplier which aims to take advantage of the pre-
contract asset specificity in future transactions.  
 
The supplier can achieve this by making transaction-specific investments during the 
contract, in order to gain from its post-contract advantages. The ultimate motive for the 
supplier is to create a long-term exchange relationship and ‘lock-in’ the buyer; hence a 
bilateral dependency condition. This would ensure that the supplier can secure future 
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From the MoD perspective the transaction-specific investments is welcomed, in that it 
requires the specialised equipment for its ultimate defence capabilities. It is in the 
investments to asset specificity of the physical kind (i.e. technology) where the MoD is 
able to procure military equipment to gain operational advantage. The consequence, 
however, is that it becomes dependent on the technology (physical asset specificity) and, 
thus, the supplier.    
  
In The Torpedo Programme, Marconi Underwater Systems Limited (MUSL) was able to 
gain a monopoly position in the UK after having won the tender competition against a US 
supplier. The MoD is left with no alternative for procuring future torpedo capability, since 
the pre-contract asset specificity allows MUSL to deploy its first-mover advantage. The 
defence market, as evidenced in the data analysis, is shown to be controlled by 
monopolies in specific sectors. This reduces the chances of the MoD following a 
competitive route to its procurement, as was desired in the Levene Reforms. 
 
It does raise the question of whether the Levene Reforms were realistic by focussing on 
competition policy in a sector characterised by monopolies and market entry barriers are 
high. If market barriers were lowered the monopoly condition may be removed. However, 
for that to be realised the MoD would have to either provide investment to new entrants 
or create more generic requirements to allow companies to cross over from the civilian 
sector. These inducements are unlikely due to defence funding gaps and the asset 
specificity of defence requirements. 
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It is in the presence of asset specificity in defence transactions and the relationship-
specific investments being made by the prime contractors, that rather than creating 
greater competition in defence, the data indicates more cases of bilateral dependency.  
 
It is clear from Proposition 1 the lack of competition for defence contracts due to the 
fundamental transformation and asset specificity has created a bilateral dependency 
between the MoD and its suppliers. Where competition exists or is encouraged the prime 
contractor is usually able to use its first-mover advantage and the large switching-costs, 
for the MoD, to hold onto its monopoly powers. 
 
The tendering methods by the MoD during contract tender have been observed in the 
analysis of Proposition 1 (e.g. in the Bowman CIP programme). In its desire to create 
greater competition in defence contracts and mitigate the effects of the fundamental 
transformation the MoD employed some questionable tactics. The MoD has enforced 
(pseudo-)competition, contractor shadowing and used capability change to create greater 
competition instead these policies resulted in an adversarial relationship with industry.  
 
These tendering methods are clearly an attempt to remove first-mover advantage for 
follow-up projects or support contracts are being tendered. However, the analysis of the 
data shows that the MoD has been unsuccessful in applying these methods effectively. 
This is mainly due to the fact that the reason for the bilateral dependency is due to asset 
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specificity. In that it is the transaction-specific investments which the Prime has made in 
the project, which gives them the first-mover advantage.  
 
It is, therefore, not a matter of creating greater competition instead it is a question of 
creating a larger supply base, willing to make the same transaction-specific investments. 
Where this fails it is inevitable that bilateral dependency results. This means that there 
needs to be an appropriate transaction governance to deal with the situation and create 
safeguards from opportunistic behaviour which may lead to organisational failure. 
 
It is clear that if the MoD follows these tendering methods, which create extra costs to the 
prime that can be avoided and  better spent on development costs then the buyer-
supplier relationship will continue being adversarial. The data analysis shows that more 
recent projects have instead successfully moved away from this adversarial position to a 
more conciliatory partnership approach. The MoD have realised the best way to deal with 
contractual hazards brought on by the bilateral dependency is to move to a partnership 
approach.  
 
The data also shows that the MoD has failed to create appropriate transaction governance 
for the use of PFI procurement. This centres mainly on how the MoD are able to 
effectively transfer risk to the prime, while incentivising them to deliver the project within 
the value for money criteria. As such the failure, thus far, to implement PFI contrasts to 
the success of Smart Acquisition. 
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The PFI procurement route removes the dual role of the MoD by replacing it as an 
investor with a private contractor. This removes the responsibility for transaction-specific 
investments from the buyer and places it with the supplier, as such project risk is 
supposed to be transferred to the investor in return for a premium payment.  
 
However, the capital-intensive nature and the presence of uncertainty and complexity 
within defence transactions have meant that the MoD has not been able to fully transfer 
the investment responsibilities to the private sector in high asset specific transactions. PFI 
has, so far, been more successful in low asset specific transactions such as The 
Procurement of Non-Combat Vehicles for the Royal Air Force. 
 
Smart Acquisition has been, in the latter part of the decade, a vehicle to improve the 
acquisition process. The reason I would suggest that it has been able to succeed is that 
rather than resist the bilateral dependency – it has been designed to support bilateral 
governance. It does this through the principles of Smart Acquisition which allows the 
fundamental transformation to take place; however it does so in a manageable manner. 
 
The use of a ‘whole life approach’ is not new to defence procurement but it has become 
ingrained since becoming a Smart Acquisition principle. The whole life approach has an 
element of pre-contract asset specificity of the temporal kind. In that, when the MoD is 
planning a project with a prime, with future costing and development strategies, it allows 
the prime to make transaction-specific investments according to those plans. This gives 
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first-mover advantage to the prime, however it also provides the MoD to better align its 
value for money expectation with the prime.  
 
Similarly, the principles of ‘investment in the early project phases’ and ‘new procurement 
approaches, including incremental acquisition’ encourage bilateral dependency resulting 
from the fundamental transformation. These aspects of the Smart Acquisition principle 
impact the post-contract asset specificity of the transaction.  
 
Greater investment at the early phase of the project means that the prime would have 
more funding to develop its physical or dedicated assets, and thus the switching costs 
increase due to higher transaction-specific investments. However, the MoD and its prime 
can also use the increased investment in the early stage for better risk identification and 
reduction work, and reduce the negative impacts of technical factors on achieving value 
for money criteria. 
 
8.2.2 Contract Negotiations 
The fundamental transformation in defence procurement transforms pre-contract 
competition into a bilateral dependency situation post-contract. This has led, as shown in 
the analysis, to a number of suppliers consolidating their positions in the market as a 
monopoly supplier in their sector. Even with the introduction of liberalisation policy in the 
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1990s, to create competition, the MoD is still in a position where a number of its large 
projects are given to preferred bidders (see chapter 2).  
 
Therefore, the non-competitive procurements which the MoD follows have created a 
bargaining dilemma for the MoD and its prime contractors because the negotiations are 
between a monopsony buyer and a monopoly supplier with equivalent bargaining powers. 
In the past the MoD and the defence industry have followed an adversarial negotiation 
approach. This, as shown in the analysis, has created a number of challenges in the 
contract negotiation process and contributing to the power play is the environmental 
dimension of the transactions. 
 
The environmental dimension has a major effect on contract negotiation. The uncertainty, 
asset specificity and frequency of the transaction will determine the way the transacting 
partners adapt to the bilateral dependency and will determine whether the safeguards in 
place are steadfast in instances where opportunistic behaviours may occur.  
 
The contractual safeguards in The Construction of Nuclear Submarine Facilities at 
Devonport were weak; this was as a result of the arms-length nature of the transaction. 
The project was given as an example of project failure in delivering value for money, 
mainly attributed to the presence of uncertainty and asset specificity. In terms of 
uncertainty, cost uncertainties in the project due to technical complexities and poor 
supplier performance made it difficult for the MoD to identify future costing plans. 
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As for asset specificity, the reference discusses the way the MoD uses temporal asset 
specificity to pressure the supplier, DML, into delivering its cost and time targets in the 
contract renegotiation. This bargaining situation was adversarial in the way that each 
party was using uncertainty and asset specificity to gain pricing advantages in an 
opportunistic manner.     
 
Another example, where uncertainty and asset specificity is present in contract 
negotiations is in The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability. In the project 
the MoD created a situation where temporal asset specificity has become an important 
factor in contract negotiations with suppliers, by outlining its desired in-service date.  
 
In publicising its desired in-service date and the MoD has weakened its bargaining position 
and, as is suggested by the NAO, given itself little manoeuvring space. The post-contract 
temporal asset specificity is increased, which may lead to the ‘hold-up’ problem, where 
the buyer is dependent on the seller to deliver to the specified date.  
 
While, in-service dates can be changed or varied they can be sensitive at the institutional 
level, such as political pressures and budgetary conditions. The contractual hazard is that 
the supplier can act opportunistically due to the pressures of temporal specificity and hold 
the MoD to ransom – this does not necessarily mean that the supplier will act as such. 
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Hartley (2007, p.1162) explains ‘competition can determine prices and ‘police’ profits 
whereas negotiation with a preferred supplier requires both prices and profits be agreed 
between buyer and seller. Such bilateral monopoly bargaining between a monopsony 
government buyer and monopoly seller involves two ‘sticking points’ namely, the buyer’s 
maximum price or willingness to pay and firm’s minimum supply price below which it will 
not undertake the work’. 
 
In the balance between the buyer’s maximum price and the firms minimum supply price, 
uncertainty and asset specificity will play a role in which side gets to achieve the optimal 
outcome. In the data analyses the evidence points to the MoD being most affected by the 
uncertainty and asset specificity of the transaction, it is usually the MoD which moves 
towards its maximum price rather than the Primes moving to the minimum price. The 
value for money reports and the major projects reports indicate that the MoD usually end 
up paying more than it expected.   
 
The current U.K. financial crisis has led some political commentators to question the 
continuation of the Future Nuclear Deterrent programme by arguing it is too costly. 
Hence, arguing that the MoD’s maximum price is unaffordable and in a situation where it 
is unable to reduce the prime’s minimum price, the project they argue is no longer viable.   
 
While this has been resisted, there have been some budgeting disagreements as to how 
the MoD will be able to fund the project. The UK Treasury has suggested that the MoD will 
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have to find the funds within its own budget, though this has been rejected by the 
Minister for Defence, Dr. Liam Fox; he has stated this situation is under continued 
discussion. This has created a great deal of political uncertainty over the future of the 
nuclear deterrent programme.  
 
Therefore, it is clear that defence contract negotiations may be affected not only by the 
transactional consideration at the contracting level, but also at the institutional level. At 
the process level, there will be certain considerations to make in terms of the way the 
contract is designed and how it can incentivise the supplier to deliver value for money 
projects post-bargaining under a bilateral dependency situation. 
 
8.2.3 Supply Agreements 
Supply agreements are defined in terms of the contractual arrangements being made in 
order to outline the requirements of the buyer and the responsibilities of the supplier. 
The design of the contracts will determine the requirements and responsibilities of the 
supply agreement. The MoD has followed a number of contract types, such as cost-plus, 
fixed-price, incentive-based and contracting for availability, in order to define the supply 
agreement.  
 
The transaction-cost perspective in the supply agreement is in terms of the environmental 
turbulence caused by conditions such as uncertainty and/or complexity and behavioural 
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hazards such as opportunism. Crocker and Reynolds (1993) make the point this is a 
characteristic of the design of military procurement contracts (as discussed in section 
3.2.2).  The focus in this research has been to look at what the transaction-cost issues are 
for the MoD and its primes when designing contracts and how this will affect the 
achievement of value for money.    
 
The contract negotiation within a bilateral monopoly bargaining situation can deliver a 
range of contract types. At the heart of the negotiations are two specific issues - payment 
arrangements and risk sharing. The contract types are distinct in the way the risk is 
apportioned and payment is made.  
 
The contract type can be an important aspect of a bilateral monopoly; it signifies the 
negotiating powers of the parties by presenting their ability to ensure favourable terms, 
which protect their self-interests. In deciding the contract type, the MoD assesses the 
desired risk sharing arrangements (as explained in section 2.4.1). 
 
Incentive-based contracting is the most commonly used contract type in the research data 
(see Chapter 7, Figure 7.4). The MoD has attempted to use incentive-based contracting as 
a means of linking performance indicators and milestones to payment, to induce desirable 
outcomes from the project. Milestones are a common part of incentive-based contracts. 
Most are linked to points in the CADMID lifecycle and some are linked to more specific 
deliverables in the project such as key user requirements. 
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The adoption of performance indicators provide the MoD with a certain amount of cost 
and time controls, as well as using it as a supplier monitoring mechanism. This aim is 
usually missed due to unrealistic performance expectations or vague and changeable 
customer requirements, which may lead to the MoD having to renegotiate contracts. This 
then creates further contract bargaining and requirement changes to lower cost and time 
burdens. The difficulties in incentive-based contracting in defence, identified by 
Williamson (1967), continue to manifest.  
 
Gardener and Moffat (2008) highlighted in their study that there exists an optimism-bias 
in defence projects. They show that the presence of uncertainty creates a situation where 
the MoD follows an optimistic rather than a realistic strategy, when planning spending, 
schedules and performance requirements. These two studies are discussed at length in 
Chapter 3.  
 
The solution to optimism-bias, in my view, must be in the way the MoD fully implements 
the ‘open relationship’ principle of Smart Acquisition, and seeks greater involvement from 
the prime on what is feasible and deliverable. Rather than the current situation where the 
MoD is told what it wants to hear from Industry, as was suggested is the current status 
quo by an informant in Kebede et al. (2009). 
 
The complexity of defence transactions, the uncertainty and the lack of information 
transfer between the MoD and Industry plays a major role in the difficulties in negotiating 
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contracts. This creates a situation where the contract can be poorly structured and 
unrealistic, as was the case in The Construction of Nuclear Submarine Facilities in 
Devonport or Chinook Mk3 Helicopters contracts.  
 
Overtly prescribed incentive-based contracting as a tool for cost and time controls can 
become difficult to maintain in bilateral monopoly bargaining. Since, the uncertainty and 
complexity (of technical factors and requirement changes) in the transaction can make it 
difficult to keep to milestones and renegotiation becomes the norm rather than the 
exception. Rather than having to renegotiate milestones and linking them to incentives to 
the contract, the MoD and the prime can create basic partnering agreements and deal 
with changes to project plans directly without contract change. 
 
The contract negotiation can be a difficult process whether it is under a bilateral 
monopoly or through a competitive tender. This is because it is difficult to write a 
contingent claims contract under conditions of uncertainty and bounded rationality. In 
defence, uncertainty and complexity is ever present and the variety and magnitude of its 
existence further complicates predicting all or even some contingencies. As such this 
explains why over-prescribed incentive-based contracts can be difficult to implement. 
 
Uncertainty results in the human-decision makers being unable to take contingent 
decisions; this is further exasperated where ‘information transfer issues’ impact the 
contract. The decision-makers in the transaction are impacted by a lack of information 
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communicated between the transacting parties, impacting their ability to make informed 
decisions.  
 
This situation creates a negative impact on the contract negotiations, and the parties have 
to look to remedy such situations in the contract. In The Private Finance Initiative: The 
Contract for the Defence Fixed Telecommunications System the impact of information 
transfer issues resulted in higher priced bids during the tendering process. The uncertainty 
in the contract is covered by a premium in the final bid price. 
 
In order to combat the difficulties of bargaining in the dark, the transacting parties seek 
improvements in information sourcing to reduce the impact of uncertainty and 
complexity, and to support decision-making. The MoD has sought to reduce information 
transfer issues by implementing historical cost trend analysis in Providing Anti-Air Warfare 
Capability: the Type 45 Destroyer project. The MoD also seeks to reduce its forecasting 
costs by requesting accounting data from the prime. 
 
Sandler and Hartley (1995, p.121) point out ‘demands by the government for access to 
contractor’s accounting data will always be resisted and even where granted, accounting 
information is historical and does not indicate the extent of contractor inefficiency. 
However, the government is not powerless. It can use competition from either national or 
foreign firms to check on a contractor’s price bid’. This situation emphasises an adversarial 
approach, in which sharing information is seen as undesirable. 
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The MoD, however, will be able to use the historical accounting data from the supplier 
and its own historical cost trend to improve ‘realism’ in cost estimation and create 
realistic targets in the contract. In the Type 45 Destroyer project, it is the buyer who seeks 
to reduce information transfer issues, whereas in the Defence Fixed Telecommunications 
contract, it was the supplier.  
 
Under bilateral dependency, the contract negotiations can become adversarial, as has 
been exemplified. Information can be an important tool in the contract negotiation 
process; it can have a major effect on bid pricing and cost estimations. This is particularly 
the case when the contract negotiations take place in an environment of high uncertainty 
and complexity. Where the information transfer is more efficient, through greater 
communication, cooperation and partnering, a contract can be designed which reduces 
project risks.  
 
8.3 Risk, Uncertainty and Complexity 
8.3.1 A Question of Risk  
Risk is identified as an important part of the defence acquisition process, in the data and 
the literature review. However, it is curious that risk is omitted from TCE considerations, 
since one would expect it to play a major role in transaction decisions. Williamson, 
however, views risk only in his assumption in the risk neutrality of the behaviour of 
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decision-makers. Event his idea is ancillary to the main thesis of TCE and is neglected to 
the extent that it makes minimal impact on the transaction-cost approach.  
 
Risk is interesting in this research due to the discrepancies between the NAO definition of 
risk, and that of the Carnegie School (which is being used as a base definition). The focus 
here is not to define risk, instead it is to explore the way the NAO defines risk and the 
impact this has on understanding risk in terms of acquisition. First, the varying views of 
risk must be presented and understood.  
 
Williamson (1985, p.388) defines risk in terms of ‘a third behavioral assumption that is 
employed but to which reference is less frequently made warrants separate attention. 
That is the assumption of risk neutrality. Unlike the other two assumptions, this one is 
patently counterfactual’.  
 
In defining risk preference in transactions in this way, I take it to mean that Williamson 
while accepting risk exists feels it is not important enough to consider as part of the 
central thesis. Williamson (1985, p.389) explains this by rationalising that risk neutrality is 
an approximation, a separate view, and allows for the focus to be on core efficiency 
features instead. Thus, he sidelines risk in favour for what he views as more critical to 
transactional considerations of organisation.  
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As Chiles and McMackin (1996, p.79) explain ‘the behavioral assumption of risk neutrality 
has received but sparse attention in the TCE literature’. However, it places risk as a 
behavioural property, in which the decision-makers preference to risk is to be assumed as 
neutral in a transaction. The NAO perspective on risk does not specify risk in terms of the 
decision-makers preference; rather it looks at its impact on project success in an almost 
environmental definition. 
 
The NAO (2000, p.1) outline their definition of risk in a report discussing the management 
of risk in government departments. ‘In this report ‘Risk’ is defined as something 
happening that may have an impact on the achievement of objectives as this is most likely 
to affect service delivery for citizens. It indicates risk as an opportunity as well as a threat’. 
This definition of risk closely resembles the characteristics of the coded risk from the VfM 
reports. In that, the focus is on the risk to achieving the objectives of the project i.e. 
meeting the value for money criteria. 
 
This definition of risk differs from that outlined by Winch and Maytorena (2011, p.357) 
‘Risk is the condition where inferences from historical data using analytic techniques can 
provide a sound basis for decision-making because it is believed with confidence that the 
future will be like the past and the probability of a threat or opportunity event occurring 
and its associated impact can be calculated from existing data’.          
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The major difference between the NAO and, Winch and Maytorena definition of risk is in 
the time-sensitivity and the subject of risk. The time-sensitivity is shown by Winch and 
Maytorena, in that they specify the thread between historical data, existing data and 
future outcome. Whereas, the NAO studies view risk in two spectrums: retrospectively 
and prospectively.  
 
The retrospective analysis of risk by the NAO is irrelevant for TCE, unless one takes the 
learning opportunities into account. The prospective analysis of risk, by the NAO, is 
synergetic to Williamson’s view of Uncertainty. The NAO are, thus, identifying risk where 
they could equally be discussing uncertainties in future outcomes. Risk is where valid 
measurement is possible and uncertainty where there is not. Transaction-cost places risk 
as a behavioural aspect of the transaction, thus squarely with the decision-maker.  
 
The NAO focus on viewing risk in terms of the effect it has on the future of the project 
rather than on the decision-maker. The future is changeable and therefore it is impossible 
to state its outcome and how that may be influenced. Instead, it is more logical to identify 
the affect risk has on the decision-maker, which then influences the future outcomes. 
Instead, this prospective analysis of risk is more in line with the way uncertainty is seen in 
the transaction-cost perspective. 
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The Risk node was recoded, post-analysis, in light of its importance to defence acquisition 
and the lack of application from TCE. It was coded into the differing views of risk in the 
NAO definition, between that of the retrospective and prospective view of risk.  
 
Retrospective risk is identified by the NAO as having occurred during the project, prior to 
publication of the report, hence as an event from the past. Prospective risk is identified as 
what the NAO identified as the risk to the achievement of the project criteria, hence a 
possible future. The results of the coding of these two perspectives of risk are shown in 
Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.1 provides the break down for the number of reports and references made to risk 
retrospectively and prospectively. The results shows an almost equal number of reports 
make reference to retrospective risk as to prospective risk. 
 
 
 
Reports References 
Retrospective Risk 
(RR) 
15 116 
Prospective Risk 
(PR) 
14 108 
Table 8.1: NVivo analysis of Retrospective Risk and Prospective Risk 
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PR RR 
CNGF 
 
Trident Project 
DII 
 
Helicopter Logistics 
 
Torpedo 
12 
 
Reports 
Figure 8.1: Venn Diagram showing the share of the risk perspectives in the VfM reports  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Venn diagram in Figure 8.1 provides the share of reports. Twelve reports make 
references to retrospective and prospective report, three reports (on Defence Information 
Infrastructure, Helicopter Logistics and the Torpedo project) make reference to risk 
retrospectively only, and two reports (on the Common New Generation Frigate and the 
Trident project) make reference to prospective report only. 
 
These results indicate that the NAO views risk equally as a means to learn from past 
experiences and future uncertainties of projects. However, there is a lack of appropriate 
risk analysis which would satisfy the definition of risk as stated by Winch and Maytorena 
(2011). There is a lack of threading of the past experiences, the present occurrences and 
the future threats and how this impacts the decision-makers ability to make an informed 
decision.  
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The learning from risk however can play an important part in understanding how the 
future threats can be understood and mitigated. Risk, in the NAO sense, can play an 
important role in the way learning can be used to save on transaction-costs. In that by 
learning from past risks of a project future threats can be mitigated. This is the focus of 
the NAO, and the following sub-section provides a discussion of what learning is gained 
from risk in the VfM reports.       
 
8.3.2 Learning from Risk  
Four project risk types are identified from the VfM reports: contract risk, technical risk, 
delivery risk and in-service risk. Contract risk is in the form of an ineffectual contract 
agreement or risk which can impact the contractual agreement. This risk type can affect 
every aspect of the project. Technical risk is most evident in the development and 
production stage of the project and is mainly due to unforeseen technical difficulties or 
ineffective risk reduction work during the assessment phase.  
 
Delivery risk is the risk of missing in-service target dates as a result of delays in the project 
arising from contract or technical risk. In-service risk is as the name suggests the risk to 
the project at the in-service phase. This may have resulted from the impact of all the other 
risks due to operational challenges or renegotiating support services. 
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The first step in risk mitigation is in the type of risk agreed under contract agreements. 
Different contract types require differing levels of risk management by the MoD. Contract 
agreements can place the risk on the MoD, or on the prime contractor, or share the risk. 
Where the risk is taken on by the prime contractor, they will charge a premium to cover 
the project risk in the form of a fixed price contract. The basis under which the MoD 
chooses its procurement and contracting process to manage risk is discussed in section 
2.4.1. 
 
In some cases the MoD are willing to absorb the risk. In Transforming Logistics Support for 
Fast Jets (HC 825, 2007) in the availability contract for the Tornado support contract the 
MoD took a greater degree of risk due to its satisfaction with the partnership agreement 
and the pre-contract work undertaken. Where there is a lack of risk reduction work and 
effective partnering arrangements, contract risk can be increased by an inefficient 
contract agreement. An example of this is the Type 45 Destroyer contract (HC 295, 2009), 
where there was a lack of proper risk analysis work combined with an insufficient 
governance arrangement.  
 
Contract risks are created mainly due to the presence of uncertainty in the contract (this is 
more compatible with Williamson’s views due to the focus on uncertainty). The Type 45 
Destroyer employed a fixed price contract, which had undefined elements and also 
allowed the contractor to claim compensation. The combination of these two elements in 
the contract demonstrates the poor contract arrangements made in the project. Risk plays 
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a major role in how the MoD engages with its prime, while the MoD aims to transfer or 
share project risk with the prime as part of its procurement practice.  
 
The Prime is reluctant to take on risks in the contract and if it does so it will aim to cover it 
by charging a premium. Therefore, risk becomes an important element in the way 
partnership succeeds in the project. The evidence in proposition 3 shows governance 
failures were predominantly due to a lack of risk management in the contract (mainly in 
PFI procurement).   
 
Contract risk has been discussed in relation to the contract type, however it can manifest 
in other ways in the project management. In the Apache Helicopters procurement (HC 
1246, 2002), contract risk arises due to a lack of stakeholder management. The MoD when 
directly contracting with the Apache Helicopters prime failed to realise the importance of 
the institutional level considerations of the transactions, in that the U.S. government are 
responsible for data release. This resulted in schedule delays in accessing valuable data for 
the Apache Helicopters, which could have easily been avoided if proper partnership 
arrangements were put in place.  
 
Further problems were evident in gaining the data from the U.S. government, in that they 
were uneasy about transferring data to the newly privatised QinetiQ as part of the 
project. The concerns over the privatisation of QinetiQ could have been allayed with a 
confidentiality clause in the contract. Some risk reduction work can be undertaken to 
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ensure transaction costs do not unnecessarily increase. MPR reports’ analysis has 
indicated the importance of project definition and risk reduction in the project’s 
Assessment Phase (Section 5.4.1). 
 
A key step to reducing the project risk is to adopt an effective partnership approach with 
the prime contractor. NAO (2006a, p.11) points out ‘contracts are mostly likely to support 
successful project delivery if they are negotiated against a common information base and 
with an understanding of stakeholders’ aspirations. In applying the contract it will be 
important that all parties understand the way in which achievement of the desired 
outcomes is incentivised and the position of each stakeholder is protected’.  
 
The transition to effective partnership arrangements, shown in proposition 3 of the 
successful projects, has enabled the MoD to partner with its suppliers and deliver 
improved procurement and support contracts. Thus, in delivering effective risk 
management the projects referenced as being successful mention ‘co-located teams’ and 
‘communication’ as key to working practices. The strengthening of the relationship 
between the MoD and prime, emphasised in the creation of IPTs has been an important 
step in improving risk management in defence projects. 
 
An appreciation of technical risk in project development and production is a key factor to 
project success. A common reason for project cost and time variance discussed in the 
MPRs (Chapter 5) was identified as technical factors. The reasons given for the continual 
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presence of technical factors in the MPRs are due to a lack of risk reduction work and 
investment in the Assessment Phase. Defence projects involve a high level of 
technological complexity, where the prime contractor is responsible for the integration of 
systems of systems. 
  
The MoD is sometimes able to manage the risk related to technical factors, as in the case 
of the DII project (HC 788, 2008). Technical risk is lowered where the procurement is of a 
standardised product with non-specific investment required in physical assets. However, 
where asset specificity is high, the technical risk may increase.  
 
The delivery of mobile tactical internet requirement, in the Bowman project (HC 1050), 
proved to be a challenge for General Dynamics. However, it is one example in which the 
prime contractor seemed to invest time and money in order to deliver the customer 
requirements. The evidence in the MPR and VfM reports shows that Bowman under the 
partnership of the MoD and General Dynamics was a successful project (in time and cost 
increases at a mere 5 per cent). While General Dynamics inherited a lot of the technical 
difficulties from Archer’s Consortium, they worked to effectively reduce the technical risk.  
 
Delivery risks can affect the scheduling of the project and can have a negative impact on 
in-service dates. The MoD and its industrial partners have to work in partnership to 
reduce the impact of delivery risks. The rationale behind investment in the early stage of 
the project of the Assessment Phase is to reduce the risk of in-service delays as well as 
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cost increases. Delivery risk is based on unrealistic in-service dates, which impact all 
aspects of the project. Time pressures can reduce the amount of time spent during the 
Assessment Phase which impacts the effective delivery of the project. 
 
There is a risk in the Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability programme (HC 1115, 2008)  that 
the reported overlaps in the work strands will put greater pressure on the project 
schedule in the long run. The overlap in the design and construction work may save time 
in the short-term, but there is a risk in meeting the in-service date if appropriate time is 
not spent in the design phase. The reasons for delivery risk were investigated in the VfM 
reports by looking at two specific relationships: delivery risks as a consequence of 
information transfer issues and of technical risk. In both cases, there was a low frequency 
in the presence of these relationships in the VfM reports. 
 
The relationship between technical risk and delivery risk is present in three reports, of 
which there is a single reference to the relationship in each source. The fact that there is a 
low frequency however does not disprove the existence of the relationship; however it 
may point to a lack of focus on the in-service phase in the VfM reports. It is reasonable to 
suggest that technical risks in the project can have an impact on the project’s ability to 
meet its in-service date. 
 
The risks in the in-service phase highlight the need to continue the partnership with 
industry post-procurement. This signifies the need for through-life management of 
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defence projects ‘from cradle to grave’. The risks involved in the in-service phase are 
linked mainly to the operational requirements of projects and are significant to the 
customer, the Armed Forces. 
 
As explained by NAO (2003b, p.15) ‘through enhanced planning, Through-Life 
Management should lead to improvements in the affordability of future programmes, a 
reduction in the number of ‘surprises’ encountered by a project and better delivery of 
integrated military capability rather than individual items of equipment’. The NAO are 
pointing to the importance of planning for future costs, an important principle of Smart 
Acquisition: ‘a whole-life approach, typified by applying through life costing techniques’. 
However, their focus goes beyond just the costing of individual platforms, but of 
integrated projects with funding for integrating new technologies. 
 
8.3.3 Uncertainty and Complexity 
Unlike risk, Williamson puts a great deal of attention on the presence of uncertainty and 
complexity in the transaction. While these two factors are of a different kind, in that 
uncertainty is a difficulty in making accurate prediction of future events and complexity is 
a difficulty in calculation and computation, they have the same negative effect on the 
transaction which usually manifests in their interaction. 
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Uncertainty and complexity are tested in this research, through Proposition 2, Lemma 2.1. 
The presence of uncertainty and complexity was proposed to be responsible, in creating 
transaction costs, to contribute to the failure to meet the value for money criteria of the 
MoD. The results for the analysis of uncertainty and complexity showed that the presence 
of uncertainty was the most reported environmental dimension in the transaction to 
cause project failure (i.e. not meeting value for money criteria). 
 
The data supported Lemma 2.1 and the Type 45 destroyer was shown as an example of 
how uncertainty can lead to project failures. These uncertainties were identified as part of 
the planning phase, with optimism-bias identified in the costing and scheduling of the 
project. Where fixed-price agreements are made with compensation mechanisms, the 
effect of optimism-bias will be to create contractual risks in the buyer-supplier governance 
arrangements.    
 
It is interesting that complexity was not as frequently mentioned when discussing project 
failure in the reports. This may be due to the fact that the presence of complexity creates 
a more immediate response in terms of looking at possible resolutions, whereas 
uncertainty is a more challenging factor to respond to. However, the transaction-cost 
effect of uncertainty is usually linked to the presence of complexity.  
 
Slater and Spencer (2000, pp.73-76) provided a strong critique of Williamson’s distinction 
between uncertainty and complexity. They state that in one sense Williamson inextricably 
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links uncertainty and complexity, however he then introduces behavioural uncertainty as 
a distinction to complexity. In order to understand behavioural uncertainty we can use the 
example of the Type 45 destroyer. In that project we observe a combination of 
uncertainty and optimism-bias, a relationship explored in greater detail by Gardener and 
Moffat (2008), (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3).  
 
Williamson (1985, p.58) defines behavioural uncertainty as ‘uncertainty of a strategic kind 
is attributable to opportunism and will be referred to as behavioral uncertainty’. Whether, 
Williamson’s motive is to distinguish uncertainty from complexity this makes no 
difference, in my view, it does however provide us with a way to understand the 
relationship between optimism-bias and uncertainty.  
 
I believe optimism-bias can be seen as behavioural uncertainty, in the transaction-cost 
perspective, combined with an element of opportunistic behaviour. As Gardener and 
Moffat (2008) point out optimism-bias has an element of poor behaviour emanating from 
both sides in the acquisition in order to reach their short-term gains. While this may differ 
from the type of uncertainty that is linked to complexity it has nonetheless the same 
transaction-cost effects, as shown in the Type 45 Destroyer case.  
 
It is due to the presence of uncertainty (whether that be of the complexity or behavioural 
kind) that transaction governance choices must be made to reduce the possibility of 
organisational failure (which in the defence acquisition case would be a failure to deliver 
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value for money). Therefore, the focus turns to how to create governance structures 
which can cope with the strains placed on the transaction due to the presence of 
uncertainty, the asset specificity characteristics, and the frequency of the interaction. 
 
This governance trade-off is discussed in relation to Proposition 3, in which the MoD 
response to failure is tested with respect to such a trade-off. The findings show the 
question of transaction governance (in the form of acquisition practice in MoD language) 
has become more important within the last ten years.  
 
Therefore, the governance trade-off from a failed organisational choice to one more 
appropriate to dealing with the transaction-cost considerations, has been evident in more 
recent projects. In these projects the transformation has been a transition from an 
adversarial market-based classical contracting model to one which embraces bilateral 
governance with support from relational contracting approach, specifically that of the IPT 
mechanism. 
 
The reason for this transition has been inferred as being due to an acceptance of the 
bilateral dependency between the MoD and its prime contractors. Rather than combating 
this bilateral dependency the MoD has in certain respects looked to move towards a more 
open relationship, which facilitates for the long-term nature of the relationship. The IPT 
mechanism is seen as the key to this evolution in defence acquisition in the UK, the 
following section will discuss this further. 
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8.4 The IPT Mechanism 
8.4.1 Partnering in IPTs  
The introduction of the IPT mechanism has been one of the most tangible acquisition 
policies taken by the MoD to foster a close working environment with industry (sections 
2.4.2 and 2.4.3). It is one of the seven Smart Acquisition principles and its implementation 
was fast tracked by the Smart Procurement Implementation Team (NAO 2002a) in 2000. 
The DE&S described it as the primary building blocks of the organisation (MoD 2007). 
 
The aim of the IPT is to create the collaborative environment and partnering the MoD 
wishes to foster with industry. It is therefore an ideal candidate to test the successful 
realisation of this bilateral governance framework. Figure 8.2 represents the impact of the 
factors identified in the VfM reports on the IPT mechanism, and it provides the framework 
in which it can be understood in the context of this research. 
 
There are three elements to the Venn diagram. The top circle represents the structure of 
engagement between the MoD and the prime in the IPT. There is a circle describing the 
positive impact of defence acquisition factors on the IPT and next to it the negative 
effects. The boxes explain the effects that the defence acquisition process factors have on 
the IPT mechanism. Each box corresponds to an overlapping area of the circles. The 
impacts are to strengthen the IPT, to weaken the IPT and to neutralise the effect on the 
IPT. 
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The structure of the engagement in the IPT is defined by the selection process and 
contract type. This has been discussed in the first section, and was shown to depend on 
the pre-contract asset specificity involved in the transaction. When the MoD and the 
prime make relation-specific investments, it can improve the engagement of each party in 
the IPT. However, if the parties do not invest in the collaborative relationship, there can 
be a weakening of the IPT. This is explained in a case study of the AMV IPT: 
One important idea behind the IPT was to have a co-located project team that could take 
advantage of team working, good communication and cooperation. This notion was to be 
realized through continuous interaction enabled by prescribed tasks, teams and routines. The 
management of relationships (customer, user, suppliers) was therefore a key tactic in this 
programme. However, the original bid was won through competitive tendering, and the 
Figure 8.2: Venn Diagram of IPT Mechanism 
Strengthen IPT: With the combination of a 
trained and resourced staff, a collaborative 
approach understanding the long-term 
nature of the industrial engagement, 
learning from previous projects with 
frequent experience of procurement the IPT 
can apply these positive impacts to the 
selection process and contract type 
Weakens IPT: With the existence of uncertainty 
and complexity in defence creating information 
transfer issues, there are risks to the project in 
terms of the contract, technical aspects, and timely 
delivery and during the in-service phase. This will 
impact the selection process and contract type if 
the IPT cannot deal with these negative impacts on 
the project.  
Neutralise: the positive aspects of the project can 
neutralise the negative impacts. If collaboration 
and communication is applied in the IPT the impact 
of uncertainty and complexity and information 
transfer issues can be reduced. With frequent 
experience of similar procurement projects the IPT 
can use the learning gained towards risk reduction 
work in the contract, technical factors, and delivery 
schedule and whole-life approach to in-service risk. 
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dynamics inherent in such a process have placed significant constraints upon the IPT’s ability to 
collaborate, because of the constraints of a project won by competition, with “a very tight 
contract, budget and margins squeezed to win the work”. For example, the proposed shared data 
environment (SDE), which would enable improved communication and coordination between 
industry and customer, was not effectively implemented due to cost and commercial constraints’. 
 
(Kebede et al. 2009, p.323) 
 
The selection process and the contract type are seen to have knock-on effects on the IPT 
mechanism. A lack of investment in the shared data environment may increase the 
presence of negative factors, such as uncertainty and complexity, creating information 
transfer issues, which may lead to risks in the project in terms of contract, technical, 
delivery and in-service risks.  
 
The use of IPTs in the Helicopter Logistics support contracts (HC 840, 2002) have been 
identified as a successful change to governance arrangements, as part of the evidence for 
Proposition 3. However, there are also some concerns that not enough time and 
resources were provided to implement new working practices successfully.  
 
IPTs can be a positive influence in the project management; however, there is a clear need 
to provide the appropriate resources to strengthen the IPT mechanism. The NAO have, in 
the case of the Fast Jets support contracts (HC 840, 2002), praised the effective use of the 
IPT mechanism. The IPTs have followed ‘open book accounting and sharing of information 
and benefits between projects’.  
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Where relational contracting is utilised in the form of relation-specific investment in 
communication and trust, the bilateral governance can be seen as a successful transaction 
governance, as exemplified by the Fast Jets support contracts. However, where the IPT 
fails to engender the principles of IPT engagement, then the transaction costs increase 
and organisational failure can seem more likely.  
 
As specified in Proposition 3, the MoD moved towards a partnership arrangement in its 
acquisition projects to safeguard the transactions from failure. Where there is a strong 
governance mechanism in the form of the IPT, the partnership arrangements will succeed 
in safeguarding the contract from organisational failure. 
 
IPTs are also an effective mechanism to ensure bilateral dependency in defence 
transactions does not result in the more opportunistic natures of bilateral monopoly 
bargaining. The MoD desires the creation of a ‘better, more open relationship’ with 
industry as part of its Smart Acquisition principles. Under a bilateral monopoly situation, 
this will require close collaborative relationships with primes using the IPT mechanism. 
Therefore, the MoD will seek to ensure that relational contracting can be used to support 
the IPT mechanism.  
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8.4.2 Relational Contracting for IPTs 
To ensure the successful application of the IPT mechanism, there needs to be a congruent 
contractual process that complements the IPT ethos. Relational contracting is a 
contracting process best suited to engendering the closer and open nature of defence 
acquisition under the IPT mechanism. While the contract type may continue to be under a 
fixed price or incentive-based contract, mainly the latter, the contract would follow a 
relational contracting agreement. 
 
In relational contracting, there is a move from prescriptive contracting to one that is more 
flexible and adaptable, rejecting the classical or neo-classical approach where ultimate 
dispute resolution is decided in the courts. Transacting parties rather would work together 
to create their own conflict resolution mechanism, mainly in the form of joint-problem 
solving exercises. Relational contracting is explained in section 4.3.4. However, here the 
characteristics that make it suitable to the IPT context are emphasised.  
 
For such relationally-governed exchanges, the enforcement of obligations, promises, and 
expectations occurs through social processes that promote norms of flexibility, solidarity, and 
information exchange. Flexibility facilitates adaptation to unforeseeable events. Solidarity 
promotes a bilateral approach to problem solving, creating a commitment to joint action 
through mutual adjustment. Information sharing facilitates problem solving and adaptation 
because parties are willing to share private information with one another, including short and 
long-term plans and goals. As parties commit to such norms, mutuality and cooperation 
characterize the resultant behaviour.’ 
 
(Poppo and Zenger 2002, p.710) 
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The MoD hopes to achieve this by replacing its traditionally adversarial relationship with 
industry to one with a more open and collaborative nature. The transition towards what 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) relationally-governed exchanges through social processes may 
take time, but it is aided by the use of Smart Acquisition procurement and IPTs. There will 
be resistance from each side to sharing information which they view are sensitive to their 
bargaining position, however once relational contracting  is supported by improved trust 
between the parties such issues may be less problematic.  
 
A relational contracting approach to IPTs may provide greater freedom for them to work 
more effectively, with less contractual threat hanging over the MoD and industry joint 
team. It would remove the perception of IPTs as a monitoring mechanism intimated by 
Cullen and Hickman (2001), creating a full recognition of IPTs as drivers of joint-working 
arrangements for the MoD and industry. It would create more opportunity for DE&S staff 
to examine ways of maximising the IPT mechanism, rather than spending a great deal of 
effort and funds on legal advice on contracts.   
 
Artz and Brush (2000) suggest that relational contracting in itself does not remove the 
contractual hazard of opportunism and the like, especially at periodic negotiating stages; 
instead it is the relational norms that create a long-term safeguard. Artz and Brush (2000, 
p.341) explain ‘those transactors who have established behavioural norms that can 
simplify and smooth renegotiation process can reasonably expect to incur lower ex post 
bargaining costs than those who have not’.  
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Parker and Hartley (2003, p.103) comment ‘a distinctive feature of MoD’s business is the 
requirement to provide an operational capability in peace, crisis and war and PFI/PPP 
projects have to meet this criterion. This increases the difficulty of writing a long-term 
contract dealing with all contingencies. As a result, MoD is relying more on partnership 
arrangements based on trust and reputation rather than using detailed contractual 
controls, as earlier theoretical framework predicts’. 
 
The analysis of the data in Proposition 3, however, shows that PFI projects have yet to 
achieve the desired outcomes for the MoD in terms of value for money. While, 
partnership arrangements may provide success as a policy at the institutional level 
evidence at the governance and process level is not yet representative of that view. The 
difficulty in delivering partnership through PFI procurement seems to be focused on the 
risk transfer arrangements.  
 
Until the MoD can improve the governance and process of PFI procurement, it may have 
to focus on other procurement processes. I suggest the use of Smart Acquisition 
principles, with prime contracting, the IPT mechanism and relational contracting, will do 
more to create partnering arrangements with industry. Since, in Smart Acquisition, the 
focus is on risk sharing rather than risk transfer. The MoD needs to be able to create a 
mechanism which makes it viable for the Prime to take on the risk of a defence contract, 
before it can successfully implement it as a procurement process. 
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8.4.3 The Importance of People in IPTs 
The IPT mechanism can improve the MoD’s ability to negotiate with its monopoly 
suppliers, enabling a better understanding of their customer requirements, where 
learning is gained from frequent transactions and an effective investment in human 
resource is made. The MoD (2005, p.139) states ‘we must ensure that the appropriate 
training, development and professional standards are in place for all those involved in 
acquisition, and that staff receive due reward and recognition for their competence and 
for their achievements in project delivery’.  
 
The evidence for Lemma 2.3 was quite barren; however, there was evidence to suggest 
that the MoD can use occasional or recurrent transactions to undertake transaction-
specific learning. Transaction-specific learning can be linked to the way project managers 
are able to identify and catalogue lessons to be learnt specific to the project. If the MoD is 
able to use transaction-specific learning as a training tool for its decision makers, 
specifically its project managers, it may be able to achieve its aim of being an ‘intelligent 
customer’.    
 
Major defence projects are characterised by occasional transactions of highly specialised 
equipment. The MoD can apply learning where there is a close link of previous contracts 
to current ones, especially where the same contractor is involved. Transaction-specific 
learning is described in the Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability programme (HC 1115, 
2008).  
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Since nuclear submarines must be replaced, due to decommissioning requirements, there 
is an almost regularity (even though at long intervals) to the procurement process. This 
still enables the MoD to use transaction-specific learning in the project, while also 
allowing for modern technology and practices. The effective use of human resource is 
another area which can positively impact IPTs where the MoD can apply a long-term 
approach, as pointed out by NAO (2004):  
 
For MoD, the introduction of new processes and technology, such as Whole Life Costing, adds to 
training requirements. Also, regular movement of staff affects levels of continuity in some roles, 
which impacts on skill and experience levels. The availability of suitably skilled and experienced 
staff in MoD impacts particularly on the early stages of projects when MoD is leading on 
decisions affecting the scope and direction of projects, which have resonance for downstream 
acquisition performance. For example, the availability of MoD staff with suitable skills and 
experience in risk management affects the quality of early risk reduction activity. 
 
(NAO 2004b, p.16) 
 
As well as ensuring that MoD staff in the IPTs have the expertise required in industry, 
there is also a question of staff rotation in the civil service which can disrupt the team 
working in IPTs. Kebede et al. (2007) discuss the effect of staff rotation on the project 
team in the example of the AMV IPT.  
 
The findings of the case study clearly show that the industry partners found staff rotation 
as a barrier to effective collaboration. Gray’s (2010) report provides evidence that civil 
servant tenure is worsening not improving, with less time being spent in IPTs. These issues 
are raised in section 2.4.4, where the organisation of acquisition is presented. 
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While the MoD and Industry can ensure that they use their bilateral dependency to 
engage in positive contractual negotiations where mutual benefit is sought, investment in 
human resources is made, and where learning is gained from experience, it is possible to 
neutralise the negative impacts of uncertainty, complexity and risk. It is also important to 
ensure that the parties engage in a selection process which engenders relational 
contracting. Under these conditions, the IPT mechanism can thrive and the MoD can 
engage in the values of partnership espoused in the MoD (2005).  
 
The MoD (2005, p.133) comments ‘the emphasis on our future approach to ensuring value 
for money has highlighted the need to place greater emphasis on fostering better, and 
where appropriate, longer term relationships with our key suppliers, and the use of 
appropriate commercial tools, including competition of formal partnering agreements. 
This must be underpinned by greater openness and transparency, with a common and 
more explicit understanding of how to achieve best value for both Defence and industry’. 
 
Competition may create the opposite of what is desired in a partnering agreement, as 
pointed out earlier by Kebede et al. (2009) competition created strains in the IPT 
mechanism which reduced its efficacy. The MoD may have to view the procurement 
process as a ‘competition V partnership’ choice prior to tender. While, competition can 
provide advantages in pricing and aligning the Prime to the MoD’s interest. Partnership 
can reduce the long-term transaction costs, by reducing the project risks and creating a 
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more collaborative and open relationship with the Prime. In the end, the MoD may decide 
which procurement route it prefers on a project-by-project basis.    
 
8.5 Summary 
The selection process in defence transactions are characterised by ever increasing 
monopoly supplier markets. The choice between monopoly and competition is becoming 
more one-sided in favour of the former. The reason for this is due to the effects of the 
fundamental transformation in defence contracting. Competition is becoming less viable, 
and in some cases less effective. Therefore, the relationship is becoming characterised by 
a bilateral dependency between the MoD and its suppliers in major defence projects. 
 
A major contribution to knowledge in understanding defence acquisition in terms of TCE 
has been to provide greater insight into the reason why the bilateral dependency has 
become the norm in defence. The contribution has been to show that this is due to the 
post-contract asset specificity resulting from the fundamental transformation and MoD 
investment decisions.  
 
The transaction-specific and relation-specific investments made by the buyer, the MoD, 
have contributed greatly to the bilateral dependency condition in defence transactions. Its 
role as investor in defence projects is key to the reliance on the supplier to deliver the 
project to the required value for money criteria. 
 - 466 -  
The MoD has tried to mitigate the creation of the fundamental transformation through 
pseudo-competition, contractor shadowing and capability change. However, the result 
has been one where post-contract asset specificity means that the original contractor still 
has an advantage over its competitors in the retender phase or support contracts. The 
MoD has instead created greater cost in the tender process which it is most likely will 
have to bear itself and weakened the relationship with the prime. 
 
The introduction of Smart Acquisition in the early part of the 2000s has by the latter part 
of that decade become an important tool in easing the strains of the bilateral dependency 
situation. The use of Smart Acquisition principles has been successful mainly because it 
supports bilateral governance, rather than attempting to weaken it. The principles 
emphasise strengthening the relationship by looking at a long-term through-life approach 
with IPT mechanisms at the heart of the interaction between the MoD and its partners. 
 
The fundamental transformation plays an important role on the contract negotiations, as 
well as the environmental dimensions of the transaction i.e. uncertainty, asset specificity 
and frequency. The evidence points to a greater role for uncertainty and asset specificity 
in defence transaction, rather than frequency.  
 
They impact the contract negotiation and the ability of the project managers to deliver 
the value for money criteria of the MoD. It has been shown where MoD is unable to 
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manage the uncertainty and asset specific nature of the transaction failure to meet value 
for money becomes more likely. 
 
Contract design is therefore important in mitigating the effects of these environmental 
dimensions. However, the contracts in defence using fixed-price and incentive-based 
contracting are characterised by an optimism-bias. The prime is unable to meet the 
unrealistic targets set by the MoD in the original tender; however the contractor fails to 
make this clear in fear of losing the contract. In the second section optimism-bias has 
been identified as a combination of behavioural uncertainty and opportunism, the 
consequences of which are that it contributes to increasing transaction costs.  
 
The failure to meet these unrealistic targets and milestones usually results in 
renegotiating the contract and in some cases by retendering the contract (Bowman CIP). 
The former is more likely because the MoD is usually locked-in to the supplier, due to the 
pre-contract asset specificity, at the moment where renegotiation takes place (as was the 
case with the Devonport Nuclear Submarine facilities). Renegotiation favours the supplier 
since they can usually shift the contract to more realistic targets, while at the same time 
recovering their losses from the previous contract. 
 
Information Transfer Issues can have a destabilising effect on the contract design and 
execution. In cases where the MoD lacks the information to outline specific elements of 
the project (contract contingencies) the Prime may take advantage of this information 
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asymmetry by refusing to deliver certain requirements. This has been a problem 
specifically in the transfer of technical data, since the Prime see’s it as a part of its IPR.  
 
Prime contractors have also complained of a lack of information from the MoD, which 
creates difficulties in the tendering process and thus increases bidding prices. Information 
sharing is an important part of partnership agreements; it is therefore more likely that 
such information transfer issues may be reduced by applying partnering. 
 
The role risk plays in defence acquisition has been discussed with respect to the way it is 
presented in the data by the NAO. The NAO definition of risk is incongruent to the 
definition provided by the Carnegie School. This difference provides an interesting view of 
how the NAO discusses risk in the VfM reports.  
 
The NAO view risk retrospectively, hence discussing past events, and prospectively, in 
terms of threats to achieving objectives for the future. These two perspectives have been 
identified as possessing an element of learning and uncertainty, respectively, in the TCE 
perspective. However, they do not conform to the more analytical process outlined in the 
Carnegie School definition of risk. 
 
In dealing with the uncertainty and complexity evident in defence transactions, as well as 
the bilateral dependency, the success of recent applications of bilateral governance 
approach to defence acquisition has been identified. The transactions in a bilateral 
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governance relationship is more conducive to a relational contracting approach, which has 
at its core an emphasis on collaboration, cooperation and communication.  
 
IPTs have been the main vehicle to deliver these objectives in the partnership with 
industry. However, there are some concerns in the effectiveness of the application of the 
IPT mechanism. 
 
Where appropriate funding is available for information sharing, co-location of the teams 
and where trust is at the heart of the transaction the project is more likely to be 
successful. It is also important that the MoD is equal to the supplier through achieving its 
desire to become an ‘intelligent customer’. Therefore, the MoD will need to invest in 
training its people, especially its contract negotiators and project managers, and utilise 
transaction-specific learning, where it exists. 
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9 Conclusions 
9.1 Summary 
Acquisition Reform has been the buzz words in the UK defence arena for the last decade. 
There have been major developments in defence acquisition, from privatisation to the 
introduction of Smart Acquisition principles. These changes have been gradual 
movements in defence acquisition policy over the past fifty years; however in the past 
decade, the pace of change has accelerated with greater focus being placed on improving 
the MoD’s industrial relations, more specifically in acquisition management. 
 
The policy challenge for defence acquisition has, on the whole, remained the same – how 
to deliver defence equipment and services on time, to budgeted cost and at the desired 
performance requirements. The technology has advanced but the fundamental objectives 
of value for money is unchanged. The MoD has implemented a number of acquisition 
policy reforms, in the last few decades, in order to achieve this value for money goal. 
 
There are three key periods in recent history of defence acquisition were identified in the 
literature review of Chapter 2. The first marks the privatisation of UK defence production 
which was initiated in the 1970s and continued in the 1980s. The second period, the late 
1980’s to early 1990s, saw the introduction of competition and a liberalisation policy into 
defence acquisition. More recently, the third period is signified by organisational and 
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process developments in defence acquisition policy introduced in the late 1990s and 
continues to be a focus of the current UK coalition Government. The analysis of these 
three periods provides a great amount of detail on how the relationship between the 
MoD and Industry developed over time.  
 
In the first period the privatisation policy resulted in the creation of powerful enterprises 
within the defence industry. These companies were able to strengthen their positions in 
the industry and gain a monopoly in their sector, by consolidating their market base 
through mergers and acquisition. The MoD followed a cost-plus, non-competitive 
approach in its acquisition policy during the early days of privatisation. This created what 
many commentators described as a cosy relationship within the defence industry. 
  
As the Cold War era drew to an end, and resulted in the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
demise of the Soviet Union, defence spending fell sharply. The MoD became less reliant 
on the defence industry and began its reforms of defence acquisition led by Sir (now Lord) 
Levene in the late 1980s. The focus of the Levene Reforms were to create greater 
competition in defence acquisition and a more stringent buyer, in the part of the MoD, 
with firm- and fixed- price contracting identified as more appropriate to achieving value 
for money. 
  
The MoD liberalised the defence industry in the 1990s, creating greater competition for 
the national monopolies in defence, by allowing a number of European and US 
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companies’ greater access to the UK defence market. However due to political 
sensitivities, the ‘Buy British’ mentality had not changed, and most of the major contracts 
were still being won by the domestic industrial base.  
 
Given this many of the international defence companies entered into joint ventures, 
mergers and acquired UK companies willing to divest their defence businesses, in order to 
be able to compete with the national champions. The hard bargaining approach by the 
MoD resulted in an adversarial relationship with industry, which saw its profit margins 
threatened.  
 
The third period represents the current situation in defence and where this research aims 
to contribute to knowledge. Many of the defence companies active in the 1970s have 
either consolidated their position in the UK market (e.g. BAE Systems) or divested their 
defence business (e.g. GEC). This was in response to the changes implemented in defence 
in the second period. Companies which saw defence as part of their core business 
aggressively sought to consolidate their positions in the market, whereas others decided 
to divest and enter the civilian market. 
 
The result has been the creation of a defence industry of large multinational companies 
with monopoly powers in sectors of the UK defence market. The MoD’s competition 
policy has, however, been unchanged and as such the situation is one where the MoD, as 
a monopsonist, is negotiates with a monopolistic supplier. It is clear the MoD see these 
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monopolistic defence companies as the preferred bidders as they are usually the only 
ones which can deliver these major defence projects.  
 
The MoD has in recent times introduced a number of acquisition reforms (e.g. Smart 
Acquisition and IPTs) and reorganisations (e.g. creation of DE&S). It has outlined its desire 
to engender ‘long term, open relationships’ with Industry to improve defence project 
delivery and achieve value for money. However, these acquisition reforms are unable to 
fulfil their promise due to how the MoD follows its competitive pricing approach in major 
defence projects. This period in defence acquisition is therefore characterised by a 
confused relationship between the MoD and Industry. 
 
This research has, as part of its objectives, the aims of understanding why defence 
projects still fail to achieve value for money, how defence acquisition can be improved 
and thus to apply Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory in order to provide clarity (as 
outlined in section 1.2.3). The effectiveness of applying TCE, compared to other economic 
theories of defence procurement, has been justified in terms of its focus on transactional 
issues. The application of theories, such as principal-agent theory, competition theory and 
game theory, to defence has been presented in comparison to studies which use TCE (see 
Chapter 3).     
 
TCE provides a theoretical perspective to the exchange of intermediate goods in a variety 
of organisational modes in the firm to the market structure spectrum (discussed in section 
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4.1). The theory suggests that in all transactions of this kind, there are environmental and 
behavioural factors which determine the appropriate governance mode to avoid 
organisational failure.  
 
The presence of any of the environmental factors - uncertainty, asset specificity and 
frequency - manifests human behavioural factors - bounded rationality, opportunism and 
learning - respectively. This creates contractual hazards which need mitigation by the 
safeguards in the governance mode. The transaction is also influenced by the institutional 
context (or as Williamson describes it ‘atmosphere’) in which it takes place. 
     
To understand the current situation in defence acquisition Major Project Reports from 
1993 to 2010 were reviewed in chapter 5. The main findings of these reports were that in 
general most defence projects go beyond the forecasted cost and time, and fail to meet 
some key user requirements. The reasons given for this situation are a lack of investment 
in the projects assessment phase, the ineffective application of acquisition reforms such 
as smart acquisition, and the provision of unrealistic cost and time estimations. Figure 9.1 
represents a descriptive model of the cost-time progression in defence projects based on 
the findings from the Major Projects Reports. 
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In Figure 9.1, the intention is to capture, very generically, the findings of the Major 
Projects Reports (in Chapter 5) and the literature review of UK defence acquisition (in 
Chapter 2). I intend to show two aspects: first, the way cost progresses over time for 
major projects, from the concept phase to the in‐service phase (CADMI‐(D): the disposal 
phase is out of the time range of the graph), in three scenarios actual, optimal and 
targeted. Second, the aim is to show the differences (Δn) in investment (represented by 
cost gaps) at the assessment phase and in‐service phase. 
 
The three lines show very different trends lines. The progression of the targeted cost line 
represents the optimism‐bias prevalent in defence project planning, in that the decision‐
Figure 9.1: A Descriptive Model of the Time‐Cost Progression based on MPRs 
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makers underestimate the investment required. The line represents a steady cost 
progression throughout the project lifecycle.  
 
The actual cost line illustrates a rather cubic expression, with the funds for the defence 
project starting steadily and at the turning point (the assessment phase) the cost 
escalating, due to the lack of investment during the concept and assessment phases. 
Project costs continue to escalate at the in-service phase, due to a variety of reasons, such 
as user requirement changes, technical difficulties and so on.  
 
The optimal cost progression illustrates the cost trend line for how a project could be 
planned in a two step investment plan. It shows greater investment during the concept 
phase (more funds for risk reduction and technical development work). An injection of 
funds (at a lower rate than the concept phase) is then expected in the second step at the 
assessment phase. This will ensure investment is available for the project to meet its in-
service date and user requirements, resulting in the cost levelling out at the in-service 
phase. 
 
The differences in funding at two points in the acquisition process, the assessment and 
the in-service phase, are shown. At the assessment phase there are two interesting 
investment differences: 
1. The difference between the targeted cost and the actual cost, Δ1, shows a lack of 
investment into defining and planning defence projects, which then impacts 
project costs at the assessment phase (described in Chapter 5).  
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2. The difference between the optimal cost and targeted cost, Δ2, demonstrates the 
optimistic expectation, in investment, for effective preparation to progress to the 
demonstration and manufacturing phases. The difference between the targeted 
and optimal cost represents the total investment gap during the assessment 
phase.  
 
The cost gaps at the in-service phase represent the expected costs when the project 
reaches its in-service date: 
3. The cost of the project when following the optimal trend line is higher than that of 
the actual cost, as shown by Δ3. However, the optimal trend line levels off whereas 
the actual cost trend line continues to grow and surpassing the optimal line over 
time. This is because in the current situation unforeseen costs impact the project 
(identified as transaction costs in this research). 
4. The cost of the project in the targeted cost line is optimistically planned to be 
lower than the actual cost. While Δ4 is smaller than Δ3, the actual cost is still rising 
whereas the optimistic expectation is that it will level off. The optimal line shows 
that the cost can level off, but at a higher cost (due to greater investment) than 
the optimistic view shown by the target trend line. 
 
While the cost of the project is higher in the optimal cost trend line it delivers a better 
overall cost than the actual progression of current projects. The optimal cost line takes 
into account two important principles of Smart Acquisition: early investment and whole-
life costing. It is also expected that with experience (transaction-specific learning) these of 
the optimal cost plans, the timeline would improve with shorter gaps for the CADMI 
timeline.           
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The research findings are based on a content analysis of seventeen Value for Money 
Reports, using NVivo 8 software (presented in Chapter 7). The results of the quantitative 
analysis provide some interesting indication of the most common topics discussed by the 
NAO in the reports. The most commonly discussed topics were from the risk category, 
which suggests that risk, is a major focus of the reports (shown in Figure 7.1 and 7.3). 
However, the analysis of the risk node provided a difference of understanding as to what 
risk represents in the NAO reports and from academic definition (discussed in section 
8.3.1). 
  
However, the most indicative findings originate from the qualitative content analysis of 
the value for money reports. When applying TCE to the VfM references (in section 7.3) a 
picture of defence transactions is developed. A set of propositions based on TCE theory 
were tested using the qualitative results from the content analysis. The findings of these 
propositions, as applied to the data, provide the basis of the conclusions of this research 
(originating from Chapter 8). 
 
9.2 Conclusions: The UK Defence Acquisition Process 
The reasons why defence projects fail to deliver value for money under the current 
system of acquisition is based mainly because of the confused state in which the MoD 
approaches the defence industry. The MoD’s industrial relations are a mix of a desire to 
work collaboratively with industry and an aggressive competitive pricing policy to drive 
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down defence costs (a policy which has on the whole failed). However, the MoD has been 
unable realise that it is able to achieve value for money by creating a more constructive 
relationship with its prime contractors from the defence industry.  
 
These findings are proven by the TCE analysis applied to the findings of the content 
analysis of VfM reports stretching as far back to 1983 (Trident Project) to reports on more 
recent projects (Type 45 Destroyer). The advantage of having reports ranging over a long 
period of time, some of which have never been analysed by researchers, is that it is 
possible to see the progress within acquisition policy.  
 
The findings are positive in many aspects, in that they indicate that the MoD have the 
right mechanisms in place to create the collaboration it desires with Industry. Smart 
acquisition principles and the IPT mechanism have been identified as key aspects to 
achieving the desire for collaboration and consequently value for money. However, it is 
due to the fact that the MoD have failed to properly utilise the smart acquisition policies 
and IPT engagement that cost and in-service date slippage was common in the early 
2000s. Recently, there have been improvements however I present recommendations 
that the MoD can follow to ensure the IPT mechanism, along with smart acquisition 
principles, can deliver project success.   
 
This research concludes that the MoD needs to strengthen its relational contracting 
mechanisms. The findings of Proposition 1 demonstrate that the bilateral dependency 
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between the MoD and its prime contractors is a consequence of the fundamental 
transformation (i.e. a lack of substitute suppliers).  
 
Prime contractors are able to take advantage of the investments which the MoD provides 
in defence projects to create post-contract asset specificity in the transaction. The MoD 
are then left in a situation where it is locked-in to the supplier due to the high switching 
costs. A bilateral dependency condition then exists because the prime contractor invests 
in the transaction or the relationship, in order to gain pre-contract asset specificity 
advantages for future contracts. 
 
This bilateral dependency creates a long-term transaction relationship between the MoD 
and the Prime. However, the MoD attempts to resist this through policies of pseudo-
competition, contractor shadowing and requirement changes. This does not have the 
desired outcome; rather it creates an adversarial nature to defence transactions.  
 
Projects thus fail to meet the value for money criteria because they are unable to adapt to 
the environmental factors, which create frictions in the transaction. Proposition 2 
supported this theory for Lemma 1, which focussed on the presence of uncertainty, and to 
a lesser extent Lemma 2, the asset specificity of the transaction. The proposition of 
frequency creating project failure, Lemma 3, was rejected; instead it is supposed that the 
learning effects of recurrent transactions leads to greater project success. 
 
 - 481 -  
In Proposition 3 it was proposed that the MoD would respond to project failure, due to 
the transaction-costs, by implementing organisational changes through a governance 
trade-off. The interesting aspect of the findings is that the more recent (smart) projects, 
reported within the last decade, supports the proposition and furthermore has been 
successful in implementing the changes from a traditional market-based approach 
towards bilateral governance, using an IPT organisation mechanism.  
 
The MoD has therefore at the institutional level introduced policies such as smart 
acquisition and prime contracting, which has a long-term focus in its relationship with its 
suppliers. At the governance level, it is clear that a majority, but not all, of the MoD’s 
transactions with its prime contractors follow a bilateral governance approach. At the 
process level there is an attempt to implement mechanisms, which emphasises a 
relational contracting approach to acquisition using the IPT mechanism.  
 
This relational contracting approach, as described by TCE and consequent studies, is 
characterised by a more open relationship between the buyer and supplier, with trust as 
an important contractual safeguard and, communication and collaboration as a focus for 
the working relationship. While there have been some important steps towards following 
this contracting approach, there has been some indications in the analysis to show that 
the MoD has not fully embedded the approach in its acquisition process. 
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Any other organisational approach in what is evidently a bilateral governance mode is 
responsible for the failures, as predicted by TCE, in meeting value for money. Relational 
contracting provides contractual safeguards to reduce the impact of uncertainty and asset 
specificity in the transaction. This allows the MoD and its prime to deliver the projects 
according to the value for money criteria. 
 
Competitive tendering may still be applied rigorously in projects with low asset specific 
investments and larger supply base. The partnering approach is not a one-size fits all 
policy; the MoD’s acquisition team will need to assess the efficacy of competition against 
partnership on a project-by-project basis. However, most major defence projects display 
bilateral dependency acquisition characteristics and rather than enforce unrealistic 
competition, it may be more effective to follow a partnership approach.  
 
If the MoD follow a competitive bidding process, where partnering should be applied, it is 
clear that optimistic and unrealistic contracts will be the result. This has been shown in 
this study, and is based on the effect uncertainty has on contracting, resulting in the 
optimism-bias in defence acquisition. The connection between uncertainty and optimism-
bias has also been shown in a study by Gardner and Moffat (2008). In section 8.3.3 the 
optimism-bias has been described as being a combination of behavioural uncertainty and 
opportunism on the part of the buyer and supplier.  
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The conclusion of this current research is therefore for the MoD and Industry to enter into 
a new era of acquisition policy characterised by strong and effective long-term 
relationships. Some may see this as suggesting a return to the days of the cosy 
relationship; however this would be to misunderstand the advances made in defence 
acquisition over the last few decades. The balance of power in the defence industry is 
more or less equal nowadays between multinational defence companies and a national 
buyer with regulatory powers. There is more to gain through working in collaboration 
than adversarial engagement.  
 
The basis of a relational contracting approach is to foster an ethos of communication, 
collaboration and cooperation. It is also important under this approach that the MoD and 
industry enter flexible contractual agreements, which provide space for unforeseen 
circumstances. The contractual agreements of current defence transactions are too rigid 
and make it difficult to respond to changes without having to renegotiate the contract.  
 
The solution to such difficulties is to allow the IPT to resolve contractual disagreements. 
Since contractual disagreements are usually based on technical factors or exchange 
hazards (IPR and so on), the IPT is best placed to resolve issues of technical difficulties or 
trust issues. The IPT mechanism is important not only due to the co-location of team, but 
also the closer working relationships that it fosters. IPTs are also best placed to implement 
transaction-specific learning in order to learn from retrospective studies of project risks 
and reduce the impact of uncertainties on the project.  
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Incentive-based contracts have the best structure to provide flexibility in contracting. 
However rather than creating penalties where milestones and targets are missed there 
should be an opportunity for the parties to jointly tackle these issues by discussing ways 
to remove these delivery risks through trade-offs, investment in monetary or human 
capital, or bringing in a third party to provide support (technical, consultancy or logistics).   
 
Fixed/Firm price contracting can be applied to support contracts where there are less 
contractual hazards. These should however be contracted not at the procurement phase, 
but as the partners move towards the in-service phase. With relational contracting, it is 
less likely that the hold-up problem would impact the support contract since there is a 
long-term objective in the relationship.    
 
The ultimate contractual safeguard in relational contracting is reputation. Long-term 
partnering provides the defence companies with risk minimisation, increasing their ability 
to survive in the future. They would be risking their future survival if they were to act 
opportunistically for short-term gains.  
 
The MoD might reach a point where it would be willing to look at the defence supply 
chain to promote Small to Medium Enterprises (SME) acting as second-level suppliers, 
where it feels there is irreparable damage to the trust with the long-term partner. 
However if it wants to have this possibility, it needs to improve its industrial strategy, with 
respect to the role SME’s play in the defence market.  
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In turn the MoD would also have an interest in ensuring it does not endanger the 
partnering approach by acting opportunistically. If the MoD were to act in such a way, this 
would return the relationship back to an adversarial one, in which contract disputes and 
project failures are the most likely outcome. It will have to therefore reassess its use of 
some mechanisms it has used in the past, to gain competitive pricing such pseudo-
competitions, contractor shadowing and unnecessary requirement changes.  
 
The MoD should not abandon all other procurement routes in this new policy of relational 
contracting; it should employ PPP arrangements such as PFI (though it needs to design 
better governance arrangements for this procurement type) and international 
collaborations (with NATO or EU allies) where necessary.  
 
Where the MoD wishes to transfer greater risk in specific projects (PFI), or where allied 
capability would benefit from joint-capability (international collaboration), it may be 
appropriate to use a separate procurement route to partnering. However, it is the 
recommendation of this research that in most of its national acquisition, where the MoD 
needs to engage bilaterally with industry, the MoD should follow a relational contracting 
approach.  
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9.3 Recommendations 
Based on the report analysis, the following recommendations are put forward, though primary 
research would be required to make more specific recommendations of changes at the 
process level: 
 The Relationship: entering relational contracting arrangements based on a long-
term partnering approach with Primes (§8.4.2). The MoD needs to create a new 
industrial strategy, which will assess how this new approach will be embedded as 
part of the defence acquisition process. This could be addressed in the long 
awaited follow-up to the Defence Industrial Strategy White Paper. This will look at 
how prime contracts are identified, selected and delivered. It would also be an 
effective medium to communicate the MoD’s desire and commitment to a new 
approach to industrial relations.  
 The Contract: designing and introducing flexible incentive-based targets (§8.2.3). 
The NAO and MoD (with contributions from Industry) should work together to 
identify mechanisms which would improve the flexibility of incentive-based 
contracts. This should focus on how targets and milestones are assigned to 
contracts, and how the MoD can encourage industry to be more open in their 
technical capacity. 
 Conflict Resolution: removing penalties and replacing them with joint-problem 
solving mechanisms which may use third party expertise, in agreement with 
primes, where targets are being missed (§8.4.1). Third party involvement such as 
consultancies, technical experts, and logistic support can provide a useful service 
in dealing with difficulties in major defence projects. By removing penalties and 
replacing them with these problem-solving mechanisms, the focus turns to 
solutions rather than litigation.  
 The Mechanism: continuing to improve and promote the IPT mechanism (§8.4). 
The IPT Mechanism should be supported by having high-level personnel involved 
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from the MoD and Industry. Project managers need to be empowered in their 
decision-making and management of the projects.  
 The People: investing in training and developing its DE&S staff, which are at the 
frontline of acquisition policy and practice (§8.4.3). If the MoD is to realise its aim 
of becoming an ‘intelligent customer’, then it needs to invest in its negotiating and 
technical capacity, especially in its staff. 
 Database of Learning: creating an acquisition database, which IPT members can 
access to gain transaction-specific learning. Some restrictions may have to be in 
place where there may be IPR conflicts (§8.4.3). However, this database can be 
used to learn lessons from past procurement experiences.  
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10 Applications, Limitations and Further Research 
10.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will assess the possible applications of this research, the limitations in the 
research and suggest further research. The application of this research will be discussed in 
the first section, with a focus on the theoretical implications and the practical applications 
of the research. The second section will present the limitations in the research; primarily 
in the lack of empirical research of this study. The opportunities for further research into 
defence acquisition research and TCE will be proposed in the final section of this chapter. 
 
10.2 Applications 
10.2.1 Theoretical Implications 
This research contributes to theory in two ways: First, the research contribution to 
defence acquisition research and second the contributions made to TCE theory. Defence 
acquisition research originates from defence economics, defence acquisition is more 
focused on procurement policy and buyer-supplier relationship prior to- and post- 
procurement.  TCE is well established in economics, with a large literature base and 
empirical research.  
 
Defence acquisition uses economic theory in order to provide a description of defence 
acquisition practice. This research continues the economic emphasis of defence 
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acquisition research and aims to contribute defence acquisition theory. The focus is at the 
microeconomic level, specifically the governance level of defence acquisition. However, 
there are discussions of the effects of the institutional and process levels on the 
governance of defence transactions.  
 
This research applies TCE theory to defence acquisition. Previous research on defence 
acquisition (such as Peck and Scherer (1962) and Williamson (1967)) highlights the 
uniqueness of uncertainty in the contracting process. This research supports this view on 
uncertainty and highlights the effects of the presence of uncertainty in creating 
transaction-costs. The combination of behavioural uncertainty with opportunism has been 
identified as the optimism-bias situation in defence project planning.  
 
The research findings present new knowledge about the reason for the bilateral 
dependency in defence acquisition, on major acquisition programmes. The creation of 
post-contract asset specificity in the transaction is identified as being due to the 
fundamental transformation. Furthermore, the prime contractor can then seek to make 
the contractual engagement long term, due to pre-contract asset specificity which makes 
it difficult for the MoD to seek alternative supplier in consequent transactions.  
 
It is argued that the effective use of relational contracting is key to reducing transaction-
costs in defence acquisition, under conditions of bilateral dependency. Relational 
contracting is a relatively under researched aspect of TCE theory. While there is some 
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research into its theoretical application, there is a gap in empirical research.  The focus of 
this study is on the reasons why it would be a more appropriate form of governance for 
defence transactions. Further research is required to document its effectiveness and use, 
this would require empirical research.  
 
10.2.2 Practical Applications 
In a meeting with the NAO (November 16th 2009) Mr. Banfield explained the desire of the 
NAO to encompass a qualitative approach to the data analysis of their reporting. This 
research provides an example of how long-term reviews in defence (such as Strategic 
Defence Reviews) can be expanded, by collating data from a larger source of data (such as 
MPR, VfM etc.). 
 
The Government has indicated the need for more regular strategic defence reviews, at 
five year intervals. The research method applied in this study may provide an effective 
way of collating, categorising and analysing large documented data.  
 
The use of qualitative software (such as NVivo) and applying content analysis methods 
(such as categorisation, relationship formulation and modelling) could be useful in 
application to a variety of reporting (e.g. MPR, SDR, and VfM reports). The data can be 
presented in a number of formats (charts, graphs and summaries) which make it easier to 
digest for the user and easier to present trends and developments. 
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10.3 Limitations 
The main limitation in this research is the lack of direct contact with the subjects (the 
subjects being the MoD and the prime contractor) in the IPT setting. In the original 
research plan there were provisions to gain access to IPTs in order to make observations, 
conduct interviews and gain feedback through workshops with IPT members. This would 
have provided primary data on the daily activities of IPTs and empirical research on the 
nature of the collaboration in IPTs.  
 
Interviews with IPT members would have provided greater understanding of what the 
individuals’ perspectives of the engagement are. The benefits of this type of fieldwork are 
shown in the findings of Kebede et al. (2009), in which Dr. Maytorena (co-author and 
researcher at NECTISE at the time) was able to identify interesting information and 
opinions from IPT members.  
 
In addressing such limitations it is argued that the NAO reports provide a reliable and 
independent source of information in defence acquisition. However, it is acknowledged 
that greater learning can be gained, specifically at the process level, when the research is 
based on fieldwork engaging with the subject. The limitation of this research is a common 
difficulty of research into security sensitive areas such as defence, where stakeholder 
sponsorship is the best way to gain access. 
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10.4 Further Research 
The economic crisis, which began in the early stages of 2008, has had major consequence 
for public spending. The coalition agreement post-election in the UK outlined public 
spending cuts. SDR2010 highlights the cuts to be made to defence projects and personnel. 
Defence is a popular target for cuts when public spending is scrutinised, especially where 
the public do not perceive eminent threat to the home nations. 
 
The tectonic model (Figure 4.3)  by Winch (2010) highlights that the structural changes at 
the institutional level impacts the actions at the governance and process level and 
consequently changes will emerge to the structures of the levels. Williamson (1998) points 
out that institutional change occur at a frequency of decades (Figure 4.4), and as such the 
impact of the current economic crisis may be evident as soon as 2018. 
 
The challenge of reducing the defence budget deficit will impact the way the MoD 
engages with the defence industry. In my view, it makes the case for a better collaborative 
approach to defence acquisition more immediate. However, it will be interesting to see 
how the MoD will respond to these new challenges. The manner in which the contract 
renegotiations are undertaken for the programmes identified for cuts, will determine the 
way the defence industry will view its relationship with the MoD.   
 
I believe that relational contracting is the best way to deal with the political and economic 
uncertainties in defence. These new challenges, from the academic point of view, 
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provides an opportunity for further research into defence acquisition policy with greater 
focus on the institutional level and its impact on the governance and process levels.  
 
This research requires greater contact with MoD, Treasury and Industry officials for a 
holistic approach to this new acquisition challenge. A longitudinal approach would be 
most appropriate in this study in order to chart the changes in defence spending as a 
consequence of defence cuts, over a period of five to ten years. 
 
Further research into TCE is required in order to strengthen its claim to empirical success. 
There are four specific areas which I feel could benefit from further research, these are: 
behavioural uncertainty, transaction-cost learning, hybrid governance and relational 
contracting.  
 
Behavioural uncertainty has not received as much attention as other types of 
environmental uncertainty. This may be due to the fact that Williamson does not fully 
develop his views on behavioural uncertainty. However, as shown in this research there 
are examples of where uncertainty on the decision-makers’ choices or motives can impact 
the transaction-costs. Specifically, optimism-bias is shown as a function of behavioural 
uncertainty and opportunism where idiosyncratic investments are involved. Further 
research into optimism-bias using a transaction cost perspective is needed to provide 
more concrete findings. 
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Winch (2001) identifies learning as part of the TCE framework and represents it as a 
function of the frequency of the transaction. Learning has been neglected in TCE research, 
as has frequency for that matter. There is a need to provide greater understanding on the 
role frequency and learning play in transaction-costs.  
 
This research has found no support for frequency creating transaction-costs. The reason 
for this, in my view, is due to the transaction-specific learning opportunities in recurrent 
transactions which allow the decision-makers to make informed decisions. The learning in 
transaction-costs differs to those in production-costs (learning curves) or firm-specific 
learning (tacit knowledge); instead it is based on experiential learning.  
 
The analysis of the risk category identified retrospective risk as being a learning-based 
factor. It would be useful to investigate how this retrospective risk can be applied to 
transaction-specific learning in defence acquisition in order to reduce the effects of 
prospective risk (more accurately described as uncertainty). 
 
Hybrid governance was identified by Carter and Hodgson (2006) as being less researched 
than the other governance forms. There are more cases of joint ventures, and other 
alliance types, in more recent times and thus there is currently greater opportunity for 
further research into the hybrid form.  
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The telecommunications and electronic industry is a good example of using hybrid 
governance. Alliances are more common in this industry because of the multifunctional 
nature of entertainment and communication products in consumer markets for mobile 
phones, computers and home entertainment systems. Some companies prefer to 
concentrate on their core competencies and enter alliances in order to produce 
multifunctional products for their consumers. 
 
The UK is looking to privatise its new build capacity in the nuclear sector, to replace the 
current set of nuclear power stations being decommission in the next few years (my 
Masters dissertation was on this subject). In health care there is a proposal from the 
current Government to allow greater involvement of the private sector in the NHS. The 
trend is therefore is in favour of a market approach, however due to the transaction-
specific investments needed in these transactions (especially in the defence and nuclear 
industries); bilateral governance is the favoured governance form from the TCE 
perspective. 
 
Relational contracting has been identified as one of the examples of contractual means for 
bilateral governance relationships. However, there is a need to provide more empirical 
research into relational contracting and other contracting approaches which can be used 
to support bilateral governance. Using primary research, with a combination of 
observation, semi-structure interviews and relationship modelling we can expect more 
rigorous research into the relational contracting approach. 
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12 Appendices 
12.1 Appendix I – Example of References for Defence Acquisition Process Nodes 
Contract Environment 
Inherent complexity of the requirement when CIP was added in 2002, combined to make 
the programme challenging from the outset. And the requirement has evolved and been 
clarified over time against the background of rapidly changing communications in the 
civilian sector. [Bowman CIP] 
 
Contract Negotiations 
Appropriate analysis of demand and usage data is also fundamental to calculating the 
level of repair service required from a Prime Contractor and it is essential to achieving an 
affordable contract price. A lack of robust data has meant that reaching positions from 
which to negotiate availability contracts has been difficult and time consuming. [Logistic 
Support for Fast Jets]  
 
Contract Risk  
We also found that, although the Department chose a ten year contract period which can 
pose risks to value for money in a fast changing sector, they sought to address those risks. 
[Defence Communication Services] 
 
Contract Type 
The Department acknowledge the need to ensure that proposals for specification changes 
are closely controlled if they are to avoid sacrificing the benefits of the fixed price agreed 
with VSEL. [Landing Platforms for Helicopters] 
 
Contracting for Availability 
As the Department moves to contracting for availability its direct relationship with 
second and third tier suppliers will end and the Prime Contractors will take over 
management of the supply chain. [Logistic Support for Fast Jets] 
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Contracting Process 
The Department intended to hold a separate competition for the training package but 
McDonnell Douglas' ownership of the design rights, and the tight timetable made the 
competition unattractive to other bidders. [Apache] 
 
Defence Acquisition Process 
The CNGF and many of its combat equipments will be procured through international 
collaboration with France and Italy, and the overall programme is likely to be one of the 
most complex warship procurements ever undertaken by the Ministry of Defence (the 
Department). When operational, the CNGF will be a very sophisticated and capable 
warship providing an area defence capability. [Common New Generation Frigate] 
 
Delivery Risk 
There are, however, a number of risks both to achieving these dates and to delivering 
the full capability in the longer term. In the short term these include integrating the 
destroyer and PAAMS; and trialling and operating the Combat Management System. The 
Department and industry have taken a number of additional steps to mitigate these risks 
including constructing test facilities for the many elements of PAAMS. [Type 45 
Destroyer] 
 
Fixed Price Contracts 
MOD regard the fixed price obtained for the development and initial production of the 
two weapons as a major achievement and consider that there are other benefits from the 
financial and contractual arrangements agreed with the company. I agree that 
competitively priced contracts are to be preferred to cost plus contracts for development 
and initial production wherever possible to increase incentive to the contractor. [The 
Torpedo Programme] 
 
Frequency 
Since 1954, Lockheed Martin has built more than 2,200 Hercules aircraft, making it the 
most widely used military transport aircraft. It is currently operated by more than 60 of 
the world’s air forces. The aircraft are used for a variety of purposes but primarily for 
movement of personnel and freight. [Hercules]  
 
Incentive-Based Contracts 
The Department devised a robust commercial structure for the DII contract. The structure 
includes contractor shadowing, incremental acquisition and payment on performance to 
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manage the risks of the Programme and drive contractor performance. [Defence 
Information Infrastructure] 
 
Information Transfer Issues 
Certain of the Vanguard facilities, including 9 Dock itself and the cross-site services, were 
completed, as planned, by the end of January 2002. However, this was only achieved after 
the Department agreed to fund extra measures in 2000 to recover a 23-week delay in 
construction. This delay arose, in part, because the Department was late in supplying DML 
with information on the process to be used for the decontamination of the reactors in the 
Vanguard submarines. This information was vital to DML's design of the facilities for the 
decontamination of the submarine's reactor prior to its refuelling. The Department had 
commissioned Rolls Royce to generate this information under a separate contract. 
[Submarine Facilities] 
 
In-House Procurement 
The project was to provide and maintain the Royal Air Force fleet of nearly 2,800 cars, 
light vans and minibuses. Operational control of the vehicles was to be retained in-house 
and short-term spot-hire of vehicles was to remain under existing contracts. [Non-Combat 
Vehicles for the RAF] 
 
In-Service Risk 
To protect against the risks of unacceptable, repair, maintenance and running costs, and 
of reduced availability during ships’ period in service, lifecycle costing procedures and 
reliability/maintainability criteria must be established at an early stage of development. 
This risk has been recognised on the programme for the CNGF by the adoption of 
Integrated Logistic Support principles. [Common New Generation Frigate] 
 
International Collaboration Projects 
Eurofighter 2000 is being developed collaboratively by the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Italy and Spain. [Eurofighter] 
 
Learning 
Because of the similarities between the Astute project and the future submarine class 
which will carry the future nuclear deterrent, the Department needs to ensure that it has 
learnt these lessons of the Astute project and is putting them into action in the new 
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programme. [Nuclear Deterrent Capability] 
 
Monopoly and Monopsony 
The company, now Marconi Underwater Systems Limited (MUSL), is currently in a 
monopoly position for torpedo development and production in the United Kingdom, 
supporting MOD in the three on-going projects referred to above. [The Torpedo 
Programme] 
 
Negotiation Power 
The Department retained the interest of both bidders until they selected BT as preferred 
bidder in November 1996. This was despite BT’s dominance and the fact that the 
Department requested two further bidding rounds after the first Best and Final Offer. 
[Defence Communication Services] 
 
PPP and PFI 
We found that the Department scoped the project in a way that may not have maximised 
the potential benefits and that they did not fully take into account the implications of 
changing the project to a privately financed deal during the competition. We also found 
that, although the Department chose a ten year contract period which can pose risks to 
value for money in a fast changing sector, they sought to address those risks. [Apache] 
 
Risk 
In March 2006, changes were made to the risk management regime. The processes for 
gathering information about key risks have been improved, and the leaders of the 
Programme now take greater ownership of strategic risks. [Defence Information 
Infrastructure] 
 
Selection Process 
To ensure the delivery of these facilities, at the same time as the sale of the dockyard and 
after four years of negotiation, the Department entered into a Prime Contract with DML 
for the design, construction, commissioning and licensing of the facilities in accordance 
with nuclear safety requirements. For its part, to ensure the project's successful delivery, 
DML adopted partnering arrangements with its key sub- contractors. The Department was 
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not part of these arrangements and kept its relationship with DML on a more traditional, 
contract-orientated basis. [Submarine Facilities] 
 
Smart Procurement and Acquisition 
The Defence Logistics Organisation has established Integrated Project Teams and 
introduced a number of initiatives to improve performance but it needs to ensure that 
project teams have the data to manage their businesses effectively. [Helicopter Logistics] 
 
Technical Risk 
Steps were taken to minimise the technical risks to the project. For example, Boeing 
selected Thales Limited to provide its “Top-Deck” digital cockpit which is from the same 
family as the cockpit fitted to the Department’s own A400M transport aircraft and the 
Nimrod MRA4. [Chinook] 
 
Traditional Procurement 
Financial control of major defence projects is based on MOD instructions which take 
account of the principles recommended in the Downey Report in 1966. These have been 
progressively developed to control complex and technically advanced projects throughout 
defined stages of their development, and to provide reliable estimates of costs as a basis 
for decisions on further work. [Trident Project] 
 
Uncertainty and Complexity 
Inherent complexity of the requirement when CIP was added in 2002, combined to make 
the programme challenging from the outset. And the requirement has evolved and been 
clarified over time against the background of rapidly changing communications in the 
civilian sector. [Bowman CIP] 
 
12.2 Appendix II – NECTISE Poster 
Poster Title: Defence Acquisition Process for NEC: Transaction Governance within 
Integrated Project Teams.  
 
Presented: 21
st
 January 2009 at the University of Loughborough. 
 
Event:  Mid-Term Review of NECTISE 
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 Challenges
 Understanding how collaboration is engendered in 
IPTs
 Investigating the effect of contract design on 
collaboration 
 What are the processes involved in IPTs
 Approach
 Transaction Governance 
 Value Statement
Collaboration is an important element of NEC, not only on the operational level, but also on the 
capability acquisition level. Using the transaction governance model we aim to identify the 
appropriate approach to a collaborative defence acquisition process. 
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